NOTES ON RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

BY

Gopinath Kaviraj

EDITED BY

GAURINATH SASTRI

Sampurnanand Sanskrit University Varanasi

THE PRINCESS OF WALES
SARASVATI BHAVANA STUDIES
(Reprint Series No. 8)

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[Published under the Rare Texts Publication Scheme of Sarasvati Bhavana Library with the financial assistance provided by University Grants Commission]

Published by :
Lakshmi Narayan Tiwari
Librarian,
Sarasvati Bhavana Library
Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya
Varanasi.

Available at —
Sales Department,
Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya
Varanasi-221002 (India).

First Edition-1100 Copies
Price : Rs 50.00

Printed by--
Ghan Shyam Upadhyaya
Manager,
Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya Press
Varanasi.

PREFACE

We are privileged to present before the academic world the reprint of the twelve volumes of the famous "The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies" published between the years 1922 and 1945 under the authority of the Government of the United Provinces with Dr. Ganganatha Jha as its first editor. We are thankful to the University Grants Commission for releasing adequate funds for the publication.

The present editor takes upon himself the responsibility of reprinting the volumes according to a principle convenient and commendable to readers by putting together in one separate book the several avticles from the pen of a single writer published serially in successive volumes on the subject. To mention, Mm. Gaṅgānātha Jhā's 'Studies in Hindu Law' and Mm. Gopīnātha Kavirāja's 'The History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature', which appeared in Vols. I-IV and VI and Vols. III-V and VII respectively are printed in two separate books. The foot-notes in the original volumes are collected here at the end, the text mentioning their numbers serially And, indices which will enable scholars to consult those portions of the text where they occur, have been inserted.

Mm. Gopīnātha Kavirāja's articles in this volume (Reprint Series No. 3) contain 24 articles of which the last one is his masterly English translation and annotation on the first cluster of Udayana's Nyāya-kusumāñjali. We are giving below the reference to the articles as were published in the different volumes of the Original Series :

I.	The View-point of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy	Vol. 1, pp. 27-45
II.	Nirmāṇa-kāya	Vol. 1, pp. 47-58
III.	Paraśurāma Miśra *alias* Vāṇī Rasāla Rāya	Vol. 2, pp. 1-4
IV.	A new Bhakti Sūtra (Bhakti-mīmaṁsā)	Vol. 2, pp. 65-81
V.	The System of Cakras according to Go-akṣanātha	Vol. 2 pp. 83-92
VI.	Some aspects of the history and doctrines of the Nathas	Vol. 6, pp. 19-43
VII.	Theism in Ancient India	Vol. 2, pp. 93-111 & Vol. 3, pp. 67-77
VIII.	Some aspeets of Vīra Saiva Philosophy :	Vol. 2, pp. 137-158
IX.	Sondala Upādhyāya	Vol. 2, pp. 199-200
X.	The Problem of Causality : Sāṅkhya-Yoga View	Vol. 4, pp. 125-151
XI.	The date of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī	Vol. 7, pp. 177-182
XII.	Mysticism in Veda	Vol. 8, pp. 185-189

XIII. Gleanings from Tantras.
The Ten Mahāvidyās Vol. 7, pp, 167–175

XIV. The Philosophy of Tripurā
Tantra Vol. 9, Sec. II,pp. 85-98

XV. Notes on Pāśupata Philoso-
phy Vol. 9, Sec. II, pp. 99-106

XVI. Some aspects of the Philosophy
of Śākta Tantra Vol. 10,pp. 21-29

XVII. The life of a Yogin Vol. 9, Sec. I pp. 1–15

XVIII. The conception of Physical
and Super-physical Organism
in Sanskrit Literature Vol. 10, pp. 1--20

XIX The Mīmāṁsā Manuscripts
in the Government Sanskrit
Library (Benares)
[Informative of Important
Authors and their works] Vol. 6, pp. 165--196

XX Some variants in the Readings
of the Vaiṣesika Sūtras Vol. 7, pp. 71--76

XXI. A short note on Tattvasamāsa Vol. 10 pp. 30--34

XXII. Descriptive notes on Sanskrit
Manuscripts Vol. 7 pp. 183–192

XXIII. Notes and Queries
[1] Virgin Worship Vol. 5, pp. 193–195
[2] Author of Prapañcasāra Vol. 6. pp. 197--198

XXIV. Nyāya-kusumānjali
(English translation) Vol. 2. pp. 159--191

The title of the book, 'Notes on Religion and Philosophy' has been devised in conformity with the

nature of the various articles collected in this single volume

It is difficult for me to attempt an assessment on the quality and usefulness of the articles that come from the pen of a savant of his stature and eminence. His was a versatile genius who was destined to revel in any branch of Indian and European philosophy. And we, who had the opportunity to sit at his feet for decades could only feel how he could express himself with ease and precision . It seemed that his was not an intellectual make up; in him intellect and intution had a rare fusion.

I feel very happy to be associated with this University once again to see this important work printed in a book-form. The task of editing is indeed very difficult. And in this cotext I must appreciate the invaluable service rendered by our Librarian, Shri Lakshmi Narayan Tiwari in seeing the book through the press and preparing the indices. Services of my Personal Assistant, Shri Saligram Yadav, in this regard are thankfully acknowledged.

Gaurinath Sastr

8th September, 1983

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NOTES ON RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

THE-VIEW POINT OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

The origin of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy, as of all schools in India, is involved in great obscurity. It is not known when and under what circumstances these schools came to assume their present form, but, it may be supposed that before they took a definite shape with a solidity and distinctive character of their own, the ideas and views represented by them had been for a long time in a floating condition, though in wide vogue. These ideas and theories had not perhaps been the special property of any particular school—and in all likelihood no school had yet existed—but, they had been the common patrimony of all thoughtful minds; and it is possible that they were subsequently assimilated and utilised by the various religio-philosophical sects of the pre-Buddhistic and Buddhistic ages. A study of the early Pali and Prakrit literature in general, and of Dr. Schrader's learned tract "über den stand etc." in particular, would seem to countenance this conjecture. In the Kathāvatthu, for instance, we find much which we can recognise at once to be in common with the accepted truisms of Sāṅkhya-Yoga, e.g., the germs of *Satkāryavāda* etc. etc.

So, it is very probable that if we at all allow ourselves in the present state of our ignorance the liberty of seeking for origins we should expect them in a certain measure, so far as the leading ideas are concerned, in the religious speculations of early India. That Nyāya and

Vaiśeṣika were in their inception affiliated to (at any rate coloured by) Śaiva cult, as Sāṅkhya to Vaiṣṇavism, seems likely enough.[1] Haribhadra, author of Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, distinctly says that Śiva was the object of worship among the Naiyāyikas[2]; and Rājaśekhara characterises Nyāya system as 'Śaiva Darśana' in his own work on the subject. Similarly the Vaiśeṣikas, too, being the worshippers of Paśupati, a form of Śiva, were known as Pāśupatas.[3] If we remember this fact we shall better understand certain features of these combined systems.

But, this religious element was not all. Even in metaphysics, psychology and logic the two systems are closely connected and present a community of form, so much so that it is hard to distinguish for a modern analyst or Paṇḍita one from the other. Indeed the two may be said to represent two complementary phases of fundamentally one and the same body of thought. What this attitude exactly was, it is not possible to determine within the brief compass of the present paper.[4] For in order to understand a system properly it is necessary not only to set it in its true perspective, but,to study it from various points of view and under different relations. Nevertheless, it is desirable to say just a few words by way of introduction concerning the aims and methods of this philosophy and the meaning of philosophy in general in India.

In India philosophy, especially in its earlier and truer form, was intended to serve a practical purpose. Bare speculation is invariably condemned as waste of energy, in as much as it leads nowhere; speculation is deemed blind without the guiding light which Revelation or Higher Perception alone can furnish. Thus, the premises from which Reason has to draw its inferences are naturally beyond its own reach and stand outside of

itself. Reason is by nature impotent and cannot in any wise overstep its data. It is not creative nor intuitive; its function is interpretation of facts. Its ultimate resort is, therefore, nothing short of Direct Experience. But, as human experience is limited in its scope and is liable to error the experience on which our reasoning is based must be conceived as infinite and free from all the defects incidental to erring humanity. This infinite experience is embodied in the Revealed Scriptures. Reason, unaided by the light of this revelation, would be a groper in the dark and would never be able to discover the truth which is incapable of analysis and synthesis. To the general Indian philosopher, therefore, seeking to build up his individual system of thought on the bed-rock of supra-rational illumination contained in the Vedas or Āgamas, much in the same fashion as to the schoolmen of Mediaeval Europe[5], reason is subservient to faith. "Believe and then know"—**श्रद्धावान् लभते ज्ञानम्**—this seems to be the motto of Indian philosophy.

Thus, in the general scheme of a man's inner culture the study of philosophy is given a secondary, though a necessary, place : **"आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः—श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः"।**

"श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः ।
मत्वा च सततं ध्येय एते दर्शनहेतवः"॥

This implies that the ultimate source of true knowledge is revelation, but, as the facts of revelation cannot be accepted without any questioning in the present state of our life we have to study them with the help of reason. As soon as it is brought home to us that these facts are quite possible and not irrational, the function of reason as a factor of our culture is fulfilled. For, this function is

simply to beget a notion of possibility (*Sambhāvanā-buddhi*) in regard to a certain proposition, and not of its certainty. Certitude can never be reached by the intellectual faculties (cf. तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्, etc. etc.). That is, it is the bane of all intellectual processes, however subtle and cautious, that they involve self-contradictions. To be a thinker, without committing oneself to the antinomies of thought, is impossible. It is for this reason that whatever a thesis may be it is not difficult to find a sufficient reason for supporting it. Consequently, the intellectual processes have to be supplemented by processes of personal realisation, viz., concentration and abstraction.

In other words, the general enunciations of the Scriptures which are in the form of categorical propositions are sufficient in themselves, as coming from an infallible source, to carry conviction; but, if the mind of the hearer be not free from the disturbing factors of doubt (*asambhāvanā*) and perversion (*viparītabhāvanā*), it will not receive the truth. The process of rational demonstration (*manana*), which is implied in all philosophy, aims at removing this element of doubt[6] and producing a belief that the proposition as laid down in the Scriptures is likely enough. But, even at this stage the seed of uncertainty is not wholly gone; the root of all error (*viparītabhāvanā*) still remaining, illumination of consciousness resulting in the Vision of Truth cannot of course follow. Yoga (*Nididhyāsana*) or the process of psychic discipline has, therefore, to be resorted to as capable, by holding in abeyance the phenomena of mental life altogether, of bringing about this transcendental Vision or Intuition (*sākṣātkāra*) of Truth.[7]

Philosohy, if rightly understood, is then only ap step in the cultivation of a man's life. To be at all fruitful it must work in subordination to, i. e., on the data supplied by, revelation. Else it is apt to run astray.[8]

This being so, it is easy to understand how different systems of philosophy, apparently conflicting with and subversive of one another, originate. The Highest Truth, which lends itself to the light of supra-mental Intuition, is indeed one and indivisible; but, it appears in diverse forms when looked at from diverse points of view corresponding to the capacities and tastes of the individual *Sādhakas*. So long as the individualised consciousness asserts itself—so long as we are unable to dispense with 'mind' as an organ of knowledge—it is vain to hope for the attainment of the Absolute Truth. Relative or partial truth is all that can be reached by human reason. And these relative or fragmentary truths, or aspects of the Absolute Truth, are held to be the immediate ends of the different systems of philosophy. They represent varying stages in the ascending order of the *Sādhaka*'s journey in quest of self-realisation. When pieced together and studied in the light of the resultant whole, they will present a sublime picture of synthesis, fraught with deep significance and interest to humanity. This is an indirect and veiled picture; but, it is the grandest within the reach of our mind.

One word remains to be noted. The piecing together or co-ordination of the systems is possible, simply because there is at bottom a real Unity. For, all the systems pledge unconditional allegiance to Revelation. It is in their mode of interpreting the Scriptures, determined by the capacities of the people for whom they are meant, that the systems vary. Even the Buddhist and

Jain philosophies accept in their own ways the necessity of this.

This Unity, of which Revelation is an expression, is transcendental. The *Ṛṣis*—the Sages and the Illuminati split up by an apparent process of self-division this Unity into concepts of symbolical knowledge, arranged them in a certain grade of increasing purity and laid them before the intellectual faculties to play with. If rightly pursued, these will result in a wonderful clarification of the intellect, when the 'mind' will cease to work and vanish. On the bare soul Truth will then dawn as a flash of lightning, dispelling all doubts and uncertainties.

This is the secret of what is technically called *adhikārabheda*, which means that every man is not capable of receiving every form of truth. The faculty of understanding developes gradually, and, in the course of this development, truths which once seemed unintelligible and vague begin to assume a depth of meaning and are accepted. It is thus that the folly of one age is turned into wisdom in another. So with countries and individuals. It is believed that the *Karmans*—the forces and tendencies accumulated from the actions of the past ages and building up the 'lower personality'—stand in the way of man's knowledge of Reality. As soon as these impediments are gone, either worked out through their natural reaction on the mental life or destroyed by knowledge or Yoga, the obscure truths are at once illuminated. Thus, there are degrees in the receptivity of the mind which the Teacher has to recognise if he wants his instructions to be understood and acted upon. This idea finds excellent expression in the following statement of the Bodhicittavivaraṇa :—

"देशना लोकनाथानां सत्त्वाशयवशानुगाः ।
भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोक उपायैर्बहुभिः पुनः ॥
गम्भीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा ।
भिन्नापि देशनाऽभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा" ॥

This is from a work on Mahāyānic philosophy. The same appears also in an even more precise form, in the words of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who is rightly reckoned as one of the greatest philosophers of India in the last millenium. Referring to the apparently conflicting views of the differen *Ācāryas* he observes :

" न हि ते मुनयो भ्रान्ताः सर्वज्ञत्वात् तेषाम् । किन्तु बहिर्विषय-प्रवणानामापाततः परमपुरुषार्थे प्रवेशो न भवतीति नास्तिक्यनिवारणाय तैः प्रकारभेदाः प्रदर्शिताः" ।

From what has been said it is apparent that there is a real order in the systems of Indian Philosophy which a close study is able to discover. The synthetic consciousness to which such an order reveals itself has ever been recognised in India. In the Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka[9], in the Ātmatattvaviveka[10],and in the Prasthānabheda[11] of Mahimnaḥstotra an attempt has already been made in this direction. The Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya[12] explicitly states that the different views of Reality, which the different philosophies present, are but fragments of the One Supreme Vision. Vijñānabhikṣu and Nīlakaṇṭha,in several places emphasise, each from his own point of view, on the mutual and supplementary relations existing among the various schools of thought. It is immaterial in this context, however, to discuss how far the different schemes of synthesis are agreeable among themselves. This is merely to point out that there is a real spirit of unity, of Aim as much as of Methods, among the diversities of thought and activity according to Indian philosophers.

II

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy is generally conceived by the synthetic critics to stand on the lowest rung of this ladder, so far as the present orthodox systems are concerned. Before proceeding to discuss, as we propose to do in a subsequent paper, in what points the two systems differ from each other it may be well, for purposes of elucidation, to take note of the close affinity existing between them. A brief outline of this combined philosophy and a statement of the rationale of its metaphysics, may, therefore, be of some use for a proper understanding of the systems as a whole and determining their point of view.

In the first place, and at the root of all, we may note the belief that there is a close correspondence between the order of our ideas and the order of extramental reality to which it testifies. The two orders stand to each other in a certain relation of causal sequence—whatever is present to consciousness has, therefore, an objective ground of reality. It is independent of consciousness in so far as its existence is prior to the existence of, and is a condition of the possibility of, the phenomena of our mental life. It may be an object of immediate perception where such a perception is possible, or else its notion may be arrived at by an indirect process of abstract reasoning or by some other valid sources of knowledge. Idea (*Pratīti*) being a symbol of and verbal usage (*vyavahāra*) being based on reality, is assumed to be an index of its existence.[13]

When we look upon the phenomena of change the question naturally presents itself—whence these changes and how do they come about ? The problem is difficult and admits of a variety of solutions according as we approach it from various standpoints, but, to the Naiyāyika, starting from the data of his common consciousness, the question of origin and destruction is involved in deep obscurity. It is believed that the observed contingency of phenomena implies that a product comes into existence which had not existed before and that when destroyed it is reduced to nothing. Before origination and after destruction the product has no entity whatsoever. But, the matter is relatively permanent, being the unalterable substance in which the product arises, in which it resides during its term of existence and in which it is destroyed. Relatively speaking the cause is *nitya* and the effect is *anitya.*

So the individual product is a mystery in creation—nay, production itself is an inexplicable enigma. The Universal *(sāmānya)* is already there, so is the Matter; but, what determines the emergence of a particular form in this matter which stands on one hand for the manifestation of the appropriate Universal and on the other for the origin of the individual in which the Universal is apprehended ? The *asatkārya* theory is supposed to be a reaction on the part of the Naiyāyika against the doctrines of Universal Flux and of Universal Void of the Buddhists. But, the Naiyāyika in his turn has not succeeded in avoding the perils of abrupt recoil.

For clearing up the position I now take up the question of Causality[14] as it has been discussed in these schools. It is assumed, in opposition to the theories of some of the Buddhist scholars, as a fact of common

experience, that nothing comes out of nothing and that pure negation is unproductive. The production of an effect implies a change of condition or movement which presupposes the presence of two factors, one passive which receives and the other active which imparts the transitive movement.

The passive element is the material or constitutive cause of the product and is relatively permanent. It is invariably a substance, positive in character. The active factor known as the operative, efficient or instrumental cause acts upon the product either directly or by virtue of its presence. It is in the latter sense only that the Causality of Divine Will, Time, Space, etc., has to be conceived. In both cases the efficient cause is an extrinsic (*bāhya*) factor in the production and bears no intimate relation to the effect concerned. This formal duality in the causal principle is of course everywhere recognised, but, the Naiyāyika insists, under the exigencies of his fundamental position, that this analysis is not complete. Besides, the two classes mentioned there is a distinct kind of Cause called *asamavāyī* which is neither material nor even wholly extrinsic. Thus, for instance, when two parts are brought together resulting in the production of a whole the conjunction of the parts is as much a cause of the product as the parts themselves. Similarly, in making a blue te ture the blue colour of the material is a causal antecedent to the blue colour of the product. It is maintained that every positive product comes into existence under the influence of this threefold cause. Negation as a product, i. e., destruction, requires only a *nimitta* and nothing more.

Being an ardent advocate of the doctrine of *asatkāryavāda* which is necessitated by his assumption of

common sense view of reality, the Naiyāyika finds it indispensable to maintain an absolute distinction (*atyanta-bheda*) between the material cause and the effect which is produced from it. The relation which holds between the two is neither *abheda* nor even *tādātmya*, but, an Intimate Union (Inherence, *samavāya*) of one with the other. It is a mysterious relation.

But, what is the driving factor which compels the Naiyāyika to assume the doctrine of *asatkārya* ? Does it not do violence to our belief in Persistence and Continuity ? Why is it found necessary to posit *prāgabhāva* as a precondition (a general *nimitta*) in all production ? To this the Naiyāyika replies that to confine ourselves to the records of our usual experience we are bound to assume by the very laws of our thought the necessity of *prāgabhāva* as such a condition of production. But, this does not amount to a denial of a Principle of Persistence altogether, for the doctrine of Conservation of Matter is an essential feature of its philosophy. The Naiyāyika, as much as the Sāṅkhya, admits that Primary Matter is eternal. The four kinds of atomic substances, viz., earth, etc. and *ākāśa* persist through eternity (like time, space, *manas* and self). Being without any parts or component members they have neither a beginning nor an end. It is only the compounds of the first four substances (*kārya-bhūta*) as well as some qualities and all actions which are produced and destroyed: भूतोच्छेदानुपपत्तेः.[15] It is pointed out that though forms (*saṁsthāna*) may change, matter as such remains constant; being eternal it is capable neither of increase nor of diminution. Form, which is nothing, but, a collocation of parts (*avayava-sanniveśa*), is conceived as a quality inhering in matter. The appearance and disappearance of forms is bound up with,

being logically considered as antecedents of, the origin and destruction of individuals, for origin and dissolution, so far as the substances are concerned, are synonymous with aggregation and separation of parts.

Thus, in this view though the individual is perishable (*dhvaṁsa-pratiyogī*), the Universal is eternal. What the individual is in Sāṅkhya, the Universal is from this standpoint in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The Universal is revealed by a definite arrangement of the parts of the body, for though it is by nature eternal and free from spatial limitations, such is the nature of things (*svabhāva*) that it inheres and manifests itself in those individuals only whose component parts are fixed in a particular spatial order. Though present everywhere it is not so perceived. It enters as a predicate in our judgment. No further question is here admissible : we are dealing with an ultimate fact incapable of further analysis.[16] In this system (as much as in Sāṅkhya) it is, therefore, naturally assumed that before the commencement of the Causal operation there is something already given, viz., the Universal (or the Individual).[17]

So then we find that before the appearance of a particular Cosmic Order we have to presuppose the existence of Primary Matter, which in this school is understood as partly atomic, e. g., the first 4 elements and partly ubiquitous, e. g., *ākāśa*, of the Principles of Time and Space and of the Universals. These atoms, which till now have been in a loose and free state (*pravibhaktāḥ*)[18] are set in motion by a certain influence and begin to group themselves into different forms.

But, what is this influence which imparts the initial motion to the atomic matter without and to the atomic *manas* within ? The problem is extremely complicated. The atoms and the *manas* being inert by nature have to be moved from without. The Self in itself cannot be a source of motion, for it is a continuum. The only active principle, if there could at all be anything deserving of this name, in this system, is *adṛṣṭa* which resides as a specific quality in the Self. It is maintained that when the Self, charged with this *adṛṣṭa*, comes in contact with the atoms the latter are impelled to action. The occasion for such contact is determined by the maturity of *adṛṣṭa* which is effected by the passage of Time. But, *adṛṣṭa* in itself, as being a link in the chain of causation, cannot be a final and adequate explanation of the origin of motion. The ascription of causality in this case to the human will (मानुषीय-प्रयत्न) is out of the point. The human will, in so far as it is a product, is occasional, i.e., an event in time and is itself derermined by *adṛṣṭa*. As a result of this analysis, therefore, our system finds compelled to reject both the hypotheses as ultimate solution. We have, it is urged, in the last resort to fall back on the Divine Will (ईश्वरीय-प्रयत्न), which being eternal is not determined by anything external to it and requires no further explanation. This is what in the scholastic language we may designate as the doctrine of the Divine Concursus.

The origin of Motion is, therefore, to be explained by the operation of the Divine Will in the first place and by that of the human will (मानुषीय-प्रयत्न) and of mechanical necessity implied in previous *karma* in the second. All the principles work concurrently though prominence is given in all theistic philosophy to the Will of God

without which nothing can be actuated. The process of the formation of organic and inorganic bodies is a question to which we cannot advert here,[19] but, it may just be noted that the same *karma* which brings about a contact between the self and the *manas* is also instrumental in bringing together the atoms so as to form different collocations capable of exhibiting a variety of specific characters. In other words the *manas* and the material particles are stirred into activity by one and the same force conceived as a quality present in the self. The external world, including the organism, is held to be a field for the experiences of pleasure and pain resulting by way of natural reaction from the *Karma*-forces of the past, and, has only a moral value. Apart from *karma*, i. e., from the standpoint of the liberated self, wrapped in the glory of its Isolation, the existence of the world and of its life is without any significance. Hence, the same moral End (viz , *bhoga*) which occasions the rise of subjective phenomena acts also as a motive for the origin of the objective order.

A word or two may be useful in connection with this vexed queston of *adṛṣṭa* or *karma*. Uniformity of Nature and the Principle of Causality are invariably assumed[20]. That is, whatever comes into being is supposed to do so from an adequate Cause. Granting this it remains to take note of the facts of pleasure and pain and justify their existence. Evidently they must be traced to distinctive causes which cannot be extrinsic or *bhūta-niṣṭha* as the materialists (*Laukāyatikāḥ*) would contend. The same external object is the source of pleasure to one and of pain to another, causes pleasure to a man at one time and pain to the same man at another time. These differences of experiences have, therefore,

to be explained on intrinsic grounds. That is to say, once assuming that pleasure and pain, which are facts of mental life and belong to the Self, are occasioned by causes also belonging to and existing in the same Self, the question becomes simplified. The conclusion becomes then irresistible that these causes are of the nature of tendencies or subconscious forces resulting from conscious efforts in the past and lying dormant in the Self. They lie dormant-unseen-for a definite period of time proportionate to the intensity of the strain originally put forth. They are then released, so to say, and, give rise to pleausre and pain, indeed to the whole panorama of phenomenal existence. For the world itself, as already mentioned, is justifiable only on moral grounds as the field wherein the Self has to work out its destinies. It can have no other meaning.

The materialists, who rejected the efficiency of *Karma*, explained that a living organism (*śarīra*), just like an inorganic substance (*mūrttī*), is produced from matter under purely mechanical influences. The assumption of *Karma* is declared unnecessary. But, the Naiyāyika remarks that while the mechanical causes are indeed admissible they do not go very far ; they are subject to the operation of a governing principle of Justice or Moral Retribution in the world. The mechanical theory is open to several objections : (1) The analogy of inorganic substances is ill-founded, for there is no evidence testifying to the fortuitous character of their origin. (2) On the contrary, the origin of organic bodies is known from experience to follow generally (e. g., in the case of sexually-generated bodies) from the fusion of two principles, male and female (viz., *Retaḥ* and *Lohita*), but; this involves previous *Karma*—

both of the person to be born and of the parents—capable of bringing about the fusion. And, even where such a fusion is not a necessary pre-condition, as in the case of the *ayonija* (not-sexually-generated) bodies of (i) *devas*, *ṛṣis* on one hand and (ii) of the Infusoria, etc., on the other, the action of *Karma* is held to be indispensable. To explain : The immediate material which enters into the constitution of all organism (whether *ayonija* or *yonija*) is the atomic substances, but, the efficient cause, viz., the unseen agency of differentiation or the factor which determines their varieties(i.e., the different forms of organic structure), is *Karma*. The former is passive, but, it yields to the impulse communicated to it by the latter, the active principle, and, takes on a corresponding form. Unless the agency of such an unseen principle be admitted it seems hard to explain how the same primordial cells which are uniform in character and do not exhibit the slightest indications of difference either in physical or psychical activities should gradually evolve themselves into different organisms altogether.

Karma is conceived as bringing about a twofold union—(a) the aggregation of the atoms resulting in the production of the body, and (b) the union of the particular Self, in which it inheres as a quality with this body. These two actions are indeed not two different actions, but, rather two complementary phases of the same action and are simultaneous. For the body being considered to be the vehicle of *bhoga*, and, *bhoga* explained as the experience of pleasure and pain (सुखदुःखसंवित्ति), it is apparent that its relation to the Self is already implied. To clear up : the same *Karma* which resides in a particular Self creates for it by a process of atomic combination (अणुसंघात) its vehicle of experiences. If this be not

conceded a great difficulty would follow. That is to say, if it is supposed that the efficient cause of body (i.e., *Karma*) does not pertain to the Selves severally, i.e., is not *pratyātma-niyata*, the problem arises—why should one individual Self experience his pleausres and pains through one body, and through that alone, rather than through any other ? Since all the Selves are by nature omnipresent and related to all bodies alike what determines the sense of possession (स्वस्वामिभाव, भोक्तृभोग्यभाव, ममत्व) in regard to a particular Self and a particular body as expressed in the judgment—'this body is mine' ? It is a universally admitted fact that such a restriction (*niyama*) of personal experience really exists—one cannot enjoy or suffer in another's body.[21] Hence, there must be a ground of this restriction. This is *Karma*.

From what has been said above it follows that *Karma* is the force which helps to build up a particular body and unite it (and the *manas*) to the Self to which it attaches, so that it lies at the root of the entire phenomena of mundane existence. The assumption of bodies and senses, not once, but, through a beginningless series of births, is the only means by which the experience of pleasure and pain is possible, for a disembodied soul is free from pleasure and pain—in fact from every form of mental life, e. g., cognition, desire, volition, etc. Now, for one who wants to be rid of pain and consequently of mental life, including what is popularly esteemed as pleasure—and pleasure not preceded and accompanied by pain is not possible[22] —the one thing needful is to destroy the accumulated force of *Karma*, this destruction alone being capable of leading to a discarnate state.

But, what is it that can destroy *Karma* ? To this question one has to answer by asking a cross question,

viz., what is it that produces *Karma* or rather makes its origin a possibility ? All the systems of Indian Philosophy agree in the main in replying to both these questions. They hold, irrespective of the individual standpoint from which each of them looks at Reality, that Ignorance leads to *Karma* or makes it productive, while Knowledge serves to destroy it or to sterilise its forces. Let us confine ourselves to the special views of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Ignorance is said to consist in thinking that the Self is *kartā* and *bhoktā* and that it is identical with the body and senses or at least is their owner. True knowledge enables the Self to realise that in itself, as dissociated from the action of the specific qualities which inhere in it under the influence of *adṛṣṭa* during its term of embodied life, it is absolutely pure and indifferent (स्वरूपतश्चाहमुदासीनः). It reveals the truth that all real agency or efficiency belongs to the Lord and that man is, and considers himself to be, an efficient cause in so far as he identifies himself, though falsely and unknowingly, with the Lord. This false sense of efficiency (*Kartṛtva-bodha*) on the part of man, which is necessitated for the working out of his past *Karma*,[23] disappears with the disruption of *Karma* by the fire of Knowledge, so that in reality (*paramārthataḥ*) the human soul is not a free agent (*kartā*) nor even a patient (*bhoktā*), but, is neutral (*udāsīna*). The notion that the soul is active or passive springs only from ignorance or misapprehension of its real character.[24]

II. NIRMĀṆAKĀYA

I

The word *Nirmāṇakāya* occurs in the text of the Kusumāñjali.[25] The meaning of the term being obscure different commentators have proposed different interpretations upon it. But, it seems that the true import remains still to be determined.

Haridāsa's exposition of the term as 'निर्माणार्थं कायः' is hardly more than a mere conjecture. Varadarāja and Guṇānanda's explanations[26] too are not quite clear and fail to bring out the precise and original significance of the word.

Apparently the word does not belong to the stock of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, and, the passage in the Kusumāñjali referred to above does not represent the views of the Naiyāyikas at all. But, it must be plainly understood that the conception was a common property of all the ancient philosophical systems of India. In the Yogadarśana, for instance, the word is interpreted as a body or a series of bodies assumed at will by a *Yogin* who has risen above the so-called laws of nature and learnt to command its secret forces. In the Mahāyānic Buddhism also the word bears practically a similar sense. As for the reason why and the manner how God, the *Yogin* or the Buddha takes on such a body, different answers may of course be given from different points of view, but, they are ultimately resolved into the same position.

Thus, (a) in an aphorism attributed to Pañcaśikha[27] we find it stated, in connection with the revelation of Sāṅkhya-Yoga, that Kapila, the first Enlightened One (*Ādi-vidvān*), created a Mind, hence called *Nirmāṇa citta*, and, through its medium declared the saving knowledge to the enquiring Āsuri. The motive in this case is explicitly mentioned to be his deep compassion (*kāruṇya*) on the pains of mundane existence. It is believed that whenever the human soul feels itself sorely in need, a response comes from the higher worlds. To teach Wisdom and the Way to Liberation to erring humanity, the *Siddhas* may, if they so choose, take on a material form, before plunging into the Eternal Quiescence of *Kaivalya*.

(b) So, in Mahāyāna Buddhism also the object of Buddha's assuming a *Nirmāṇakāya* is said to be the service of entire creation (*sattvārtha*). Vasubandhu in his Commentary on Asaṅga's Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra[28] plainly characterises such a body as contributive to *parārtha-sampatti* in contradistinction from the *Sambhogakāya* which is purely, though in its highest sense, of a personal character (*svārtha-sampatti-lakṣaṇa*). This distinction reminds one of the contrast sometimes drawn in the later literature between the *Līlā-deha* and the *Māyā-deha* of the Supreme Divinity. The one is, in terms of Vaiṣṇava philosophy, *aprākṛta*, supra-natural, while the other is a natural—a material (whether subtle or gross) incarnation (*avatāra*) assumed in response to the needs of the human soul.

(c) Similarly in the Nyāya system, though the word *Nirmāṇakāya* is doubtless absent, the fact of God's investing Himself with a material form from time to time

is admitted throughout without a question. In the second chapter of the Kusumāñjali Udayana says that in the beginning of a particular cycle God assumes a material body to serve as Teacher for the guidance of the newly-created world,[29] much in the same manner as a magician induces and presides over, by the mere effort of his will, the movements of the puppets. This power of God is called *Māyā* and *Vibhūti*. In the 5th chapter of the same book he adds that not in the beginning of creation only, but, whenever the assumption of such a form is necessary, He assumes it and displays His powers :

"गृह्णाति हि ईश्वरोऽपि कार्यवशात् शरीरमन्तरान्तरा, दर्शयति च विभूतिमिति"।[30]

Now, it is useless to enquire whether He builds a new body and then enters into it or enters into a body already in existence (i. e., a natural body, or as Vācaspati Miśra calls it **स्वभावनिर्मित-शरीर**) in the manner known as **भूतावेश-न्याय**, for both amount to the same thing,[31] since even in the latter case (*āveśa*) the Person already in possession of the body has to be stripped (permanently or provisionally) of his personality (i. e., must be rendered passive), before his body can be employed as an instrument for any definite purpose.

(d) So in Śaṅkara's system. He plainly says :"**स्यात् परमेश्वरस्यापीच्छावशान्मायामयं रूपं साधकानुग्रहार्थम्**".[32] Like the Supreme God the liberated (but not yet unified) souls too have a similar power.

From the above one fact stands out clear, viz., that what is usually called *Nirmāṇakāya* is generally resorted to by the Exalted Ones for the sake of teaching mankind. It is primarily the Body of the Supreme Teacher. This will make intelligible the Buddhist belief according to

which Gautama is represented as the *Nirmāṇakāya* of the transcendental Buddha in the *Tuṣita* heaven—a point which is quite in consonance with his character as the *Guru* of humanity.[33] The Buddha is known elsewhere to have created such a body (a "double" as it were, or "a likeness of himself" as Kern puts it[34]) during his stay at Śrāvastī and through this body expounded the *Abhidharma* to his mother Māyā who was in heaven.

But that *Nirmāṇakāya* may be taken on other occasions also need not be gainsaid. Thus--

(a) The *Yogins* are known to create simultaneously a number of such bodies of various kinds and work out through them the remnants of their past *Karma* after the attainment of Self-knowledge. This simultaneous group of bodies dominated by one Central Will called *Prayojaka-citta* is technically known as *Kāya-vyūha*.

Vātsyāyana refers to this fact in the following interesting passage :

"योगी खलु ऋद्धौ प्रादुर्भूतायां विकरणधर्मा निर्माय सेन्द्रियाणि शरीरान्तराणि तेषु तेषु युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलभते"।[35]

So does Udayana in the Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi.[36]

(b) The miraculous story of Saubhari may be cited as another well-known instance of *Kāya-vyūha*. The legend runs that *Ṛṣi* Saubhari built simultaneously (*aparyāyeṇa*) 50 similar bodies for himself, and, with each enjoyed the company of each of the 50 daughters of King Māndhātā.[37]

(c) In the Commentary on Ved. Sūt. 1.3.27 Śaṅkara urges that the *devas*, too, like the *Yogins*, have the similar

power of simultaneous self-multiplication, so that the same *devatā* may appear, with what is apparently the same body, in different places (i.e., sacrifices) at one and the same time :

"एकस्यापि देवतात्मनः युगपदनेकस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तिः सम्भवति । .. स्मृतिरपि ..... प्राप्ताणिमाद्यैश्वर्याणां योगिनामपि युगपदनेकशरीरयोगं दर्शयति । किमु वक्तव्यमाजानसिद्धानां देवानाम् । अनेकरूपप्रतिपत्तिसम्भवाच्च एकैका देवता बहुभी रूपैरात्मानं प्रविभज्य बहुषु यागेषु युगपदङ्गभावं गच्छतीति"।

(d) In the Bhāgavata[38] when describing the *Rāsalīlā*, it is said that Kṛṣṇa multiplied himself into as many Forms as there were Gopīs :

"कृत्वा तावन्तमात्मानं यावतीर्गोपयोषितः ।
रेमे स भगवांस्ताभिरात्मारामोऽपि लीलया"॥[39]

The Bengal Vaiṣṇavas call this manifestation by the name of *Prakāśa*.[40]

II

As to how this may be possible Vācaspati Miśra offers a few words of explanation. He says that the body of the *devas* is not born of parental union, but, that it is produced directly from the elements which are acted on and set into collocation by the power of Will. The vision of the *devas*, who are described as *ājāna-siddha*, is not obscured by the distance of time or space or by other limitations. Their knowledge is always of the nature of direct presentation extending equally to all time and to all space. And, this **उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञान** being present, there is nothing to prevent such bodies being formed by a natural process. The *devas* being *bhūtajayins* fit material is always responsive to their will.[41]

What is said of the *devas* in the above could be said with equal propriety of the powerful *Yogins*. But, in the Yoga system itself the process of this body-formation is somewhat differently explained[42]. It is there pointed out [43] how the *Yogin* projects on one hand a desired number of personalities and on the other a Supreme Personality (*Prayojaka-citta*) to direct them to his will—all from the stuff of pure Egoity (*asmitā*).[44]

The bodies which he brings into existence are subject immediately to these personalities and ultimately to the Supreme Person, which is but another name for his Created (and Creative) Will.[45] The projection, maintenance and withdrawal of these multiple personalities and bodies are entirely a matter of his choice, so that they cannot in any way affect the absoluteness of his freedom.

In the orthodox systems as a rule the *Nirmāṇakāya* is said to be produced from some pre-existing matter, viz., atoms or *Prakṛti*. The miraculous or supernormal element, if there could be such a thing, lies only in the efficient factor—the incalculable potency of the Yogic Will. I say'as a rule', because there are systems where according to their special viewpoint, this restriction is not deemed necessary. In the Vedānta, for example, which teaches the identity of *nimitta* and *upādāna*, the need for such pre-existing matter is not recognised. The existence of *Māyā* as an independent entity being denied, the stuff of the *Nirmāṇakāya*, viz., *Māyā*, would indeed be the very Self at whose will the body as such manifests itself. From the phenomenal standpoint the substratum of the body is indeed *Māyā*, but, in reality it is nothing but the Spirit, pure and undefiled. The difference between *pariṇāmyupādāna* and *vivartopādāna* is only empirical. The

Pratyabhijñā system of Kashmirian Śaiva Philosophy is more precise and explicit on the point. Abhinava Gupta definitely says that Divine or Yogic creation does not stand in need of any pre-existing material. It comes forth as the spontaneous expression of the Free Will of the Self.[46]

And, the Mādhyamika Buddhist also rejects the necessity of assuming pre-existing matter. Consistently with his doctrine of Universal Void he holds that such a body, as everything else in creation, is a product from the Void and is, therefore, identical with it, being devoid of all reality. It is a mere apparition without an underlying substance. It differs from the normal bodies, exactly as the orthodox systems hold, in so far as it comes into and disappears from being through the conscious effort of the *nirmāṇa-citta* (which itself is a creation from the Void); and, is entirely free from the compelling influence of *adṛṣṭa* or *karma*.[47]

Thus, the *Nirmāṇakāya*, though real to the empiric consciousness, is yet nothing more in its usual acceptation than a mere phantom, an illusory appearance, from the Divine or Buddha's (or *Yogin's*) point of view. It manifests itself before the phenomenal world for a limited time to serve some definite end and having finished its self-imposed task vanishes into the Fulness (or Void) of the Transcendental Realms. The doctrine of *Avatāra*, in its different forms, is in a sense an aspect of this wider view about the *Nirmāṇakāya*. In the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata we find that the Body which Nārada beheld of the Lord Nārāyaṇa in Śvetadvīpa was only a "phantom-body", and, not His Essence, and, as such could be pronounced to be a case of *Nirmāṇakāya* :

"एतत्त्वया न विज्ञेयं रूपवानिति दृश्यसे ।
माया ह्येषा मया सृष्टा यन्मां पश्यसि नारद" (माया = निर्माण) ॥[48]

So in the Gītā it is said that the birth, body and movements of the Lord are super-natural (*divya*)—a statement which may lend itself to a double interpretation : viz., either that these are created and phantasmal (*nirmāṇa*), and, appear as real only through the Lord's *Māyā* or that these are eternal and real, as the mediaeval Vaiṣṇavas so strongly insisted.

The whole question is indeed of great interest, though highly complicated; and, especially so when it is studied in its relation to the allied scheme of *Rūpas* including *Vilāsas* and *Svāṁsas*, *Prakāśas*, *Āveśas* and *Avatāras* of the Vaiṣṇava philosophers and to the doctrine of Emanations (*vyūha*) in general.[49]

At any rate the doctrine of *Nirmāṇakāya*, as in the early Indian systems (e.g., Buddhism, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, etc.,), was in a certain sense docetic in colouring. But, it must be remembered at the same time that the opposite view, too, was not wanting even at the outset.

III

The doctrine, if not exactly the term, is very old, and, the germs of both may be found in the famous Ṛgveda *Mantra* : "इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते"[50], where the magical self-multiplicative power of the Lord (Indra) is clearly indicated. I fail to see any justification, therefore, in the view usually held attributing to Aśvaghoṣa the credit of inventing the theory of *Nirmāṇakāya*. Besides, Pañcaśikha's lost Yogasūtra, which Vyāsa quotes and to which reference is made above, contains an open

declaration of this particular doctrine. That Pañcaśikha had been a very ancient Sāṅkhya authority even in the days of Aśvaghoṣa (100 A. D.) may be taken for granted. Indian tradition invariably makes Pañcaśikha the third *Sāṅkhyācārya* in order from Kapila; Jaigīṣavya and others being comparatively recent. In the Buddhacarita[51] Aśvaghoṣa refers to Jaigīṣavya as one of the ancient Sāṅkhya teachers whose views were represented by Alāḍa Kālāma, the scholar to whom Buddha repaired in search of wisdom; and, if Pañcaśikha is earlier than Jaigīṣavya, he must be considered as belonging certainly to the pre-Buddhistic age.[52]

Of course this does not preclude the possibility that Aśvaghoṣa gave to the doctrine of *Nirmāṇa* a prominence in the popular mind, and even a tinge, which it had lacked in the earlier centuries, but, it does not seem that he was its original propounder.

The meaning of the term *Nirmāṇakāya* is now practically established. It shows that the word *Nirmāṇa* has not in this phrase its later and ordinary sense of "natural formation". It implied in the ancient literature the notion of the miraculous, self-multiplicative or multi-formative power of the Adepts—a notion which seems to have been well nigh forgotten in the subsequent ages. While explaining the term *Nirmāṇarati*, the name of a class of *devas*,[53] Nīlakaṇṭha rightly brings out the old and peculiar sense of *nirmāṇa* when he notes "**निर्माणमनेकधाभवनं योगेनानेकशरीणधारणम्**".[54]

Haridāsa seems to be wrong, therefore, in expounding the phrase as "**निर्माणार्थं कायः**". The word, as in this phrase, is an adjective rather than a verbal noun, and,

means literally "contrived by magic, brought forth in an extraordinary manner". Even when used as a substantive it stands for an object, usually a body, which is so contrived (निर्मीयत इति निर्माणः). The Divyāvadāna[55] and Vasubandhu's Commentary on Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra[56] illustrate the use of the terms *nirmāṇa* and *Nirmāṇakāya* in this sense.[57]

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III. PARAŚURĀMA MIŚRA *ALIAS* VANĪ RĀSĀLA RĀYA

It is well known that some of the Moghul Emperors and even some minor Mahomedan kings of India were great patrons of Sanskrit Learning. They encouraged Sanskrit poets, philosophers and men of science, and, in several cases went so far as to get Sanskrit works translated into Persian. Some of these are known to have signified their appreciation of these men of letters by conferring titles upon them.

Kavīndrācārya Sarasvatī of Benares was the object of such royal honours. It is related in the Gādhivaṁśānucarita how he went to Delhi, at the head of a large deputation of Paṇḍitas, in order to get the oppressive pilgrim tax rescinded; how he succeeded by means of his eloquent advocacy in carrying the whole Imperial Court with him and persuading the learned audience as well as the Emperor Shah Jehan himself as to the strength and justice of his cause, and, how ultimately he secured his triumph not only by abolition of the tax, but, also by obtaining from the Emperor the distinguished title of Sarvavidyānidhāna, literally "the repository of all sciences." Kavīndrācārya was in possession of a huge collection of Sanskrit Mss.,[58] and, we still find on the cover of each and every work belonging to this collection, his name and the title obtained from the Moghul Emperor written in bold and beautiful character.

The great Jagannātha, whose Rasagaṅgādhara and Bhāminīvilāsa have earned for him an immortal renown in the history of Sanskrit Poetry and Rhetoric, was another protege of the same Emperor and the recipient of

similar distinctions. The title of *Paṇḍitarāja* by which this author is more generally known to the posterity is also supposed to have been received from the same source.

It appears that of all the Moghul Emperors, many of whom were patrons of Sanskrit Learning, none was so fond of conferring titles on worthy scholars as Shah Jehan. In the course of my examination of Manuscript collections I have come across a very interesting work which records incidentally the history of another scholar appreciated by the same Emperor in the same fashion. I am speaking of Paraśurāma-prakāśa (fols. 1-170; and 171-293), a work on Dharmaśāstra in two sections (viz., *Ācāra Ullāsa* and *Śrāddha Ullāsa*), by one Khaṇḍe Rāya Paṇḍita, son of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita of the famous Dharmādhikāri family of Benares. The Ms. is dated in Saṁvat 1697 (=1640 A. D.). The work was written at the request of one Paraśurāma Miśra (whence its name), the scholar whose name stands at the top of the present paper and whose brilliant parts were recognised by the Emperor Shah Jehan.

As regards the parentage, etc., of Paraśurāma all that we find recorded in this work is that he was the son of Horila Miśra and grandson of Sūryākara, a Śākadvīpī Brāhmaṇa of the Parāśara *gotra*, ruling over the city of 'Yamunāpura'. This city was the home of many brave warriors and excelled in all the arts of luxury. Sūryākara was a devotee of Viṣṇu, but, his son Horila used always to be surrounded by a band of *Brahmacārins* and *Sannyāsins*. He was a man of stern morality, and, the work in question describes him as 'समुत्पादितधर्मसेतुः'—an epithet which may mean either that he was the author of a work named "Dharmasetu" or more probably that he brought about a religious revival among his subjects who had in

all likelihood forsaken; or become lax in, the observance of their traditional *ācāra* under the influence of Mahomedan domination.

Paraśurāma was a religious man, learned and generous. He is said to have been the author of ritualistic tracts on Vedic and Smārta works (श्रुतिस्मृतिविधानकृत्). But, none of these tracts are known by name. He was a brilliant controversialist (उद्दण्डवादप्रखरतरवचोवीचिवादीन्द्रजेता) and a keen student of fine arts (चञ्चत्कलानामध्येता). But, above all he had the wonderful gift of writing charming and graceful poems—an art of which he was a professed master and which brought him renown from the Imperial Court. For it is said, he won, by reason of his sweet speech, the title of *Vāṇī Rasāla Rāya* from the Emperor of Delhi, evidently Shah Jehan :

"वाणीरसालरायेति पदवीं मानपूर्वकम् ।
स्ववाङ्माधुर्यसन्तुष्टात् सार्वभौमादवाप यः" ॥

The occasion on which the title was conferred upon him is not definitely known. But, we read in this connection :

"सोत्कण्ठं यस्य वाणीं विबुधपतिसुधाजित्वरीं पावनीं तां
श्रुत्वा ढिल्लीमरुत्वान् मनसि गुरुमदं प्राप तापं जहौ च ।
या गन्धर्वैस्त्रिलोक्यां सदसि सुमनसां गीयते स्तूयतेऽज्ञैः
पृथ्वीपालार्त्तिहन्ता जगति विजयते रायवाणीरसालः"॥

This shows that the Emperor of Delhi had been once deeply in sorrow, when the sweet and holy music of Paraśurāma's rolling poetry brought solace to his heart and elevated his spirits. When could it be ? Was it on the death of the Emperor's beloved Begum Mumtaz ? If it was, the historic interest of the document which in itself is beyond question would be very great indeed.

Since the obtaining of the title, Paraśurāma appears to have been better known by this new name.

There is an anthology of Sanskrit poems, treating of various subjects and composed by a variety of authors—compiled by one Caturbhuja. The work is named Rasa-kalpadruma and exists in manuscript in the library of His Highness the Mahārāja of Ulwar[59]. It contains a verse, beginning with "रूपे मदन समानो," attributed to Vaṇī Rasāla. I have no doubt that this Vāṇī Rasāla is no other than Paraśurāma Miśra. References to Kavīndra and Vidyānidhi, both being the shortened forms of the name of Sarvavidyānidhāna Kavindrācārya Sarasvatī, are to be found in the same work, showing that the author lived after the reign of the Emperor Shah Jehan, whose contemporaries both Kavīndra and Vāṇī Rasāla had been. And, the author himself gives 1785 (Saṁvat ?), 'बाणाशषिशशाङ्कांङ्के', as the date of the composition of his anthology. This is equivalent to 1728 A. D. But, if *āśā* is taken to mean 4 instead of 8, as it is not likely,[60] the year must be understood to refer to Śaka Era, in which case it would correspond to 1823 A. D. (1745 + 78). Anyhow the priority of Vāṇī Rasāla to Caturbhuja being easily established, the fact of Caturbhuja's quotation from Vāṇī Rasāla need not strike one as an anomaly.

IV. A NEW BHAKTI SŪTRA

(BHAKTI-MĪMĀṂSĀ)

In the history of Bhakti Literature two works only are known to have come down to us in the form of *Sūtras*, viz., one ascribed to Śāṇḍilya and the other to Nāradā. That there were other *Sūtras* in existence is beyond any doubt. Śāṇḍilya himself refers to Kāśyapa and Bādarāyaṇa (2. 1.29-30) as representing two extreme views in regard to the relation between God and Self and to the nature of right knowledge. As to whether these *Ācāryas* were the authors of Bhakti Sūtras or only of Brahma Sūtras, as the latter is known to have been, is not quite clear; but, it is highly probable that both Kāśyapa and Bādarāyaṇa were eminent teachers of Bhakti cult, though Svapneśvara has tried to read in the Śāṇḍilya Sūtra 2.1.30 a reflection of Brahma Sūtra 4.1.3. Nārada refers to Pārāśarya and Garga in addition to Śāṇḍilya, and, their respective theories concerning the essence of Bhakti (16-18). This Pārāśarya may or may not have been identical with Bādarāyaṇa.[१] In other contexts we read of Uddhava, etc., as apparently expositors of *Bhakti-śāstra*.

But, none of these works are available now. The *sūtras* of Śāṇḍilya and Nārada have been the only works in that form so long known to us. It is, therefore, of great interest to find a new *Sūtra* work devoted to a clear exposition of the Bhakti cult. The book is named Bhakti-mīmāṁsā and had been found in a private Ms. collection

owned by a Mahārāṣṭrī Paṇḍita of Benares. We reproduce it below in full, prefixing a few words by way of comments on its contents.

The work is complete in four chapters, with two *pādas* in each, and, consists of 103 aphoristic sayings. The Ms. contains at the end a gloss called Bhakta-kaṇṭhābharaṇa by one Raghunātha. It is unfortunately in a fragmentry condition, extending only to a part of the second *pāda* of the first chapter. The name of the author of the *sūtras* does not appear. It is a sad omission and we are unable to ascertain whether the work is really one of those associated with the names of the *Ācāryas* whose references are often met with in Sanskrit Literature. But, it is clear that it belongs to a school of thought distinct from those of Śāṇḍilya and Nārada, though in certain features similarity among them is also unmistakeable.

It is evident from *sūtra* 4.1.7 that the author represents the views of the Bhāgavata sect; and, this is further corroborated by the fact that the work bears a close resemblance to Bopadeva's Muktāphala[62], which is based directly upon the Bhāgavata. Śāṇḍilya, however, is associated with the Pāñcarātra sect; so is Nārada.

Bhakti is described in this work as a kind of *ullāsa* of the mind (1.1.2) which being of the nature of *rasa* is eternal and is an end in itself. From this it is evident that Bhakti as thus conceived is different from what it is made out to be in some of the *Alaṅkāra* treatises, where, e.g., in Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa, it is openly characterised as a *bhāva*, implying that it is debarred by its very nature from rising up in intensity to the aesthetic level of *rasa*. In the history of *Alaṅkāra* and Bhakti literature,

there is no lack of evidence to show that Bhakti is not unoften recognised as a *rasa* rather than a *bhāva*. The names of works like the Bhakti-rasāyana of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and the Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu of Śrī Rūpa Gosvāmī, to speak only of two out of a number, are sufficient by themselves to establish the fact that this conception of Bhakti was in favour with many of the mediaeval mystics, especially of the Vaiṣṇava order, of India. The literature of the Vallabhācārya school agrees in the main with that of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas on this question. The author of our tract also makes it perfectly clear, saying that the reason why Bhakti should be regarded as a *rasa* and not as a *bhāva* is that it arises, i. e., is manifested,[63] like other *rasas*, from the same causal assemblage (1.1.1-2). And, hence true Bhakti, being of the nature of *rasa*, is not a means to an end, but, an end in itself. It is only in a figurative and indirect sense (*gauṇa*) that the so-called *Sādhana-bhakti* may be named Bhakti at all (1.2.7).

Acyuta Rāya in his Sāhityasāra[64] refers to the two rival theories regarding the nature of Bhakti, viz.,(a) the one connected with the school of Śāṇḍilya and his followers who claim it as a *rasa*, and, (b) the other expounded by Mammaṭa, Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha and other rhetoricians who consider it to be a kind of *bhāva*. In reconciling the two views he observes that both are right. Thus, we learn from the Gītā[65], he says, that Primary Bhakti is synonymous with *Jīvanmukti*; and, this is confirmed by Vidyāraṇya's statement in the Jīvanmuktiviveka : "**जीवनमुक्तः स्थितप्रज्ञो विष्णुभक्तश्च कथ्यते**". Consequently it may be placed under the category of *Śānta-rasa*, so that its rejection by the *Alaṁkāra* writers as a distinct *rasa* is easily explained. But, the devotional

literature accepts it as a distinct *rasa* in view of the fact that it is a kind of *Vṛtti* with the one Universal Self as its object. This of course represents a slightly different standpoint. Really speaking, therefore, there is no inherent contradiction between the views of the devotees and those of the rhetoricians. As the commentator points out—Bhakti is twofold, primary and secondary. To the rhetorician the primary Bhakti is identical with *Śānta-rasa* and the secondary one is merely a *bhāva*. To the devotee on the other hand *Śānta* itself falls under the category of Bhakti and primary Bhakti is essentially a *rasa*.

The result of pure Bhakti, or more properly its invariable concomitant, is the attraction of God (ईश्वर-वशीकार),[66] and, not cessation of Evil (अनर्थनिवृत्ति), nor even *Jīvanmukti*. (4.1.16). The *sūtra* (4.1.6) makes it plain that *Mokṣa* is not according to the Bhāgavatas an object of human striving. The highest object which a devotee keeps in view is Bhakti itself and not absence of misery or freedom from pain (4.1.7),[67] both of which he would regard as enlightened forms of selfishness.

It follows, then, that our tract is in a sense more allied to Nārada's school than to Śāṇḍilya's. Nārada's outlook on Bhakti is practically similar in so far as he calls it '*amṛta*' or '*ānanda*' in its essence (3) and describes it plainly as end in itself (30). Nārada openly repudiates the view, apparently the same as we find in Śāṇḍilya (5&84), which holds that Bhakti proceeds from *Jñāna* and leads to *Mokṣa*. The other view that Bhakti is a means to *Jñāna* which causes *Mokṣa* is of course out of question in Bhakti literature.

The rejection of *Mokṣa* as the Supreme End of human aspirations follows as a necessary corrollary from the conception of Bhakti as in itself the Highest Form of Bliss, higher indeed—so it is boldly declared—than *Brahmānanda* which is revealed in *Mokṣa*. This view is ascribed to the Bhāgavatas.

The Haribhakti-sudhodaya says—

"त्वत्साक्षात्करणाह्लादविशुद्धाब्धिस्थितस्य मे।
सुखानि गोष्पदायन्ते ब्राह्माण्यपि[68] जगद्गुरो"॥

The Śrīmad-bhāgavata is full of evidences in support of the view that Bhakti constitutes in its form of Love Divine, the Supreme Happiness, before which even the Joy of *Mokṣa* pales into insignificance. In the Nārada-pāñcarātra we have the explicit statement that Bhakti is the Empress and that all the *siddhis*, including *Mokṣa* and *Bhoga*, are as it were its attendant slaves.[69]

It is thus clear that the realisation of this Supreme object helps one inevitably in rising above the reach of Pain and Misery of mundane existence—a state after which every seeker after *Mokṣa* really aspires. To one who has attained to the heights of Divine Love, pain becomes a stranger, even as darkness ceases to obscure the vision of one who is in the presence of light.


Next, the classification of Bhakti. From the foregoing it is abundantly clear that in the truest (i. e., primary, *mukhya*) sense of the word Bhakti is unique and hence is incapable of classification. But, from the empiric point of view a double classification has been attempted in the *sūtras*, and, this is in conformity with the teachings of the Bhāgavata as summed up in the Muktāphala :

A. (a) *Nirguṇabhakti.*


(b) *Saguṇabhakti.* This is described as ninefold (1. 2. 2) according to the number of persons enjoying. Each of these again is of three kinds and may be arranged in a scale varying in degrees of intensity or rather extensity (*samāsa* and *vyāsa*), comparable to (i) a drop (*viprut*), (ii) a river (*nadī*), and (iii) the Ocean (*samudra*). Of these three, each may be looked at from a double viewpoint, according as the state persists for a short while (अल्पकालावच्छिन्न) or continues long.

B. The second classification is a verbatim reproduction from the Muktāphala, with some omissions. For facility of comparision we append below in the form of tables both the schemes :—

(A) The Scheme of Muktāphala :—



(B) The Scheme of the Ms. of Bhaktimīmāṁsā-sūtra :—



It may be noted by way of elucidation that *śuddhā* or pure Bhakti alone is Bhakti *par excellence*, while the rest—the remaining forms of devotion, are so many stepping stones leading up to and finding their fruition in it. To this Bopadeva gives the name of *Bhakti-yoga* proper, adding that it is by this that one can pass beyond the action of the three *guṇas* and become one with God (*madbhāva*). It is described as absolutely selfless and free from the slightest touch of motive (*ahetukī*) and as unceasing (अव्यवहिता, निरन्तरा). Such *Bhaktas*, blessed with the joy of pure (*śuddhā*) Bhakti, look down with unconcern on the joys of all kinds of *Mokṣa*, nay even that of unification (*ekatva*), with the Lord, and, do not accept them when offered.

From a glance at the above tables it would appear that the two schemes are identical, so far as the forms of *vihita-bhakti* are concerned. The four varieties of *niṣiddha-bhakti* have not been recognised in table (b), but, they are referred to in the *sūtras* (2.2.7-8), where it is distinctly stated that they do not deserve the name of Bhakti in as much as they are not a means to pure Bhakti. *Kāma* and *sneha* lead only to the secondary Bhakti, which itself is a means (*sādhana*) to pure Bhakti; and, on this account they bear a close analogy to *Karma*. *Dveṣa* and *bhaya* do not lead to the secondary Bhakti either.[7 ō]

भक्तिमीमांसा

श्रीबदरीनाथो जयति

प्रथमाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. अथातो भक्तिजिज्ञासा ।१।
२. भक्तिर्मनस उल्लासविशेषः ।२।
३. भाव एवेयमित्येके [71] ।३।
४. रसस्तु तत्सामग्रीत उत्पत्तेः[72] ।४।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

५. स द्विविधो निर्गुणः सगुणश्च ।१।
६. अन्त्यो नवविधो भोक्तृभेदात्[73] ।२।
७. नवविधश्चैषः पुराणादिषु[74] ।३।
८. समासव्यासाभ्यां स पुनस्त्रिविधो विप्रुषनदी समुद्रश्च पूर्व-पूर्वाभ्यासात् ।४।
९. तद्भेदोऽल्पकालाऽवच्छेदाऽनवच्छेदाभ्याम् ।५।
१०. जातिभेदो वा ।६।
११. साधनेषु भक्तिशब्दो गौण आयुर्घृतमितिवत् ।७।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे प्रथमाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः । समाप्तिश्च ।

द्वितीयाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१२. भक्तिर्न जन्या रसो हि सा ।१।
१३. नाऽऽगमविरोधात् ।२।
१४. भक्तियोगो बहुविधः पुराणेषु ।३।

१५. स द्विविधः शुद्धो मिश्रश्च ।४।
१६. मिश्रस्त्रिविधः कर्मज्ञानतदुभयमिश्रणात् ।५।
१७. आद्यस्य न विधा कर्मज्ञानविरोधात् ।६।
१८. परिपाकापरिपाकावपीतरभेदाविति चेन्नाऽवस्थाभेदौ हि तौ।७।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१९. त्रिविधः कर्ममिश्रः सात्त्विकादिभेदेन[75] ।१।
२०. सात्त्विकस्त्रिविधः कर्मक्षयविष्ण्वर्पणविधिसिद्ध्यर्थभेदेन[76] ।२।
२१. तथा राजसो विषयाद्यभिसन्धिभेदात्[77] ।३।
२२. एवं तामसो हिंसादिफलभेदात्[78] ।४।
२३. ज्ञानमिश्रस्त्वेक एव[79] ।५।
२४. उभयमिश्रश्च त्रिविध उत्तममध्यमप्राकृतभेदेन सत्त्वतारतम्यात्[80] ।६।
२५. कामादयोऽपीति चेन्नाऽऽद्याऽन्त्ययोः साधनं हि फलं न भक्तिः कर्म्मवत्[81] ।७।
२६. मध्यमयोर्न साधनमति[82] ।८।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः । समाप्तिश्च ॥

तृतीयाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

२७. सर्वे भक्तियोगोऽविशेषात् ।१।
२८. त्रिवर्गो वा तस्यैव भक्तिसम्बन्धात् ।२।
२९. यथाश्रुतीति चेन्न भक्तिवैषम्यात् ।३।
३०. अपि वा विलम्बाऽविलम्बाभ्यां तदुभयोपपत्तेः ।४।
३१. श्रवणमेव वा सर्वत्र सामर्थ्यसव्यपेक्षो हि विधिः ।५।
३२. स्मरणमपि वा ।६।
३३. उत्तरोत्तरस्मिन् पूर्वः पूर्वश्च ।७।
३४. समुच्चयस्त्वङ्गभावेऽपि ।८।
३५. न चैष विधिर्हेतुनिर्देशात् ।९।
३६. विधिश्चेन्नित्यः स्यात् ।१०।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे तृतीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

३७. इतराणि तदङ्गानि ।१।
३८. सर्वैः सर्वाण्यविशेषात् प्रयुज्यन्ते ।२।
३९. बिन्दुना वाद्यानि लौकिकतुल्यसामग्रीको हि सः ।३।
४०. इतराणि तु द्वाभ्याम् ।४।
४१. आरादुपकारीण्यप्येवमिति चेत् ।५।
४२. नोच्छिद्यतैव हि नदी ।६।
४३. पादसेवादिकमप्यङ्गं भयद्वेषवतोस्तदनुत्पत्तेः ।७।
४४. नेह प्रधानानिष्पत्तेः ।८।
४५. अपि चोद्दीपकाऽभावाल्लौकिकवत् ।९।
४६. सङ्गीतशब्दश्रवणमपि प्रधानं भक्तिकामश्रुतेः ।१०।
४७. न शब्दप्रधानत्वात् ।११।
४८. गानञ्च स्वकर्तृकम् ।१२।
४९. सङ्गाने नास्ति नियमः ।१३।
५०. पर एव वा गायति, अप्रयोज्यं हि तत्तमेवेति श्रुतेः ।१४।
५१. श्रवणन्तु भक्तमुखतोऽतिशयहेतुः श्रुतेरनुभवाच्च ।१५।
५२. सप्तमवर्गोक्ता आद्यवर्गप्रधानस्यापि वाक्यसंयोगात् ।१६।
५३. अपि वा नाम्नातवृद्धिधर्म्मकस्य द्विस्तयापत्तेः ।१७।
५४. न च लक्षणा प्रधानधर्मवित्ततिरल्पधर्म्मकत्वात् ।१८।
५५. अपूर्वं वाऽऽम्नातधर्मकत्वात् ।१९।
५६. नाऽन्यानर्थक्यं फलतारतम्यादधिकारिभेदाच्च ।२०।
५७. सप्तमवर्गोक्ता इहापि ।२१।
५८. कीर्तनं पुनरुक्तं स्यादिति चेन्न भिन्नं ह्येतत् ।२२।
५९. एतेन षष्ठवर्गश्रवणं व्याख्यातम् ।२३।
६०. सप्तमवर्गीयास्तु न तत्र यमनियमोपदेशात् ।२४।
६१. सङ्कीर्तनं नाम्नां सुस्वरेण सम्बन्धिगानम् ।२५।
६२. नवं लक्षणादौ कीर्तनं शब्दसंस्कारकम् ।२६।
६३. नमस्कारमात्राङ्गकं च क्वचिच्छ्रवणम् ।२७।
६४. अनुपदेशे फलं स्वर्गः स्यात् ।२८।
६५. भक्तिर्वानर्थो हि सः ।२९।
६६. लिङ्गाच्च ।३०।
६७. षाष्ठवर्गिकप्रकृतिकमिदं साप्तवर्गिकधर्मकं वा न वा पुनरुपदेशात् ।३१।

६८. नमस्कारोपदेश एवायमिति चेन्नानेकगुणश्रुतेः ।३२।
६९. क्वचित्तु केवलं स्मरणं तदप्येवमेव ।३३।
७०. एतयोरत्युत्तमाधिकारिकत्वम् ।३४।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे तृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः । समाप्तिश्च ।

चतुर्थाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

७१. भक्तेः फलमीश्वरवशीकारः[४३] ।१।
७२. अनर्थनिवृत्तिरित्येके ।२।
७३. तन्न विनाऽपि पुरुषप्रयत्नं निवृत्तेः ।३।
७४. जीवन्मुक्तिः फलं नैष्कर्म्यमपीति श्रुतेः ।४।
७५. नैवमपि बाधितनिवृत्तेः पुरुषानुपेयत्वात् ।५।
७६. उक्तदोषाच्च ।६।
७७. भक्तिरेव परमः पुरुषार्थो मोक्षस्याऽपुरुषार्थत्वादिति तु भागवताः ।७।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे चतुर्थाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

७८. तानि च भक्तेः श्रूयन्ते हि ।१।
७९. नानानभिसंहितानि हि भक्तिर्हि साधनम् ।२।
८०. अविशेषाच्चयमिति चेत् ।३।
८१. न समुद्रस्तद्वशीकरणविरोधात् ।४।
८२. अन्ययोरपि न त्व तत्कालेन तद्विरोधादिति चेत् नैवं प्रागुत्तरं वा तत्सम्भवात् ।५।
८३. भक्त्या मामभिजानातीति चतुर्थीसाधनमधित्येत्याचार्याः ।६।
८४. नदी वा ।७।
८५. मध्यमोत्तमयोर्वशीकारः परिग्रहस्तु त्रयाणाम् ।८।
८६. भक्तिर्नार्थो विनाशयोगाज्जन्यभावो हि ।९।
८७. न हेतुर्जन्यत्ववदप्रयोजकत्वात् ।१०।
८८. अवच्छेदवत्त्वेनाऽश्रुतेश्च ।११।
८९. ध्वंसकादृष्टाभावाच्च ।१२।

९०. मनोनाशात्तन्नाशश्चेत्तथापि नानर्थ इष्टनाशाननुभवात् ।१३।
९१. सामर्थ्यमर्थिता विद्यावाधिकारिविशेषणं नान्यदश्रुतेः ।१४।
९२. चतुर्णामेवेतरेषां विद्याविरहात् ।१५।
९३. पापनाशसाधनत्वं सर्वेषामिति चेत् ।१६।
९४. न विद्याद्यपेक्षानपेक्षाभ्यां विशेषात् ।१७।
९५. निरङ्गत्वाच्च तस्य तत्र ।१८।
९६. अपि वाऽन्येषामपि श्रवणात् ।१९।
९७. विद्या कथमिति चेद् गुरूपदेशादितः ।२०।
९८. पूर्वमीमांसासिद्धान्त एवं सति व्याप्ये [बाध्ये०] तेति चेत् ।२१।
९९. नाध्ययनविधितोऽधिकारनिर्णयो हि तत्र ।२२।
१००. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।२३।
१०१. उपलभ्यते च ।२४।
१०२. वामदेवादीनामिव जन्मान्तरीणपुराणश्रवणादिसम्भवाच्च ।२५।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे चतुर्थाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः । समाप्तिश्च ।

ग्रन्थश्च समाप्तः ॥छ॥

V. THE SYSTEM OF CAKRAS ACCORDING TO GORAKṢANĀTHA

The system of mystic culture introduced by Gorakṣanātha does not seem to have spread widely through the educated classes, so that although about a millenium has passed since this great man appeared, his preachings have remained till to-day almost a sealed book to many. The Gorakṣa-śataka and Gorakṣa-paddhati are two of the few Sanskrit works published which profess to give an exposition of this teacher's instructions. The Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā also belongs to this school, but, it deserves to be supplemented.

We propose to deal in a separate paper, on the basis of Mss. and printed books (in Hindi and Sanskrit), with the entire system of mystic culture associated with Gorakṣanātha, both historically and philosophically. Here, we must confine ourselves to the system of *cakras* or intra-organic centres of spiritual energy recognised by Gorakṣa-nātha. Our description will be based on a Ms. of Vairāṭa Purāṇa and on an old coloured chart (obtained accidentally from a local gentleman interested in this *pantha*) repre-senting the human body containing the spinal column with the various centres painted and duly located. It will be found that this arrangement differs widely from the current notions both of the Haṭhayoga school and of the Tantras.

× × ×

First of all in the perineum we have the *Ādhāra-cakra* (coloured red) presided over by Gaṇeśanātha with

his two Powers, viz., *Siddhi* and *Buddhi*. This is identical with the well-known *Mūlādhāra* of the Tantras. But, the next centre, called *Mahāpadma-cakra*, controlled by Nīlanātha is unknown elsewhere. The third, the *Svādhiṣṭhāna-cakra* (coloured yellow), is in the genital region and has Brahmā for its Deity and Sāvitrī for the Power.

Between this and the *Maṇipura* there are three distinct centres, viz., *Ṣaḍdala* (called also *Suṣumṇā-cakra*), *Garbha* (in the *Garbha-sthāna*) and *Kuṇḍalinī* (in the region adjoining the waist and presided over by Fire). Pesides, bare names and vague localisation we do not find statement of any further detail about these psychic vehicles. The *Maṇipura* is situated in the navel and has Viṣṇu for its *Devatā*. Above this is supposed to exist the so-called *Liṅga-cakra*, of which, again, no particulars are given. Higher still, in the pericarp of the *Anāhata* is the seat of mind—*Manas*.

The *Anāhata* itself is in the heart and looks like a lotus with 12 petals, emitting a white radiance around. The presiding god of the *cakra* is named Mahādeva (Rudranātha, in the Mss.) and the Power is Umā. The *Ṛṣi* is called *Hiraṇyagarbha*. This corresponds to the causal body, dreamless sleep, *Paśyantī Vāk* and Sāma-veda.

The next higher *cakra* is of course *Viśuddha*, in the throat. It is a sixteen-petalled lotus, with smoky colour, presided over by Jīva aud Ādyā Śakti. The *Ṛṣi* is *Virāṭ*. It corresponds to the causal body, dreamless sleep, *Parā Vāk*, Ātharvaṇa Veda, *Jālandhara Bandha* and *Sāyujya Mukti*.

The *Prāṇa-cakra* which is a thirty-two-petalled lotus of bright hue (उद्द्योतवर्णप्रभा) and is controlled by

Prāṇanātha and *Paramā Śakti*, is seated near the region of the throat (गलस्थान).[8] It forms the 10th aperture of the human body. Of the four *cakras* above *Viśuddha* and below *Ājñā*, the second one is *Avala-cakra*, furnished with 32 lobes shining like the rising sun (अरुणोद्द्योत-प्रभा), presided by Fire. The exact site of this *cakra* is not mentioned. From what is said it appears that it is seated where the three *granthis*, viz., Brahma°; Viṣṇu°; and Rudra°, unite (त्रिग्रन्थिस्थान), and, is very intimately connected with *Kāla-cakra* and *Yoginī-cakra*. The *Civuka-cakra* is somewhere in the facial region, apparently near the chin, and, is formed like a sun-like lotus of 34 lobes, presided by *Prāṇa* and Sarasvatī. All the *devas* have their seats within the lotus. Its *Ṛṣi* is named Krodha. All languges, indeed human speech itself, are supposed to have their origin here. The *Balavān-cakra* is just below the *Ājñā*, in the nasal region, and, looks like a three-petalled lotus of red, white and dark colour. This place is described as *Tribeṇī*, being the confluence of the three streams of Gaṅgā, Yamunā and Sarasvatī represented in the body by the three *nāḍis*, viz., *Iḍā*, *Piṅgalā* and *Suṣumṇā*. The presiding God of this *cakra* is *Praṇava* and the Power *Suṣumṇā*. The statement that this place is associated with the three *mātrās* of *Praṇava* (viz., A, U & M) becomes thus intelligible. The name of its *Ṛṣi* is given as Mahāhaṅkāra.[85]

The famous *Ājñā-cakra* (called also *Aṇi-cakra* in the Ms.), which is in the centre of the space between the two brows, is a diamond like (माणिक्यवर्णप्रभा) lotus of two petals, presided by *Haṁsa Devatā* and *Suṣumṇā Śakti*. It corresponds to the *Vijñāna* state and *Anupama Vāk*, and, to the half *mātrā* of the *Praṇava*.

The *Karṇamūla-cakra*, within the auricular region, is a 36-lobed lotus of mixed colour (dark and yellow). The presiding God and Power are *Nāda* and *Śruti* respectively. It is the seat of the 35 *mātṛkās*.

The *Tribeṇī-cakra*, above the brows, is a 26-lobed circle with *Ākāśa* as its *Ṛṣi*. This is the real *Tribeṇī*, but, how this place is connected with the *Balavān-cakra* lower down is nowhere stated.

The *Candra-cakra* is in the forehead and consists of 32 lobes[86] with a colour between white and red.[87] It is presided by the Moon and *Amṛta*[88] *Śakti*. The *Ṛṣi* is *Manas* (mind) with its sixteen *kalās*. It is said that the sun goes to this lunar mansion to drink nectar.

This centre is very closely related to another *cakra*—the *Amṛta-cakra*, almost in the same region, probably a little upwards. Its *Devatā* and *Śakti* are identical with those of the preceding *cakra*, but, the *Ṛṣi* is *Ātmā* rather than *Manas*. It is from here that nectar is constantly flowing. This place is described as the abode of the Gāyatrī named Kāmadhenu (lit. 'wish-giving cow') figured like a milch cow with four teats, viz., *Ambikā*, *Lambikā*, *Ghaṇṭikā* and *Tālikā* It has a human face with intoxicant looks (*Mada-netra*), a peacock's tail, a horse's neck (*grīvā*), an elephant's tusk (*śuṇḍa*), a tiger's arms (*hasta-śārdūla*), a cow's horns, and, wings consisting of *Līlā Brahma* and *Haṁsa*. It is a strange figure. It is from the udder of the 'cow' that nectar is perpetually streaming down. The *Khecarī*, *Viparītakarṇī* and other *mudrās* are some of the devices intended to check the downward flow of this blissful current. The *Yogin* who had obtained access to this *cakra* and abides here becomes immortal and free from the effects of Time.

Next is the *Brahmadvāra-cakra*, located above the forehead and shining with its 100 petals like the many coloured rainbow; and, beyond this is the seat of the *Akula Kuṇḍalinī*—a lotus of 600 petals bright like the newly risen sun.

On crossing this one comes up to the *Brahmarandhra* in the cranium (*mūrdha-sthāna*), with its multi-coloured 1000 petals. This is the so-called *Sahasrāra* of the mystic literature—the Aim and End of all spiritual progress. It is here that the *Guru* and the *Caitanya Śakti* reside.

One would naturally expect that the series of *cakras* would come to an end here. But, the picture on which the above account is based, mentions 6 *cakras* more beyond the *Sahasrāra*, viz., (a) *Ūrdhvarandhra*, (b) *Bhramaraguhā*,(c) *Akuṇṭhapīṭha*. (d)*Kolhāṭa*, (e)*Vajradaṇḍa* and (f) *Nirādhāra Paramajyotiścakra*. The *Urdhvarandhra*, called *Tālu-cakra* in the Ms. is seated in the *Tālimā* and is a 64-lobed *cakra*, presided by Gorakṣanātha and *Siddhānta Śakti*. This statement is interesting as it gives us an idea of what the followers of the path thought in connection with the founder of their school. The *Bhramaraguhā*, also called *Alekha*, i.e., *Alakṣya-cakra* (called *Brahma-cakra*[89] in the Ms.), is the place where *samādhi-yoga* ensues, and, *prāṇa* and *manas* cease to work. The lotus is described as furnished with ten millions of lobes and wonderfully brilliant. The presiding God of this centre is Alakṣyanātha, the *Śakti* called *Māyā* (= *Mahā-māyā* ? ; *Akalā* in the Ms.) and the *Ṛṣi* Mahāviṣṇu.

The higher *cakra* with an equal number of lobes has Akalanātha as *Devatā*, Akalesvarī as *Śakti* and Akala as *Ṛṣi*.

The *Kolhāṭa-cakra* is in the *Śikhāmaṇḍala* and corresponds to the *Vaikuṇṭha* of the Vaiṣṇavas and Kailāsa of the Śaivas. Both the *Devatā* and the *Śakti* are named *Ananta.*[30] The Ms. calls this region a road to the Highest Void (*Parama-śūnya-mārga*).

The description of *Vajradaṇḍa* is not very clear. It is said to be as I understand it to be, in the form of a column, vast (*Mahā-viśāla*), lustrous (*tejaḥ-puñja-prabhā*) and long (*dīrgha*).

The final *cakra* is in the *Nirālambasthāna*, with an infinite number of lobes, colours, *mātṛkās*, *devas* and worlds. This is the Highest Seat of the *Gurudeva.*

Beyond this is a series of 20 voids of which nothing is said. The Ms. observes that Final Liberation takes place in the Great Void (*Parama-śūnya-sthāna*) above 21 *Brahmāṇḍas*, Transcending the great Void the *Yogin* becomes eternally free from 'coming and going,' i.e., the wheel of birth and death : "**स च योगी तिष्ठति युगे युगे ज्योतिः समेत्य.**"

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We have tried to reproduce above with as much fidelity to the understood meaning of the chart as possible the account of the *Gorakhapanthis* concerning the arrangement and function of the various *cakras*. But, as the chart was on an old canvas with the figures rendered indistinct by time and the notes appended generally vague, illegible and sometimes totally unintelligible, it is quite likely that mistakes and in some places even confusion have been left unnoticed. It is sure nevertheless that the general presentation of the scheme is unimpeachable.

Taking it as we find it there is no doubt that the ideas of this school differed in many points from those of the Tantras on the same subject. The question of the total number of *cakras* may be left aside for the present. For, we are aware that there are several hidden (*gupta*) *cakras* which are not ordinarily counted ; and, very often a certain number of *cakras*, considered minor from one's own point of view, is supposed to form a connected whole. There are other reasons also which would explain the difference of the number in different systems. The actual description of a particular *cakra* is more important to a student for purposes of comparative studies. But, even here there are certain fatal limitations. For instance, the same *cakra* may not look exactly alike to different *sādhakas*. The personal *saṅkalpa* of the aspirant, either conscious or sub-conscious, and, that of his *Guru* go a great way towards determining the nature of the Vision. The reality observed is, in a certain sense, only ideal.

Entering into detail we may observe that the *Sahasrāra* is not supposed to form the Highest Limit ; there are stages beyond. With this we may compare the accounts of the Rādhāsvāmī sect who also hold more or less the same views.

The *Manaścakra* as described here embodies 32 lobes, while elsewhere it is said to be 6-petalled.[91]

Regarding *Akula-kuṇḍalinī* it may be said that the Tāntrists locate it within the Moon of Consciousness which forms the pericarp of the downward facing *Sahasrāra* and is situated in the transcendant heaven (*Paravyoma*)—a technical term for a part of the cerebral region.[92] The contact of *kula* with this *akula* is the

immediate cause of the flow of nectar (*sudhā-srāva*). While Gorakṣanātha holds that the nectar flows from the *Amṛta-cakra* above the Moon, Bhāskara considers that it flows from the *akula* which is within the Moon.

The name of *Bhramara-guhā* is to be found mentioned in the literature connected with the names of Kabīra, Rādhāsvāmī, etc., but, no where is its function clearly stated. The Sūta-saṁhitā and Bodhasāra use the term vaguely in the sense of *Brahmarandhra*. This so-called cave is in reality a hole or rather a hollow which appears to view when one gazes into the centre of the '*Kūṭastha*'. The entrance to this hollow is brilliantly dark, but, it is surrounded by a luminous ring or rays. The powers of obscuration (*āvaraṇa*) and dissipation (*vikṣepa*) are said to guard this entrance, so that they try to screen up and throw off the gazer. It is only when the power of introvision is produced after the generation of pure magnetism within the body through strict continence, pure food, etc. etc., and, through the cultivation of the moral virtues of selflessness, forbearance, etc. etc., and, through the action of *prāṇa* that one can expect to gaze at this hollow without fear of *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*. At this state mere gazing makes the mouth of the cave wide open and every *tattva* is illuminated.

In the chart the *Prāṇa-cakra* is described as the tenth avenue of the human body. This aperture is usually closed in men, so that the body is as a rule likened to a "city with nine gates" only.[93] But, a steady process of psychic discipline helps to open this avenue through which the *Jīva* of the *Kramamukta-upāsaka* passes away along the ray of the sun into the Solar Region, called also *Brahmaloka*, and, thence with the dawn of Know-

ledge is absorbed in *Brahman*. The medulla oblongata (*mastaka-granthi*) above the *Viśuddha-cakra*, is one of the sites where the three *nāḍis* are united. From here the *Suṣumṇā* enters into the skull, and, the other two *nāḍis*, viz., *Iḍā* and *Piṅgalā*, pass along the right and left sides of the forehead and meet together and are joined with the *Suṣumṇā* between the two eyebrows. From there the *Iḍā* goes to the left nostril and the *Piṅgalā* to the right. From the medulla the *Suṣumṇā* is bifurcated: (1) One line passes below the brain and in a rather oblique course comes to the eyebrow whence with a slightly upward bend pierces the pericarp of the *Ājñā* and unites with *Iḍā* and *Piṅgalā*. Then it comes out, and, running straight up crosses a very subtle hole within the interior of the central region of the forehead and hanging down to some distance takes a curve and goes right up, penetrating the *Sahasrāra* and entering the *Brahmarandhra*.[94] (2) Another line goes up direct from the medulla, and, through the interior of the skull extends to the *Śikhara*. With a slight curve it enters the *Brahmarandhra*. The mouth of this line of the *Suṣumṇā* which is in the *Brahmarandhra* remains usually closed, while that of the first line is open. Consequently the hollows of the two lines are not in union. While passing away from the body the *Yogin* gets the closed mouth of the *Suṣumṇā* opened, on which the two holes mentioned above become unified. This is what is usually known by the name of the "10th avenue". In the Amaraugha-śāsana, however, the "10th aperture" is identified with the mouth of the *Śaṅkhinī*, which is a hollow behind the front tooth (*rāja-danta*); and, the Kaṅkālamālinī Tantra locates *Brahmarandhra* just below the *Śaṅkhinī*.[95]

VI. SOME ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY AND DOCTRINES OF THE NĀTHAS

Introduction

A detailed and systematic history of Indian Culture remains yet to be written. But, there is hardly any doubt that before it can be sucessfully undertaken continued spade-work is necessary in various fields of study. The cultural history of a people is no less complex than its political one, and, it becomes all the more so when it extends through long centuries and represents the outcome of diverse currents and cross-currents of forces.

The study of Nātha and Siddha sects is a preliminary to a through study of mediaeval Indian Thought. Even this study has its different aspects. The present paper, which sums up some of the main points on the subject, is, therefore, meant, to be no more than a suggestive one. And, it may be hoped that the subject will be taken up for investigation and and an attempt will be made to throw light on the many obscure issues involved.

Mm. Haraprasāda Śāstrī drew the attention of scholars to the literature of the so-called Buddhist Siddhācāryas. That many of the *Ācāryas* were identical with the Nāthas, who were known as Siddhas, is indeed a fact. But, their exact position is not known. The history of Tāntric Literature, specially that of the Tripurā section, abounds in the names of Nāthas. Many

of these names are of course not proper or historical names at all, but, only of certain abstract principles. But, some are indeed historical. After initiation the disciple is given there a name ending in 'Nātha'. It is needless to say that we have no concern here with these 'Nāthas'. A regular and systematic study of the teachings of the *Haṭha-yogins*—the Nāthas proper, e. g., Matsyendra-nātha, Gorakṣanātha, etc., of the Vajrayāna and Sahajayāna Buddhists, of the Tāntrists of Tripura order and also of the Vīrācāra cult, of the followers of Dattātreya, of the Śaivas, of the later Sahajiyās and the neo-Vaiṣṇavas, will reveal several features in common. The relation between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Tāntric culture is an important one and deserves close and careful examination. It would be of great interest to find out how the *Śūnyavāda* of Mahāyāna has crept into Haṭha Yoga, Tantra etc., and, how ultimately this *Śūnya* has come to be interpreted in the way it has been done in the later Buddhist schools. All these Schools of Thought being allied to the philosophical position of the Alchemists the science of Alchemy as it used to be cultivated in Ancient India has also to be studied. The *Rasavāda* of the neo-Vaiṣṇavas owes much to the development of the mystic Science associated with the names of the Siddhas.

The scope of the present paper is not however so wide. It is an humble attempt to present in a very few words, mainly on the basis of Mss. and of printed books, a sketch of the doctrines of the Nāthas together with a short note on the origin of the sect and on the bibliography of its literature.

Origin Of The Sect

As usual in this country the Nātha sect claims a divine origin. Brahmānanda,[96] in his Commentary, Jyotsnā, on the Haṭha-yoga-pradīpikā (1.5) clearly states that Ādinātha or Śiva was the first of all the Nāthas and that according to a tradition preserved in Nāthist literature the sect was founded by Śiva :

"आदिनाथः शिवः सर्वेषां नाथानां प्रथमो नाथः। (ततो) नाथ-सम्प्रदायः प्रवृत्त इति नाथसम्प्रदायिनो वदन्ति"।[97]

From the above extract it would appear that the Sect was known by the name of *Nātha-pantha*. Scholars too genrally use this very term in refering to the sect. But, in literature it is also known as *Siddhamārga*, *Avadhūta-mārga*, etc., and, as the teachers of this School lay a great emphasis on the practice of Yoga for the attainment of perfection it has come to be designated as '*Yoga-mārga*' *par excellence*. The Kāpālika sect is in some minor respects closely allied to it, but, it is a distinct path altogether; and, though its origin is attributed to Ādinātha, its main teachings and practices have character of their own.

The Śabara Tantra gives a list of tewenty-four Kāpālikas--12 teathers and 12 pupils. It is interesting to find that some of these names, especially those of the pupils, are those of the well-known Nāthas or Siddhas. The names of the twelve teachers, for instance, are— (1) Ādinātha, (2) Anādinātha, (3) Kālanātha, (4) Atikālanātha, (5) Karālanātha. (6) Vikarālanātha, (7) Mahākālanātha, (8) Kāla-bhairavanātha, (9) Baṭukanātha, (10) Bhūtanātha, (11)Vīranātha and (12) Śrīkaṇṭhanātha. The names of their twelve pupils appear in this order :

(1) Nāgārjuna, (2) Jaḍa-bharata, (3) Hariścandra, (4) Satyanātha, (5) Bhīmanātha, (6) Gorakṣanātha, (7) Carpaṭanātha, (8) Avaidyanātha, (9) Vairāgyanātha, (10) Kanthādhārī, (11) Jalandhara and (12) Malayārjuna.

Though the spiritual descent of the sect is said to be from the Divine source its historical foundation is ascribed to one Matsyendranātha. The life history of this great man is so intimately woven up with legends that it is very difficult to make a proper discrimination. It is said that Matsyendra has originally been a fish who overheard the secret Yoga-instructions of Ādinātha or Śiva and became fixed in body and mind (**तीरसमीपनीरस्थः कश्चन मत्स्यः तं योगोपदेशं श्रुत्वा एकाग्रचित्तो निश्चलकायोऽवतस्थे**). When the fact was noticed by the great Lord, He came to know what the steadiness meant and out of compassion sprinkled water on his body. The result was that the fish was immediately transfigured and his form was converted into a human body of celestial type—thenceforward famous as the Siddha Matsyendranātha. Mm. H.P. Śāstrī is of opinion that the real name of Matsyendra was Macchaghna, which probably means 'a fisherman'. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Matsyendra was a *Yogin* of high order. It is said that inspite of his great powers he fell a victim to the snares of passion and that it was with much difficulty that Gorakṣa, his most favourite disciple, succeeded in reclaiming him.

He has several disciples. Besides Gorakṣa, who became the most renowned of the batch, there were Caurangī, Ghorācolī and others. There are legends associated with each and every Siddha. And, almost every Siddha is credited with the composition of certain

musical verses which used to be sung in the middle ages and continue to be recited even now to the tune of an one-stringed instrument by pedestrian minstrel-beggars in the street.

In the literature of the Nāthas one very often comes across the name Mīnanātha. It is hard to say whether this was a synonym of Matsyendra. The two names were believed by many to refer to the same person. But, in the list of Nāthas furnished by Brahmānanda, we find the name of Mīna mentioned separately from that of Matsyendra.[98] Mm. H.P. Śāstrī speaks of them as if they were two persons and says that both of them were natives of Candradvīpa.

The word Caurangī (= Sk. Caturangī) means a person shorn of hands and legs. It is said that while Matsyendra, after he had become a Siddha through the grace of Ādinātha, was roaming at will through the world he came across Caurangī in a certain forest and took pity on him. Caurangī's body, which was only a trunk, became furnished in a mysterious way with hands and legs, whereupon he fell at the feet of the great Siddha, asked for his Grace and obtained it. He became a Siddha, known as Caurangī-nātha.

Ghorācolī was another disciple of Matsyendra.

But, the greatest of Matsyendra's disciples—indeed one of the greatest souls India has ever produced—was certainly Gorakṣanātha. He was a great Siddha, was the father of Haṭha Yoga in its current form and was the great apostle of Yogic mysticism in the mediaeval ages. In the Pañcamātrāyoga, attributed to himself, it is stated that during the period of his discipleship he passed twelve

long years in watchfulness on the cremation ground. Mm. H.P. Śāstrī says, on the strength of Tārānātha's evidence, that Gorakṣa was originally a Buddhist and that he became a Nātha only in his later years. As a Buddhist he was known by the name of Anaṅga-vajra (according to Tārānātha, but, Ramaṇa-vajra according to Mm. H.P. Śāstrī). This may be true. But, in the Kāyabodha, attributed to Gorakṣanātha himself, there is a saying which would seem to show that he had been in all probability originally a slayer of animals (*paśvārambhaka*). If the word *Ārambhà* means sacrificial slaughter,as it often does,Gorakṣa cannot be described to have been a Buddhist before his conversion into Nāthism. But, as it is a mere conjecture the point need not be pressed far.

The age of Gorakṣa or of his *Guru* Matsyendra is not known with certainty. The tradition connecting him with Kabīra (1500 A D.) and with Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1700 A.D.) is not probably of any historical value. But, Jñāna-nātha *alias* Jñāna-deva, who is usually assigned to the thirteenth century, mentions his own spiritual pedigree, in his Commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā in which Gorakṣanātha appears as his third predecessor—thus : Ādinātha, Matsyendra-nātha, Gorakṣanātha,Gahinīnātha, Nivṛtti-nātha and Jñāna-nātha. This would place Gorakṣa in the beginning of the 12th century A.D. This date agrees with the tradition which makes Gorakṣa and Dharma-nātha contemporaries and pupils of the same *Guru*. Dharma-nātha is generally assigned to the 12th century A.D. But, there are other views according to which Gorakṣa lived in 500 A.D. or 700 A.D. or 1000 A.D. The disciples of Gorakṣa were numerous, some of whom attained to distinction. We read of Bāla-nātha, Hālika Pāva, Māli Pāva, etc., as being his disciples.

Mayanāmatī, the queen mother of Rājā Gopīcanda, is also said to have been initiated by Gorakṣa.

This Bāla-nātha may be the same as the Siddha Bālapāda of whom we find an account in the Tibetan literature and who is identified with the great Jalandhara-nātha. He had probably been a *Śūdra*, but, became a Buddhist afterwards and finally a convert to Nāthism. He was a powerful saint. In Bengal he was popularly known as Hāḍipā. His greatness was universally acknowledged, some assigning to him a higher place, owing to his extraordinary sanctity, than Gorakṣanātha himself.[99] We can glean some account of this Saint from Nirañjana Purāṇa. It is said that in the neighbourhood of Kerali he showed Grace to one Śabala, who wrote certain *dohās* or verses in memory of his *Guru* and of his own conversion. His achievements were many and varied. Among the persons on whom he condescended to confer Grace there was many an illustrious figure. Rājā Gopīcanda of Bengal, Rājā Bhartṛhari of Ujjein and Carpaṭa,[100] who is described as the maternal uncle of Gopīcanda, were among his disciples. The names of some of his other disciples are Gogā,[101] Caṭikānātha, Rāma Siṁha,[102] Bhīma,[103] the merchant Agila, the merchant Sandhara (in Palanpur), etc. He is said to have practised penances on a mountain, called Rakta, in the City (Ādipurī) of Daṇḍavatī. Many of his Yogic feats are recounted. For instance, he caused pearls to be miraculously produced in the Yugandhara field; he turned a person, named Kānha, born dumb (*jānmā-mūka*), into an eloquent poet; he exhibited the whole Universe in a clear vision to King Reṇuka on mount Kāñcana and gave him a wonderful sword; he conferred a boon on a gentleman of the Raghu family which enabled him to

subdue the superior forces of the Emperor single-handed and granted a lovely son to a Cāraṇa named Dala. There are many other stories of this kind. It is related that once Jalandhara went to the borders of a village (named Śeṣāli) and lit his *dhūnī* (*agni- dhānī*) there, when a prince came to meet him. Jalandhara was pleased to present him with an excellent sword, called Rāmacandra, with which the prince fought and killed several Yavanas—including those of 'Joya' (?) class, one of whom had assassinated his father. Thereupon some Bhāṭis, a clan of the Yādavas, challenged him in battle and pressed him hard. The prince remembered Jalandhara in the battlefield, on which the latter appeared before him at once. The sword was immediately lengthened into an enormous size and the opponents were beaten back. Having won the battle the prince himself disappeared and became immortal.

Gopīcanda, the son of Rājā Triloka-candra[104] of Bengal, became the disciple of Jalandhara-nātha and left his kingdom at the instance of his saintly mother Mayanāmatī. The Mahāsanta-vākya contains a short account of his renunciation. The language in which the queen mother exhorted her reluctant son on the vanity of the world and its possessions and on the supreme necessity of taking recourse to a Spiritual Teacher for enlightenment is unrivalled. Seldom in human history has a mother been found to take the initiative in sending her own son away in quest of saving Wisdom—a quest fraught with immense perils and possibility of untold sufferings. The story of Gopīcanda's renunciation has become classical, and, almost every vernacular of northern India has got its own versions of it. Gopīcanda, as a Siddha, came to

be known as Śṛṅgārī Pāva. In the Siddhānta-vākya there is an interesting dialogue between him and Jalandhara. The former puts to Jalandhara a series of questions, to which the latter replies. The questions are thus worded :

"गोपीचन्दः कथयति—

भो स्वामिन् पृच्छामि कथय अन्तर्यामिन्—
वसतौ स्थीयते तदा कन्दर्पो व्याप्नुते ।
वने स्थीयते तदा क्षुत् सन्तापयति ।
आसने स्थीयते तदा स्पृशति माया ।
पथि गम्यते तदा छिद्यते कायः ।
मिष्टं भक्ष्यते तदा वर्धते रोगः ।
कथय कथं साध्यते योगः" ॥

Jalandhara answers—

"श्रोतव्योऽवधुत तत्त्वस्य विचारः
यः एष सकलशिरोमणिः सारः ।
संयत आहारे कन्दर्पो न व्याप्नुते ।
बाह्यारम्भे क्षुन्न सन्तापयति ।
सिद्ध आसने नहि स्पृशति माया ।
वादप्रमाणेन छिद्यते कायः ।
जिह्वायाः सुखाय न कर्त्तव्यो भोगः ।
मनः पवनौ च गृहीत्वा साधनीयो योगः" ॥

He further adds—

"अल्पमश्नाति स तु कल्पयति जल्पति ।
बहु भुनक्ति स तु रोगी ।
द्वयोरपि पक्षयोर्यः सन्धिं विचारयति
स तु कोऽपि विरलो योगी" ॥

The last couplet contains the quintessence of the Nāthic teachings.

The story of Bhartṛhari, another prince of royal blood, is equally interesting. He too renounced the joys and luxuries of the palace and under the guidance of Jalandhara attained to perfection in Yoga. In the literature of the Siddhas his name appears as Vicāra-nātha.

The Teachings of the Nāthas

In the Siddhānta-vākya of Jalandhara we read—

"वन्दे तन्नाथतेजो भुवनतिमिरहं भानुतेजस्करं वा
सत्कर्तृव्यापकं त्वा पवनगतिकरं व्योमवन्निर्भरं वा।
मुद्रानादत्रिशूलैर्विमलरुचिधरं खर्परं भस्ममिश्रं
द्वैतं वाऽद्वैतरूपं द्वयत उत परं योगिनां शङ्करं वा" ॥

This shows that metaphysical position of the Nāthas was not monistic, nor was it dualisitic either. It was transcendental in the truest sense of the term. They speak of the *Nātha*, the Absolute, as beyond the opposition involved in the concepts of *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* or of *Sākāra* and *Nirākāra*. And, so to them the Supreme end of Life is to realise oneself as *Nātha* and to remain eternally fixed above the world of relations. The way to this realisation is stated to be *Yoga*, on which they lay great emphasis. It is held that Perfection cannot be attained by any means unless it is supplemented by the disciplinary practices of Yoga. The Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati, attributed sometimes to Gorakṣanātha and sometimes to Nityanātha, goes further and says :

"सन्मार्गश्च योगमार्गः, तदितरस्तु पाषण्डमार्गः"[105] ।

But, what is Yoga ? It is explained in different works in different ways. But, in whatever way it is explained the central conception remains the same. It is

what since then has come to be known as *Haṭha*—a term which is thus interpreted in the Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati :

"हकारः कीर्त्तितः सूर्यष्ठकारश्चन्द्र उच्यते ।
सूर्याचन्द्रमसोर्योगाद् हठयोगो निगद्यते" ॥

According to Brahmānanda the Sun and the Moon stand here for *Prāṇa* and *Apāna*, and, their union is *Prāṇāyāma*, which is, therefore, the meaning of Haṭhayoga. The conquest of *Vāyu* is thus the essence o Haṭhayoga.

It is believed that this kind of Yoga was introduced in India by the Nāthas. The Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā[106] says that the mystery of this Yoga was known only to Matsyendranātha and Gorakṣanātha. Brahmānanda adds the names of Jalandhara, Bhartṛhari and Gopīcanda. It is of interest to note that all these persons were associated with the *Nātha-pantha*. Hence it seems likely that Gorakṣa, or more probably Matsyendra, was the earliest preacher of Haṭhayoga.[107] This need not be inconsistent with the statement—

"श्रीआदिनाथाय नमोऽस्तु तस्मै
येनोपदिष्टा हठयोगविद्या" ।[108]

because every *Vidyā* may be said to emanate in a sense from the Supreme Lord.[109]

It is hard to ascertain how far the tradition ascribing to the Nāthas the foundation of Haṭhayoga as a science is true. For there is a rival tradition which speaks of two schools of *Haṭha*, one ancient and the other modern, founded by Mārkaṇḍeya and the Nāthas respectively :

"द्विधा हठः स्यादेकस्तु गोरक्षादिसुसाधितः।
अन्ये मृकण्डुपुत्राद्यैः साधितो हठसंज्ञकः" ॥[110]

If this tradition has any historical basis it means that the Nāthas simply revived an ancient and dying science. And, this seems to be the more plausible view to take.

But, what was the need of reviving this Yoga at all, when Rājayoga was already in a flourishing condition? That the Haṭhayoga, even in its higher and perfected forms, is only an ancillary, nay a stepping stone to Rājayoga, is admitted by the Siddhas themselves. Patañjali's system is mainly based on Rājayoga principles; so are the Buddhist and Jain systems, though in all these the utility of simple *Haṭha* practices has also been recognised.

The *Haṭha-yogins* are of opinion that for ordinary people who have very little control over their mind the practice of Rājayoga is simply impossible. Mantrayoga and the practices of meditations are indeed capable, if properly resorted to, of leading to the perfection of Rājayoga; but, these too require the exercise of mental concentration to be of any efficacy at all—an exercise which is beyond the power of the average man. Haṭhayoga, however, which consists in certain mechanical devices of the physical character is the only form of scientific Yoga which can be useful in such circumstances. For, it does not presuppose the possession of mental strength which every other class of Yoga more or less implies. We have already said that the essence of *Haṭha* lies in the conquest of *Vāyu*. It is an article of universal acceptance in this country that *Bindu* (essence of the physical body in the form of *Vīrya*, *Śukra*, or

seminal fluid), *Vāyu* (the intra-organic vital currents) and *Manas* (mind or the principle of thinking)are closely related to one another, so that by restraining any one of them the remaining two may be easily held in check. The restraint of *Bindu,* as accomplished by the practice of successful *Brahmacarya,* being already assumed, the *Haṭha-yogins* direct the control of *Vāyu* as a preliminary, or rather a means, to the realisation of mental quiescence which is the ultimate aim of all strivings. But, to facilitate this restraint of *Vāyu* or *Prāṇāyāma* they recommend the employment of a few other practices, viz., (1) *Āsana*, (2) *Mudrā* and (3) *Nādānusandhāna*[111]. The continued practice of *Āsana* is of great help in securing the lightness, health and steadiness of the body. These qualities, once attained, naturally react upon the mind. The practice of *Mudrā* is intended to rouse the dormant *Kuṇaḍlinī Śakti* without whose active guidance no spiritual realisation is possible. And, the practice of *Nāda* audition acts directly upon the mind and tends to destroy its inherent restlessness. As soon as the mind is rendered inactive and the *Vāyu* is absorbed in the *Brahmarandhra* there arises the resplendent glory of Beatific State, technically known as *Laya* or *Manonmanī* or *Sahajāvasthā*. It is a state of intense Joy. It is to be observed in this connection that all these practices are inter-connected. The practice of *Nāda* can be properly started only when the Inner Sound, which is in a sense a perpetual current running through the heart of sensible Nature,comes to be an object of hearing. And, this sound can be heard as a matter of course after the *Vāyu* has entered in to the *Suṣumṇā Nāḍī* and its various branches rendered free from the impurities accumulated there for ages. When the *Nāḍīs* are purified the *Anāhata*

Sound becomes audible at once. But, this purification requires the exercise of *Āsana* and *Mudrā*. On the contrary, the perfection of *Āsana* is impossible until and unless the subtle causes which operate as deterrents upon the stability of the body are thoroughly removed. The awakening of *Kuṇḍalinī* which is the immediate aim of the practice of *Mudrās* and indeed of many other practices—is really bound up with the success, more or less complete, of *Āsana*. In fact, all these mechanical devices have one end to fulfil, viz., to release and set in operation the Divine Power lying asleep under the burden of Matter within Man and to render clear its path of movement. This path is now blocked up.

The peculiarity of the Yoga which the Nāthas taught consisted in the emphasis which it placed on the physical side of the discipline. It presupposes a thorough knowledge of the body, with its nervous and vital apparatus. The general principle on which they proceeded appears to be the recognition of the graded character of Matter, ranging from the densest form revealed in our waking sense—experience up to the most rarefied and tenuous form to which the end of *Samprajñāta Samādhi*—the so-called *Sāsmita Samādhi*—eventually leads. I am speaking here in terms of Sāṅkhya nomenclature. The consciousness of the individual self, as enmeshed in grosser matter, is really identical with the Universal Consciousness of the World-soul—nay, with Absolute Consciousness itself. Only that limitations have to be carefully removed. The *Haṭha-yogins* are of opinion that the only surest and quickest way of transcending the limitations is to rise up, rather to raise up the *Vāyu*, from one plane to another until the Universal Stuff is reached in the Spirit—Matter of the

Highest Plane—manifesting itself in the so-called Thousand-petalled Lotus (सहस्रदलकमल). These limitations are the products of stress and strain caused by the Creative Impulse of the Supreme Lord in Matter.

To speak more clearly. The pure soul, which is a mode of the Absolute and ultimately consubstantial with it, becomes enveloped in its mundane stage with a double coating of *Manas* and *Bhūtas*, representing two aspects of subtle matter. The word *Manas* is used here in a very wide sense, including *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, etc. The senses which develope later and are only the functional variations of *Manas* are also implied in it. The word *Bhūta* stands here for the objective stuff in a state of relative equilibrium. It holds within it the so-called *tanmātrās*, viz., *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha*, which are not yet distinguishable as such. Each of the five *mātrās* has its own centre, wherein it is capable of expanding and contracting. The soul in its descending or outgoing course takes upon itself as a matter of necessity these layers of subtle matter. Though its innate purity is marred thereby it still retains enough of self-consciousness and the consequent powers. Total self-forgetfulness takes place only when it emerges into the outer worlds of gross matter which is the outcome of a combination, by means of a process known as *Pañcīkaraṇa*, of the finer radiating particles shooting out of the *tanmātric* centres. The descent into subtle Matter was, as it were, in a straight line, but, birth into the external world is the product of an oblique motion (*tiryag-gati*) in *Vāyu*. As soon as Consciousness finds itself encased in sensible or gross matter, the *Manas* developes into senses which begin to operate each in its own line with reference to a corresponding aspect of this Matter. It is for this reason

that senses cannot apprehend anything beyond dense Matter. The *Manas*, as abstracted from the senses, is indeed capable of giving rise to supersensible knowledge. The greater the abstraction the purer the quality of this knowledge. The abstraction of *Manas* is really synonymous with its concentration and consequent purification. The so-called *Divya-cakṣu*, the Celestial Eye or the Third Eye of Śiva is nothing, but, this purified and concentrated Mind : "मनो ह्येवात्र दैवं चक्षुः".[112] The *Manas* as coated with dense Matter may be described as dense or sense-bound. And, in this state the *Vāyu* too is no longer rectilinear in its motion. Every form of *Vāyu* with which we are familiar in our sensible experience is of this type.

This oblique motion of *Vāyu* in our physical body necessitates the existence of tracks of an oblique characer. This is what is technically known as *Nāḍī-cakra* consisting of numerous *Nāḍis* ramifying in different directions. Leaving out the *Suṣumṇā* which is the central track of the straight motion of refined *Vāyu*, the other *Nāḍis* may be loosely classed under two heads, Right and Left, from their position in relation to the *Suṣumṇā*. The *Manas* and *Vāyu* of an ordinary man in his senses move along these winding tracks. This movement is his *Saṁsāra*—his *Vyutthāna*.

The Nāthas insist that if the Absolute is to be reached the central Track, which leads directly into it as a river loses itself in the ocean, must be found out and resorted to. All other ways will mislead, as leading to the different planes of material existence, because they contain sediment of gross matter. As soon as the divergent currents of physical *Manas*—the *vṛttis* of the senses,

and, of the physical *Vāyu*, i.e., the functions of the vital Principle, are brought to a point with a certain degree of intensity, there flashes forth a bright light representing the expression of the concentrated *Śaktis* of the soul. This expression of *Śakti* is the revelation of *Kuṇḍalinī* and its partial release from the obscuration of Matter. The *Śakti* as thus released, however, partially it may be, rises up spontaneously and disappears in the Infinity of the Absolute. This disappearance does not mean annihilation : it simply means absorption and unification. The Absolute, as conceived in terms of *Śakti*, is the Infinity of *Śakti* actualised. *Śakti* is a Unity, whether manifest or otherwise. *Brahman* is nothing, but, the eternally manifest *Śakti*, which as such is only a synonym of Śiva. It is free from action and from every tinge of Matter. But, it is a fact that a portion of this *Śakti* is swallowed up by Matter and appears to lose its identity under the pressure of the latter. The Nāthas claim that the *Sad-guru*, the true Spiritual Teacher, alone is able by virtue of his active *Śakti*, which is indeed nothing, but, Śiva at work, to call forth the slumbering *Śakti* of the disciple. The difference between Śiva and *Śakti* is really a difference without any distinction. It is said :

"शिवस्याभ्यन्तरे शक्तिः शक्तेरभ्यन्तरे शिवः ।
अन्तरं नैव पश्यामि चन्द्रचन्द्रिकयोरिव"॥[113]

It is an inscrutable mystery how *Śakti* can at all be veiled by Matter. It is, nevertheless, true that once it is released it is drawn into the Infinite and Universal Source which is actually free.

It is Matter that seems to divide Śiva and *Śakti*, so that as soon as Matter is transcended this apparent division also vanishes. And, what is Matter itself ? It is a

phantasm appearing from the self-alienation of the Absolute as Śiva and *Śakti*. Naturally, therefore, when Śiva and *Śakti* are united this phantasm vanishes into nothing. We shall see that the aim of Yoga is the establishment of this Union. This will also explain the existence of so much erotic imagery in connection with an account of this matter in the Tāntric and Nāthic literature, both Hindu and Buddhistic, in the mediaeval ages.

The point is that the soul cannot know Śiva, i.e., cannot gain self-realisation, so long as it is bound by matter, which it can do only when its *Śakti* becomes free. The obscuration of *Śakti* means (i) its loss of connection with Śiva from which it emanated, (ii) its consequent engulfment within the dark womb of Primary Matter, and, (iii) its final emergence into the dense world of evanascent light which is produced from Primary Matter. The first and second moments may be successive in time or only in logical sequence. In any case it represents the so-called *Prakṛti-līna* stage of the Yoga literature. The taint of Cosmic Nescience is the characteristic of this stage which precedes the subsequent evolution. The physical state of bondage, the third stadium in the present scheme, is characterised by a disturbance of the relative equilibrium of the forces. By way of illustration it may be pointed out that the *Vāyu* in the physical body is working unequally—so are the other forces.

It is, therefore, enjoined that this inequality has to be removed. In natural course also it is removed, though only for a moment, from time to time. This is called the *Sandhi-kṣaṇa*, corresponding to the *Nirodha-*

kṣaṇa of the earlier literature. What is necessary is to increase the duration of this *kṣaṇa*. It has already been shown that the Vital and other currents working within the system may be brought under a two-fold head—one flowing along the right course and the other along the left. The two currents are opposite being positive and negative, and, are supplementary to each other. In the literature of the Siddhas and Nāthas they are known as the Solar and the Lunar Currents,[114] and, their tracks as the Solar and the Lunar paths, the *Piṅgalā* and *Iḍā Nāḍīs* of Haṭhayoga, respectively. The neutralisation of these Solar and Lunar forces, often described as *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, by allowing them to act upon each other by certain specified means, helps to open the Natural or Middle Track which is called *Suṣumṇā* or *Brahma-nāḍī* or *Śūnya-nāḍī*. As soon as this Path is opened, which was till now lying blocked under a heap of dense matter, the *Bindu*, *Vāyu* and *Manas* rendered fine through Kriyāyoga rush into it at once and begin to take an upward course spontaneously. The awaking of *Kuṇḍalinī*, the opening of the Middle Path, the purification of *Vāyu* and *Manas*, the rise of Gnosis (*Prajñā*), the dissolution of *Ahaṅkāra* and the knot of Ignorance (*Avidyā-granthi*) are different names of this very act from different points of view. It is not an instantaneous act, as a rule for the accumulated *vāsanās*—the heritage of the ages—have to be worked off slowly. The entire course is graduated. The Nāthas generally describe it in terms of Tantra phraseology as *Ṣaṭcakrabheda*, thus, representing the successful transcendence of each of the six intra-organic Centres as a definite stage in the journey. This corresponds to the purgative process of he western mystics and to the *bhūta-śuddhi* and *citta-śuddhi* of the *Upāsanā-kāṇḍa* of Tantra.

The secret path of *Brahma* (*Brahma-nāḍī*) was indeed known to the Vedic seers. Leaving aside the testimony of the minor Upaniṣads, we find evidence of its knowledge in the Chāndogya, where there is a reference to a Central *Nāḍī* running up from the *Hṛdaya* to the Cranium *(Mūrdhā)*. This is evidently the *Suṣumṇā*. It appears from a study of the ancient literature on the subject that there were mainly four distinct views on the point from which the upward journey of the *Manas* was to be undertaken, the four places according to the four views being—(1) *Mūlādhāra-cakra*, (2) Navel, (3) Heart and (4) Middle of the two eyebrows. The Vedic schools were generally in favour of the 'Heart', but, the Nāthas preferred the first and the second places. In every case it represents the spot where the *Manas* and *Vāyu* are focussed into a Point. It is after such concentration that the Great Path reveals itself. Speaking graphically, one end of this Luminous Path represents *Īśvara* or *Guru*, and, the other end enlightened *Jīva* or *Śiṣya* and the Path itself the relation between the two. With continued practice the distance between the two ends begins to be reduced and the Yoga gains in strength, until at last the path disappears, leaving *Īśvara* and *Jīva*, or Śiva and *Śakti*, in close union with each other. As it has been stated above, the Union may be termed Identity also, in the sense that the two principles lose all semblance of distinction and inequality, and, become, what in reality they have always been, the Absolute.

This *Śiva-śakti-sāmarasya*, the equilibrium of Śiva and *Śakti* is manifesting itself in *Ānanda* or Divine Bliss. It presupposes *Jñāna* or Realisation in the manner just mentioned, and, *Jñāna* is the natural expression of Yoga. This *Jñāna* alone has saving virtue. The theoretical

knowledge gained from a study of books is severely condemned by the Nāthas as a useless lumber, as leading to confusion rather than illumination.

True knowledge cannot be gained without Yoga. Merely intellectual knowledge does not avail for salvation. The *Yogabīja*[115] says—

"....योगेन रहितं ज्ञानं मोक्षाय नो भवेत्"

There are indeed records in history that several people obtained knowledge directly without the need of practising Yoga. By way of illustration the names of Jaigīṣavya, Asita, Janaka, Tulādhāra, Dharmavyādha, Pailavaka, Maitreyī, Sulabhā, Śārṅgī and Śāṇḍili, to name a few among many such, may be mentioned. But, it is replied that even in these cases the practice of Yoga in a previous life has to be presupposed. The Siddhas assert that a man who has obtained knowledge, but, not *Siddhi*, will be required to come under the sanctifying influence of a Siddha in course of time and through his Grace receive initiation into the mysteries of Yoga.[116] This is absolutely necessary for the realisation of *Mokṣa*.[117]

They lay so much emphasis on Yoga, because without its instrumentality the conquest of physical body cannot be accomplished. None, but, a true *Yogin* can rise above the limitations imposed by the body. So long as these limitations persist, which imply not only the passions, but, also the dependence upon the elements of nature, the stability of mind and the consequent enlightenment is not possible. The physical organism, for instance, as it exists in the present state, is considered to be the source of all evil. It is affected by the action of the five elements, is afflicted, with heat and cold, and,

is subject to decay and death. This corruptibility of the physical body, the *Yogins* claim, can be overcome only by Yoga.

As it is a very important issue in the study of the doctrines of the Nāthas, it is desirable to consider this question of physical purification at great length in this context. The human body, as it is ordinarily known to us with its defects and corruptions, is described by the *Yogins* as immature (*apakva*). It is possessed of all the characteristics of physical matter. Contact with such a body must inevitably result in the experience of Pain and in the veiling of the inherent powers of the soul. For an ordinary man, therefore, it becomes practically impossible to subdue the senses and the passions even with austere self-restraint. The effect of the elements of Nature makes itself felt, for all his efforts, as a disturbance of the mind. Such a man is a slave to circumstances. The so-called *Jñāna* is unable to remove these defects which are incidental to a dense physical body. The body as such requires, therefore, to be purified and rendered mature (*pakva*) by means of Yoga.

The doctrine of physical immortality, which is an immediate corollary from that of physical purification referred to above, finds a special treatment in the system of the Nāthas. If the defects which cling to the dense organism can somehow be eliminated from it, the body will naturally become immune from disease, decay and death and from all the ills attendant on physical matter. It will be free from weight and capable of moving through space with the velocity of thought, assuming any shapes at will and multiplying itself to any number.

It will pass through a solid wall, enter into a stone, be not drenched by water, burned by fire or affected by the wind, and, it will be invisible in pure space. It will be able to expand and contract itself and will be endowed with all the Powers consequent upon the conquest of the five elements (*bhūta-jaya*). A body like this is said to be rare even among the gods. It is pure—purer than *Ākāśa* itself. *Siddha-kāya*, *Divya-deha*, *Yoga-deha*, etc., are but names of this Body, and, the process of this transformation is called *Deha-vedha*, *Piṇḍa-sthairya*, *Piṇḍa-dhāraṇa*, etc.

It may be pointed out in this connection that the possession of an immortal body of this kind has been felt to be a desideratum by the mystics in all ages and in all countries. In the literature connected with Haṭha-yoga, *Rasāyana* (Alchemy), Tantra, etc., we find repeated references to such a body. It is said that as a base metal can be transmuted into gold (*loha-vedha*), in the same way a natural body may be spiritualised (*deha-vedha*). The alchemists of the ancient age had their own method of transmutation in which mercury, mica, sulphur, etc., played an important part. They called this body by the name of '*Rasamayī Tanu*' and '*Hara-Gaurī-sṛṣṭijā Tanu*', because it was effected through the action of *Rasa* or Mercury—the seed of *Hara* (*Harasṛṣṭi*) on one hand and Mica—the seed of *Gaurī* (*Gaurīsṛṣṭi*) on the other.[118]

What the alchemists professed to accomplish by means of Mercury, the *Haṭha-Yogins* attempted through the discipline of *Vāyu*. It is, therefore, said that Karmayoga,by which the stability of the body is secured, is twofold :

"कर्मयोगेन देवेशि प्राप्यते पिण्डधारणम् ।
रसश्च पवनश्चेति कर्मयोगो द्विधा स्मृतः" ॥

Nāgārjuna, the great Mahāyāna Teacher, is said to have been a great alchemist credited with wonderful powers. He was also a Tāntrist and a *Yogin* of rare perfection. Many of his followers too were worthy of his name. The Nāthas were apparently influenced by Nāgārjuna and his teachings. And, there are indications to show that though the Nāthas were advocates of the *Haṭha* process, they were equally masters of the alchemic lore.

Both the *Haṭha* and the alchemical processes have the same limitations. They render the body immortal, pure and free. But, they cannot without stepping beyond their bounds lead to the cessation of mind and the attainment of final equilibrium. They give rise to *Jīvanmukti*—the state in which Mind and *Vāyu* (Life) continue to remain steady in the *Ājñā-cakra* illuminated by the white radiance of the Universal Light of the *Sahasrāra* above. This state lasts for a long time—for countless aeons, it may be—during which time the continued *Upāsanā* or the course of Rājayoga which follows naturally tends to render the mind liable to sink gradually into the Infinite. From this it is clear that the true scope of Rājayoga comes in only after the *Haṭha* and alchemical processes terminate.[119] Rājayoga ends in the Final Illumination of Perfect Wisdom (*Pūrṇa-prajñā*), which only a thoroughly purified body and mind, such as what a *Siddha-deha* implies, can sustain. A natural and corruptible body is thus totally unfit for receiving Wisdom[120]—nay, incapable of practising unbroken meditation which precedes it.[121]

VII. THEISM IN ANCIENT INDIA

Part I.

Introduction

As a brief introduction to the study of theistic philosophy in ancient India it is desirable to take a short survey of the old controversy over the Causal (efficient) Problem and the kindred questions centred round it. It is an interesting question, one which inevitably presents itself in the study of all ancient Philosophy, and, we cannot well afford to leave out a short discussion of it here.

It may be said, broadly speaking, that the doctrine of *Īśvara* is as old in its systematised formulation as the age of the Mahābhārata and the Upaniṣads. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad contains a nominal enunciation of some of the most popular theories current in its time in explanation of the origin of the Universe and *Īśvara-vāda* forms one of this number. Thus we read :

"कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा
भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्यम् ।
संयोग एषां न त्वात्मभावा-
दात्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ॥

In the second half of this famous passage, suffering though from a slight ambiguity of expression, the doctrine of *Īśvara*, I believe, is undoubtedly indicated.[122] A more pronounced statement, however, appears in Suśruta,[123]

where six diverse views are mentioned. Puṇyarāja in his Commentary on the Vākyapadīya,[124] Sarvajñātmā Muni in the Saṁkṣepa-śāriraka, [125] Guṇaratna in the Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti,[126] Māṭhara[127] and Gauḍapāda[128] on Sāṁkhya-kārikā,[129] Bhaṭṭa Utpala on Bṛhat-saṁhitā,[130] Ācārya Nemicandra in Gommaṭasāra,[131] and, Gotama in Nyāya Sūtras[132] speak of various rival theories about the origin of the world.[133] Many of these had been in vogue in independent forms, and, as inter-related, long before the rise of Buddhism. And, there seems to be good reason to believe that in course of centuries, with the systematisation of the schools, some of these doctrines lost their independence altogether and came to be affiliated to the systems newly built up. The inevitable consequence of this gradual assimilation would appear to have been a blending of thoughts which sometimes seriously hinders historical discrimination. I am, however, trying to append below a short note on each of these doctrines, taking especial care to keep up its integrity as closely as feasible;[134] and, it will be evident from a glance at this description that theistic studies were very intimately connected in early times with the study of the fundamental Causal Problem with which all these theories had endeavoured to deal, and, that they are traceable to a great antiquity in the past.

1. Svabhāvavāda

Under the name of *Svabhāvavāda* we may comprise almost[135] all those modes of thinking which may deny the principle of Causality, more particularly efficient Causality, and, assert the supremacy of the inherent or immanent nature of a thing. Theoretically it may be

thought of under a twofold aspect—extreme and moderate :

A. The extremist view :

It repudiates the possibility of discovering the cause of a thing at the very outset of the inquiry and sets up in explanation of the why of an event or product, the doctrine of *Svabhāva*. This is *Svabhāvavāda par excellence*.

B. The moderate view :

It allows causal analysis as possible and even as legitimate, within certain limits, but, holds that this discursive process of seeking for a sufficient reason cannot be carried very far. At the last stage, however, where no adequate explanation is forth-coming, an appeal must be made to "the nature of the thing"; and, this is *svabhāva*. This is practically a confession of the importance of human reason in regard to all first principles, on which some assumptions have necessarily to be made.

From the above it would appear that the former kind of *Svabhāvavāda* is inimical to scientific progress, in that it puts a stop to the initiative of all researches by denying the existence and knowledge of the principle of efficient causation, while the latter view is quite sane and sound.

The earliest representatives of the extreme form of *Svabhāvavāda* seem to have been a set of free thinkers in ancient India who were originally called *Lokāyatikas*,[136] but, subsequently came to be more widely known under the name of *Cārvākas*.[137] Rank materialism, an absence of belief in the Unseen and of regard for Authority,

and, an uncompromising rationalism—more correctly casuistry (*Vitaṇḍā*)[138] were their general characteristics.

There are evidences in the Pali Literature as to the existence, during the age of Buddhism or even earlier, of a class of persons, Brahmins by caste, who spent all their wits in the subtleties of futile controversies. What the nature of these controversies was in which they found so much pleasure and showed such skill we do not exactly know. But, one thing stands out certain. They did not believe in the Vedas nor even in the *Dharma-śāstras*—the canonical works—of the Buddhists and the Jains. Hence their arguments did not appeal to any of those religious communities in which in spite of mutual differences there was unanimity in an unquestioning and unquestionable obedience to Authority (in the form of Veda or *Buddha-vacana* or *Jina-śāsana*).

Thus, we find that the Brahmins, the Buddhists and the Jains were all equally ill-disposed towards the *Lokāyatikas* on whom they looked down with contempt as their common enemies : (a) In the Rāmāyaṇa[139] Rāmacandra is said to have spoken to Bharata—

"कच्चिन्न लोकायतिकान् ब्राह्मणांस्तात सेवसे ।
अनर्थकुशला ह्येते बालाः पण्डितमानिनः ॥
धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः ।
बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते" ॥

Here the Commentator Rāma explains the word *Lokāyatikas* as चार्वाकमतानुसारिणः or as शुष्कतर्कवावदूकाः. There is little doubt that Manu[140] refers to these *Lokāyatika* Brahmins given to casuistry by the expression *nāstika*. (b) Pali works abound in references to this sect. The Buddha did not allow his Bhikṣus to learn or teach the

Lokāyata system.[141] The notorious Chabbaggiya monks whose names occur so often as mischief-makers in the Vinaya Piṭaka were adepts in this branch of learning. It is condemned among other low arts in the Mahāsīla 5. The Nepalese Buddhists refer to it as one of those things with which a Bodhisattva should not occupy himself or in which good disciples should not take any pleasure.[142] (c) The attitude of the Jains may be best evidenced by their describing it as a form of *micchāditṭhi* or heresy.[143]

The extreme form of *Svabhāvavāda* may be thus illustrated. It has already been noted that in this view the rejection of causal principle forms the most important feature.[144] It is averred that neither sensuous perception nor inference is an evidence in support of its existence. For mere perception of two events is not sufficient to establish between them a causal nexus, the reason being that even when a thing is observed by the senses doubt may still arise as to its being a cause. To ascertain whether a given antecedent condition has the character of a true cause it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability (*niyama*) and of relevancy (*ananyathā-siddhi*) involved in such a notion. But, this certitude can never be arrived at. As for inference being possibly a means of the ascertainment of causality, the *Lokāyatika* contests its evidentiary value. The problem of Induction is to him insoluble. The conviction of Universal Concomitance or of the absence of a condition limiting the Universality of the relation on which all inference is based is inaccessible to human resources. The result is that to the *Lokāyatika* there is no order revealed in the world, either of sense or of intellect. Every thing stands isolated and self-contained.

In this state of intellectual confusion the fact of contingency observable in phenomenal creation appears to be very hard to explain; but, an explanation may be suggested. Contingency means that a product comes into existence at one particular moment rather than another. But, how is this particular time to be determined? The usual reply of the causalists consists in referring this time-determination to the co-operation of the antecedent conditions. But, the *Svabhāvavādī* staves off this difficulty by an appeal to *svabhāva*, remarking that no further question on this point is relevant. Let us try to understand the situation. It is well-known that even the doctrine of causality fails to explain the ultimate principles; it is then simpler, so it is affirmed, to assume at the very start that causes, known or unknon (*adṛṣṭa*) are all superfluous. Varieties and inequalities remain after all unexplained facts, and, no amount of analysis will ever furnish us with the right solution. The only reasonable conclusion, therefore, in such cases is to say that it is the nature of the thing to happen at such and such a time, and, that is all. The only law here is the law of *svabhāva*. Just as a piece of cloth occupies the same space as its material cause, the threads (*tantu*), and, not the shuttle etc., although the threads and the shuttles are both equally causes; in the same way a product, though destitute of a cause, may appear at one time and not at another. As in the former case space-association (*deśa-niyama*) is due to *svabhāva* and not to a cause, so in the latter time-relation (*kāla-niyamà*) too is similarly to be explained. This being so, the contingency of the visible-phenomena need not be in opposition to the fact of their being self-sufficient (*nirapekṣa*) and uncaused (*ahetuka*).[145] The position

of the *Lokāyatika* on this point is thus summed up by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī :

"अदृष्टाङ्गीकारेऽपि क्वचिद् गत्वा स्वभावे पर्यवसानात् स्वाभाविकमेव जगद्वैचित्र्यमस्तु दृष्टे संभवत्यदृष्टकल्पनानवकाशात्। अतः काम एव प्राणिनां कारणं नान्यददृष्टेश्वरादीत्याहुरिति लोकायतिकदृष्टिरियम्"[146]।

From what we have seen of *Svabhāvavāda* we can well understand that it is a doctrine of unmitigated automatism, in the sense that all movements, within the organism and outside it, are held to proceed from the inherent necessity of the body rather than from an extrinsic principle of efficiency, such as Personal Will or *Adṛṣṭa*.[147] The power and freedom of Will being thus totally disavowed, the theory commits itself to the awkward positition of a queer sort of Determinism.

The literature of the *Svabhāvavādins* is now entirely lost except what has reached us in fragments. Here is a verse which appears to have originally belonged to a standard work of this literature, describing in outline the three main theses of this doctrine, viz. : (1) varieties due to *svabhāva*, (2) movement (*pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*) due to *svabhāva*, and (3) denial of free will :

"कः कण्टकानां प्रकरोति तैक्ष्ण्यं
विचित्रभावं मृगपक्षिणां च।
माधुर्यभिक्षोः कटुतां च निम्बे
स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तम्" ॥

I quote this from Bhaṭṭa Utpala's Commentary on Bṛhatsaṁhitā,[148] but, it also occurs in the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya-vṛtti,[149] in Ḍallana's Commentary on Suśruta,[150] and, among other *ślokas* of a similar nature, in Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita.[151] In the last there is a

slight variation in the reading of the verse in the second half : thus—

Line 3 = स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तं

Line 4 = न कामकारोऽस्ति कुतः प्रयत्नः ।

Probably this view is referred to as *Nirnimittavāda* in Nyāya Sūtra 4.1.22-24.

(1) Udayana in his Kusumāñjali[152] appears to make *Svabhāvavāda* one of the five forms of *Ākasmikatva-vāda*, the remaining 4 forms being (1) *Ahetuvāda*, (2) *Abhūtivāda*,(3)*Svata utpādavāda*, and (4) *Anupākhyo-tpādavāda*. A brief note on these tenets is, I believe, necessary to make the discussion complete.

(1) The first view is apparently a formal denial of causality, but, not of production. This much is common with *Svabhāvavāda*, but, it does not accept the elaborate explanation of *svabhāva* as offered by the latter. This *Ahetuvāda* seems to me identical with the famous *Adhicca-samupanna-vāda* so often met in Pali literature.[153] (*Adhicca* = fortuitous, opposed to *Abhiṇha* = habitual[154] or *Paticca* = having a cause). (As for the meaning of the term *Adhicca* compare Udāna,[155] where the word from its context seems to mean neither *svata utpanna* nor *parata utpanna*). Buddhaghoṣa[156] explains it as a*hetuta utpanna*. This is really the so-called *Ahetuvāda*. Buddha-ghoṣa explains its form as *ahutvā sattattāya*, *pariṇata*, i.e., *abhūtvā bhavanam*. There is reference to the *Ahetuvāda* in the Mahābodhi-jātaka,[157] but, the doctrine appears to have a slightly different shade of meaning there.

(2) The second view is a down-right rejection of production (*bhavana*) itself. I cannot say anything about the historical setting of this *vāda*. Could it be an extreme

form of *Śāśvatavāda* which in later times entered into Vedānta and Sāṅkhya-Yoga ?

(3) The third view is a strange doctrine in which the duality usually set up between an effect and its cause is denied. This view is referred to in (1) above and in Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka Kārikā.

(4) The last doctrine is evidently some form of *Śūnyavāda* in which a product is said to appear from a pre-existing Void or Nothing. In this view of Causality the reality of both *upādāna* and *nimitta* is denied.

Ujjvaladatta divides *svabhāva* as two-fold, viz., (1) *nisarga* and (2) *svabhāva* proper. The former is explained as habit and the latter as nature. Habit has its origin in conscious and repeated effort in the past, but, nature is spontaneous and has no extrinsic source of origin at all. He says :

"बहिर्हेत्वनपेक्षो तु स्वभावोऽथ प्रकीर्त्तितः ।
निसर्गश्च स्वभावश्च इत्येष भवति द्विधा ॥
निसर्गः सुदृढाभ्यासजन्यः संस्कार उच्यते ।
अजन्यस्तु स्वतः सिद्धः स्वरूपो भाव उच्यते" ॥[158]

2. Niyativāda

The views of the *Niyativādins* are thus stated in Ḍallana's Commentary :

"पूर्वजन्मार्जितौ धर्माधर्मौ नियतिः, सैव सर्वस्य कारणमिति नियति-वादिनः" ।

As thus expressed the doctrine appears to be practically identical in sense with the *Karma-vāda* to which Varāha Mihira refers in the Bṛhat-saṁhitā[159] Nīlakaṇṭha makes it the especial feature of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy[160]

but, the reason is not given. The word *Niyati* according to the above definition stands undoubtedly either for the whole body of stored *Karmic* forces which are waiting for the right Time—proper season, to be realised into action or only for that part of its which has commenced to fructify. In any sense it is a doctrine held in common by all the systems of India, and, not by Mīmāṁsā in particular. Nīlakaṇṭha's justification seems, however, to be thus possible : in all the systems *Karma* has a subordinate rank, in that it has to work in subjection to the Divine Will or at any rate to the transcendental influence of *Puruṣa*; but, in Mīmāṁsā alone the restrictive condition laying down that an insentient object cannot move into action of itself is totally rejected and inconsequence of this *Karma* has in Mīmāṁsā a unique position. Mīmāṁsā is *par excellence* a *Karmavādin*.

But to me it seems as if the original significance of *Niyativāda* were some what different. In all probability the original *vādas* known as *Svabhāvavāda*, *Kālavāda*, *Yadṛcchāvāda*, *Niyativāda* etc., were collateral and had a community of origin. They were all not-theistic assumptions, which had arisen in attempting to find out an explanation of the appearance and disappearance of phenomena. All were more or less of a determinist cast. The reality of *Kṛti-Puruṣakāra* (*Kāmakāra*) or Freedom of the Will is denied everywhere, and with this the agency of the Self. Naturally, therefore, *Niyati* would seem to stand for the blind driving impulse of a Power from behind, without indeed the redeeming capacity of an initiative Will. It is, so to speak, the determining power of the past asserting itself over against the vacuity of the present. Thus viewed *Niyati* answers in a large measure to the ancient classical notions of Necessity

(*necessiteo ineluctabilis*) or Fate (fatum).[161] It is altogether a different conception from *Adṛṣṭa*, in so far as it is an inexorable and inevitable destiny, in every manner blind and purposeless. *Adṛṣṭavāda* allows for the freedom of will and the consequent possibility of fresh actions, with the result that *Adṛṣṭa* and *Puruṣakāra* are held to be capable of acting and reacting on each other. *Adṛṣṭa* is never an implacable necessity, for its power, however intense, may be neutralised by an act of the will, provided that it is sufficiently strong.

The doctrine known as *Pubbekatavāda* (*Pūrvakṛtavāda*), of which we find an account in the Pali Literature, approaches the philosophical position of *Niyati* in so far as it denies the freedom of the will and the existence of the present *Karma* capable of modifying the past. In the Mahābodhijātaka[162] where this view is described it is plainly stated that pleasure and pain are due entirely to the past *Karma* and that the act of rendering pleasure to or inflicting pain upon others means really a discharge of old debts and involves no fresh moral responsibility. The two doctrines are not, therefore, exactly identical.

Nemicandrācārya explicitly says that *Niyativāda* consists in holding that the time, instrumentality, manner and the subject of an action are all pre-determined and invariable :

"जत्तु जदा जेण जहा जस्स य नियमेण होदि जत्तु तदा ।
तेण तहा तस्स हवे इदि वादो णियदिवादो दु" ॥[163]

(1) In the Yogavāśiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa, (2) in the ancient Pāñcarātra and (3) in the Śaiva systems, the conception of *Niyati* is of course greatly modified. There is none of that rigid and inflexible determinism, that blank fatalism, which prevailed in the old extremist school.

(1) In the former, for instance,[164] it stands, stripped of metaphor, as equivalent to what I consider to be the Cosmic Law (*samaṣṭi-karma*) or the Combined *Adṛṣṭas* of a particular system of the world. Ānandabodhendra, in his Commentary on the above[165] explains the word simply as "कृतस्य कर्मणः फलावश्यम्भावनियमः"; but, the context hardly leaves any doubt as to the exact nature of its connotation. And again, the brilliant metaphor conceiving *Niyati* as the consort of Time-spirit with whom it dances in union[166] and sets up the cosmic movement lends undoubtedly a strong support to my contention about its universality.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out that this Cosmic Law, including what are generally called the Laws of Nature, is according to Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, as in the Purāṇas usually,[167] the stamp of God's Will set on the forms of creation.

Thus, the question turns on the origin of *svabhāva (vastu-svabhāva)* or of the laws of nature. Why, e. g., is fire hot and ice cold ? How are the final differences to be accounted for ? The simple answer is—through *Niyati*. So the Yoga-vāśiṣṭha says. But what is *Niyati* ?

To start from the state of Universal Dissolution when all phenomenal varieties are believed to sink into the Unity of the Absolute. On the close of this of quiescent period, which is indicated by Time, God wakes into activity and wills into manifestation all the entities of the preceding cycle which have not yet completed their round of worldly journeys. The rise of Will (involving its logical precedents—Knowledge and Desire) in God is tantamount to the maturity or fructification (through Time) of the Universal *Karma* hitherto lying

dormant. God as thus willing forth or projecting the Universe, subject to the past *Karmas* of the *Jīvas*, is technically known by the name of Brahmā, and, the Universe thus brought forth as the expression of His Will (*saṅkalpa-janya*) is really a Mental Creation. The forms of His Will as expressed in the beginning of Creation persist even to-day and will persist till the very end. They are in this sense unalterable. These fixed laws and relations and the properties of things are what is collectively known as *Niyati*:[168]

"सर्गादौ या यथारूढा संवित्कचन सन्ततिः ।
साद्याप्यचलितान्येन स्थिता नियतिरुच्यते" ॥[169]

It is interesting to note that this fixity is not absolute, in so far as individual acts of the will are believed,according to their degrees of purity, to be able to influence more or less successfully this pre-destined nature. But, what particular *Karma* has the power of acting on a particular aspect of *Niyati* is already determined by the Will of God, and, this remaining inviolable the fixity of *Niyati* stands in one way unassailed. It would be instructive to compare with this the view of Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga Sūtra III. 45, where he notes that the *Yogin* who has conquered by a process of psychic control (*saṁyama*) the 5 forms of the *bhūtas* and can direct them to his will is rewarded *inter alias* with the power of immediately realising his will. The essences of the *bhūtas* (*bhūtaprakṛtayaḥ*) obey his will, as soon as it arises. But, even such a *Yogin*, with command over the entire forces of nature, does not act in violation to the established order of the universe, viz., the order already imposed by the Will of a Supreme Self (i. e., God) similarly empowered : "न च शक्तोऽपि पदार्थविपर्यासं करोति । कस्मात् ? अन्यस्य यत्रकामावसायिनः पूर्वसिद्धस्य तथाभूतेषु संकल्पात्" ।

Vācaspati's comment on the above is of exceeding interest. He observes that a *Yogin* of the kind described above may indeed alter the powers and properties of things, since these are variable, being subject to diverse conditions, e. g., time, place, origin and circumstances; but, he can in no wise reverse the nature of the things themselves.

(2) In the Pāñcarātra works, however, *Niyati* is conceived as the mother of Time and the immediate product of *Māyā Śakti*.[170] Probably this is a modification of the early Sāṅkhya in which besides the grosser time, which is declared to be an emanation from *Ākāśa*,[171] a subtler form of it, perhaps equally eternal with *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, was conceded. The question of *Puruṣa* being left out of account, it seems to me likely that the *Prakṛti* and *Kāla* of the ancient Sāṅkhya correspond to '*Śakti* (*Māyā*) and its Time-body (consisting of *Niyati* and *Kāla*) in the Pāñcarātras (as preserved in the Ahirbudhnya-saṁhitā). The *Guṇa*-body of *Śakti* is of course the same as the disturbed state of *Prakṛti's* equilibrium brought about by the influence of Time.

(3) The Saiva works present a slightly different account from the above. But, even here *Niyati* and *Kāla* are clearly distinguished in their functions,and, have none of that stern fatalistic tinge about them which is the distinctive feature of the extremist schools known by those two names. *Niyati* and *Kāla* are here two of the five forms of limitation of experience, viz., those in regard to Space and Time, imposed by *Māyā Śakti* on the experiencing Self (*pramātā*), *Niyati* being concerned with the obscuration of the Immanence (*vyāpakatva*) of the Self and *Kāla* with that of its Eternity (*nityatva*).[172]

The main difference of the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava notions on this point lies in the fact that whereas in the former *Niyati* and *Kāla* are supposed to spring simultaneously from *Māyā Śakti* in the latter *Kāla* comes out of *Niyati* which is the direct offspring of *Māyā*.[173]

3. *Kālavāda*

With *Niyativāda* stands intimately connected the concept of *Kāla*, a detailed review of which is omitted from this place.[174] The original *Kālavāda* was doubtless a fatalistic creed, much like the notion to which Uddyotakara refers in the Nyāya-vārtika.[175] But, the doctrine of which Dallana speaks is evidently different. The writer quotes a verse from the astronomer Śrīpati, in which Time is described as the Lord-*Īśvára*—the Source of the world's efficient Causation. From the above as well as from the statements of Rāmatīrtha and Agnicit Puruṣottama[176] it would seem that this view was that of the astronomers.[177]

4. *Yadṛcchāvāda*

Yadṛcchā is defined by Śaṅkarācārya(on Svetāśvatara Upaniṣat) as "आकस्मिकप्राप्तिः" or Coincidence.[178] The upholders of this doctrine were also deniers of the Uniformities of Nature (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*), and, asserted that the knowledge of the causal relation was unattainable by any of the accredited means of proof. It is observed that the the same product arises from each of a variety of antecedents,[179] and, this would not be possible if there were a definite and invariable relation between the cause and the effect. The connection between an antecedent and the consequent following upon it is always casual, rather than causal.

It is very difficult to distinguish between *Svabhāva* and *Yadṛcchā*, as both are indentical so far as the rejection of the causal principle is concerned. But, the distinction, however, may be taken to lie in this that whereas in *Svabhāvavāda* a *niyama* is formally admitted which is technically known as *svabhāva-niyama*, in *Yadṛcchāvāda* there is no scope for any such restriction.[180] With reference to the question—why a jar should be produced from clay and not from threads—the answer of the *Svabhāvavādin* is a plain statement of the nature of the thing which is unchangeable, but, the answer of the *Yadṛcchāvādin* would be a flat denial of the reality of any such natural principle. The observed order and regularity in our experience is due to mere Chance, they would say. Amalānanda, in his Vedānta-kalpataru on 2.1.33,[181] brings out this distinction very clearly in the following remarkable sentence : "नियतनिमित्तमनपेक्ष्य यदा कदाचित्प्रवृत्युदयो यदृच्छा, स्वभावस्तु स एव यावद्वस्तुभावी यथा श्वासादौ".

Part II.

The Non-theistic Systems

I have given in the foregoing pages a bare outline of the different theories relating to the origin of things. I now propose to deal more particularly with the principal notions of some of the recognized schools of non-theistical philosophy which bear, directly or in a remote way, on the problem of Theism. An exhaustive treatment of the subject is *prima facie* impossible within the compass of these pages, but, I have nevertheless endeavoured not to exclude from my scope or dismiss unexamined any of the more important doctrines.

The Cārvāka view

First and foremost among the philosophies which deny the existence of Personal God stands the material school of the Cārvākas. Though this school of thought owing to its gross sensationalism had never succeeded in striking its roots deep into the soil of the country it still possessed an interest, almost unique in character, partly theoretical—in the eyes of controversialists, and, partly even practical, though only to a very limited number. Its doctrines, if doctrines they could at all be called, were most mercilessly exposed by all the other systems, orthodox as well as heterodox; and, if they have survived to-day they have done so simply as so many ill-formulated theses without any pretention to speculative value.

The founder

Tradition ascribes to Bṛhaspati the foundation of the philosophy of materialism.[182] An adherent of this school of thought is, therefore, usually known as Bārhaspatya.[183] That Bṛhaspati was not a mythical personage is evident from the *Sūtras* extant in quotation under his name :

Compare :—(i) Bhāṣkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra 3.3.53 :

(a) पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि ।[184]

(b) तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा ।

(c) तेभ्यश्चैतन्यम् ।

(d) किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवद् विज्ञानम् ।

(ii) Saṅkara's commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra 3.3.53 :

(a) तेभ्यश्चैतन्यम् ।
(b) मदशक्तिवद् विज्ञानम् ।
(c) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।[185]

(iii) Nīlakaṇṭha on the Gītā :

(a) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।
(b) काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थः ।

(The last two *Sūtras* are also quoted by Madhusūdana, Nīlakaṇṭha and Dhanapati in their commentaries on the Gītā (16-11).

(iv) Sadānanda in the Advaita-brahmasiddhi :

(a) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।
(b) काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थः ।
(c) मरणमेवापवर्गः ।

The doctrines

We have already dealt at some length with this view in the preceding pages where we observed that it had been one of the main dogmas of the Lokāyatika sect. We now pass on hurriedly to describe some of the other tenets of the school.

Among these we may mention first of all the doctrine of the four elements. The Cārvākas believed, very much like the Buddhist Philosophers, that *Ākāśa* was not an element at all; it was a Void, an absence of *āvaraṇa*. Only the four elements in their atomic condition were held to be the basic (root) principles in Creation. The external world, the sense-organs as well as the physical organisms were supposed to be the products of these primordial types of matter. But, how this production comes to be possible is a question left unexplained. All kinds

of causes, known or unknown (*adṛṣṭa*), being rejected, and, the guidance of an Eternal Intelligence being regarded as superfluous, the materialist is left with the only alternative open to him, viz., to say that this production results from the fortuitous concourse of the blind constitutive particles of matter. Nothing further can be said on this head. It would be illegitimate, so it is urged, to demand an explanation where no explanation can be given.

To the Materialists Life and Consciousness are practically equivalent, and, are both believed to originate from Matter. Sentience and the phenomena of mental life are material properties and need not imply a distinct immaterial substance as the Self. It is admittedly true that Consciousness is not observed to inhere in the particles of matter, either severally[186] or even collectively, but, this is no argument against the fact that when these particles come to be arranged into a specific form in a manner not yet scientifically explicable they are found to show signs of life. This peculiar collocation of the atoms results in the formation of the organism (*śarīra*).[187] This is the Self (*Ātmā*).

That consciousness is a function of the body may be proved by a process of logical demonstration, e.g., by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). (a) Thus, we find by observation, and, there is no instance to the contrary, that for the manifestation of consciousness body is an inalienable factor and that discarnate consciousness is not possible. This shows that between organism and consciousness there exists some necessary bond, viz., that of Causality. (b) And, Universal experience as expressed in judgments like "I feel hot, I feel tired" seems to vouch for the truth of this view. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and

perceptions can arise only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But, it would not be so were not the body the substrate of consciousness. (c) Apart from this there is another proof in favour of the causal relation between Matter and Consciousness. This is afforded by the description in medical literature of the properties of particular preparations of food and drink (e.g. *Brāhmīghṛta)* conducive to the development of the intellectual powers.[188]

(i) First, since the body is declared to be the agent (*kartā*) of all actions it should, on grounds of logical consistency, be held morally responsible for their natural consequences. But, this is scarcely possible : (a) The particles which go to the formation of the body are always in a state of flux, so that the body which performs an action (*karma*) at one moment does no longer persist at the next to feel its reaction (*bhoga*). (b) And even if this momentary fluctuation be not admitted it is nevertheless undeniable that the body suffers change; the bodies in two different periods of life are different from each other, for otherwise they could not have different sizes. The appearance of a different size implies that the former size is destroyed which is possible only when the subject in which it resides (i.e., *pūrva-śarīra*) is also destroyed.

(ii) Secondly, the material theory is incompetent to account for the facts of memory and recognition (*smṛti* and *pratyabhijñā*). Necessity of thought demands that memory and the original experience (*anubhava*) which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject, but, this identity of reference would not be possible if the subject were not fundamentally an unchangeable unity.

To these alleged objections the Cārvāka replies that they are more apparent than real. For the second difficulty may be easily got over by supposing that the traces (*saṁskāra*) left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted *saṁkrama*) from the prior moment to the succeeding moment, i. e., from the material cause (*upādāna*) down to its direct product (*upādeya*).

As to how this may be possible one may consider, the Cārvāka says, the analogous instance of the transferrence of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. Here the only condition observed to be necessary is the presence of a relation between the two objects. And, between a cause and its effect—the case under consideration—such a relation does undoubtedly exist. The unity of reference may also be ensured by the admission that the impressions, though transferrable, do pertain to, i.e., are preserved and revived (reproduced) in, a single line or Causal series.

As regards the first point the position of the Cārvāka prevents him from recognising its cogency as an objection. An inveterate foe of the doctrine of *Adṛṣṭa*, he finds no justice, natural or moral, in the government of the Universe, so that the very question of the necessity of logically unifying *karma* with its *phala* does not appear to him as a problem calling for solution. *Bhoga*—the experience of pleasure and pain—is not determined by a previous *karma* (*Pūrva-karma*), but, comes by chance (*yadṛcchā*) over which there is no control. This being so, the subjective unity sought for to explain the synthesis of cause and effect needs hardly a ground for establishment.[189]

But, even if it were needed we could find it in the unity of the organism. Recognition testifies to the

identity of the body through all its changing states; and, this recognition cannot be pronounced false as in the case of nails pared and renewed, for there is no chance here as in the example cited of the body being once destroyed and then substituted by a fresh one of similar kind. The fact of recognition which is brought forward as subversive of the alleged momentariness of an object appearing one in consciousness is fatal also to the mutability of the organism.[190]

Besides the above, there are three more views of the material school according as the Self is identified with (1) the sense-organs (*indriya*), with (2) the principle of Life (*prāṇa*), or with (3) Mind (*manaḥ*).

The advocates of the first view set forth that the senses are really the intra-organic conscious agents. This view is based on the facts that consciousness and bodily movements (*ceṣṭāh*) follow from the initiation of the senses and the judgments expressed in "I am blind, etc." showing the identity of Self with the sense organs are universally accepted as valid. Vātsyāyana thus describes the view : "तानीन्द्रियाणीमानि स्वस्वविषयग्रहणाच्चेतनानि, इन्द्रियाणां भावाभावयोर्विषयग्रहणस्य तथा भावात्। एवं सति किमन्येन चेतनेन"।[191]

The second view consists in maintaining that as the senses depend for existence and operation on the Vital Principle, this principle itself is really the source of intelligence. The fact that the presence and absence of the senses involve the origin and non-origin of knowledge does not necessarily point to their agency; the fact may be equally explained on the hypothesis of their instrumentality. Moreover, if agency were to be assigned to the senses there would ensure an insurmoun-

table difficulty in consequence of the absence of organs about the origin of action. Again, the question arises: which of the senses is the agent—each of them severally or all combined? In the former case, is the agency simultaneous or successive? Now it is absurd to think that the agency belongs to all the senses indifferently, for the object of one sense never becomes cognisable to another and the senses are never known to work concurrently in producing an effect. The alternative of simultaneity is of course out of the question. As to the remaining contention that each of the senses may be an agent in succession, the reply is: if each of these be an absolutely independent agent, as asserted, it is likely that in case of conflicting movements due to varied resolutions the balance of the whole bodily organism should be upset, but, this is never known to happen. But, if the senses were subservient in their functions to the guidance of a Superior Entity it would be reasonable to hold this latter to be the true Self rather than the senses. This Entity is *Prāṇa*, the principle of Persistence during Sleep and Wakeful Condition alike.[192]

Finally, we may mention the view which claims that Consciousness is a quality of the Mind.[193] Brahmānanda, in his Commentary on the Siddhānta-bindu,[194] explains the grounds on which this theory is founded, stating that the other organs are only the means of indeterminate sense-knowledge (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*), but, it is mind alone that introduces into such knowledge the element of determinateness. For this reason, as well as because it controls by virtue of its power of Volition (*Saṅkalpa*) the outer organs and may persist and function singly even when the latter happen to be

absent (e. g., on the plane of existence called *Svapna*), the Mind is the true Self.

In these different views there is perfect agreement as to the number of *pramāṇas* recognised, for all of them admit that perception is the only way of gaining a right knowledge of things. Inference is not a valid proof, in as much as the Universal and Necessary relation on which it is based cannot be discovered. In other words, it is practically impossible and logically incongruous to ascend, merely by a process of multiplication of individual instances (*bhūyo-darśana*) from limited sense-experience to a knowledge of Universal Truths (*Sarvopasaṁhāriṇī Vyāpti*). Bare enumeration of facts, however far it may be carried, hardly suffices to find out the element of Necessity involved in generalisations. Perception is unable to establish the truth of Induction. For though perception may tell us, e. g., that this particular A is related to this particular B, this knowledge would hardly justify its extension in the form of 'all A's are related to B's.' What right have we, with the limited faculties at our command, to jump into the Unknown and assert a Categorical Universal proposition ? Moreover, the assertion of such a proposition would presuppose the elimination of all accidental factors (*upādhi-vidhūnana*). But, how is the absence of these factors to be made known ? Perception would not avail where these are by nature supersensuous, and, the validity of inference as a proof has been already controverted. There would thus cling an abiding suspicion, not removeable by any means accessible to man, as to the truth of every Universal judgment.

Thus, according to the Cārvāka perception being the only criterion of existence whatever is not perceived

is held to have no existence at all : "यन्नोपलभ्यते तन्नास्ति." This view naturally leads up to scepticism. But, for practical purposes probability (*sambhāvanā*) alone is sufficient.[195] Thus, at the sight of smoke rising from a certain place there arises in the mind a sense of the probability of fire, and, not of its certainty, and, this is enough for all practical purposes. For this end there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence, called Inference. The notion of *pramāṇa* as being the basis of certain knowledge is due to Chance Coincidence *(saṁvāda)* between the knowledge which led to the activity *(pravartaka-jñāna)* and the attainment of the object in which the activity is fulfilled *(pravṛtti-sāmarthya)*, i.e., harmony between thought and object.

From the above sketch of the philosophical notions of the materialists it can well be seen why there is no room for God in this system. The usual arguments held out by the theists have not for them the force of persuasion. *Adṛṣṭa* or even the principle of physical causality being denied, it is idle to argue, they would say, that God is the moral Governor of the world adjusting the *Karmas* of the *Jīvas*, or that He is the Universal Agent—the author of the contingent phenomena. And, to one to whom the Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility it is equally vain to attempt showing that from them the existence of a Omniscient Spirit could be inferred. And last but not least, Inference itself *(Anumāna)* is denied. The senses do not confessedly reach Him and verbal testimony falls under the category of inference. There is no means of ascertaining, therefore, that an all-knowing, all-powerful spirit exists. Nature (*svabhāva*), and, not God, is the watch-word of this school.[196]

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VIII. SOME ASPECTS OF VĪRA ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY

I

Though the sect of Vīra Śaivas or Liṅgāyatas holds an important position in the religious history of Southern India, its name, except at Benares, is not perhaps so widely known in the North. Neither its history and sectarian characteristics nor its system of philosophy are so familiar to the student of Indian Culture as one might wish them to be. It is proposed, therefore, to speak a few words in the present paper on some aspects of this philosophy.

The sect had its origin about the middle of the 12th century A. D., being founded by a Brahmin named Bāsava, who had been the Prime Minister of the Kalachuri King Bijjala. Of course there are differences of opinion. But, it is beyond doubt that Bāsava was a very important figure, and, if he was not the actual founder he was at least the reformer of the sect. What Gautama had been to Buddhism and Mahāvira to Jainism (according to tradition) Bāsava was to this Śaiva faith. According to tradition the sect originated from five ascetics who became the first heads of five original monasteries. The names of these pontiffs are: Ekorāma, Paṇḍitārādhya, Revaṇa, Marula and Viśvārādhya, and, those of the monasteries respectively are: Śrī Śaila, Kedāranātha, Rambhāpurī (Balehalli), Ujjainī and Benares. They appeared in a miraculous way from the following Liṅgas respectively, viz., Śrī Mallikārjuna in Dhātu Kuṇḍa, Rāmanātha in

Drākṣārāma, Someśvara in Kollipākī, Siddheśa in Vaṭa Kṣetra and Viśveśvara in Benares.

There seems to exist a variety of opinion regarding the line of teachers through whom the teachings of the sect are said to have been transmitted. Śrīpati in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra makes Sadāśiva the original teacher. From him we have the following line :

Sadāśiva
|
Śaktidhara
|
Dadhīci
|
Durvāsas
|
Viśvāmitra
|
Sukeśa
|
Agastya
|
Cinmaya Vāmadeva
|
Śrī Revaṇa Siddha

This Revaṇa was one of the five original *Mahants* of the order. Śrīpati was apparently a disciple of Revaṇa to whom as well as to Ekorāma he pays his respects.

Māyideva, author of Anubhava-sūtra and Viśeṣārtha-prakāśikā, another teacher of this sect, claims his spiritual descent from Upamanyu, thus :

Upamanyu
|
Bhīmanātha
|
Kuleśvara
|
Vopanātha
|
Nākarāja
|
Saṅgameśvara
|
Māyideva

It may be of interest to note that in the Vāyavīya-saṁhitā of the Śiva-purāṇa[197] Upamanyu is mentioned with three others, viz. Ruru, Dadhīci and Agastya as the original propounders of Śaiva doctrines and authors of four distinct Saṁhitās. Śrīpati also in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra *Śāstrayonitvāt* mentions the names of Upamanyu, Dadhīci, Gautama, Durvāsas, Reṇuka, Saṅkhakarṇa, Gokarṇa, etc., as those of great teachers who were omniscient (*Sarvajña*)—a term which is explained as meaning *sarva-veda-vedāntokta-sakala-padārthābhijña*.

II

The Primal Reality, called here by the name of *Sthala*,[198] is the abiding background of all phenomena (creative, preservative and destructive) and as such is identical with Parama Śiva. Absolute Freedom, Eternal Self-revelation and Supreme Selfhood (*Pūrṇāhantā*) constitute its very essence. When this Primal Reality want to play with Itself as Worshipper and Worshipped there arises on its calm bosom what we might describe as a slight

tremor or vibration, very much like the agitation which appears on the calm surface of an ocean before heavy breakers begin to rise into view. This tremor results in dividing the *Sthala* into two aspects by depriving it, as it were, of its equilibrium, so that the portion where self-consciousness is predominant is called by one name, viz., *Śiva* and the remaining portion by another, viz., *Jīva*.

The Primal Reality would thus appear to be a state in which the Substance and its Power are in unaffected equilibrium. The Substance is known in the Āgamas as *Para Śiva* and the Power as *Parā Śakti* or Cidambarā. The Anubhava-sūtra (2.20) says :

"शक्तिरप्रतिमा साक्षात् शिवेन सहधर्मिणी ।
साक्षिणी सत्यसम्पूर्णा निर्विकल्पा महेश्वरी" ॥[199]

The Liṅgāyata philosophers are advocates of Viśiṣṭādvaita like Śrī Kaṇṭha and the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, and, they have consequently to assume that *Śakti* as qualifying the Supreme Reality is its eternal adjunct and never separable from it. It is two-fold, according as it abides in *Brahma* directly as Light or *Cit Śakti* or indirectly as the Reflection of the Light or *Acit Śakti*. The two names represent the opposite aspects of the same Fundamental Power, so that the system does not recognise any inherent contradiction between Matter and Spirit.[200]

The Sārasvata-sūtra[201] says that the *Śakti*, which always resides in the Supreme Self, is called *Vimarśa* when it reposes exclusively in the Self (*svasthā*). The Self which as Awareness is the background of the entire creation must be described as existing—for without its presence all would be darkness and void,


and, therefore, it must be held to be the subject of existence or being. It is the Agent (*Kartā*) or *Śiva* and Existence the Action (*Kriyā*) or *Śakti*. When the Primal Reality loses its equilibrium the *Śakti* becomes partially agitated (*Kṣubhita*) and transforms itself into the manifested Universe consisting of thirty-six *tattvas* and of an infinite variety of products. The agitation of the *Śakti* is partial, because there are some aspects of the *Śakti*, e. g., *Cit* and *Ānanda* which being devoid of succession (*krama*) by nature are never subject to agitation. It is *Icchā* and the others alone which are sometimes agitated and sometimes in a state of balance. The *Śakti*, both spiritual and material, in its unmanifest condition is called subtle (*sūkṣma*) and its manifested state is known as gross (*sthūla*). In Dissolution which represents the causal and undifferentiated state of *Brahma* both spirit and matter are involved while their evolution or differentiation marks the beginning of the creative or productive stage.

(a) Through the agitation of its own Power (*svaśakti-kṣobha-mātreṇa*) the *Sthala* becomes divided into two—*Liṅga* and *Aṅga*. But, this division is only an apparent cleft in the Indivisible, the duality being due to the limiting conditions (*upādhi*) of accidental existence. Accepting the current coinage of Vedānta terminology it may be said by way of illustration that *Liṅga* corresponds to the *mahat* of *mahākāśa* and *Aṅga* to the *ghaṭa* of *ghaṭākāśa*. Beyond a verbal distinction introduced by association with two distinct concepts (e. g. *mahat* and *ghaṭa*) there is no difference in *ākāśa* at all, so far as it is considered in its pure essence. It is as ever one and undivided. So too with *Liṅgasthala*

and *Aṅgasthala*. *Liṅga* is the *Upāsya*, the Object of worship and *Aṅga* the *Upāsaka* or worshipper, but, in reality both the worshipper and the worshipped are One :

"नाशिवस्य शिवोपास्तिर्घटते जन्मकोटिभिः ।
शिवस्यैव शिवोपास्तिरिति नानाश्रुतिस्मृतिः ॥

Thus one of the great dicta of mystic experience is asserted and vindicated. He is the worshipper and He is the worshipped—in fact, He is worshipping Himself through Himself. The Universe, with all its activities, is an expression of His self-delight, manifested in myriads of ways.[202]



(b) Like *Sthala*, *Śakti* (Power) too becomes two-fold during manifestation. The original *Śakti* is ubiquitous and practically identical with Śiva. As residing in the *Liṅga* this Power is known as *Kalā* (कलाशक्तिः लिङ्गस्थलाश्रया शक्तिः कलारूपा प्रकीर्त्तिता) and when in *Aṅga* then it is called *Bhakti*. The former is *pravṛtti* and is the cause of the origin of worlds, the latter is *nivṛtti* and is the cause of their dissolution. It is the mysterious virtue of *Śakti* (*Kalā*) which makes what is absolutely formless and homogeneous take on an infinite number of forms; and, through an equally mysterious virtue inherent in *Bhakti* all varieties of forms return into the blankness of the Primal Unity. One looks down, as it were, from the heights and is tinged with *māyā*, while the other looks up from the depths and is free from all defilement.

Briefly speaking the natural tendency of *Śakti* is towards multiplication and that of *Bhakti* is towards unification. The Self, as endowed with this *Śakti*, is an object of of worship and as possessed of *Bhakti* it is the worshipper.

III

That the *Liṅga* is identical with Śiva has been already noted.[203] It is three-fold—(a) *Bhāvaliṅga*, (b) *Prāṇaliṅga* and (c) *Iṣṭaliṅga*. Of these (a) *Bhāvaliṅga* is described as pure being (*sanmātra*) partless or indivisible (*niṣkala*) and accessible to intuition (*bhāva*) alone. It is the *Sat* aspect of Divine Essence and the Highest *Tattva* (*Para-tattva*).

(b) *Prāṇaliṅga* is at once above all division and yet infinitely divided (*sakala* and *niṣkala*) and is reached by the mind. It forms the *Cit* aspect of the Divine Essence and the Subtle *Tattva* (*Sūkṣma-tattva*).

(c) The third one, the so-called *Iṣṭaliṅga*, is called *mahat* and is the source, for the devotee, of all his pleasure and immunity from pain. It is to this that the afflicted soul appeals for succour. It is the *Ānanda*-aspect of the Deity and forms the Gross *Tattva* (*Sthūla-tattva*).

Each of these *Liṅgas* is two-fold. Thus—

(a) *Bhāvaliṅga*	=	(1) *Mahāliṅga.* (ii) *Prasādaliṅga.*
(b) *Prāṇaliṅga*	=	(iii) *Caraliṅga* or *Jaṅgama-liṅga.* (iv) *Śivaliṅga.*
(c) *Iṣṭalinga*	=	(v) *Guruliṅga.* (vi) *Acaralinga.*

These are the six *Sthalas*, and corresponding to them, each to each, there are six *Śaktis* :—

"एवं षड्विधं भूतं लिङ्गं परमकारणम् ।
स्वशक्तिवैभवाच्चैव स्वातन्त्र्याल्लीलयापि च ।
शक्तयः षड्विधा ज्ञेयाः षट्स्थलेषु समाहिताः ॥

The six *Śaktis* are named : *Cit Śakti*, *Parā Śakti*, *Ādi Śakti*, *Icchā Śakti* or *Vidyā*, *Jñāna Śakti* or *Pratiṣṭhā* and *Kriyā Śakti* or *Nivṛtti*.

(i) The *Mahālinga*, in association with the Light of Supreme Revelation (*Cicchakti*), flashes eternally upon itself. This is known as *Śivatattva*, the Ultimate Unity, Full, Subtle and Immeasurable, without beginning or end. It is accessible to *bhāva* or intuition.

(ii) *Prasādaliṅga*, with *Parā Śakti*, is known as *Sadākhya Tattva* and is open to *Jñāna*. It is devoid of all limitations (*upādhi*), Bright, Supersensuous, and, contains within itself in potentia the yet-unmanifested Universe.

(iii) The *Caraliṅga*, with *Ādi Śakti*, is realised in mental concentration (*Mānasa-dhyāna*).

(iv) The *Śivaliṅga*, with *Icchā Śakti* is the Ego (*Ahaṁkṛti*) described as one-faced (*ekamukha*) and Luminous, shining with the *Vidyākalās*.

(v) The *Guruliṅga*, with *Jñāna Śakti*, is the great Teacher (*upadeśaka*) from whom the Tantras come forth as if by a spontaneous movement.

(vi) The *Ācāraliṅga*, with *Kriyā Śakti*, is the source of renunciation.

IV

Aṅga is the Soul or *Jīva* so-called because it resorts to the *Liṅga* and finds its rest there.[204] It is said to be of three kinds—(a) *Yogāṅga*, (b) *Bhogāṅga* and (c) *Tyāgāṅga*.

The first enjoys Communion with the Śiva, second Power (*Bhoga*) with Him, and the third is so called from the fact of its having cast off the Cosmic Illusion —*Saṁsāra-bhrānti-saṁtyāga*). Of these

(a) *Yogāṅga*, being self-contained, represents the Causal State and is identified with the dreamless sleep. It corresponds to the *Prajñā* of Vedānta.

(b) *Bhogāṅga*, being intrinsic (*antaraṅga*), represents the *Sūkṣma* state and is identified with dream, standing for the *Taijasa* of Vedānta.

(c) *Tyāgāṅga*, being extrinsic (*bahiraṅga*), represents the gross state and is identified with the waking life. It is equivalent to the *Viśva* of Vedānta.

Like the *Liṅga*, the *Aṅga* is of two varieties each :

(a) Yogāṅga = (i) *Aikya Sthala*.
(ii) *Śaraṇa Sthala*.

(b) Bhogāṅga = (iii) *Prāṇaliṅga*.
(iv) *Prasādī*.

(c) Tyāgāṅga = (v) *Maheśvara Sthala*
(vi) *Bhakta Sthala*.

Bhakti, as a dominant mood, is really one and undivided, but, appears as many coloured in relation to the six *Sthalas* :

"मधुरादिषु यत् षट्सु प्रविश्य सलिलं यथा।
तत्तदाकारतो भाति तथा भक्तिः स्थले स्थले" ॥

The names of the six kinds of *Bhakti*, arranged in the order of the *Aṅgas*, are : (i) *Samarasākārā*, (ii) *Ānandākārā*, (iii) *Anubhavākārā*, (iv) *Avadhānātmikā*, (v) *Naiṣṭhikī* and (vi) *Sadbhakti*.

V

It is said that *Jīva* is a part (*aṁśa*) of Śiva, and, hence like Him pure (*amala*), eternal (*nitya*), spotless (*nirañjana*) and tranquil (*śānta*). Essentially there is not the slightest difference between the two. And, when this semblance of distinction due to the presence of the threefold defilement, which perennially haunts one in the state of bondage and stands in the way of one's self-realisation, melts away, there dawns upon the "naughted" soul the Vision of its destiny fulfilled. Taken back, absorbed, into the Being of Śiva, the soul finds at last its consummation reached. The six attributes which are usually predicated of Śiva or of the Pure Self are named: Omniscience, Self-contentedness, Immaculate Wisdom, Freedom, Absolute and Infinite power.[205]

Just as *Liṅga Sthala* (*Śiva*) becomes manifold through its own power (*Śakti*) so does *Aṅga Sthala* (*Jīva*) become correspondingly multiplied through its devotion (*Bhakti*). As *Liṅga* becomes more and more drawn up into the state of *Śiva* through accession of power, so does *Aṅga* become lifted higher and higher into the level of *Ātman* by reason of its Devotion, till in the end Pure *Śiva* and Pure *Ātmā* alone remain, eternally attached to each other, as Master and Attendant, as Worshipper and Worshipped, or as Teacher and Pupil. This is the blessed state to which every devotee inwardly aspires.[206]

The union of *Jīva* and Śiva as described above, is called here *Sāyujya Mukti*, and, constitutes

according to the teachings of this sect the highest form of Salvation :

"तस्माल्लिङ्गाङ्गसंयोगात् परा मुक्तिर्न विद्यते "।

Ātmā is really a direct part of Śiva pure and free, but, in its mundane existence it appears as roaming, restless and in chains. It is on account of self-forgetfulness that the state of bondage seems so real to it. It identifies falsely, the body with itself, accepting as a matter of course the hard penalties which such an act of identification inevitably entails; at the best, it considers itself as the owner of the body and inseparately associated with it. A period of storm and unrest naturally follows, accompanied by pain, heart-burnings, doubts and despondencies and culminating in the disillusionment of a blighted life. Racked by agonies, the soul seeks refuge in the wisdom of an elevated and illuminated self, asking for edification as to its real character (*Ko'ham*). The teacher (*Deśika*), out of compassion (*Karuṇābalāt*) and in response to his query, declares the great truth as expressed in the *Mantra—Tattvamasi*—expounding analytically that the words *tat* and *tvam* denote *Liṅga* and *Aṅga* respectively and that the word *asi* stands for their identity which is the truth of both.

The pupil is then led through a solemn process of Initiation known as *Mahā Śaivī Dīkṣā* which results in snapping asunder the bonds of ignorance, effecting the union of *Aṅga* with *Liṅga* and removing the three-fold impurity :

"दीयते लिङ्गसम्बन्धः क्षीयते च मलत्रयम् ।
दीयते क्षीयते यस्मात् सा दीक्षेति निगद्यते" ॥[207]

Dīkśā is three-fold : (a) *Vedhātmikā*, (b) *Mantrātmikā* and (c) *Kriyātmikā*.

(a) The word *Vedhā* stands here as a symbol for the touch of the teacher's hand on the disciple's head. The mere gazing of the teacher is enough to rouse into action the spiritual energy of the disciple.[208] In the Śivādvaita darpaṇa[209] it is further observed that the result of this *Dīkṣā* is the contact (*saṁyoga*) of the *Yogāṅga* (the soul as conditioned by its causal envelope) with the *Bhāvaliṅga*. (b) *Mantra* means what the teacher whispers into the ears of the disciple. This form of *Dīkṣā* consists in the instruction of the great five-syllabled *mantra* and is represented by the contact of the *Bhogāṅga* of the *Jīva* with the *Prāṇaliṅga*.[210] (c) *Kriyā-dīkṣā* is the ceremonial part of the initiation, in which the disciple is seated within the *Svastika* circle drawn, and, made to repeat by way of penances the name of Śiva and to meditate on Him. Then follows the three-fold anointment of the disciple with waters from five jars.[211]

Such is the mysterious power of this initiatory process that it effects a complete revolution in the life of the neophyte. It makes manifest to him his hidden and hitherto unrecognised powers and secures for him the Beatific Vision; and the Veil of Cosmic Illusion is for ever lifted from his eyes.

The details of this inner conversion are not set out here with as much fulness as might be desired. But, what is said is enough to convince one that the whole process is g aduated, even though on occasions quite rapid. It is said that the novice is instructed, immediately after his initiation, to meditate upon the *kalā*. This leads on successively to the realisations of *bhāva*, of *manas*, of *dṛṣṭi* and finally of the *Sthala* itself. The *kalā* serves to awaken (*bodhinī*) and bring into play the latent energies stored in the *mantra*. Having drawn

it forth (*ākṛṣya*) by force, the initiate is to lay it in the *Liṅga* which is All-Light. As soon as this Supreme *Liṅga* is seen, all the *karmas* of the *Jīva* are burnt off, his struggles and vacillations—indeed the whole machinery of his discursive understanding—come to an end, and, he becomes a new man altogether, convinced and pacified. As to the manner in which this is done it is said that the Teacher brings the three *Liṅgas* down in touch with the three *Aṅgas* of the disciple by a threefold process along the same line, but, in an inverted course (viz. through *dṛṣṭi*, *manas* and *bhāva* down to *kalā*). That is, by means of the *Vedhādīkṣa* the *Bhāvaliṅga* is united with the *Yogāṅga*; the *Prāṇaliṅga* is united with *Bhogāṅga* through *Mantradīkṣā*; and through *Kriyādīkṣā* the unification of *Iṣṭaliṅga* and *Tyāgāṅga* is brought about. The union of *Liṅga* and *Aṅga* is likened to the union of flame (*Śikhī*) and camphor (*karpūra*), *Liṅga* being the flame and *Aṅga* the camphor.

This union is indeed the inner reality of all *upāsanā*. The duality of exclusiveness being gone, the soul rests for ever unmolested in the presence of its Lord and feels identified with His Being. The cessation of duality and of divided consciousness as effected in this way is variously termed—as *Nivṛtti* (Rest), as *Viśrānti* (Quiescence) and sometimes as *Parama Sukha* (Supreme Happiness).

The identity thus established is not absolute. But all empirical differences incident to a life of bondage have also vanished. Śiva and *Ātmā* are in all essentials one and the self-same thing, both being of the nature of Pure Existence, Consciousness and Bliss—in fact, the Being of one is the Being of the other. But a myster-

ious difference still persists through which the one appears as the Lord and the other as the Servant, and so forth. It is a state, not describable in the language of man, in which the opposite moments of the so-called identity and difference, with which the lower mind is familiar, are reconciled in the synthesis of a higher Unity. This state is called *Bhāga-yoga*, and, bears in the mystery of its relation a close resemblance to the intimacy subsisting between, say, fire and its light, or ice and water or camphor and its perfume. The two are not separable except by a logical abstraction.

As soon as this union comes to happen, the seed of Pure Devotion (*Parā Bhakti*) which has till now been embedded in the Soul waiting for a favourable opportunity begins to sprout forth and germinate :

"तस्मात् क्षेत्रस्य बीजस्य बीजिनश्च कदाचन ।
वियोगो नेष्यते क्वापि सदा संयोग एव हि ॥
योगेन तु परा भक्तिरिति भक्तेस्तु वैभवम् ।
अस्याः स्वरूपसद्भावात् सद्भक्तिरिति कीर्त्तिता ॥"

This is *Sadbhakti* which works up to higher and higher levels, bringing each *Aṅga* into contact with its corresponding *Liṅga*, till it comes to the Supreme stage called *Sāmarasya* when the *Mahāliṅga* and *Aikya Sthala* are completely fused with each other.

This six-fold contact is called *Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga* and is declared to be a means to the attainment of *Śivatattva*- to the Divine Alliance.

VI

A few words now require to be said about the manner in which the activities of the *Jīva* are to be offered up one and all to the Lord. It is said that this

dedication (*arpaṇa*) is to be made in a spirit of meekness and self-abnegation. It is two-fold, according as the object dedicated is : (a) an action (*Kriyārpaṇa*) or (b) a thought and emotion (*Jñānārpaṇa*).

(a) Let us try to understand what the author intends to convey by the former term (*Kriyārpaṇa*). It is said that the object which the Self holds enjoyable in its earthly life must belong to one of the three Categories of *Bhogya-dravya* (i) *Sthūla*, (ii) *Pravivikta* or (iii) *Ānanda;* and consequently the dedication is slso threefold.

(i) The first and lowest kind of such object is *rūpa* which the *Viśva* offers up to the *Iṣṭaliṅga*. This is external dedication (*Bāhyārpaṇa*).

(ii) The next in order is *ruci*, which is offered up by the *Taijasa* to the *Prāṇaliṅga*. This is internal dedication (*Antarārpaṇa*).

(iii) But the highest form of dedication is that known as *Ātmasaṅga*, in which the *Prājñā* offers up *tṛpti* to the *Bhāvaliṅga* by way of sacrifice.

This statement, albeit brief, gives an excellent account of what according to this system constitutes the true philosophy of enjoyment. All enjoyment is not bondage, it is held, but, only that which is divorced from the Spirit. Nothing is to be accepted for personal gratification unless it be dedicated to the Lord who is the real owner of all. That is, everything being his should be offered to Him, and, then received back from Him as a free gift or *prasāda* for purposes of enjoyment. Else it would be an act of misappropriation. Cravings after fruits and petty desires should be given up. What-

ever is not thus offered in sacrifice to the Lord is not fit for enjoyment :

"यद्रूपमर्पितं लिङ्गे तद्रूपं भोक्तुमर्हति ।
रूपान्तरं न भोक्तव्यं भुक्तं चेत्तदनर्पितम्" ॥

The purity and liberation of heart,[212] the inner enfranchisement (*nirlepa*), which this attitude of dedication ends in effecting, vary in degree and are differently named *Suddhi*, *Siddhi* and *Prasiddhi*.

(b) The second form of dedication (*Jñānārpaṇa*) which is described as ineffable (*Svānubhūtyekagocara*), and not definable by words, and, of which the purpose is to remove taints of sensible objects, is said to consist in offering up to the *Sthala* revealed in the *6 Liṅgas* the 6 kinds of experiences of the soul, viz., the five sense impressions and the sixth—*pariṇāma* of the feeling of pleasure, pain, etc. All these varied objects, of which the word of man is composed, being offered to the Lord, the *Ātman* is able to enjoy them as His favour (*Prasāda*) and find in them the fulfilment of an all-encompassing delight :

"ऐक्यात्मकोऽयं परिणामवस्तु सदा महालिङ्गसमर्पितं हि ।
स्वभावसिद्धान्निजभक्तियोगान् निषेवते तृप्तिघनप्रसादम्" ॥

The mysterious relation between Faith and Grace is such that it is hard to say which of them stands in the relation of cause to the other. It is said that Grace leads to Faith and also Faith to Grace :

"प्रसादाद् देवताभक्तिः प्रसादो भक्तिसम्भवः ।
यथा बाऽङ्कुरतो बीजं बीजतो वा यथाऽङ्कुरः" ॥[213]

When all the activities of the soul, through dedication to the Lord, come to absolute rest in themselves (स्वस्मिन्नेव स्वयं यान्ति विश्रान्तिं), this state of repose is called

Kriyāviśrānti or Happiness. It is a state when, all desires satisfied (*āptakāma*), the soul rises above the stirrings and strivings of a finite existence and becomes perfectly free. Its true character is then revealed and it realises in a single act of intuition, no longer subject to the disturbing influence of Time, its eternal Unity with the Supreme Being—'I am Śiva Himself' (अहं साक्षात् शिव एव). For one who has attained to these heights all the movements of the body, all the activities of the will, are transmuted into forms of Divine Worship.[214] His will is but God's Will, every thing is to him 'apparelled in a celestial light'—a fact of Divine manifestation.

His freedom of movement (*svecchācāra*) forms at this stage the highest kind of worship. Such a man is no more subject in his dealings to the regulations of ethical codes (*vidhi* and *niṣedha*) or even to the Laws of Nature. His Devotion is unrestricted (*niraṅkuśa*), all-absorbing. *Yoga* has done its share of work in conducting him above the realms of *Māyā* : *Bhakti* alone endures. This *Bhakti* is an ever-flowing source of Happiness, being above the trammels of bondage.[215] This is the so-called *Advaita Bhakti* of which we hear so much in subsequent literature and which is characterised as *nija-nirvāṇa-rūpiṇī*. It is to be distinguished from *Dvaita Bhakti* which involves difference between the worshipper and the worshipped and is a source of evil (*kleśa-hetu-prasādhinī*). The actions of an *Advaita Bhakta* are no actions at all, though appearing as such.[216] These are neither fruitful nor barren, but are by nature (*svabhāvataḥ*) the plays of Divine Will (*Līlā mātrāḥ*). It is thus evident that the true *Śaiva Bhakti* finds scope for manifestation only when the liber-

ation is effected. That *Parā Bhakti* stands above *Mokṣa* is clear from the following lines of Māyideva :

"ज्ञानादेव हि मोक्षः स्यान्मोक्षादुपरि शाम्भवी ।
भक्तिः परतरा भाति स्वतन्त्रा भक्तिलीलया ॥
लोकयोरुभयोरैहिकामुष्मिकपदार्थयोः ।
गमागमं विनैवास्ते भक्तिः सम्पूर्णवैभवा" ॥

This is an interesting statement, as showing that as in *Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇavism*, so in the *Śaiva-siddhānta* also, *Mokṣa* is not held to be the highest end of man, but, forms only the gateway through which the soul has to pass for realising its divine possibilities of Self-Adoration and Self-Delight. The doctrine of what has come to be known as a fifth *puruṣārtha* finds an explicit enunciation[2 1 7] in this system as well, and, it would be a historical blunder to associate it exclusively with the *Gauḍīya* and other *Vaiṣṇava* sects affiliated to the *Bhāgavata* order.

In the following lines of Māyideva it is stated that true *Bhakti* comes after *Jñāna :*

"ज्ञानं ब्रूते भक्तिः कुरुते शिवजीवयोः ।
पृथग्भावं तेन ज्ञानं पूर्वं भक्तिस्तूत्तरतया विभाति ततः" ।

Jñānakāṇḍa starts from and finds its justification in the egoistic consciousness (*abhimāna*) of man, and, so far is on a par with the *Karmakāṇḍa*, the difference being based only on the nature of this consciousness. Thus in the Way of Action the Soul must need feel itself to be an active agent (*karttā*); in the Way of Knowledge too, though it does not participate in and stands above the multiple activities of Nature and watches them from its lonely height, it still feels itself to be their cons-

tant Witness, indifferent and poised in the serenity of its blissful unconcern. But, in devotion both these *abhimānas* are transcended, and, stress is laid on the passive aspect of the Soul. It is a marvellous state and is incapable of expression in human language. For who can fathom the mystery of that ineffable state in which every enjoyment of the Soul becomes equivalent to divine worship, so that what appears on one hand as the Satisfaction (*tṛpti*) of the Soul is on the other a synonym of the Favour (*Prasāda*) of God. It is through *Advaita Bhakti* that absolute Grace of the Lord is realised.[218]

Through this Grace unending of the Supreme Self, resulting as a matter of course from *Parā Bhakti*, is vouchsafed unto the Soul a Unitive of Defied Life (*Sarvātmabhāva*)—a life in which everything reveals itself as the Self. Such is the infinite potency of Divine Grace that the subject, object and instrument of every action, cognition and enjoyment—nay, the action, cognition and enjoyment themselves are recognised as verily the Self. The body, the senses, the names, the vital energies, the intellect, the egoism—indeed the injunctions and the prohibitions, are all glorified into one Universal Reality, viz., Self.[219]

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IX. SONDALA UPĀDHYĀYA

Except the bare fact of Sondala's[220] priority to Gaṅgeśa who quotes his view in his Tattvacintāmaṇi, often with disapproval, no sure indication exists to settle his exact time.

Mahādeva Puntāmkara in his Nyāya-kaustubha attributes to him (तदुक्तं सुन्दलकारैः) the following couplet :

"अत्यन्तासत्यपि ह्यर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि ।
प्रमाबाध्याऽप्रमा तत्र ह्यतः प्रामाण्यनिर्णयः ॥"[221]

And, as the first line of this is quoted in Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's Commentary on Nyāyasāra of which a manuscript, dated 1352 A.D., exists in the Government Sankrit Library, Benares (तदुक्तमत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्दः करोति हि)[222] it might be fairly presumed that Sondala was much earlier than the middle of the 14th century. But, this presumption is invalidated by the reason that the premise is unfounded. The *śloka*, as a matter of fact, did not originally belong to Sondala, but to Vākyapadīya.[223]

But the fact that Gaṅgeśa refers to Sondala as a *Navya* in the 4th volume of his work[224] and to Jayanta as the *Jarannaiyāyika* may be taken as proving that the former lived long after the latter, but, how long there is no means of ascertaining. Personally I am disposed to believe that the distinction between the old and the new school in the history of Nyāya Philosophy dates from after Udayana and Śrīdhara. It stands to probability, therefore, that Sondala lived after the 10th century.

In Nyāya Sondala's name is associated with the introduction of a peculiar theory, so quaint in its implications that almost all the writers from Gaṅgeśa downwards made their best efforts to combat it and drive it out of recognition. It is technically called **व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभाव** or more strictly **व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभाव**. To explain : it is generally admitted that only that attribute (*dharma*) which exists in the counter-entity (*pratiyogī*) of a negation (*abhāva*) can legitimately be said to be the qualifying or limiting condition (*avacchedaka*) of its *pratiyogitā*, or in other words the qualifying attribute (*avacchedaka dharma*) must be co-existent (*sāmānādhikaraṇa*) with the *pratiyogitā*; violation of this restrictive condition (*sāmānādhikaraṇya-niyama*) would be subversive of the Naiyāyika's fundamental doctrine of Error, viz., *anyathākhyāti*. But Sondala does not admit this restrictive condition.

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X. THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY :

SĀṄKHYA-YOGA VIEW

In the history of ancient Indian Philosophy the controversy over the doctrine of Causality is very old indeed. Although the nature of the controversy has varied from time to time, the fundamental problem has persisted. It is : what is the relation between the cause and the effect ? Does the cause contain the effect in its implicit form or is the effect a new thing altogether ? What are the presuppositions of the genetic process ? Does it imply simply a gradual unfoldment of what lies within, as eternally existing, or is it a creation *ex nihil* ?

We know that various answers can be given to these questions according to the differences of our view-point. The Naiyāyika, with his commonsense and realistic assumptions, would naturally be inclined to favour the view which maintains an absolute difference (*atyanta-bheda*) between the cause (material) and the effect. To him the cause and the effect are two distinct concepts, though bound together by a mysterious tie of relationship; for it cannot be gainsaid, the Naiyāyika would say, that though the effect is distinct from its cause—indeed from everything else in creation—by virtue of its own apparent individuality, it still inheres in it during its existence, and, that even when it does not exist, i. e., before its production and after its destruction, its non-existence, technically known as *prāgabhāva* and *dhvaṁsa*

is predicable of its cause alone. As to what constitutes this bond of affinity nothing is said beyond the fact that it is in the nature of an effect to be thus intimately related to its own material cause. It is an ultimate fact and has to be accepted as such.

This appeal to "the nature of things" on the part of the Naiyāyika amounts practically to a confession of weakness of his theory. The *Yogin*, who is an advocate of *Satkārya-vāda*, rejects the Naiyāyika hypothesis and affirms that the effect, in so far as its essence is concerned, is identical with the cause from which it comes forth. The so-called production and destruction do not really mean that the product comes into and passes away from existence. Every product being an aspect of the Supreme *Prakṛti* in which it exists somehow involved and identified as an eternal moment, creation out of nothing and annihilation is an absurdity. Production, therefore, is differentiation and dissolution is re-deintegration. The process of becoming, with which the problem of causality has to deal, does indeed imply a change, but, it is a change conceived as the transition of a *dharma* from an unmanifest to a manifest state and from the manifest back into the unmanifest condition. The substrate of change is everywhere and always an existing unit.

The sum and substance of the *Satkāryavādin's* contention seems to be this. We all must start from the assumption, under the necessity of our thought, that being comes from being and not from non-being, and, that an absolute void giving rise to being is inconceivable. The denial of this principle would land us in contradictions. We conclude, therefore, that the effect is real (*sat*).

In the text books of the school we find a set of five arguments brought forward to establish the reality (*sattā*) of the effect (even before its origin) :

(1) The fact that what is unreal (*asat*) cannot be subject to the causal operation (*kāraka-vyāpāra*).

(2) The fact that an appropriate material (*upādāna*) is resorted to for bringing about a certain effect, in other words, that every material is not by nature capable of producing every effect. This means that the material cause, which is somehow related to the effect in question, brings about that effect. But, if the effect were not existing there would be no relation and consequently no production. An unrelated material is no material at all.

(3) And, if the necessity of the relation between the material and the effect be not admitted, it would imply that the fitness of the material is not a condition of production and that any effect could result from any cause. This would be subversive of all order and so against our experience.

(4) This difficulty cannot be got over by the assumption of *Śakti* even, as the Mīmāṁsakas seem to do. They declare that an effect, before origin, is indeed non-existent (*asat*) and that the cause is, therefore, indeed unrelated. Still there would be no irregularity, for we admit, they say, that the cause, in so far as it possesses a *Śakti* favourable to a certain effect, does produce that effect. As to the question whether the cause possesses a particular *Śakti* or not, it can only be answered a *fortiori*, for it is inferred by observation of the effect.

(5) The last argument is *kāraṇa-bhāvāt*, viz., that the effect is nothing different from the cause. If the

cause be existent (*sat*) there is no reason to maintain that the effect, which is only a mode of the cause, should be non-existent (*asat*).

This last argument requires to be expanded. We have already said that according to Sāṅkhya, unlike Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the relation between cause and effect is declared to be identity (*abheda-tādātmya*). The Naiyāyika, with his pragmatic attitude towards reality, makes utility the criterion of existence (*sattā*) and approaches the problem in a semi-Buddhistic fashion. To him, therefore, the effect, say a jar, is altogether a distinct entity from its cause, clay, for both donot serve the self-same purpose. This is *artha-kriyā-bheda*. Besides this, there are other grounds which, to a Realist Philosopher, help to differentiate one object from another. These are *buddhi* (= *pratīti*), *vyapadeśa* and *artha-kriyā-vyavasthā*. On these grounds, too, the Naiyāyika seeks to establish the difference of the effect from the cause. Thus, the notion of jar is distinct from that of clay and consequently corresponding to this notional or logical difference the Naiyāyika would say, there must be a real difference in the objective world. In other words, jar and clay, as objective realities, must be mutually different. So, too, differences of names and functions point to a difference in reality.

These are some of the stock arguments of the Naiyāyika. But, they do not appear to have much weight against the Sāṅkhya-Yoga position. They lose their point as soon as they are aimed at a system in which the so-called Realism finds little support. The *artha-kriyā-bheda* is really no sure test of objective difference, for the same object may have different *artha-kriyās;* nor is *artha-kriyā-vyavasthā* a test, for different collections of the same

cause may serve different purposes. The difference of names, viz., clay and jar, is no proof of difference either, for in that case a forest would have to be postulated as different from the individual trees composing it.

The true relation between the cause and the effect, therefore, is that the effect is a *dharma*, an aspect, of the cause and constitutes a mode of it. The Primary *Prakṛti* being the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*, the effects or *vikāras* are nothing but various modifications and collocations of it. In essence the cause and the effect are identical, for both consist of *guṇas* and it is in difference of collocation (*saṁsthāna-bheda*) that the difference between the two, as it reveals itself to our consciousness, consits. And, this difference in collocation is a peculiar manifestation. That of which it is a manifestation remains always in the back-ground, unmanifest. In the last resort the cause, the *Prakṛti*, the *Materia Prima*, is the Unmanifest and the effect, the *Vikāra*, is the manifested world of manifold existence; and, the manifested world is always held within the bosom of that Unmanifest, Universal Being.

The doctrine of *Satkārya*, therefore, implies, as we often find in Indian Philosophy, that the Universe, with an infinite number of cosmic systems belonging to it, is always existing in *Prakṛti* as its aspects. The evolution of a Universe out of Void has no meaning. The Buddhists, together with the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika, believe that the product has no existence prior to its origination and that it loses its existence as soon as it is destroyed. What this really means and how far it is justified we shall try to explain elsewhere. But, we may just observe here that the whole doctrine of *Satkārya* is a blow to this position.

To make the Yoga thesis more clear we give here a brief analysis of its concept of substance or *dharmin*. In the technical nomenclature of Indian Philosophy the term *dharmin* bears the sense of "substrate, subject, that in which something is held, that of which something is predicated", and, *dharma* means the "aspect of *dharmi*, predicate, content, and so forth". All predication, and, therefore, all judgment, involves the affirmation (*vidhāna*) or denial (*niṣedha*) of a particular *dharma* with reference to a particular *dharmin*. In fact every proposition, which is an expression of judgment, bears testimony to the fact of predication. Now, though predication is made—and, our entire phenomenal existence is necessarily based upon this—the subject of predication remains always, so far as its nature and essence are concerned, a point of controversy. When it is said that "the flower is red", the proposition is certainly intelligible to common sense, but, on closer examination the meaning of the proposition furnishes a topic for discussion. It reveals the same old problem which Nāgasena raised before Menander more than 2000 years ago. What is it to which I am attributing redness ? What is meant by 'flower' ? Is it a mere bundle (*saṁghāta*, *samudāya*) of sensible qualities or is there a real objective ground, a substrate, to which the qualities are attached by some natural relation ? We know that two answers are usually given to this question. The first is that of the Buddhists and in a certain sense of the Vaiyākaraṇas. The second answer comes from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Vedāntic position on this question is one of compromise between Idealism and Realism, but, it tends towards the former. And, the Yoga view, too, is more or less Idealistic, though with an important qualification.

In other words, the Buddhists deny the existence of a substance away from the qualities and a whole as distinct from the parts. But, the Realists, to whom the external world has an objective, extra-mental value, are not satisfied with this view. They posit a real substance in which various qualities inhere and which is not a mere collection of *guṇas*, but, has an independent existence. So, too, with the whole (*avayavī*) which results, as a distinct and independent object, from the combination of parts. In Vedānta, also, the former view is favoured. Śaṅkara, in Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya plainly denies substantiality to the atoms and describes them as mere *guṇas*.

But, the Yoga theory is more clear on the point. It is said indeed that *dharma* is the *guṇa*, or set of *guṇas*, by which the *dharmin* is made known to us and that this *guṇa* may be any of the sensible qualities, viz., colour, sound, etc., or any of their combinations. But, this ought not to imply that there is any fundamental distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*. Both of these are at bottom (*paramārthataḥ*) one.[225] They are different only in *vyavahāra*. And, since this difference between *dharma* and *dharmin* and between one *dharma* and another is founded on the appearance and disappearance of the *dharmas* which is due to time-limitation, it is evident that in Eternity, where there is no distincition between Past and Future, all the *dharmas* are in a sense identical, not only with one another, but, even with the *dharmin* to which they are referred. Thus ultimate *dharmin* is the Unmanifest *Prakṛti* whose infinite modes (*vikārāḥ*) are the infinite *dharmas*, of which those which are present to our consciousness are called present and the rest is characterised either as past or as future. The *dharmas* are, therefore, only the varying manifestations of the *guṇas*

of Primary Matter. That is, *Prakṛti* as modified in a particular manner is known as a particular *dharmā* or *vikāra*.

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The Yoga philosophy, especially the system propounded by Patañjali and Vyāsa, accepts in the main the views of the rival school of the Sāṅkhyas. The Yoga view of causality is, therefore, in all essential features almost identical with the Sāṅkhya.

From what we have said regarding *Satkāryavāda* it must have been made clear that the Yoga (and Sāṅkhya) notion of causality has a distinct character of its own. The word 'cause' means indeed a necessary pre-condition of a subsequent event; this meaning is common to the other systems; it also accepts the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* as the guiding principles for the discovery of causality. But, the characteristic doctrine remains to be noted.

If we observe the world of change and analyse it carefully we find that every change involves a double element, (a) a transitional one, and (b) a permanent one. When clay is moulded into the form of a jar, we are accustomed to speak of this moulding as an instance of change. Evidently here too, there are two elements present, viz., clay and the forms that appear and disappear in it. The forms are all transitional—they come and go, but, the matter, the clay for instance, is relatively permanent. It is, therefore, said to be the substrate of these changes of forms, through all of which its unity remains unbroken. Before the production of jar, clay had a definite form, viz., 'lump', which disappeared and made room for the appearance of a new form, viz., 'jar', and,

the destruction of the jar again is nothing, but, the disappearance of the 'jar' form and the appearance of a fresh one in its place, and, so on till Universal Dissolution when Matter will absorb within itself all its forms and regain its pristine formless and blank character. But, during *Sṛṣṭi* it stands as the background for the play of these countless fleeting forms. From this will be obvious what the relation between Matter, the *dharmin*, and the form, the *dharma*, is. Every change being a kind of causation, true causal relation must be understood as meaning the relation of the form to the matter, and not, as the Buddhists would contend, of one form with another. In the chain of causation, of course, one form may be spoken of as the cause of another,[226] but, it is not by virtue of itself, but, of the matter which is its content. In the technical language of Sāṅkhya-Yoga all causal relation is *Prakṛti-vikṛti-bhāva*, *Prakṛti* being the cause and *Vikṛti* the effect.

But, the meaning of the term *Prakṛti* is very often misunderstood. It is generally supposed to stand for the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the Vaiśeṣika or for the material cause of the Scholastics. There is no doubt that what is meant by *samavāyi-kāraṇa* falls under *Prakṛti*, but, the latter includes the so-called *nimittas* as well. If we leave aside for the present the question of *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*, which is a peculiarity of the Vaiśeṣika alone, we may conveniently divide *Prakṛti* into a two-fold aspect, viz., *upādāna* and *nimitta*.

Thus, although *Prakṛti* is one and the question of causal classification is, therefore, out of place in Sāṅkhya, it becomes intelligible why we find mention of a two-fold division of the causal principle. This division is really a concession to the demands of empiric consciousness, and

is resorted to just as in Vedānta. Truly speaking, Sāṅkhya-Yoga , as much as Vedānta, is an advocate of the identity of *nimitta* and *upādāna*. In other words, the distinction between *nimitta* and *upādāna* is a pseudo-distinction, and, has no existence on the plane of Pure *Prakṛti* which is Universal Being and Essence. It is only when *Prakṛti* has evolved herself into the first stadium—into the *Mahat*, that we find this distinction of *nimitta* and *upādāna*, like every other distinction, probably brought out. The function of the *nimitta*, therefore, is not to serve, as with the Vaiśeṣika, as an external principle of movement, the effectuating factor in the Universal Becoming. *Prakṛti* is self-moved (*svataḥ-pariṇāminī*), motion is inherent in it by nature and does not come to it from without. It (as *Rajas*) is an aspect of its Being. The efficiency of the *nimitta*—and this is all that we mean by causal operation—consists only in the removal of the *prohibens* in the way of *Prakṛti* (*tamaḥ*, *āvaraṇa*) and in the consequent liberation of the *Vikāras*, the forms, held so long in confinement within the womb of *Prakṛti*.

For practical purposes, therefore, we may distinguish in our system between two kinds of causes at work, viz., the material and the efficient. What Aristotle designated as formal causes donot seem to possess here a causal character at all. And, we shall find that the so-called final causes of Aristotle fall under the category of *nimitta*

Let us try to understand the position more clearly. We have said that the material cause, the *Prakṛti qua upādāna* possesses an eternal motion inherent in itself and is not an inert substance required to be moved from outside. It possesses *in potentia* infinite forms towards the manifestation of which it has a natural proneness; but, this

manifestation is held in check by a retarding force which, as we shall find later on, is identical with the merit or demerit of the *Jīva* with whose personal experience the manifestation is directly concerned. As soon as this force is counteracted by an opposite force, e. g., merit by demerit and vice versa, the path of evolution becomes clear and the material transforms itself into the appropriate effect. The block of stone, for instance, contains involved within itself any kind of image, but, it is able to manifest a particular image—and this manifestation is called production—only when the particular *āvaraṇa* which stands in the way of its manifestation is removed by the smith's chisel. The removal of this *āvaraṇa* constitutes the efficiency of the *nimtita*, and is the sum and substance of all causal operation. The *nimittas* donot lend any impulse to the material nor can they bring out what is not implicitly contained in it. The apt illustration in the Yogabhāṣya (4. 3) of the water in a reservoir on a higher level flowing of itself into the lower fields when a leakage or an outlet is made in the embankment, will clear up our point. Further, since every subsidiary *Prakṛti*—finite cause, is ultimately permeated by and coincident with Pure *Prakṛti*, it naturally follows that every individual thing in nature contains every other thing potentially.[227]

Thus we need not seek for a principle of effectuation in *Prakṛti* outside of its own nature (*svabhāva*). This independence, on the part of the *Prakṛti*, of an extrinsic influence, is called her *svātantrya* or freedom. Vijñāna Bhikṣu shows[228] that the only possible cause of *pravṛtti* is the nature of the *guṇas*.[229] It is universally admitted that the particles of matter (*aṇu*) are in perpetual motion in space. This motion is the vague vibration

characteristic of the atoms and is to be distinguished from the definite motion which brings two atoms together (*dravyārambhaka*) so as to form a substance. This motion does not serve any moral purpose, i.e., does not produce *bhoga;* hence merit and demerit cannot be its cause. Nor is this motion due to a special act of God's Will, for it would be assuming too much. It is more reasonable, therefore, to think of it as natural. Vijñāna Bhikṣu further points out that the *nimittas* are not found to be necessary and indispensible in the manifestation of an effect, for the *Yogin*, by a mere act of his will, can bring forth any thing that he pleases and for creation he does not stand in need of any human instruments. Similarly, in the beginning of creation things, e. g., seeds, are produced by God's Will merely, without the help of any positive precedent conditions, e. g., similar other seeds. All this goes to corroborate the view that the *nimittas* have not a direct causality in the production of an object. They help, each in its own way, to rouse the evolving power of *Prakṛti*, viz., *Karma* (merit and demerit) by breaking the *āvaraṇa* which is a *dharma* opposed to itself, God's Will by breaking all kinds of *āvaraṇa* beginning with the greatest one, i.e., state of equilibrium, *Kāla* by rousing *Karmas*, etc., and the ordinary instruments, *daṇḍas*, etc., by retarding the possibility of manifestation of other effects.

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But what is the aim of all this manifestation ? What is its end ? An answer to this would furnish us with what Aristotle calls final causes of creation. It is admitted that all movement presupposes an end to be realised; without an end there can be no activity, **प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्त्तते.** This end is however variously conceived :

(a) Firstly it is pleasure or pain, which the *Jīva* is bound to experience in consequence (i e., as the fruits, *phala*) of his previous *Karma*. In common parlance, this experience is known as *bhoga* and *Jīva* as *bhoktā*.

(b) The author of Yoga-bhāṣya sets forth that this aim is twofold, Pleasure or Absence of Pain. The former is *bhoga* and the latter is *Apavarga*. It is either of these two which is the object of a man's striving (*puruṣārtha*). Pleasure or *bhoga*, when further analysed would be found to embrace the three varieties of End, viz., *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma*. But the Supreme End is *Apavarga*.

In the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, 42, it is clearly stated that the *puruṣārtha* actuates the *Liṅga* (*pravartaka*). This *Artha* is (a) experience of pleasure and pain on the ascertainment of *viṣayas;* or (b) denial of *viṣayas* on the ascertainment of distinction between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. In other words, every movement is either towards *Viṣaya-bhoga* or towards *Bhoga-tyāga*, i. e., Peace. But, as *bhoga* is the necessary precedent of *tyāga*, and, must eventually be followed by it, sooner or later, it may be said with reason that the End of all movement is this *tyāga* which in its highest form is Dissociation from *Prakṛti* and Self-realisation. It is the "One Event to which the whole creation moves."

The perpetual unrest and agitation which we observe around us will have their close only when this Supreme End is attained. The course of evolution, for each individual, will terminate when he realises the Essential Nature of his own Self : **ततः परिणामक्रमसमाप्ति-र्गुणानाम्**. For apart from the individual for whom it is

intended, the evolution of Nature has no other meaning. As to the further question whether Nature as a whole will ever cease to evolve we have nothing to say here. This point will be discussed in a separate paper in connection with the doctrine of *Pralaya*.

Without going into further detail at this point we may note that the conception of causality in Sāṅkhya-Yoga is as much mechanical as it is teleological. Leaving out the other auxiliary factors and confining ourselves to *Karma* alone we find that it is both efficient (though negatively so as already pointed out) as well as final. Everything in Nature has its end. It will be found that even the objective inequalities in creation are not explicable except on the hypothesis of the determining principle. A thing is what it is not by chance, but, as it were, by necessity. If the external world exists, and has come into being, to serve as the object of experience (pleasure or pain) of a Conscious Subject and would vanish for him, as soon as that purpose is fulfilled, it is easy to follow that its varieties must be occasioned by that principle, moral in its nature, which governs the varieties of such experience; and, consequently all instruments and efficient factors must work in subordination to this Supreme Governor. So far, therefore, the whole scheme of Nature, appears to be teleological.

But *Karma* is not the last word. It is worked off partly in natural course by fruition and is ultimately transcended by the Light of Supreme Wisdom which reveals the Self as it is and as distinct from *Prakṛti*. This is the final term of the evolutionary series. From this point of view, too, the Scheme of Nature would be found to be pervaded by finality.

This analysis of ours leaves out of account what Aristotle calls "formal causes". Though the forms, as conceived in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and even in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, are not considered to have a causal character strictly, they are not important in the order of creation, so far as the specialities of the individuals are concerned. They will be discussed elsewhere.

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It is universally admitted that the world of sensible reality is a world of perpetual change, and, it is also practically assumed, as we said, that every change involves a twofold element, viz., one that is transient and the other that is relatively permanent. The material, which is the subject of change, endures, while the effect comes and goes.

A careful and systematic study of this problem of change led in ancient India to the formulation of three broad theories, viz., *Ārambha-vāda*, *Pariṇāma-vāda* and *Vivartta-vāda*.

The *Ārambha-vāda* or the Doctrine of Origination (genesis) is the view of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika to whom the effect is entirely a different thing from the productive material. It is immaterial whether the effect produced is a substance or a quality or an action; in all cases it is a new thing altogether and is distinct from the substance from which it arises. This view is a necessary corollary from the *Asatkārya-vāda*. That the effect is found to inhere, so long as it continues in existence, in its material cause and is not capable of separation from it, simply proves that there is an intimate relation between the two and not that the two are identical.

A strong argument in favour of *Ārambha-vāda* seems to be furnished from the Atomic theory. This theory

postulates the existence of an infinite number of eternal particles of matter as the ultimate constituents of all substantial products (*Kārya-dravya*), that is, every product is explained as due to a peculiar combination resulting in contact (*Ārambhaka-saṁyoga*) of these particles. And, since it is impossible to consider the product as a mere grouping of the parts – and the reason why this is impossible consists in the disparity between the two, viz., that the particles are imperceptible and many, while their collection is perceived as one—it is more compatible with common sense to suppose that the parts, by reason of combination, result in the formation of the whole which is a new entity, pure and simple.

But what is the bearing of this doctrine on the problem of change ? The question is whether change is predicable of the whole (*avayavī*) or of the ultimate particles or of both.

The Vaiśeṣika says that the particles change and that the resultant whole also consequently changes. This is of the nature of chemical change and is due to the influence of *tejas*. The constant change going on in the world is in the end reducible to this type. In other words, if X represents the whole consisting of parts represented by, say, a, b, c and d, we might say that the change of a, b, c, d into a′, b′, c′, d′, by the assumption of new qualities would necessarily involve the destruction of X and of the origin of a new whole, called Y.[230] This theory, therefore, assumes a double series of change—one in the parts and one in the whole. But why does a, etc., change into a′, etc. ? It is not natural, of course; for this would violate the postulate that no motion is inherent in a thing. To explain this change

the Vaiśeṣika assumes the contact of a, etc., with the particles of *tejas* which penetrate into the body by means of pores (according to Vaiśeṣika, every substantial product is porous and pervious), break the contact of the atoms and produce in them a change of qualities. The atoms, as thus changed, are united again and form a fresh whole. This *tejas* is not only what we ordinarly call fire. It is ultimately the Solar Energy which, therefore, stands at the root of all physical and chemical changes in the world.

But the Naiyāyika does not agree in this. He holds, against the Vaiśeṣika, the solidity of a substantial product and its impenetrability by heat particles which act upon the body as a whole and produce in it change of qualities. Thus, though the substance is constant, from its origin till its destruction, it is subject to change so far as its qualities are concerned.

The Vedāntist does not admit with the Vaiśeṣika, that difference of size (*parimāṇa*) is the cause of difference of substance; hence the *dharmī*, say, the jar, remaining the same its former *rūpa* is destroyed and is replaced by a new *rūpa*; similarly the animal organism remaining the same, its leanness (*kārśya*) is due to falling off (*apatraya*) of particles and its fatness (*sthaulya*) may be explained as due to accretion (*upacaya*) of new particles. Thus, the body of A when one year old would be identical with his body in his 80th year, although there may be an entire change of particles and difference of size. In other words it is the same body in different states (*avasthā*).

The problem of change has received a good deal of attention and careful treatment in the hands of Sāṅkhya

and especially of Yoga. *Pariṇāma* means disappearance of one *dharma*, followed by the appearance of another, within the same subject or *dharmī*.[231] The word is used to indicate the process when it refers to the subject, and, the result of this process when it refers to the predicate, *dharma*. In popular usage and in later literature this word is found synonymous with *Vikāra*.[232]

This *pariṇāma* is threefold, according as it concerns *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā*. The definition of *pariṇāma* given above is that of *dharma-pariṇāma*. *Lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* is the name of the change in regard to *lakṣaṇa* or time-sequence, i.e., past, present and future. The grammatical tenses correspond to this *pariṇāma* in nature. The *lakṣaṇa* too is not conceived as an ultimate unit and is further analysable into what we may call *avasthā* or states, viz., new or old. Each such state is supposed to be ultimate and momentary. This kind of *pariṇāma* is not really expressible in language. This being the case the evolution of Nature may be supposed to consist of a series of such successive moments. In this ceaseless stream of *pariṇāma* everything is being carried away from the future through the present into the past. But, the future (*anāgata*) and the past (*atīta*) being nothing but Unmanifest *Prakṛti*, every *pariṇāma* is a passage from the Unmanifest into manifestation and return into the Unmanifest. This represents a circle, of which one half, viz., passage from Unmanifest into manifestation, i.e., from the future into the present, stands for what is known as *visadṛśa-pariṇāma* and another half, i.e., return from manifestation into the Unmanifest, i.e., from the present to the past stands for *sadṛśa-pariṇāma*. This is true of all the three kinds of *pariṇāma*,

Thus, the triple *pariṇāma* represents a series of three circles not mutually exclusive, but, really concentric, *dharma-pariṇāma* being the outermost and the *avasthā-pariṇāma* the inmost of the group. But *dharma* and *avasthā* are relative concepts merely and are identical. The author of Yoga-bhāṣya clearly states[233] that the change of *dharma* in a *dharmī*, of *lakṣaṇa* in a *dharma* and of *avasthā* in a *lakṣaṇa* is the same process being characterised by modification of the substance and involving a transition of states (*avasthā*).[234]

This change is incessant and uncaused. It pervades the whole realm of Nature. It is said that nothing that is made of *guṇas* is ever, even for a single moment, at rest and this for the simple reason that *guṇas* are by nature fickle.[235] Even int he state of Dissolution when the manifested Universe is resolved into *Prakṛti*, this change or mutation still continues—this is *sadṛśa-pariṇāma.*[236] It is only *Puruṣa* or the Self which is truly immutable, being beyond *Prakṛti.*

Now a *dharma* or state, unless it is present, must be either past or future; but, in all these states the *dharmī* of which these are affirmed, is constant. A *dharma* is a particular *Śakti* pertaining to a substance and is inferred to exist in it from its action, viz., from the production of a particular effect. It is subject to mutation, but, is never annihilated.[237] The present or *udita* (actual) *dharma* is one which is described as "*svavyāpāramanubhavan*" and *savyāpāra*; this is the object of our immediate consciousness, and, is differentiated on the one hand from the past or *śānta-dharma* which has ceased to be active (*kṛtvā vyāpārānuparataḥ*), and, on the other from the future (possible) or *avyapadeśya dharma* which has not yet commenced to operate. Of these *dharmas* the present

only is felt as distinct (*viśiṣṭa*) from *Prakṛti* by reason of its manifest character, and, one might say that this alone exists. And, we know that the Buddhists actually denied the others. The past and the future *dharmas* are not directly known. The truth in the matter seems to be that these *dharmas* rest in *Prakṛti* as in union with it and are not distinguishable, not only from one another but even as *dharmas*. Their essence is the essence of the *dharmī*.

Hence it follows that the *dharmas* are two-fold, according as they are manifest (*abhivyakta*) or unmanifest (*anabhivyakta*) and the *dharmī* is the substance which persists (*anvayī*) in them both and consists of a double nature, viz., it is a *sāmānya* as well as a *viśeṣa*, i.e., as a *sāmānya* it persists in and is identical with *śānta* and *avyapadeśya dharma* and as a *viśeṣa* it persists in and is the same as *udita-dharma*. In other words, every effect or manifest product, in so far as it is a manifestation, is an individual (*viśeṣa*) and considering its past and future unmanifest condition is identical with the Universal Being or *Prakṛti* · *sāmānya*). The relation of cause and effect being identity in difference (*tādātmya*) every effect has an individual character (derived from its difference from cause) and stands by itself, distinct from everything else in creation and has also a Universal character (derived from its identity with cause) by virtue of which it is perceived as one with everything else in nature.

The above will suffice to bring out the meaning of the statement that all things are essentially identical and consequently all are in all. The root principle of Yoga Philosophy and practice is thus found to be a recognition

of the fact that every thing is full of infinite possibilities, and, personal exertion is meant simply to give them, by removing the obstructions, actuality. As to how this is done we shall discuss elsewhere.

The perpetuity of flux is thus found to be an established fact in Nature. Our mind as well as the outer world are both equally fluent. Let us now try to discover how these momentary changes contribute to various results. The question is—if the *dharmī* is one and suffers changes of state moment by moment, it follows that these changes are all uniform, and, in that case how are we to account for the varieties of creation ? The origin of multiplicity in effects from one or uniform cause is an illegitimate hypothesis. Concerning this it is said that diversity of modification is due to diversity of *Krama*. *Krama* is the relative sequence between one *dharma* and another (*dharma* includes *lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā* also) and is ultimately a unit of change. It is the sequence of *kṣaṇas* (*kṣaṇānantaryātmā*). One *dharma* may be said to be a *krama* of another provided that it immediately follows it. The *krama* of *dharma* and *lakṣaṇa pariṇāmas* is sensible, but, that of *avasthā-pariṇāma* is extremely subtle and supersensuous. None but a *Yogin* can perceive the subtle change that a substance is undergoing every moment. But, such *kramas*, though ordinarily imperceptible, are not to be ignored. Their cumulative effect, from which they are inferred, is great. It is their permutations and combinations, endless in number, which give rise to this manifold of our sensible experience.

Thus understood *krama* is a movement of the *guṇas*. Referring to a *dharma*, we may define *krama* as its movement, from moment to moment, from the *anāgata* state

towards manifestation (*varttamānatā*) and then towards *atīta*. In the *atīta* or *śānta* stage of the *dharma*, where all movement comes to a stand-still, there is no *krama*[238], and, it is for this reason that it is described as irrevocable. That *krama* belongs to the present *dharma* is universally admitted. But, the *Yogin* points out that even the *anāgata-dharma*, a *dharma* which has not yet come to be manifested and is yet in the womb of *Prakṛti* as an *avyapadeśya-dharma*, possesses *krama* and is subject to the law of fluctuation. Had it not been so, an *anāgata-dharma* would never have become *varttamāna* at all. An *anāgata-dharma* becoming *varttamāna* is tantamount to the evolution of Primordial Nature. A detailed study of this point and the secrets of creation, will be furnished in another paper, when it will also be shown that just as lapse into the past is the final term of life-history of *dharma*, so the *anāgatāvasthā* of the *dharma* is the initial term of its history. And this *anāgatāvasthā* may be conceived firstly (1) as *Prakṛti* and then (2) as an Ideal *Dharma* (*bodha*), i. e., the same *dharma* when it is in the *Mahat*[239]

The philosophy of *krama* is very deep. It is said that the *guṇas* being eternal and always in motion by nature, the *krama* of their modification never comes to an end. Their *pariṇāma* is eternal. But, their evolutes, viz., *buddhi*, etc. are not permanent. That is, the *krama* of every substantial product ceases one day when it becomes dissolved. Every product, *buddhi* downwards, is meant to serve as an end or a means to an end, of the Self (be it *bhoga* or *apavarga*) and is thereby justified in its existence. The realisation of *puruṣārtha* is the *raison d'etre* of the existence and continuance of the manifested world, and, as soon as this is accomplished (finally by

Dharma-megha) it is resolved into its components, viz., the *guṇa* particles.[240] But, this is for one man--for him only who has reached his goal. There are other *Jīvas* who may be still in the middle of their journey, some who are still moving outwards in search of *bhoga* or earthly enjoyment and some who, having turned back upon them, are indeed moving inwards, but, are yet on the path, struggling in pursuit of the saving knowledge. For such *Jīvas* the manifested world (*dṛśya*) will have to continue. And, the number of *Jīvas* being infinite there will never come a time when there will be no more a manifest, objective world.[241]

But, this does not violate the possibility of periodic dissolution of the world.

We have seen above that the *krama* of modification of the *dṛśya* ends as soon as the *puruṣārtha* is realised. But, as the *krama* has an end, has it also a beginning ? The *dṛśya* being only a product or evolute of the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, the question recurs—what is the origin of this relation and when did it originate ? We pointed out that the *anāgatāvasthā* is the beginning of the *krama* of the *dharma*. Does this *avasthā* refer to a definite point of time or is it simply a vague assumption following from the necessity of thought alone ? Put more pointedly the question refers itself to the moral explanation of the bondage and consequent limitations imposed on the Self In reply to this pertinent question, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, like other kindred systems, asserts that we can not posit an absolute beginning of this series of *kṣaṇas*, that since every *kṣaṇa* is explicable only on the hypothesis of a preceding *kṣaṇa* no absolutely first *kṣaṇa* is conceivable. The casual series must be held to be infinite *ab ante*.

Moreover, what is the nature of this relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (i.e. between *Puruṣa* and *Sattva*) ? The relation is given in every judgment of ours, which is a function (*vṛtti*) of the *buddhi* and implies of co-ordination of subject and object. Such a co-ordination of two distinct and mutually exclusive principles is not possible except through confusion or non-discrimination (*avidyā*, *viparyaya*). Thus this relation, which is the source of phenomenal consciousness and misery, is due to *mithyā jñāna*. But, the origin of *mithyā-jñāna* can be explained only as a consequent of another *mithyā-jñāna* and that of another, and, in this way the series would be stretched infinitely backwards and we would not be able to arrive at its first term at all. The *guṇas* being always in relation to the *Puruṣa*, (because both are eternal) [242] their effects too must always have been in relation with it : "**धर्मिणामनादिसंयोगाद् धर्ममात्राणामप्यनादिः संयोगः**".[243]

But the usual argument set forward in support of the beginningless character of *saṁsāra* consists in the inexplicability of the inequalities of pleasure, pain, etc., on the hypothesis of a beginning in time.

The inevitable conclusion which follows from the above is practically a confession of ignorance. However smartly we may tackle the problem, the mystery remains ever the same. Different attempts at solution simply change the form of the difficulty, but, the mystery is never fully cleared. Yet from an intellectual and rational point of view, the doctrine of *anāditva* remains the only valid theory on the point.

The doctrine implies that there has never been a first *Karma* or a first *mithyā-jñāna*, in the absolute sense

of the term. There has always been a push from behind. The difficulty of admitting a first *Karma* would be great. Assuming pluralism and absence of limitations, all *Karmas* would be uniform in the beginning and differences would never ensue. According to such a view the Selves, before they fell into the meshes of *Prakṛti*, must have been in a free condition, joyous and pure. Why then should they have acted at all ? And, even if they had acted, why should one have acted differently from another ? In such a theory differences have to be assumed in the very beginning, and, since these differences are self-explained and do not require an extrinsic ground of justification, why not extend the same lower down in the series ? But, this would upset the causal principle and end in a chaos of thought. Better, therefore, than introducing differences on the Eternal Planes (*Nitya-dhāma*), it is to explain them in the usual way by referring them to the adequate causal conditions working in time. An endless succession is not an illegitimate hypothesis.

Unless the causal series is admitted to be infinite, that is, if the world be supposed to have a beginning in time, we must have to take recourse, as already noted, to the doctrine of accident and chance (*Nirnimittavāda*). In that case, the experience of pleasure and pain on the part of the *Jīvas* would remain unexplained and there would follow the defect of *akṛtā-bhyāgama* or fallacy of unmerited reward and punishment. Moreover, the doctrine would involve the possibility of the Free Souls also returning to bondage. Śaṅkara expresses himself on this point thus : "आदिमत्त्वे हि संसारस्याकस्मादुद्भूतेर्मुक्तानामपि पुनः संसारोद्भूतिप्रसङ्गः, अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गश्च सुखदुःखादिवैषम्यस्य निर्निमित्तत्वात्".[244] These inequalities are not explicable through *Īśvara* and through mere *avidyā* (without *Karmas*

following from the *vāsanās* of the *Kleśas*, viz., *Rāga*, *Dveṣa* and *Moha*) which is uniform in all.[2 4 5]

This is the burden of infinite *Karma* which every *Jīva* bears on his back. To escape from this is to obtain permanent Peace. How this may be done need not be discussed at this point. The question why one *Jīva* differs from another morally, since all are equally burdended with *Anādi Karma* of an infinite kind, seems to be solved by the consideration of succession (*krama*) in the development or ripening of the *Karmas*. The *Karmas* being infinite, their permutation and combinations too are infinite. Hence the difference in the different series of lives.

This view is not universally admitted even in India, though undoubtedly this is accepted in almost all the recognised systems of Indian Philosophy. For there are schools which, while conceding that the world as such has neither beginning nor end, deny that a particular *Jīva's* course of existence in it should also be beginningless. They mean to say that as the *Jīvahood* has an end at a definite point of time, it begins also in time. It is inconceivable that a life, which is known to end should have no beginning. If *anādi* is intended to mean that we do not know when the series begins, simply because our own vision does not reach far back, it is all right; it would merely amount to a confession of the fact that our eyes are dimmed with *avidyā* and cannot discover the beginning; but, if it means, as it undoubtedly does, that it has no beginning at all, it is nonsense. These thinkers teach that the *Jīva* is originally pure and free, and essentially identical with *Īśvara*, but, that through some fault on his part he was thrown into the vortex of *saṁsāra* in which he has been rotating ever since and from which he

will be able to escape only when the *vega* with which he fell (which itself was determined by the intensity of the original fault) will have been exhausted. The intensity of his fault determines the length of his stay away in *saṁsāra*. His original fall and his final emancipation are both due to the action of Divine Will, the former known as *Nigraha-Śakti* and the latter as the *Anugraha-Śakti* (Power of Grace) of the Supreme Lord.

The question how the *Jīvas*, all pure and spotless at first, are at all capable of transgression, and, even then why they transgress in different ways, is answered by saying that they are all 'free' (*svatantra*) at this stage and that their actions are all self-determined. The different series of lives of the *Jīvas* may be explained by their original differences on the Eternal Plane. These differences donot require to be explained from without. They follow from the essential difference in the nature of the *Jīvas*. For according to this view the *Jīvas* are different from one another, so far as personality is concerned, although each of them may be pure, free, etc., equally with the rest. This is a doctrine characteristic of all the pluralistic systems.

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XI. THE DATE OF MADHUSŪDANA SARASVATĪ

The date of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has been as much a vexed problem in the chronology of Indian Literature as that of Appayya Dīkṣita. The paper on Appayya Dīkṣita[246], recently published in the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras[247], has indeed thrown much fresh light on the date of Appayya, though certain difficulties still remain to be solved. But, the date of Madhusūdana seems yet to be an open question. Mr. R. Krishna Swami Sastri, B. A., contributed an interesting paper on the age of Madhusūdana in the pages of the same Journal, pleading in favour of the third quarter of the 17th century as his probable date.

Assuming that the date of Appayya, as finally determined by Mr. Y. Mahaling Sastri, is correct, viz., that Appayya was born about 1520 A. D. and died about 1593 A. D., having lived a life of 72 years, it seems to one more than likely that Madhusūdana too lived about the end of the 16th century or a little earlier. Madhusudana's date cannot be dragged down into the 17th century for the obvious reason that a manuscript of the Siddhānta-bindu composed by him was transcribed in Śaka 1539 (नवाग्निबाणेन्दुमिते शकाब्दे) or 1617 A. D. This is the most positive proof in support of the 16th century date for Madhusūdana. Besides, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa is said to have defeated Madhusūdana and Nṛsiṁhāśrama in a public controversy. Nārāyaṇa's commentary on the Vṛttaratnākara was written in 1545 A. D. which is, therefore, also the date of Madhusūdana. This is per-

fectly in keeping with the date of Nṛsiṁhāśrama whose Vedānta-tattva-viveka was composed in 1547 A. D. Madhusūdana's high praise of Appayya, whom he describes as *Sarva-tantra-svatantra*, is explicable on the supposition that Madhusūdana was a junior contemporary of the latter. In the same way Appayya's alleged intellectual conversion by Nṛsiṁha and his respectful reference to the views of the latter in the Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha are easily intelligible if Nṛsiṁha is held to have been an earlier contemporary of Appayya. Nṛsiṁha lived up to an advanced age.

That Madhusūdana's Advait-ratna-rakṣaṇa was written in reply to Śaṅkara's Bhedaratna is certain. But, Śaṅkara's date is not after 1529 A. D., but long before it[248]. As a Ms. of his Bhedaratna was copied in Saṁvat 1519 or 1462 A. D., Śaṅkara may be assigned to the 15th century. Madhusūdana's contemporary Nṛsiṁhāśrama too had already commented upon a similar work, called Abhedaratna, written by one Mallanārādhya with the same end in view, i.e., for vindication of the cause of Advaita.

Madhusūdana's posteriority to Appayya is undoubted, but, this need not imply any long interval between the two authors. They can well be explained by the assumption that Madhusūdana was a younger contemporary of Appayya. As Madhusūdana's date cannot be brought down beyond 1617 A. D., when a Ms. of his Siddhānta-bindu was copied, this assumption becomes inevitable. And in the light of evidence adduced by Y. Mahalinga Sastri it seems no longer possible to stick to the old dates for Appayya Dīkṣita.[249]

Vyāsarāja too was probably an older contemporary of Madhusūdana. The date for him given by Mr. R. K.

Sastri, i. e., between 1446 and 1539 A. D., may be accepted. It is said that Vyāsarāja himself sent his pupil Vyāsāśrama to study Vedānta with Madhusūdana.[250]

Rāmatīrtha, pupil of Kṛṣṇa Tīrtha, commented on the Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī adversely criticised this commentary in his own Ṭīkā on the same work. So much is clear. But it is doubtful whether this Rāma Tīrtha was identical with the *Guru* of Ananta Deva I. Even assuming the truth of the proposed identity there appears to be no anachronism in Madhusūdana's having attacked the views and interpretations of Rāma Tīrtha. The date of Ananta Deva II was between 1616 and say 1650 A. D., for he referred to Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa whose Nirṇaya-sindhu was composed in 1612 A. D. and was criticised by the great Mīmāṁsaka Khaṇḍa Deva[251] who died in 1666 A. D. As Ananta was a protege of Prince Baz Bahadur who reigned probably from 1644 to 1664 A. D. the year 1644 may be taken to be the year when Ananta Deva II was living. This would explain the possibility of Ananta's referring to Kamalākara and being himself referred to by Khaṇḍa Deva. If Baz Bahadur was a Prince when Ananta undertook at his request the composition of the Smṛti-kaustubha, this date will have to be shifted a few years earlier. Accepting this year as our initial point and computing backward we may date the literary activities of his father, Āpa Deva II, the author of Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-prakāśa and commentary on Vedānta-sāra about 1600 A. D., and, those of Ananta Deva I, the author of (Vedānta) Siddhānta-ratna, about 1570 A. D. The date of Rāma Tīrtha, the author of the commentary on the Saṅkṣepa-Śārīraka referred to above and the *Guru* of Ananta Deva I, may be 20 years earlier or about 1550

A. D. For Madhusūdana who might have lived up to the end of the 16th century and whose commentary on the Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka was probably a production of his maturer years it was in no way impossible to refer to the views of Rāma Tīrtha.

It may be further observed that Madhusūdana had among his pupils (i) Balabhadra, (ii) Puruṣottama Sarasvatī and (iii) Śeṣa Govinda. This Balabhadra, called Balabhadra Bhaṭṭācārya at the end of Puruṣottama Sarasvatī's commentary on the Siddhānta-bindu, was the pupil for whose study Madhusūdana had written the Siddhānta-bindu. Puruṣottama refers to Madhusūdana as his *Guru* in the line—**विद्यागुरुं गुरुमिव सुराणां मधुसूदनम्**, (**नौमि**)—of his commentary on the Siddhānta-bindu. Śeṣa Govinda calls himself the son of Śeṣa Paṇḍita and the pupil of Madhusūdana in his commentary on the Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha attributed to Śaṅkarācārya. If the father of Govinda is held to be identical with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa which is not unlikely, the synchronism of Madhusūdana with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa becomes established. That Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa lived in the 16th century is well-known. Madhusūdana may, therefore, also be assigned to the same age.

Thus it seems to me very likely that Madhusūdana lived and worked in the 16th century. The lower limit of his age is furnished, not by the date of Hari Dīkṣita's Brahma-sūtra-vṛtti (completed in 1736 A. D), but, by that of the transcription of a Ms. of Siddhānta-bindu (1617 A. D.). There is no doubt that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, the *Guru* of Brahmānanda, whose commentaries on some of Madhusūdana's works (viz., Candrikā, Bṛhat and Laghu—on the Advaita-Siddhi and Nyāya-ratnāvalī

on the Siddhānta-bindu) are well-known, was greatly influenced by Madhusūdana's teachings. His Bhakti-candrikā bears upon it traces of his close familiarity with Madhusūdana's Bhakti-rasāyana and he himself wrote a commentary on the latter's Siddhānta-bindu (recently published from Benares). Nārāyaṇa lived about the end of the 18th century. In the Government Sanskrit College Library, Benares, there is a Ms. of Muktāvalī-prakāśa by Dinakara dated Saṁvat 1758 or 1701 A. D. This Ms. belonged to the private library of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha himself.

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XII. MYSTICISM IN VEDA

Thanks to the enviable zeal and industry of Western Orientalists our Vedic studies have acquired a great impetus. Since the laudable efforts of Max Müller and other pioneer workers in the field of Vedic researches, the bibliography of Vedic publications within easy reach of us all has been gaining in strength. As the works are becoming available attempts are being made to interpret the contents of the literature in a way consonant with the high esteem in which it has been held. Several schools of Vedic exegesis are already in existence and more are expected to appear as our studies are progressing.

And in India too we know of different schools of Vedic interpretation. A cursory glance at the Nirukta will suffice to show that before the days of Yāska there were several lines of thinkers whose interpretation of the Vedic *mantras* was divergent.

This shows that the true import of the Vedas was always considered to be very difficult of realisation. That mere book-knowledge did not contribute in any real way to a proper understanding of the Vedas goes without saying. It has always been recognised that there is a secret or hidden sense in the Veda, which does not reveal itself to a superficial observer. To admit this is to admit that there is mysticism in the Veda.

But what is the true conception of the Veda ? It is well known that the study of the Veda is forbidden

to any but the so-called twice-born, which implies that without proper initiation it is held to be absolutely impossible to find access to its secrets. The so-called ceremony of *Upanayana* or *Gāyatrī-dīkṣā* is in fact an initiatory process which leads to personal regeneration, of course in a spiritual sense, without which competence to be in touch with higher truths can never arise. The Gṛhya-sūtras or Dharma-sūtras will afford us little assistance in understanding the secret of *Upanayana*, for the rituals represent only the formal expression of the inner secret.

The function of the *Ācārya* in *Dīkṣā* is that of a father, viz., to procreate. In other words *Upanayana* marks that occult process whereby a spiritual being, centred in the consciousness of its own spirituality, throws out a portion of its own spiritual energy into the womb as it were of the Inner Life or *Liṅgadeha* of the Neophyte. This initiates the working of that conversion which ends in the formation of a spiritual entity out of the person of the individual initiated. The infusion of spiritual energy is effected through the medium of sacred sound. The immediate result of the action is the rousing of the navel centre into activity, which in subsequent literature is graphically described as the "unloosening or snapping of the knot in the navel region." As soon as this dormant centre becomes energised the spiritual potentialities of the people find a scope for development. The gradual evolution of these powers, latent in every man and unknown to and unrecognised by him till they are called forth from the depths of his being by the vivifying contact of the Master's Energy, corresponds in a sense to the embryonic development of the physical body. The end of this evolutionary process represents the perfection of the

spiritualisation already set in. It is in this way that the spiritual body, as distinguished from the corruptible or natural body, of a man is formed. As soon as this is complete the man is termed a *Brāhmaṇa* in the proper sense of the term.

The well known couplet,

"जन्मना जायते शूद्रः संस्काराद् द्विज उच्यते ।
वेदपाठाद् भवेद् विप्रः ब्रह्म जानाति ब्राह्मणः" ॥

recounts the four stages in a Brāhmaṇa's life. It is stated that physical birth, from the spiritual point of view, marks the lowest state which corresponds to a Śūdra. It is a state in which access to the true Vedic culture is out of the question. Even if, the birth is from Brāhmaṇa parents, there is very little difference. For the son of a Brāhmaṇa is as far from being entitled to Vedic lore as the son of a Śūdra, the only difference being, of course theoretically, that there is what is philosophically known as inherent potentiality (*svarūpa-yogyatā*) in the former, whereas there exists no such quality in the latter. And the potentiality itself is a congenial virtue, derived from hereditary transmission even from a remote distance in the line. The word *Saṁskāra* in the line stands for the *Upanayana* or Initiation which confers second birth and is akin in this sense to the regeneration of the Christian Gnostics consequent on the action of baptismal Grace. *Dvija*, therefore, is one who is born anew, viz., as clothed in a spiritual body or body of light and knowledge. In the mystic phraseology of the Vedic literature the entire process of spiritualisation, that is of the formation of the body of light, is covered by *Svādhyāya* representing in the words of the couplet

the stage of a *Vipra*. *Svādhyāya* in the inner sense does not mean, as it is supposed to mean, the reading of sacred scriptures. This meaning, which is the only one known to the lay man, is really a corollary of the original and truer meaning of the term. It is not the proper place to enter into a discussion of the theory of *Veda-pāṭha* or *Mantra-japa*, but it must be clearly asserted, to avoid any possible misconception, that it characterises the movement—rather the circulation—of the energy of light called into activity by the will of the Master. The *Upanayana* is only the beginning of this process. The *śabda*, which the pupil receives from the Master, nay, which is invoked from his own person under the influence of the Master, is really an outer vesture of the Inner Light (*āntaraṁ jñānaṁ*) which is of the nature of Subtle Sound (*Sūkṣmā Vāk*). This Subtle Sound manifests itself as *buddhi* or *jñāna* after which desire arises and the mind is actuated. The mind hitherto at rest begins to move or stir and the result is the rousing of the dormant fire in the body (*kāyāgni*). The action of the fire thus brought into play originates a corresponding movement of the *prāṇa* within the body which tends to assume an upward flow. This is the so-called opening of the navel lotus. The roused vitality gets up from the navel, strikes against the brain and comes down, in the course of which it is struck by a second flow of the same vital current roused from the navel. This produces what is known as an audible sound. The point is that *vāyu* or *prāṇa* becomes the home as it were of the Inner Organ and is permeated by the properties of the latter. Being influenced by heat it begins to expand itself, in the course of which it opens up all its knots by means of the various *śrutis* and manifests the *Varṇas*. The Subtle Sound within is asso-

ciated with degrees of light. Its form, which is unique and indivisible, is reflected in the physical and manifested sound described above. From what has been said above it is evident that the entire process of the manifestation of the inner sound is identical with the gradual clarification of knowedge. Thus *Svādhyāya* represents the *Vipra* stage. When this stage reaches its perfection one is said to be on the verge of illumination, which is the characteristic of a Brāhmaṇa par excellence. The absolute knowledge of truth or *Para Brahman* can never dawn on the soul which has not undertaken an earlier stage of purification with the currents of *Śabda Brahman* set flowing after the inner ducts have been cleansed and the master has opened the psychic centres through *Upanayana*.

Thus understood, Veda is the only way to knowledge or self-realisation, without which the bonds of the soul cannot be snapped asunder :

प्राप्त्युपायोऽनुकारश्च तस्य (ब्रह्मणः) वेदो महर्षिभिः ।
..... समाम्नातः..... .. .. ॥

Whatever else is recognised as a means is in fact only an aspect of, or an ancillary to, the Veda.[252]

XIII. GLEANINGS FROM THE TANTRAS

THE TEN MAHĀVIDYĀS

In the Tāntrika literature the Mahāvidyās are usually enumerated as ten. But the number is sometimes increased by three and sometimes by six[253]. The Muṇḍamālā-tantra[254] names the ten Mahāvidyās, thus: (1) Kālī, (2) Tārā, (3) Ṣoḍaśī, (4) Bhuvaneśvarī, (5) Bhairavī, (6) Chinnamastā, (7) Dhūmāvatī, (8) Vagalā, (9) Mātaṅgī and (10) Kamalā. This list is also found in the Cāmuṇḍā-tantra as well as in the Toḍala-tantra. There appear to be slight differences of opinion in the various Tantras in regard to the names of the Bhairavas of these Mahāvidyās. These names, as given in the Toḍala-tantra, are : (1) Mahākāla (2) Akṣobhya, (3) Śiva (three-eyed- and five-faced), (4) Tryambaka, (5) Dakṣiṇāmūrti (five-faced), (6) Kavandha (Śiva), (7) none, (8) Ekavaktra (= Mahārudra), (9) Mātaṅga Śiva (= Dakṣiṇāmūrti) and (10) Viṣṇu (= Sadāśiva). It may be noted that Dhūmāvatī being a widow has no Bhairava[255] and the first Bhairava, named Mahākāla, is attached to Dakṣiṇā, a type of Kālī. But in the Śaktisaṅgama-tantra the names of the Bhairavas under (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) appear respectively as—Lalitesvara (= Tripura-bhairava), Mahādeva, Vaṭuka, Vikarāla (= Krodha-bhairava), Kāla-bhairava (= Ghora) and Mṛtyuñjaya.

The Vidyās may be thus classified in order of the *Āmnāya* :

(1) *The Eastern Āmnāya*:

(i) Śrī-vidyā (with all its varieties), Bhuvaneśvarī, Tārā, Tripurā-bhairavī. (ii) Bhuvaneśvarī, Lalitā, Aparājitā, Pūrṇeśī, Lakṣmī, Sarasvatī, Vāṇī, Annapūraṇā, Jayā.

(2) *The Southern Āmnāya*:

(i) Vagalāmukhī, Mahālakṣmī and Bālā-bhairavī. (ii) Daksiṇākālī, Bhadrakālī. (iii) Dakṣiṇākālī, Vagalā, Chinnā, Bhadrā, Tārā, Mātaṅgī and Niḥśeṣī.

(3) *The Western Āmnāya*:

(i) Kubjikā, Kulālikā, Mātaṅgī and Amṛtā-lakṣmī.

(4) *The Northern Āmnāya*:

(i) Kālī and Tārā with some varieties, Bhairavī, Chinnamastā, Dhūmāvatī and Mātaṅgī. (ii) Guhyakālī, Dhūmrā, Kāmakalā-kālī, Mahākālī, Mahā-smaśāna-kālī, Kapālinī, Kāla-saṅkarṣiṇī, Chinnā, Mahābhīmā-sarasvatī, Mahārātrī, three kinds of Tārā, Yogeśī, Siddhi-lakṣmī and Siddhi-bhairavī.

(5) *The Upper* (*Ūrdhva*) *Āmnāya*:

(i) Kāmeśvarī, Lalitā, Bālā, Mahā-tripurasundarī and Tripurā-bhairavī.

(6) *The Lower* (*Adhara*) *Āmnāya*:

(i) Vajrayoginī, Pannagī, Nairṛtesvarī and Bhīmā.

(A) KĀLĪ

Regarding the origin of Kālī, which is described in the Tantras[256] as the chief of all the Mahāvidyās,

different accounts are available. According to the Svatantra-tantra, quoted in the Prāṇatoṣiṇī, She appeared in the city of Avantī on the day of Mahārātri, i.e., on the dark eleventh of the month of Phālguna. She is often identified with Satī, the daughter of Dakṣa and with Pārvatī, the daughter of Menakā. Viśvāmitra's attainment of Brahmanhood is said to be consequent on Her Grace[257]. The Muṇḍamālā-tantra identifies Kālī with Kṛṣṇa and Ṣoḍaśī. It is not proper to enter here into a detailed study of the very close relation existing from the cultural view-point, between Kṛṣṇa and Ṣoḍaśī. What concerns us here is that the Vidyās Kālī and Ṣoḍaśī too are similarly connected. The Prāṇatoṣiṇī[258] gives a vision of the story of Kālī's conversion into Sundarī or Ṣoḍaśī. It is said that once on a certain day Indra deputed a certain number of Apsarasas to Śiva in Kailāsa, but, he sent them on to Kālī in Kālīpura and betook himself to that place. He addressed the Goddess as "Kālī" (lit., a dark-complexioned one), which She took as an insult. She at once resolved to convert herself into "Gaurī" (lit. a fair-complexioned one) and vanished. In the meantime Nārada met Śiva in Kālīpura and Mahākālī in Uttara Meru. He told Her, of course in joke, that Śiva was ready to marry again, on which She assumed at once an extra-ordinary beautiful form and appeared before Śiva. She said, in Siva's presence, that a very fair form was reflected in His heart. Taking this form to be that of a Goddess on whom Śiva's heart was set She felt the pangs of jealousy and rebuked the God for what she interpreted as his unfaithfulness. Śiva asked Her to restrain Herself, and, with the third Eye of Wisdom, to discover the reality of what the form represented. Kālī found to Her great surprise that it was Her own shadow.

Śiva then called the beatiful form before Him by the names of Sundarī, Śrī and Pañcamī—which are the synonyms of Tripura-sundarī or Lalitā. He called Her Ṣoḍaśī on account of Her perpetual fresh youth. As he was frightened by the Shadow in His heart He gave it the name of Tripurā-bhairavī.

There are several varieties of this Goddess. In the Puraścaryārṇava we find mention of the following types—viz. Dakṣiṇā, Bhadrā, Smaśāna-kālī, Guhyā, Kāmakalā, Dhanā, Siddhi and Caṇḍī. The Jayadratha-yāmala refers to Ḍambara-kālī, Gahaneśvarī, Ekatārā, Caṇḍaśābarī, Vajravatī, Rakṣākālī, Indīvarī-kālī, Dhanadā, Ramaṇyā, Īśānakālī and Mantramātā. The Sammohana-tantra speaks of ten varieties, but actually mentions seven, viz., Sparśamaṇi, Cintāmaṇi, Siddhakālī, Vidyārājñī, Kāmakalā, Haṁsa-kālī and Guhya-kālī.

Of all these varieties Dakṣiṇā and Bhadra-kālī belong to the Southern *Āmnāya*, while Guhyakālī, Kāmakalā, Mahākālī and Mahāsmaśāna-kālī belong to the Northern *Āmnāya*.

Guhyakālī, generally worshipped in Nepal, is often described as the best of all the types, and it was of this Goddess that Brahmā, Vasiṣṭha, Rāma, Kuvera, Yama, Bharata, Rāvaṇa, Bali, Indra and others were the worshippers. The number of her faces is said to vary with various Sādhakas. The type which Bharata worshipped has ten faces and Her *Mantra* consists of 16 syllables. The external features of the type of which Rāmacandra was a votary are exactly the same, but, Her *Mantra* contains 17 syllables rather than 16. Hārīta and Cyavana both worshipped this 17-syllabled Vidyā,

but, Hārīta obstructed it with a *Kīla*, so that until this is removed, which is practically a very difficult matter, it cannot reveal itself and become effective. The Cyavana-type is still in use.

The Mahākāla-saṁhitā explicitly says that the ten-faced type of Guhya-kālī[259] is the fundamental type (*Prakṛtiḥ*), of which the other varieties are modifications. There are seven varieties of Guhya-kālī and five of Dakṣiṇā-kālī.

The worshippers of Kāmakalā-kālī are named in the Mahākāla-saṁhitā, thus: Indra, Varuṇa Kuvera, Brahmā, Mahā-kāla, Rāma, Rāvaṇa, Yama, Vivasvān, Candra, Viṣṇu and the Ṛṣis. The 18-syllabled type of of this Vidyā is supposed to be the best.

(B) TĀRĀ

Tārā is the second Mahāvidyā in the list. She is variously named—as Nīla-sarasvatī,[260] Ugratārā, Ekajaṭā[261] Mahātārā, Vidyārājñī[262], Vāgīśvarī[263] and Sarasvatī[264].

The Tantracūḍāmaṇi and Tārārṇava describe it as Kucchukā and call it a secret Vidyā. In the Tārā-rahasya-vṛtti of Śaṅkarācārya mention is found of several kinds of Tārā, thus: Tārā, Ugrā, Mahogrā, Vajrakālī, Sarasvatī, Kāmeśvarī, and Bhadrakālī. In the Tārā-bhakti-sudhārṇava[265] of Nṛsiṁha Ṭhakkura Vajrakālī and Sarasvatī are read as Vajrā and Nīla-sarasvatī.

According to tradition, the different *Mantras* of this Goddess were worshipped by different persons for different purposes. Thus, for instance, the *Mantras*

which Brahmā had resorted to while conferring boons on Tārakāsura and Hiraṇyakaśipu were 12-syllabled and 7-syllabled respectively. Rāma's *Mantra* was 7-syllabled. There is a 7-syllabled *Mantra* of the Goddess associated with the name of Brahmā, but it is somewhat different. Similar is the case with the *Mantra* of Balarāma. Nārāyaṇa, for subjugating the Daityas, worshipped the 5-syllabled form of the *Mantra*. Viṣṇu, in the form of Buddha, is said to have worshipped the 12-syllabled *Mantra* for preaching of Buddhism. The *Mantra* which Mahādeva gave to Paraśurāma for bringing to an end the Kṣatriyas in the land was the 5-syllabled *Mantra* of Tārā.

The different forms of Tārā, of which the exact number cannot be determined, are arranged in some Tantras according to the *Āmnāya* to which each is affiliated. Thus Sparśatārā, Candravarṇā, Caṇḍaghaṇṭā, Ghaṇṭikā and Trailokyavijayā belong to the East; Cintāmaṇi, Siddhajaṭā, Trijaṭā, Krūramālikā, Krūracaṇḍā, Mahācaṇḍā, Vajratārā, Brahmatārā, Maṇitārā, Nārasiṁhī and Caturvedodarī belong to the South; Ugratārā and the 84 types of Haṁsatārā to the West; Aṣṭatārā to the North; Mahogratārā, Mahānīlā, Śāmbhavatārā, Mahānīlā-sarasvatī, Cīnasundarī, Nīlasundarī and Mahānīla-sundarī to the Upper *Āmnāya*.

The connection of Tārā with Buddhism is very often referred to in the Tantras. The Rudrayāmla[266] and the Brahmayāmala[267] contain a short account of the story of Buddha and Vasiṣṭha with reference to the worship of Tārā. It is said in the former work that Vasiṣṭha practised hard penances (in the Nīlācala hills[268], says the Brahmayāmala) for a long time for

a vision of Tārā, but, the Goddess did not appear. Feeling depressed he went to his Father, Brahmā, and told him the whole story, asking him at the same time to give him a fresh *Mantra*. He was even inclined to utter a curse. Brahmā dissuaded him from cursing and requested him to continue to worship the same Goddess by means of Yoga (*yoga-mārgeṇa*). Thereupon Vasiṣṭha went to the shore of the Sea[269] and practised austerities for 1000 years. But the Goddess was not propitiated. Vasiṣṭha lost all sense of restraint and pronounced a curse upon Her. On this She appeared and said that his curse was unprovoked, for he was not aware of the mysteries of Her worship which are known to Buddha alone in the country of Mahācīna. These are generally included in the so-called Cīnācāra[270].

Vasiṣṭha repaired to Mahācīna and entreated Buddha to initiate him into the secrets of Tārā worship, but when he found around him the devotees of Tārā indulging in non-Vedic rituals and steeped in the excesses involved in the worship by the 5*Ms*—i.e., *Madya*, *Māṁsa*, etc.—he felt disgusted and doubts as to the propriety and dignity of this form of worship began to trouble his mind. Buddha realised his plight and explained to him the *Kulamārga*, which is praised as the noblest path leading to spiritual realisation. Through his persuasion Vasiṣṭha adopted the *Śākta* worship (of Tārā) by means of wine and the other accessories till he became a perfect *Yogī* (*Pūrṇa-yogī*) and had a vision of the Goddess.

For a long time the Tārā *Mantra*, owing to the curse of Vasiṣṭha remained ineffective, but its *Utkīlana*

was performed subsequently, so as to remove its barrenness. In some places it is noted that the effect of the curse was till the advent of the *Kṛṣṇa Avatāra* [271].

As regards the origin of the Goddess it is related that She came forth from the upper Mouth of Śiva in the form of a bright flame and fell into the Cola (or Colana) lake to the west of Mount Meru on the day of *Kālarātri*, i. e., on the *Dīpāvalī* day (14th dark *tithi* combined with *Amā* of *Kārtika*). Rising out of the lake She assumed a blue hue and became known as Nīla-sarasvatī. The saint Akṣobhya, who is described as an Emanation from Mahādeva and was living on the north of the lake, observed the whole affair and began to worship Her [272].

The connection of Akṣobhya with Tārā is remarkable. For it is found in the Buddhist literature as well—and modern scholars are strongly inclined to believe that the whole Tārā legend was really a graft from the Buddhistic source upon *Hindu Tantra Śāstra*. Akṣobhya is a very well-known name in Mahāyāna Buddhism as that of a *Dhyānī Buddha* whose colour is blue and whose posture of hand (*mudrā*) is what is known as *Bhūsparśa*. The Śakti and Bodhisattva attached to Akṣobhya are Locanā and Vajrapāṇi respectively.

The derivative meaning of the name Akṣobhya (lit. 'unperturbable') is given in the Tantras. Śiva was called by this name because he was not agitated even after drinking the deadly poison which came out of the Churning of the Ocean [273].

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XIV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRIPURĀ TANTRA

It is a truism that every system of theocratic culture in India has behind it a consistently evolved system of philosophic thought. It is difficult, in the present state of our knowledge, to have a definite idea of the number of such systems in ancient and mediaeval times and even of the extent of literature comprised under each. Continued progress in researches in this field is likely to yield fresh materials favourable to the better understanding of the true history and philosophic value of these systems The work known under the name of "Tripurā-rahasya" (*Jñāna-khaṇḍa*) forms indeed a highly important document in the history of Indian Philosophy, so far as the system of a section of the *Śākta Tantra* is concerned, and should be appreciated from that point of view.

The systematisation of Tāntric Philosophy, on its *Śākta* side, does not seem to have yet been seriously attempted. The Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha of Mādhavācārya ignores the *Śākta* School altogether. So do the other compendia, earlier and later (e. g. Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya of Haribhadra, Sarvasiddhānta-saṅgraha of Śaṅkarācārya, etc.). There are different lines of *Śākta* culture still in existence and we have reason to believe that some at least of these have preserved the philosophical tradition. The literature associated with the third *Mahāvidyā*, named Ṣoḍaśī or Tripura-sundarī, is very extensive and presents several interesting features of Tāntrika Literature. It is possible to construct a regular

philosophy of the school out of the materials available to us and in this work of reconstruction the present treatise will, it is hoped, prove to be substantially helpful.

The Tripurā-rahasya, which claims to treat of the secrets of the *Tripurā* culture in all its aspects is said to consist of three sections, viz., *Māhātmya*, *Jñāna* and *Caryā*. The *Jñāna-khaṇḍa* has been published at Benares in a new edition.[274] The *Māhātmya-khaṇḍa*, of which (as of the *Jñāna-khaṇḍa*) we have an original manuscript in the Government Sanskrit College, Benares, was entrusted for publication to the publishers of the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. The third section is apparently lost, no trace of it having yet been found. It is an extensive work of which the first two sections contain 2163 and 6687 verses.

The work is attributed to one Hāritāyana and the commentary called Tātparya-dīpikā is from the pen of one Draviḍa Śrīnivāsa, son of Vaidyanātha Dīkṣita, resident of the village of Mahāpuṣkara in the Draviḍa country. The commentary was composed in 4932 Kali Era (1831 A.D.). The text is in 22 chapters.

The book is in the form of a discourse delivered by Hāritāyana to Nārada. This discourse professes to be a reproduction of the teachings of Dattātreya to Paraśurāma and claims to be based on personal realisation and reason.

The plan of the work may be thus summed up. Paraśurāma having heard Dattātreya's lectures on the greatness of the Supreme Deity Tripura-sundarī as embodied in the *Māhātmya-khaṇḍa* expressed a desire to the Master to be enlightened on the methods of worship

for propitiating the Goddess. He was subsequently initiated in due form into the mysteries of Tripurā worship and prastised penances for 12 years, under instructions from his tutor, at a hermitage on the Mahendra hill in the South. In the course of his spiritual exercises the ultimate problems of life and reality began to trouble his mind, and being unable to reach a solution himself he betook himself to the feet of his *Guru* for light and guidance. He had already heard a teaching on the subject from Saṁvarta, the great *Avadhūta*, on his discomfiture by Rāmacandra in the Tretā age, but he had not been able to realise it at the time. He requested the Master to explain to him the secrets of Saṁvarta's lessons, so that his doubts might be dipelled for ever. Dattātreya's response to Paraśurāma's question, interspersed with Parśurāma's cross-questions here and there, consitutes the body of the *Jñāna-khaṇḍa*. It would thus appear that the text of the Tripurā-rahasya, which embodies the teachings of Hāritāyana to Nārada, represents an old tradional lore of secret science originally revealed by Saṁvarta and subsequently expounded by Dattātreya to Paraśurāma.

The name Paraśurāma stands eminent among the votaries of Tripurā. The Kalpa-sūtra, treating of the secrets of the Tripurā worship in ten *khaṇḍas* and containing 335 *Sūtras* is attributed to Paraśurāma, who is described as a scion of the family of Bhṛgu, a disciple of Śiva and the son of Jamadagni and Reṇukā. This description of Paraśurāma implies that the Paraśurāma of the Tripurā-rahasya is believed to be identical with the author of the Kalpa-sūtras, though Pandit A. Mahādeva Śāstrī has, perhaps rightly questioned this identity.[275] The tradition has it that Dattātreya was the author of a

Saṁhitā work in 18,000 verses which was known under his own name, viz., Dattasaṁhitā. Paraśurāma studied the extensive work, and to bring its contents within easy reach of students, summarised it in a body of *Sūtras* distributed into 50 sections (*khaṇḍas*). This contained 6,000 *Sūtras*. The Saṁhitā and the *Sūtra* were both summed up, in the form of a dialogue between Dattātreya and Parasurāma, by Sumedhā, pupil of Paraśurāma. This tradition is found recorded in the Tripurā-rahasya, *Māhātmya-khaṇḍa*.

It is evident that the work of Sumedhā, who was of the Hārita family and consequenly known as Hāritāyana, is really to be identified with the Tripurā-rahasya itself rathter than with the Kalpa-sūtras of Paraśurāma as Lakṣmaṇa Rānāde has done[276], because the Paraśurāma Kalpa-sūtra is not in the shape of a dialogue between Datta and Paraśurāma and is not attributed to Sumedhā, whereas the Tripurā-rahasya has the the form of a similar dialogue[277] and is ascribed to Sumedhā Hāritāyana.

The line of Tripurā worship is represented by several teachers. We have already referred to Dattātreya and Paraśurāma. The names of Durvāsas, Agastya, Lopāmudrā and several others may be added in this connection. Durvāsas is associated with the authorship of a Mahimnaḥ-stotra of the Goddess, where he is described in the colophon as *Sakalāgamācārya*. Nityānanda, who wrote a commentary on the above Stotra, says that Durvāsas *aliās* Krodha Bhaṭṭāraka is really identical with Śiva Himself, who is the Master of the teachers of all the Āgamas (*Sakalāgamācārya-cakravartī*), as born from the womb of Anurūpā.[278]

The Supreme Goddess is variously named as Tripurā, Sundarī, Lalitā, Ṣoḍaśī, Śrī-vidyā, Kāmeśvarī, etc. She is called Tripurā, in as much as Her Body consists of three *Śaktis*, viz. Brāhmī, Vaiṣṇavī and Raudrī.[272] The Tripurā-rahasya speaks of Her in the following terms :

"त्रिपुरानन्तशक्त्यैक्यरूपिणी सर्वसाक्षिणी ।
सा चितिः सर्वतः पूर्णा परिच्छेदविवर्जनात्" ॥

The partial appearance of the Self as thus occurring is known as *Bāhyāvabhāsa*, because such appearance implies the manifestation of what may be described as empty space which is other than the Self. Remembering that *Caitanya* is all-embracing and can have nothing outside it—for if there were any such thing it would not shine out and would, therefore, be non-existent—what is popularly called the external is indeed only a reflection on *Caitanya* as on a mirror. When the universe comes into being it does so as only an image within the unique Self. The universe as such is varied but underlying it is the pure and simple unity of *Caitanya* revealing itself to the eye of diligent search (*anusandhāna*). The manifestation of the universe, due to the Free Will (*Svātantrya*) of the Absolute, is thus a process of *Ābhāsa* and for the initiation of this process nothing beyond the play of the Will is needed. The material and efficient causes, supposed to be necessary for every product, are held unnecessary.

The peculiar metaphysical position of the Tantra consists in the theory of *Ābhāsa*, which is consistent with this positon. It rejects the *Vivartavāda* of Neo-Vedānta, because the world is not originally a false appearance due to Error. It is real in the same way as an image is real, but, it has no existence apart from the medium in which

it is manifested. Its existence is only the existence of the medium. To the Vedāntist the world appears as such to the ignorant owing to his ignorance and in the last analysis it is resolved into *Māyā* which is not identical with *Brahman* and is material; but to a Tāntrist the world is real and is the expression of the *Cit Śakti* or Free Will of the Lord and is really spiritual in essence like the Lord Himself. In the last resort it turns back into the *Cit Śakti* which is never withdrawn, for the Will (*Svātantrya*) remains, even after the world has disappeared. The Vedānta system has had to fall back on the doctrine of *Vivarta*, because it denies in a sense *Svātantrya* to Pure *Caitanya*. The first stadium of reaction is thus an *Ābhāsa*. The second state which represents the subsequent condition shows how the *Cit Śakti*, already appearing (*Ābhāsamāna*) in the Pure *Caitanya*, further progresses. *Māyā* emerges on the scene now and the *Vivarta* is the logical outcome. The third stage marks how *Māyā* becomes productive. This is the *Pariṇāma* or Evolution which gets on till the *bhūtas* spring into manifestation. The fourth stage which represents creation out of the *bhūtas* is known as *Ārambha* or physico-chemical process of genesis. From the supreme stand-point of Tantra, however, the entire Creation is an *Ābhāsa*.

As thus realised She is the Eternal and Supreme Truth beyond all limitations consequent on time and place. She is the essence of *Caitanya* and is called Lalitā owing to Her transcendent charms. The Śakti-saṅgama-tantra observes that it is this Lalitā which assumes the form of Kṛṣṇa as Puruṣa.[280]

Sundarī is one of the ten *Mahāvidyās*.[281] It is said[282] that the ten *Vidyās* combined form a *Mahāvidyā*,

but, Ṣoḍaśī is a *Mahāvidyā* by Herself. The Toḍala-tantra[283] calls Mahā-tripura-sundarī by the name of *Pancamī* with Śiva (five-faced) as Her Bhairava. The Śakti-saṅgama, however, makes Lalitesvara Her Bhairava.[284] This is different form Tripura-bhairava, (or Vikarāla, the companion of Chinnā) and Ghora-bhairava (i. e., Kāla-bhairava, the companion of Dhūmāvatī).

The system teaches that the Supreme Reality is of the nature of Pure Intelligence, which is self-luminous and unaffected by the limitations of time, space and causality It has absolute freedom (*Pūrṇa-svātantrya*) in as much as its power or Will (*Saṁkalpa*) is unrestricted. This Power is really identical with the Essence of *Caitanya* and remains either involved in it or expresses itself as its inalienable property. In the technical phraseology of the *Śāstra* it is known as *Vimarśa* or *Kṛpā* and is an eternal attribute of *Caitanya*. The freedom referred to above implies that the Essence of Consciousness is free from *vikalpas* and is fundamentally distinct from matter. The *Caitanya* is free, as it does not depend on anything else for its own revelation of matter.

The Power exists in a two-fold condition. What is generally known as creation or dissolution is in reality consequent on the manifestation of this Power or on its abeyance. It always functions, but its function is sometimes (e.g. during the creative period) expressed as the manifestation of the Universe till now absorbed in and identified with the Essence of Reality and at other times expressed as self-manifestation alone.

The Supreme Reality of the Āgamas would thus seem to differ in a sense from the *Brahman* of Vedānta. Though both are essentially of the nature of Intelligence

there is a fundamental distinction between the two. The Absolute of the Tantra is endowed with Power which is held to be identical with Itself and by virtue of which It is described as the Free Agent (*Svatantra-karttā*). Freedom to act forms the essence of *Caitanya*. In other words, according to the Tāntric viewpoint, *Śiva* and *Śakti* are aspects of one and the same Reality. But in the current non-dualistic school of Vedānta *Brahman*, which as in this Tantra is described as of the nature of Pure Consciousness, is no better than an actionless Locus (*Adhikaraṇa*), on which the Power, which is attached to It mysteriously and is neither identical with nor distinct from It, plays. It is conceived as a *Pīṭha* or passive background in relation to the active power operating on It. The *Śakti* called *Māyā* in the Vedānta School, is not thus of the nature of *Brahman*, but is material (*anirvacanīya*), though it is held to be, of course mysteriously, subservient to it. But as conceived in the Tantra *Śakti* or Pure Freedom is absolutely non-material. The term *Cit Śakti* used to denote this power implies its spiritual essence.

What in the Tantras is known as *Bāhyābhāsa* or the manifestation of a non-ego (*anahambhāva*) within the Pure Ego (*Śuddhātmā*), but appearing as external to it is the Radical Nescience (*Mūla-vidyā*) of Vedānta. This non-ego is the so-called *Avyakta* (Unmanifest) or *Jaḍa Śakti* (Matter). But, the Freedom or the Spiritual Power (*Cit Śakti*, of the Lord, as described in the Tantras, is beyond the Nescience referred to above, and to this Power the Advaita Vedānta seems to be a stranger.

In as much as the *Avidyā* itself or the Material Power is a produtct of the Spiritual Power which is the

ultimate source of all existence there is no discrepancy in the statement, often found in Tantrika Literature, that this Power has three distinct states of its existence :—

(a) During the universal dissolution when the Self is free from all *vikalpas* the *Śakti* exists as Pure *Cit Śakti* or *Cit Prakṛti*.

(b) When the *vikalpas* are on the point of merging —when though there is no *vikalpa* as such, there is yet a tendency in the direction of *vikalpas* –the *Śakti* is called *Māyā Śakti* or *Jaḍa Prakṛti*.

(c) But when the *vikalpas* are fully developed and materiality becomes dense the *Śakti* appears as *Avidyā*.

It has already been observed that the appearance of the universe follows upon the self-expression of the Divine Power and the Cosmic End follows from the withdrawal of the self-same Power.

After the period of Cosmic Night is over the Will of the Lord, in co-operation with the mature *adṛṣṭa* of *Jīvas*, manifests only partially, as it were, the Essence of the Self, whereby the Self is revealed as limited.

The appearance of limitation is thus the emergence of not-self, known as *Avidyā* or *Jaḍa Śakti*, called also by the name of Void (*Śūnya*), or *Prakṛti* or Absolute Negation or Darkness (*tamaḥ*) or *Ākāśa*. This is the first stage in the order of creation and represents the first limitation imposed on the Limitless.[285] The erroneous belief, generated through the Freedom of the Lord— the Self—that the Ego is partial (*aikadeśika*) and not full and universal (*pūrṇa*) is responsible for the

appearance of this Something which being a portion of the Self is yet outside of it and free from self-consciousness and is described as not-self or by any other name as shown above.

Thus, the Supreme Reality splits itself spontaneously, as it were, into two sections—one appearing as the subject and the other as the object. The *Pūrṇāhantā* which is the essence of Supreme Reality disappears after this cleavage : the portion to which limited egoism attaches being the subject and the other portion free from egoism the object The object as thus making its appearance is the Unmanifest (*Avyakta*) Nature from which the entire Creation emanates and which is perceived by the subject as distinct from itself.

It has been observed that *Caitanya* is of the nature of self-luminous Light (*sphurat-prakāśa*), which may shine on itself (*svātmā*), in which case it is known as *Ahantā*, or I-ness may rest on the Non ego (*Anātmā*) and express itself as *Idantā* or This-ness. The essence of *Caitanya* consists in the fact that the light (*prakāśa*) is always confined to itself. This universal Ego or 'I' stands behind all dualism. The Supreme Ego is universal, as there is nothing to limit (*pariccheda*) or to differentiate (*vyāvṛtti*) it, and the entire visible universe exists in identity with it. But this characteristic by its very nature is absent from Matter (*Jaḍa*), which is not self-manifest. Just as light and heat co-exist in fire, in the same way universal *Ahantā* and Freedom or *Śakti* co-exist in *Caitanya*. This freedom is *Māyā* which though essentially identical with *Caitanya* (*Cideka-rūpa*) brings out varieties of an infinite kind, but in bringing out this variety it does not in the least swerve from the Essence.

The appearance of the Universe in Pure *Caitanya* is the action of *Avidyā*, which has three distinct stages :—

(a) The first is the germinal state (*bījāvasthā*) when the material power, which is still in its earliest phase of manifestation, is pure. Matter does not assert itself at this stage and consequently there is no differentiation in experience. In other words, it does not yet appear as distinct from *Caitanya*, though potentially it exists. This stage is represented by the five pure *Tattvas*, viz., *Śiva*, *Śakti*, *Sadāśiva*, *Śuddha-vidyā* and *Īśvara*.

(i) The *Avidyā*, which has been described sbove as being the *Caitanya* in its limited appearance as an object external to the subject is called *Śiva*. In pure *Caitanya*, owing to the play of Its own Will, an infinite number of limited aspects (*svāṁśas*) arises. These are mutually distinct. From this point of view to every limited aspect of *Cit* there is a corresponding object external to it (*Bāhyābhāsa*), but to the Unlimited *Cit* or Pure Self (*Pūrṇa Ātmā=Para-śiva*) there is no externality. The universal (*Sāmānya*) common to all the pure and limited *Cit* aspects referred to above is called *Śiva Tattva*. This *Tattva* is thus a *Sāmānya* holding within it all the *Viśeṣas*, but *Para-śiva* or Pure Self is transcendent and above both *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*. Hence *Śiva Tattva* may be more properly described as Pure *Caitanya* in its general, but conditioned form, free from all *vikalpas* and is to be distinguished from the Absolute proper.

(ii) The appearance of *Śiva* (*Paricchinna-nirvikalpa-cit*) as *aham* is called *Śakti*. Although this self-presentative character (*ahambhāsana*) is in the essence

of *Cit*, so that there can be in fact no differentiation between *Siva* and *Śakti* as such, the *Cit* is nevertheless known as *Śiva* in so far as it is free from all *Viśeṣas* and as *Śakti* by virtue of its characteristic self-awareness (*ahambhāsana*).

(iii) When the Self-presentation (*ahambhāsana*) is no longer confined to the Self, but is extended to the not-self or the object (*Mahā-śūnya*) external to the Self, it is known as *Sadāśiva*. This state marks the identification of the Self with the not-self in the form "*ahameva idam*" and indicates predominance of spirit over matter.

(iv) But when matter prevails and the consciousness assumes the form "*idam aham*" the state is technically called *Īśvara*.

(v) The term *Śuddha-vidyā* is reserved for the state which represents an equality in the presentation of the subjective and objective elements in consciousness.

(b) The second stage in the evolution of *Avidyā*, described as *aṅkurāvasthā*, represents a further development of difference or materiality, when the subtle products of matter and spirit make their appearance. In this mixed condition both spirit and matter are equally predominant and the seven mixed (*miśra*) *tattvas*, viz., *Māyā*, *Kalā*, *Vidyā*, *Rāga*, *Kāla* and *Niyati* reveal themselves.

(i) The confirmation of difference due to the Free Will of the Supreme, which characterises the second stage, has the effect of reversing the normal relation between spirit and matter. Thus while in the first stage described above Spirit or *Cit Śakti* dominates matter or *Jaḍa Śakti* which exists in a rudimentary state, merged

in spirit or Self, the second stage shows the preponderance of matter over spirit. Consciousness loses its supremacy and becomes a quality inherent in the material subject. All this is due to the emergence and development of *bheda-saṁkalpa* in *Caitanya*. This material subject--which is matter prevailing over spirit and related to it as a substance to its quality--is called *Māyā*.

(ii-vi) The five aspects of *Māyā* are the five so-called *Kañcukas* which are the five eternal *Śaktis* of *Para-śiva* in a limited form. The obscuring power of *Māyā* acts as a veil as it were upon the Omnipotence, Ommniscience, Self-contentment, Eternity and Freedom of the Supreme Self and thus acting is known as *Kalā*, *Vidyā*, *Rāga*, *Kāla* and *Niyati* respectively.

(vii) The Pure Self as obscured by *Māyā* and its fivefold activities appears as *Puruṣa* with its limitations of action knowledge, contentment, eternity and freedom.

(c) The third or grossest stage in the evolution of *Avidyā* is represented by the dense products of the mixed *Tattvas*, where matter is overwhelmingly strong. This stands for the group of the twenty-four *Tattvas*, from the Primary *Prakṛti* down to *Pṛthivī*, constituting the material order.

Prakṛti, with which the lower creation begins, is indeed the assemblage (*samaṣṭi*) of the *Vāsanās* of all persons with various and beginningless *Karmans* : it may be fitly described as the body of the *Karman Saṁskāras* of the *Jīvas*, considered as inhering in *Cit Śakti* or Self. This *Karmavāsana* or *Prakṛti* is threefold according as the experience which is the moral outcome of this *vāsanā*

is pleasant or painful or of the nature of a comatose condition in which neither pleasure nor pain is felt.

The *Vāsanās* exist in a twofold condition, as *Avyakta* when they lie unmanifest in dreamless sleep or as *Citta* when they manifest themselves in dreams and wakeful states. In the dreamless state there can be no experience of pleasure and pain, because the mature *Karmans* having been worked off through experience the others which are not yet ripe are not ready for fructification. It is a fact that *Karmans*, when they are matured by time cause the *Jñāna Śakti* of the Conscious Self to move outwards and have contact with the objective world. In a state of sleep such movement is naturally absent. But the process of time during which the sleep continues acts on the *Karmans* and matures some of them, so that the *Jñāna Śakti* is allowed to come in touch with the external objects or with their semblances and sleep is over. The *Śakti* as thus qualified by the body of *Karma-vāsanās* leading to contact with the objects and consequent enjoyment (*bhoga*) is known as *Citta*.

The *Citta* differs according to the difference of *Puruṣa*, but it is one with *Prakṛti* in dreamless sleep. Thus the *Citta* may be viewed as *Puruṣa* or as *Prakṛti* according as the conscious (*Citi*) or unconscious (*Avyakta*) element prevails in it. It is not, therefore, a distinct category, but falls either under *Puruṣa* or under *Prakṛti*.

XV. NOTES ON PĀŚUPATA PHILOSOPHY

ANTIQUITY OF THE PĀŚUPATA SECT

The Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha of Madhavācārya devotes a chapter to the treatment of the philosophical doctrines and teachings of the Pāśupatas. It seems, therefore, clear that as early as the fourteenth century of the Christian era the sect had assumed such importance that it claimed recognition as a distinct theologico-philosophical school. From a careful study of the earlier literature it would appear that the sect is much older than the days of Mādhava. Udayana (1000 A. D.) refers to it in his Nyāya-kusumāñjali and Bhāsarvajña, the famous Logician of Kashmir (800 A. D.) and the author of Nyāya-sāra, wrote a work, viz., Gaṇakārikā, dealing with the Pāśupata Categories.[286] Uddyotakara, the author of Nyāya-vārttika (500 A. D.), calls himself a Pāśupatācārya. The Purāṇas and even the Mahābhārata contain numerous references to this sect. The Brahma Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa include a section in the second *pāda* of chapter 2, refuting the views of the adherents of this sect.

ORIGIN OF THE SECT

The earliest history of the sect is shrouded in mystery In the Vedic literature the word Paśupati indeed occurs in various places[287], but only as a synonym of Rudra. It has not got there that technical meaning which we find invariably attached to it in subsequent Pāśupata literature. The sect was of course known to the Mahābhārata.

The Vāmana Purāṇa[288] classifies the worshippers of *Śiva Linga* under four groups, viz., (a) Śaiva, (b) Pāśupata or Mahāpāśupata, (c) Kāladamana and (d) Kāpālika, and observes that all these sects had their origin in Brahmā. The Pāśupata sect was represented by Maharṣi Bhāradvāja and his disciple, Rājā Somakeśvara.[289]

It is stated in the Śiva Purāṇa[290] that Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa learnt the Pāśupata system from Upamanyu, the elder brother of Dhaumya.

LITERATURE OF THE SECT

We have now no means of ascertaining the extent of the early literature or its details. But from the statement of the Śiva Purāṇa it appears that the original doctrines of the sect were contained in four Saṁhitās compiled by Ruru, Dadhīci, Agastya and Upamanyu.[291] The Atharvaśira and some other Upaniṣads belong to this sect. The philosophical position of the school is based on a Sūtra work, called Pāśupata-śāstra-pañcārtha-darśana and attributed to Maheśvara. This work was in five chapters (hence called Pañcādhyāyī) and commented on by Rāśīkara, the 28th and last incarnation of Śiva. Mādhavācārya, Keśava Kāśmīrī and Rāmānanda (on Kāśī Khaṇḍa) refer to this work. Bhāsarvajña wrote 8 *Kārikās*, called Gaṇakārikā, dealing with the Pāśupata doctrines. An unknown author commented on these *Kārikās* (Ratna-ṭīkā)[292]. The same wrote a work, called Satkārya-vicāra. Saṁskāra-kārikā is a manual treating of Pāśupata rituals. Haradatta was one of the earlier authors of this school, but no detail regarding his life or works is known. The Yoga-cintāmaṇi of Śivānanda speaks of a work named Nakulīśa-yoga-pārāyaṇa which evidently belongs to this sect.[293]

HISTORICAL FOUNDER OF THE SECT

The historical foundation of the sect, evidently a subsequent branch of the original school, is attributed to one Nakulīśa, who was an inhabitant of Karavana[294] near modern Broach in the Baroda State. His name appears in various forms, viz., Lakulīśa, Laguḍīśa, etc. The origin of the name is not known, but it is surmised that he was so-called on account of his always holding a *Laguḍa*, a cudgel, in his hand. The *Vairāgīs* of this sect bear this characteristic even now. It is difficult to determine the age of this early Śaiva preacher. He is believed to have been an incarnation of Siva. It is stated in the Vāyu Purāṇa that simultaneously with the appearance of Śrī Kṛṣṇa as Vāsudeva, Mahādeva manifested himself as Lakuli at a place, thence called Kāyāvarohaṇa, now corrupted into Karavana. He entered into a corpse lying on burning ground and got up as a preacher.

According to this Purāṇa Lakuli had four disciples who practised the Pāśupata *Yoga* and besmeared their bodies with ashes and dust. The name of these four heros are :—

(i) Kuśika, (ii) Gargya, (iii) Mitra and (iv) Kauruṣya.

The Chintra Inscription alludes to this story [295]. Though the synchronism of Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa and Lakulīśa, as pointed out by the Purāṇa, is hardly capable of being established, the age of the Śaiva teacher remains still unsettled [296].

DOCTRINES

The *kārya* is three-fold, viz. *vidyā*, *kalā*, and *paśu*. *Vidyā* is quality of the *paśu*[297] and is of two kinds—

knowledge (*Bodha*) and ignorance (*Abodha*). The former is essentially either *Viveka-pravṛtti* or *Aviveka-pravṛtti*, but from the standpoint of object it is fourfold or fivefold. The *Viveka-pravṛtti* is manifested by a valid source of knowledge and is called *Citta* It is by means of the *Citta* that an animal is conscious of (*cetayate*) the world, with the help of the light of *Caitanya*. The secondtype of *vidyā* (i. e., *Abodha-vidyā*) is described as *Paśvartha-dharmādharmikā*

Kalā is dependant on a conscious agent and is itself unconscious. It is of two kinds—viz., *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. The former is of ten types—viz., the five *tattvas* (*Pṛthivī* etc.) and the five *guṇas* (*Rūpa* etc). The latter is of three kinds – viz. 5 senses, 5 motor organs, and 3 inner organs i. e., *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas*.

The *Paśu* is either *Sāñjana* endowed with body and senses or *Nirañjana*, i. e., bereft of body and senses.

(ii) *Kāraṇa*, lit. a cause, is the name of *Pati* (*Īśvara*-God). He is the *Anugrāhaka* of all creation and destruction. He is one and without a second. His classification is based on a difference of *guṇa* and *karma* only. The *Kāraṇa* is independent in this system and is not dependent on *karma* and other factors. He is *Pati*, which implies possession of infinite power or knowledge and action, i.e., possession for all times of *Aiśvarya*. He is *Ādya* or the Primal One, i.e., possesses natural powers.

(iii) *Yoga*—It is defined as the Communion between *Ātmā* and *Īśvara* through the medium of *Citta*.

There are two varieties of *Yoga*—one is active (*kriyātmaka*) in the form of *Japa*, *Dhyāna*, etc., and the

other stands for cessation of all action (*kriyoparama*). The latter kind is technically known as *Saṁvid-gati*. The fruit of *Yoga* in this system is not *kaivalya* (as in Sāṅkhya and Pātañjala), but realisation of Supreme power (*Paramaiśvarya*) accompanied by End of Pain.

(iv) *Vidhi—Vidhi* is the name of a function which aims at *Dharma* or *Artha*. It is two-fold, being primary or secondary. The primary *Vidhi* is *Caryā* which is of 2 kinds, viz. *vrata* and *dvāras*. The *vratas* are thus enumerated—(a) ash-bath, (b) ash-bed (*bhasma-snāna-śayyā*), (c) *upahāra* or *niyama* consisting of laughter (*hasita*),[298] song (*gīta*),[299] dancing (*nṛtya*),[300] *huḍukkāra*,[301] obeisance (*namaskāra*) and chanting (*jaṗya*), (d) *jaṗa* and (e) circumambulation (*pradakṣiṇā*). The *dvāras* are : (a) *Krāthana* or the showing of the body during waking moments as if it were in sleep; (b) *Spandana* or the quivering of the limbs as under the influence of *Vāyu*; (c) *Maṇḍana* or going in the manner of one suffering from injury in the leg, or rather limping; (d) *Śṛṅgāraṇa* or showing oneself by means of one's physical erotic movements (*vilāsāḥ*) as if one is in passion at the sight of a beautiful and youthful lady; (e) *Avitat-karaṇa* or performing of an evil action condemned by the world in the manner of one devoid of sense of discrimination; and (f) *Avitad-bhāṣaṇa* or uttering of meaningless or contradictory words.

The secondary *Vidhi* is what is subsidiary and auxiliary to the primary *Vidhi*, i.e., *Anusnāna* and *Bhakṣocchiṣṭa*.

(v) *Duḥkhānta* or End of Pain.

With the Pāśupatas *Duḥkhānta* means, not only negation of sorrow, but also realisation of Supreme Lord-

ship (*Paramaiśvarya*). *Duḥkhānta* is of two kinds:—viz., *anātmaka* and *sātmaka*. The former is absolute cessation of all pain. The latter is realisation of Power which consists in *Dṛk-kriyā-śakti*. *Dṛk-śakti* (=*Dhī-śakti*) is really one, but is called five-fold through difference of object—viz., *darśana*, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *vijñāna* and *sarvajñatva*. Similarly *kriyā-śakti* too, though one, is described as three-fold through *upacāra*—viz., *manojavitva*, *kāma-rūpitva* and *vikaraṇa-dharmitva*. The word *Darśana* means knowledge of everything amenable to sight and touch—subtle, distant and closed. The perfect knowledge of every *śabda* is *śravaṇa*, of every thought is *manana*, of every *Śāstra*, through text and sense, is *vijñāna*, and Omniscience is the perfect knowledge, eternally shining, of all *tattvas* in regard to all things, said or unsaid, either in summary or in detail or severally. *Manojavitva* is the power of doing something instantaneously. *Kāma-rūpitva* is the power of controlling any form simply at one's will and not under stress of *karma* etc. *Vikaraṇa-dharmitva* is the power of doing or knowing anything (*niratiśayaiśvarya-sambandhitva*) without any organ.

This two-fold *Śakti* is collectively called Supreme Lordship. When this two-fold *siddhi* is reached, all the 10 marks of *siddhi* reveal themselves. These marks are—*avaśyatva*, *anāveśyatva*, *avadhyatva*, *abhayatva*, *akṣayatva*, *ajaratva*, *amaratva*, *apratīghāta*, *mahattva* and *patitva*. These are explained below.

Avaśya is absolutely free. There are differences of opinion on the meaning of the term *avaśyatva*. One view is that *vaśyatva* is a *mala* and when it is removed the *dharma* existing in *Puruṣa*, viz. *avaśyatva* is manifested. The author of Ratnaṭīkā reproduces this view, saying

that the manifestation of *aiśvarya* is not admitted, for it is unreasonable to hold that a *dharma* which is not of the nature of the *dharmī* (*anātmaka-dharma*) should be manifested. If it were manifested the *dharma* would be *anātmaka*. Hence *avaśyatva* means *aiśvarya-sambandha*. It is this which eliminates subordination. *Anāveśyatva* means that the *jñāna-sambandha* cannot be overpowered by another person. *Akṣayatva* implies eternal relation with *aiśvarya*. *Apratīghāta* is thus defined : "सर्वत्राभिप्रेतार्थेषु प्रवर्त्तमानस्य महेश्वरेणाप्यप्रतिबन्धधर्मित्वम्"[302]. *Mahattva* is superiority to all *paśus* owing to greatness of *aiśvarya*. *Patitva* is Lordship of all *Kāryas*, viz., *Paśu*, *Vidyā* and *Kalā*.

XVI. SOME ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚĀKTA TANTRA

The Śākta Tantras, much like the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Tantras, have a philosophical background which represent the cultural view-point of its votaries. It is an important view-point, but it is unfortunate that in no regular history of Indian philosophy or compendium of like nature it finds any place. It is high time that scholars interest themselves in this neglected subject and endeavour to bring out the salient features of the system. The following lines are intended to serve more as a suggestion than as a fixed and definite outline of the school.

The Tantras hold that the Supreme Reality or *Parā Śakti*, before[303] the manifestation of the Universe and the souls, remains in a state of what may be described as Quiescence or Repose, devoid as it were of the light of self-reflection implied in the nature of *Caitanya*. The unmanifest universe remains then absorbed in *Caitanya*, dissolved, but retaining its self-existence in the form of *Saṁskāra* or Potentiality[304]. The souls too retain their individual continuity, though incapable, owing to disembodied condition, of asserting themselves as self-conscious and self-acting monads. This pre-creative state of the Supreme *Śakti* is beyond the so-called *Parā Vāk* of the *Yogins*, which is the universal Matrix and from which the Vedas and the worlds emanate[305].

This Transcendent *Śakti* is co-eternal and consubstantial with *Para Brahman* which is ineffable, indes-

cribable, unlimited and immeasurable. There is no way to reach this Transcendent State except through the Grace of the Causal *Śakti* or Mother of the worlds referred to above. Hence every form of spiritual discipline prescribed in the *Śāstars* is in the eye of Tantras a sort of propitiation of the universal Power[306].

The Reality as such, called in one phase by the name of *Parā Śakti* and in another by that of *Parā Vāk*, is in a sense[307] free from action (*akriya*). How can the creative process then start into being out of this Entity which is by nature inactive? The universe is made up of what in the language of philosophy is known as the *Tattvas* or ultimate constituent of things and is verily a machine (*cakra*). It is said with reference to the origin of motion and to its universal manifestation that the whole process is initiated by Will (*Svecchā*). The universe lies merged in the Causal Power as identified with it in a mysterious way as an idea in the Mind and it continues in this condition so long as the Supreme Will does not appear and necessitate its alienation *from* and *within* the Infinite. As to when this Will arises and how, no answer can possibly be given except that it is spontaneous. As the universe rises with Will, so does it sink back during *Pralaya* under the operation of the same Will[308].

It has to be observed that when creation proceeds the causal aspect of the Absolute unfolds itself as the objective world, whereas the transcendent aspect remains fixed in itself as an indifferent, unmoved and silent witness of the play of its own Causal Power. Before creation the Causal Power remains one with the Power beyond, undivided and in a sense unmanifest. But its self-manifestation (*sphurattā*) begins with the mani-

festation and subsequent projection of the universe lying involved in it. In the technical language of the Tantras the Causal Power is called *Śakti* or *Vimarśa* and the transcendent Power *Śiva* or *Prakāśa*. The two are essentially identical. What is popularly known as *Caitanya* is really due to the eternal relation between the two aspects of the Supreme Substance. This relation which never ceases may be either one of equality or of inequality. The former represents the truly Transcendent Condition (*Turyātīta*)[309], and the latter the Supreme Causal Power, working in the direction of self-expression or self-concealment.

When the *Parā Śakti* tends to look into the *Prakāśa* with which it is identified, i.e., into the universe which emerges into and is unified with itself, then comes into manifestation a *bindu* which represents the union of *Śiva* and *Śakti* (in *mātrās*) in equilibrium and which reflects the *Caitanya* as a Luminous *Linga*[310]. Technically this *bindu* is called *Kāmarūpa Pīṭha* and the *Liṅga* is known as *Svayambhū*.

Before we proceed further we wish to dwell at some length on this phenomenon which may not be clearly intelligible to persons not initiated in the secrets of Tāntric *Yoga*. The Transcendent *Śakti*, which may well be called *Śiva*, is really something of which we can have nothing to say or think. Truly speaking, it is describable neither as *Śiva* nor as *Śakti*, though it is the source and life of both. The so-called *Śiva* or *Prakāśa* and *Śakti* or *Vimarśa* referred to above are, therefore, two correlated, though polarised, aspects of the same *Śakti*, and hence each of them is a *Śakti*. The *Śiva* aspect is known as *Ambikā* and the other as *Śānta*. These two appear as

two only when their union is not sufficiently compact. But, in the event of the union being perfect the duality disappears and the resulting unit, which now is a neutral background, serves as a medium fit to reflect as it were what cannot be reflected otherwise, viz., the Transcendent.

This is the *Parā Vāk* and constitutes the Essence of *Praṇava* or Veda which is still undifferentiated. The subsequent differentiation leads to the union of *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*, in its further stages, as *iccha* and *vāmā*, as *jñāna* and *jyeṣṭhā* and as *kriyā* and *raudrī*, representing three additional *Piṭhas* (viz., *Pūrṇagiri*, *Jālandhara* and *Uḍḍiyāna*) reflecting the *Caitanya* as *Vāṇa*, *Itara* and *Para Liṅgas* respectively. These correspond to the *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* stages of *Vāk*.

In the supreme state of *Parā Vāk* the universe, which in the transcendent state had been unmanifest, is apparent in *Caitanya* and is in a sense identified with it, in the same way as a reflected image is one with the reflecting mirror. The *Parā Śakti* on this Eternal Plane has an eternal vision of this eternal universe not as an object outside of itself, but its very self. This eternal vision is, therefore, a self-vision of the *Śakti* beyond the limitations of Time, Space and Causality, and is a state of Perfect Quiet and Peace. With the rise of Will sets in a commotion which projects forth a part of the universe lying so long within the *Caitanya* as of its very essence. This projection is technically known as *Sṛṣṭi* or Creation It happens in time; space and causal factors also begin to appear at this stage. The universe, as projected, maintains itself for a time and then returns to the Primitive *Caitanya* from which it emanated. These three functions are symbolised by the three Vedas,

the three constituent letters of the *Praṇava* and in fact all triple manifestations in Nature, and are graphically represented by a triangle[311]. The centre point of this triangle is the *Parā Vāk* which is synonymous with the equilibrium of *Śiva* and *Śakti*

The supreme *Śakti*, as one with *Śiva*, transcends all *tattvas* and as differentiated from, though associated with, *Śiva*, is the source of all *tattvas* and is identical with them. In its latter aspect it is the eternal matrix of the worlds and is of the Essence of Joy.

It is likened in the Āgamas to a mirror, serving to reflect the Self-knowledge of *Śiva*; for it is through it that *Śiva* eternally knows himself which Self-knowledge constitutes the essence of *Caitanya*, and without it *Śiva* is no more than a *śava*, a lump of lifeless matter. This Self-knowledge is technically known as *Aham* or 'I'. To see one's own *Śakti* is to see and enjoy one's own self. This *Aham* is in reality the Supreme Self revealed in and to itself as Infinite Delight (*Pūrṇāhantā-camatkāra*). The Self, as thus revealed, is infinite, because of the non-manifestation of limiting not-self ('This' or *idam*) at this stage. A mirror cannot reflect a vision within itself without the presence of the object outside, or even if the object is there no reflection is possible without light. The *Parā Śakti* too requires the presence of *Para Śiva* to reveal the world within itself, though in truth the two are one and the same[312].

Hence *Śakti* has a double aspect; in one it is identical with *Śiva*. At this stage *Śiva* alone shines. There is another aspect, in which the *tattvas*, the universe made of the *tattvas* and the *devatās* appear from it, both simultaneously and successively. For the

Śakti to see its own manifestation is the same as the appearance of the world. Both *dṛṣṭi* and *sṛṣṭi* are practically the same. But, the appearance in succession follows a certain order or sequence.[3] [4]

XVII. THE LIFE OF A YOGIN

The earliest, and I might say the greatest (if not the only), pre-occupation of an ordinary man's life is the thought of happiness to himself or to those around him It is this positive thought—and it pre-supposes in its fullest significance an absolute negation of all possible evil—which spurs him into activity and constitutes the main spring of his moral existence. But, circumstanced as he is, he is hardly in a position to clearly envisage the ideal which lies vaguely before him. For the clear presentation of the ideal requires a degree of mental clarity and disinterested quiescence which is rarely to be found in an average man of the present age, in which the insistent demands of one's physical nature and surroundings leave one hardly any time or energy to devote to a calm consideration of a deep ethical problem. The difficulty remains the same, even when the ideal is pictured in a different colour. Perfection, Harmony, Universal Love and Service, Freedom—all these concepts represent the varied aspects of one and the same Ideal, and the vagueness found in respect of the one pertains equally to all the rest.

The truth is the facts of transcendent life are as a rule so little known to the world outside that the very existence or possibility of such a life is often more a matter of pious belief than of sincere conviction. And it is no wonder. With the limitations imposed upon us by our material nature it is hardly possible to look behind the appearances and have a glimpse of the transcendent

realms beyond. The knowledge of a higher life than what is ordinarily presented to us cannot be possible unless and until our general outlook is widened in consequence of the inner awakening due to Yoga. Yoga is really the paramount power which leads us not only to a knowledge of the higher life, which is spiritual, but also to its practical realisation by the Self. India has always asserted, and it has been doing so in no feeble accents since the very dawn of the world's civilisation, that it is exclusively in Yoga that one can find the key to the solution of all the problems of life and mind as well as to the realisation of the supreme End of Existence. "नास्ति योगसमं बलम्", "अयं तु परमो धर्मः यद् योगेनात्मदर्शनम्", and similar other sayings point to this fact.

But what is Yoga ? What is the secret of the great power which is universally attributed to it ? What are the natural stages through which the life of a *Yogin* must of necessity pass before it can attain to consummation and realise its community with the essence of the Universal Life and even transcend it ? Before these questions are taken up for discussion it should be clearly borne in mind that what ordinarily passes for Yoga in the world around us can hardly be described as such in the real sense of the term. Even if it be not a travesty of the great Science it is at least a faint semblance, mostly artificial, of a rudimentary aspect of the complex psycho-physical discipline which in itself represents only a fragment of the true way to Yoga proper. It is unfortunate that ordinary people, including most of the educated persons of the present day (both of the West and of this country), have all their knowledge of the subject derived from this source. And the effect of this corrupt and vitiated knowledge on their mental outlook has been

what might be expected. To understand a subject properly, specially when the subject is of an intricate and extremely delicate character, it is necessary that the mind should be dispossessed of all its preconceived notions and predilections and held in readiness in an attitude of passive but self-conscious receptivity.

Yoga is really the establishment of identity, at least of communion, between the individual self (*Jīvātmā*) and the Universal Self (*Paramātmā*), which presupposes a corresponding relation on the lower planes of existence, viz., between the mind and the individual Self, between the senses and the mind and between the object and the senses. The individual cannot realise its eternal affinity with the Universal or merge itself in it, unless it can get over the influence of the mind with which it falsely identifies itself. In the same way the absorption of the mind in the quiet awareness of the Self is not possible so long as, through concentration and consequent self-effacement, it has not got rid of the distracting power of the senses over it. On the lowest level, similarly, the senses cannot calm down and attain to unity with the mind until they are free from the action of the objects of the world outside. All the principles are thus found to be arranged in a concatenated series. In the lowest stage of spiritual perfection, therefore, Yoga may be described in a language which would represent it as the withdrawal of the senses from the external world and their convergence in the Mind. Ascending a step higher up, one would find it in the suspension of the modalities of the mind itself and its consequent unity, as it were, with the individual self, from which it appears as distinct only through its workings. When the mind ceases to be active its distinctness as an entity vanishes altogether.

But the final and culminating perfection of Yoga does not manifest itself even at this stage, which represents the standpoint of Patañjali and his school. For, with the individual left as separate from the Universal and the Supreme the higher function of Yoga cannot be stated to have been fulfilled. As soon as the artificial barrier raised between the higher and the lower Self is demolished the Pure Self emerges as a radiant and eternally Self-aware existence of Joy in which the two aspects of its being appear as united in an eternal embrace of ineffable sweetness. This is Yoga in the truest sense of the word.

We propose to study the problem under these three aspects, though as a matter of actual fact each of these aspects may be examined in several distinct phases. The first stage which finds its achievement in the abstraction of the senses from their objects is really the viewpoint of Haṭhayoga proper, as taught by Mārkaṇḍeya in ancient times and by Matsyendranātha and his band of followers (e., g. Gorakṣa, Jalandhara, Caturaṅgī, etc.) in the middle ages. The activities of the senses and their contact with the external world are occasioned by the operation of *Vāyu*, which though corresponding to the so-called bio-motor force of the living organism is to be regarded as identical with *Vāsanā*. The vision of an external world as other than the Supreme Self is in fact a magic show of illusive character devoid of all reality. It is the action of *Vāyu* or *Vāsanā* on the sensory mechanism of organic existence which projects before it a world of illusion. The discipline of the first stage consists in the removal of this illusion. The control of *Vāyu*, at which all the processes of Haṭhayoga aim,

ends in securing a relative steadiness of the senses and therewith a comparative detachment from the world outside. This is an indispensable preliminary to the success of the mental culture towards which the discipline of the next higher stage is directed. Perfection in the first stage is the perfection of body as presupposed in the control of the senses. The human body in its normal state, however healthy in an ordinary sense, is highly defective and incapable of acting as a fit instrument for the exercise of higher powers. It has to be purged of its impurities and made clean. This purification may be effected by a variety of ways, many of which fall within the scope of Haṭhayoga proper. This culture of the senses, of which the physical culture is an aspect, is completed when the senses are drawn inwards and coalesce in a common sense, which is different from and yet identical with the mind.

As soon as the common outer sense disappears what is left behind is the Mind in a state of concentration. As this concentration matures and gathers strength various degrees of ecstatic intuition manifest themselves, of course, as a result of a continued process of meditation. The rise of *Prajñā* is consequent on the attainment of *Samādhi* of the Mind. But as the *Samādhi* corresponds to the object aimed at, its variety is dependent on the varieties of objects. The object may be an ordinary thing perceived in the world around us or a subtle element. It may even be the Inner Organ itself or the Agent behind the organ making use of it as an instrument. The luminous substance of the Mind, when immediately in contact with an object—the senses having ceased—interpenetrates into it and is imbued with its nature and form. The Self behind the Mind, now

converted into the object as it were, shines on as a silent witness of the entire process of metamorphosis and of its result. It looks on as a transcendent observer towards the Mind which, having been already purged, now appears in the form of the object concerned. During this time the Mind is free from subjection to the physical body: in fact, the body totally disappears in the radiance of the luminous Mind, and this is not only in the eye of the person engaged in the spiritual pursuit but even of the world. This marks a condition when the subtle body of man being disengaged from his fleshy bonds as a result of his efforts in the first stage described above asserts itself in a luminous form, the brightness and colour of which are proportionate to the degree of purity attained. This light has a pseudo-eternal form of its own, but it is not easily revealed; so long as association with the body continues to be strong it appears more or less in the shape of its physical counterpart from which it has been partially and temporarily separated. This influence of the flesh on the mind is really the impurity of the latter, so that the relative purity of the mind corresponds to its comparative elimination of the physical shape imposed upon it. And this elimination, which is indicated by the gradual brightening and whitening of the luminous stuff, may or may not be accompanied by the appearance of a fresh form, according as the impress of an object outside itself may or may not have already been made upon it. The existence of this impress represents a particular stage of *Samādhi* conditioned by the character of the object occasioning it. Patañjali's school marks four distinct sub-divisons of this stage as we shall observe hereafter. But there are various other possible schemes which are recognised in the other systems. In case there

is no outside object to determine the form of the lumious mind and even no subjective impression carried forth from the flesh left behind, the Mind in the ordinary circumstances would sink into formlessness entailing an unconcious and a dark existence. It cannot ordinarily retain its individuality – in fact, it finds no character of its own – when it is absolutely free. It gets overpowered under the weight of Primitive Matter from which it emerged as an essence to co-operate with the Spirit in the work of spiritual emancipation. This is the Sphinx' riddle which inevitably presents itself to the aspirant.

The Mind cannot be dispensed with before it has been pressed into service. What is really needed is that it should be purged and purified and then enlightened. The Light having once dawned on the Mind, the Mind is merged in it and the light alone remains, which becomes then the adjunct of the lower Spirit and marks its attainment of self-conciousness. In the poetical language of the *Śāstras* this is a necessary phase of the spiritual awakening or the awakening of the *Kuṇḍalinī*. But the practical difficulty is that as soon as the Mind, which is always illumined by the Spirit behind it, loses touch with the object which impresses it anew or with its old impressions, it loses its luminous nature and sinks into the unconscious.[3 1 4] And for its purification such loss of touch is indispensable. The required solution consists in the purification of the Mind with its consciousness and luminosity retained, that is in the revelation of the pseudo-eternal form of the Light which stands fixed behind the Subtle Body. Call it by the name of Mental Body, Celestial Body (*Divyadeha*), Ideal Body (*Bhāvadeha*) or by any other name, it is a marvellous acquisition. It is a form of Perpetual Freshness

and Ideal Beauty radiant with a sweet halo shining above the mists of worldly passions and the incessant flux of Time, and is eternally free from decay and death. The second stage of the spiritual journey ends in the attainment of the outer phase of this status. The inner phase cannot be acquired except through Initiation or the special grace of the *Guru* or the Supreme Master.

Before we proceed to describe at some length the third and the highest stage we may appropriately pause to examine the second stage of the path. There are four successive periods of this as recognised by Vyāsa in his commentary on Yoga-Sūtras :—

(a) The initial (*Prathama-kalpika*) period when the Light has just set in (*Pravṛtta-mātra-jyotiḥ*). During this time the supernormal sense is evolved. The *Yogin* who is passing through this period is yet a mere practitioner, though the manifestation of the Inner Light brings within his reach certain extraordinary phenomena.

Reading the thoughts of other minds, sensing distant objects as if they were near (e. g., clairvoyance, clairaudiance, etc.), direct knowledge of the past and the future as well as that of the present, and various other powers of a like nature accrue to a *Yogin* even in the first period of his spiritual evolution. But they are only occasional manifestations and not permanent possessions. In the same way visions of gods and goddesses, of angels and *siddhas*, of strange scenes of distant worlds and past lives occur to him from time to time, indicating that he is on a new path with glorious prospects lying before him.

(b) The second period, called *Madhu* or *Madhumatī-bhūmi*, marks a decided advance on the first and is initiated by the origin of the clarified Intuition, called *Ṛtambharā Prajñā*, when the mind of the *Yogin* gains a vision of pure truth and is never touched by error. This Intuition cannot originate so long as the objective *Samādhi* is not perfected. It has already been observed that the *Samādhi* may have for its support either an external substance which is a gross physical object or a subtle element. There is really no limit to the magnitude of the objective support, either in its greatness or in its minuteness. As a matter of fact there is nothing existing in nature to which the Mind of the *Yogin* cannot be directed. The subtle and super-sensuous objects consist of the atoms–rather their rudimentary bases *(tanmātrās)*–the Ego, the Pure *Liṅga* and the ultimate *Guṇas*. This is a very critical period in the life of a *Yogin*, in which he is apt to be led astray by the passion of conceit or by attachment. The *Yogin* at this stage has already passed beyond the initial state of illumination, but has not yet obtained full control over the senses and the elements. The visits of celestial beings—whether angels, gods, fairies or of any other class--of which we read so much in the lives of the Mystics, are of common occurrence during this time. Even tempting offers are sometimes made, but the *Yogin*, not yet firm in his position, has to exercise his judgment and spurn all such offers. It is to be noted that this, the second period of a *Yogin's* life, represents remarkable purity (*śuddhi*) which invites such temptations, but no powers.

(c) The third period (called *Prajñājyotiḥ*) marks the fullest mastery of the elements and the senses–a mastery which affords him control over the forces of

nature, creative, preservative and destructive. The conquest of the five primordial elements and ability to use them at will gives rise in the Mind to the eight great Powers and also tends to produce a beautiful and durable body. It should be remembered that each of the elements has five distinct aspects which have to be mastered one by one. The grossest aspect of the elements (*sthūla)* is of course familiar to us all as the object of our sense perception. In other words, for instance, the specific characters of the outer world which are reported by the senses as well as the peculiar collocation in which they appear to us constitute the so-called dense form of the elements. The entire sensible universe belongs to this category and it is not possible for an ordinary man to step beyond it. The next form of the elements (called *svarūpa*) is more general and as such not easily perceived as distinct except by logical abstraction. Thus configuration is the generic essence of the first element, wetness (*sneha*) of the second, heat of the third and so forth. It is worth pointing out that the specific properties noted above, viz., sound, touch, colour, moisture and smell are evolved from, and are the peculiar manifestations of, these generic essences. Every substance existing in the world (*dravya*), in fact substance itself, is no more than a combination of these generic and specific qualities in a co-ordinated complex. The laws of collocation are extremely intricate, but they govern the entire field of cosmic action. A mere assemblage of particles does not show signs of unity and life—which presuppose synthesis and harmony; and without this unity there can be no substance. What in scientific parlance is denominated as chemical affinity is from the viewpoint of Yoga the semblance of a relation, in fact of a composite union, existing on a higher plane, which vaguely asserts itself

even after descent from the plane concerncd. Where such unity is not in existence the collection of particles is only a mechanical and barren affair and has no urge of life within, and it does not tend to evolve any new property characteristic of the production of a new substance. The third or subtle form (*sūkṣma*) of the elements is the *tanmātrā*, of which the atomic substance with its generic and specific properties is a modification. The fourth form (*anvaya*) is the *guṇas* which follow the nature of the effect. The fifth aspect of an element is the pragmatic virtue inherent in the *guṇas* in so far as the latter serve the ends of worldly experience or freedom. All these aspects reveal themselves to a *Yogin* and are subject to this control.

The conquest of the elements produces great psychic powers. Thus when a *Yogin* can command the lowest or gross form of matter, he finds it possible to convert his body into any dimension he likes, becoming as minute as a particle and as big as the universe (*Aṇimā* and *Mahimā*). He can attain to extreme levity and rise up against gravitation, so that flying through space becomes possible (*Laghimā*) to him. To such a man real distance is annihilated—he is capable of touching a thing even from a great distance (*Prāpti*).The conquest of the second form of matter (*Svarūpa*) enables the *Yogin* to become immune from the effect of the generic properties of substance. Thus it is possible for such a person to sink into the earth as if into water, the earth not resisting him (*Prākāmya*). The third subtle, that is, *tanmātric*, form of the element, when subdued, produces the *Siddhi* called Mastery(*Vaśitva*), whereby the *Yogin* can control the *bhūtas* (earth etc.) and their products, *bhautikas* (animate and inanimate). The *tanmātrās* are the causal state of the physical world.

When these are governed it becomes comparatively easy to regulate the shape of a substance or even its transmutation. When in due course the *Yogin* has mastered the *guṇas* as such (*Anvaya*), he is able to command the origin and destruction of all the *bhūtas* (*Īśitṛtva*) and their products. The greatest power, however, is the supreme efficiency of the Will (*Yatrakāmāvasāyitva*), whereby the *Yogin* can arrange the natures of the *bhūtas* in any manner he wills: this is derived from a control of the highest form of Matter (*Arthavattva*). He can make any object serve any purpose and is not tied down by the so-called natural properties. At his will even poison yields the fruits of nectar, and vice-versa. Though gifted with these powers and capable of doing anything, the *Yogin* never cares to transgress the laws of nature, which are imposed on objects by the Will of the First Power. The elements do not resist the freedom of the movement of the *Yogin*. Thus, he can physically enter into a block of solid stone which yields to his touch; the waters cannot drench him even on contact; fires cannot burn him nor can wind dislodge him. Space itself, which is free from all covering (*āvaraṇa*), may be made to serve as a veil to conceal his presence, so that he may remain invisible even to those higher and exalted beings who wander about through space.

Corresponding to the elements the senses also have five progressive states. The first state of the sense is that of cognition having for its object a thing which is not merely generic but also specific in character (*grahaṇa*). The second state (*Svarūpa*) consists in the illuminating (*prakāśātmaka*) essence which characterises every organ of knowledge as such (*karaṇatva-sāmānya*) and every particular kind of organ directed to a parti-

cular object. This essence is the *Sattva* portion pertaining to *Ahaṁkāra* or *Asmitā*, which is the third state of the sense. The fourth form of the sense is the *guṇas*. But it should be borne in mind that the *guṇas* form the pervasive aspect (*Anvaya*) of the *bhūtas* and of the senses. The fifth or highest form of the sense is identical with that of the *bhūtas* described above. The control of the senses in all these five states leads to supernormal powers, technically known as the *Madhupratīka Siddhis*. A *Yogin* with his senses held in control attains to the power of transporting himself physically to any distance within an instant. It is called *Manojavitva*, because at such a stage the body acquires the velocity of the mind on account of the senses being controlled. In an ordinary state a man cannot expect to make his body respond to the mind, in the immediacy and quickness of its movements, owing to defects in the senses. Apart from this, the sense of the *Yogin* is then able to act on the desired object, however remote in time or distance, even outside the physical body, though ordinarily a sense cannot operate except when related to a body. Besides, the *Yogin* has then at his command all the emanations of the Primordial Nature.

When the different states of matter and sense have been thus mastered, the *Yogin* has no longer the risk of a fall. The powers he has attained no longer depart from him. But at this time he becomes very particular about the states to be realised in future. The highest *Siddhi* of a *Yogin* called *Viśokā*, which consists in omniscience and universal mastery, remains yet to be obtained. When the Mind realises the greatest purity and steadiness it comes under the fullest control of the *Yogin*, who is then fixed in the knowledge of distinction between the Mind and the Self and becomes truly a Master (*Vaśī*).

Thus, the Supreme Power of a man comes from a control of the mind. The ultimate constituents of Nature, those from which the sense and the matter evolve, present themselves to such a person as to their Master, responsive to his will. This state represents the God-like nature of a *Yogin* who is all-knowing, all-powerful, free and divested of all the bonds of *Kleśa* (e. g., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion and fear of self-annihilation).

(d) The fourth period marks a transcendence of the Supreme *Viśokā* Power also. The *Yogin* realises that even this Power, greatest though it is in the state of outer consciousness (*Vyutthāna*), is yet a foreign element and has to be eliminated. The acquisition of the Supreme Power is the first result of *Vivekakhyāti* and non-attachment to this Power ending in the *Nirodha* proper and Absolution (*Kaivalya*) is the next. The fourth period commences from after the Supreme Non-attachment (i.e., detachment from the *guṇas*) and continues so long as the Mind continues to exist. This is *Jīvanmukti* proper from the view-point of Yoga. The Mind is dissolved by means of the *Nirodha*, when *Kaivalya* follows, in which the Self shines by Itself unaccompanied by the Mind.

From the above sketch it would appear that the four periods, beginning with the first appearance of the Inner Light and closing with its alsolute purity, stand for the entire *Samprajñāta* Stage. The *Nirodha* or *Asamprajñāta* Stage comes in when the Light or Mind has disappeared and the Self alone shines. This is *Kaivalya.*[315]

XVIII. THE CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL AND SUPERPHYSICAL ORGANISM IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

The doctrine of hyper-physical body, over and above the physical organism with which we are familiar, has from times immemorial been known, not only to the mystics and saints, but, even to the philosophers of all countries. But the question does not seem to have received the attention which from its interest and importance it really deserves. A deep and close search into the contents of the ancient and mediaeval literature would serve to show that there are ample literary data for preparing a consistent account of this doctrine. The following brief paper attempts to present some aspects of this doctrine with special reference to the religio-philosophical literature of India, illuminated by the personal experience of *Yogins*.

But, before proceeding into a discussion of the superphysical body it would be well to speak a few words on the physical body with which in its dense earthly form we are generally familiar. In its usual connotation the physical body represents the outcome of a process of organisation of physical matter.

This process of organisation is a gradual one. It is believed that the Principle of Life (*Cidvīrya*) being infused into Matter acts as a stimulus. Matter, informed with this principle, responds to it in the form of a *Yoni*

corresponding to the principle concerned. The Principle of Life is fundamentally one and indivisible but holds within it germs of multiplicity. In the same way the Great or Universal *Yoni* is Unitive, but, in it is involved a countless variety of forms. The inter-relation between *Liṅga* and *Yoni* helps to bring into manifestation a series of mutually related *Liṅgas* and *Yonis*, arranged in an ascending order of gradual perfection of structure and function. What the exact number of these creative matrices (*Yonis*) is or whether there is a fixed number at all remains an undecided question. The statement in the Purāṇas and in other parts of ancient literature that there are in all eight million and eighty-four thousand *Yonis* intervening between the earliest form of organised life and its most perfected manifestation in human form is a vague assertion based apparently on the association of the mystic number '84'.[316]

But, whatever the exact number might be it was believed by the ancient Indian thinkers that the attainment of human form was the result of a very slow and tardy process of natural evolution. The entire scale of biological development was subjected to a careful examination, on which certain well-marked genetic characteristics were discovered and a working classification of the species based on these characteristics was arrived at. The number of these main classes is usually held to be four and this quadruple division has become practically established :

"एकविंशति लक्षाणि ह्यण्डजाः परिकीर्तिताः ।
स्वेदजाश्च तथैवोक्ता उद्भिज्जास्तत्प्रमाणतः ॥
जरायुजाश्च तावन्तो मनुष्याद्याश्च जन्तवः ।
सर्वेषामेव जन्तूनां मानुषत्वं सुदुर्लभम्" ॥[317]

But the Bṛhad Viṣṇu Purāṇa and the Karmavipāka refer to six *Yonis* as *jalaja*, *sthāvara*, *kṛmi*, *pakṣī*, *paśu* and *mānuṣa*. To these *Yonis* the former work assigns 9, 20, 11, 10, 30 & 4 lakh varieties respectively. These figures are somewhat differently stated in the Karmavipāka, viz, 9, 30, 10, 11, 20 & 4 making up the total into 84 and not 83, as in the other book. Vidyāraṇya in his Anubhūti-prakāśa[318] speaks of 84 lakh *Yonis* as a classical fact. Caraka,[319] Śaṅkarācārya[320] and other old writers always accepted this division, on the assumption that the principal *Yonis* are four in number. There is no doubt that the human form is considered to be the consumation of all forms in the natural kingdom. The evolutionary process is bound to result in greater and greater perfection in the form evolved. In the terms of Taittirīya Upaniṣad it is the *Annamaya Kośa* which appears first. In the lowest form of the animal world this is the only *Kośa* which predominates, the other *Kośas* remaining dormant. In the next higher grades of the animal world the *Prāṇamaya Kośa* also asserts itself. And so on till the *Manomaya Kośa* is evolved and the organism assumes the human form. It is after a prolonged period of continuance in this field that the *Vijñanamaya Kośa* comes out. The *Ānandamaya Kośa*, however, appears last of all and perfects the form. But it should be borne in mind that the first or the *Annamaya Kośa* alone is the physical body with which we are immediately concerned. The gradual perfection of this body, therefore, means that as it advances from the lowest sub-human type to the human configuration it gets more and more complex with the infusion of the higher principles

There are divergent opinions, however, in regard to the meaning of the term *Yoni* referred to obove.[321] Pra-

śastapāda in his Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha speaks of earthly bodies as *Yonija* and *Ayonijā* and Śrīdhara explains in this connection the meaning of the term *Yoni* as "union of *śukra* and *śoṇita* (*śukra-śoṇitā-sannipāta*). The *Yonija* bodies from this point of view would be those which are sexually born and the *Ayonija* the others which are not so produced. This is, of course, a narrow view. But the more liberal standpoint is represented by the view of the Buddhist teacher, Vasubandhu, who considers *Yoni* as the only matrix of generation of life, so that in his opinion there can be no such thing as an *Ayonija* body. The unsexually generated bodies which in common parlance are known as *Ayonija*—be they of celestial beings or of infusoria—are also recognised as *Yonija* in the Abhidharma-kośa. The view of Vasubandhu is really the accepted doctrine of the Buddhist Schools and is found even in the Pali Canonical literature.

What is the bearing of *Yoni* on the development of a particular form ? The question is answered by Caraka, though only in a particular manner. He says[322] that the difference of *Yoni* is ultimately based on the difference of collocation of parts or configuration *(ākāra* or *saṁsthāna)*. Differences in collocation being of a great variety, variation in the origin of species calls for no explanation. Judged thus, the *Yoni* would correspond to a mould into which the germinal and other fecundating particles *(garbhakarā bhāvāḥ*) fall (*āsecana)*. This is of course for egg-born and uterine creatures. The *Yoni* in such cases serves as the *bimba,* whereas the form evolved, i.e., the body produced, is its reflected image.[323] Cakradatta notes[324] : "समुदायात्मकः सन्निति यद्यपि समुदायजन्यः तथापि योनिरूपकारणमहिम्ना स्वयोनिसदृश एव भवति नान्ययोनिसदृशः". It is asserted that the male seed (*bīja*) contains in it parts

which form the different components (*aṅgas* and *pratyaṅgas*) of the resulting body : "मनुष्यबीजं हि प्रत्यङ्गबीजभाग-समुदायात्मकं स्वसदृशप्रत्यङ्गसमुदायरूपपुरुषजनकम्". Uniformity in a species is, therefore, due to sameness of *Yoni*.[325]

The first kingdom is represented by what Śaṅkarācārya calls by the name of *sthāvaras*,[326] which include, plants, herbs, trees and other kinds of life. Being the result of organisation of matter they are generally looked upon and rightly, as bodies possessed of life and consciousness.[327] And, as such they are deemed as vehicles through which pleasure and pain may be experienced *(bhogāyatana)*. But Udayana observes in the Kiraṇāvalī[328] that though in their case the fundamental characteristic of a body cannot be questioned it is relatively insignificant, in consequence of the fact that they have a very dull and dormant consciousness (*atimanda antaḥ-saṁjñā*). Similarly Manu[329] also notes this very fact, when he says that trees have a dormant consciousness and feel pleasure and pain.

"अन्तःसंज्ञा भवन्त्येते सुखदुःखसमन्विताः" ।

This is exactly the view of the Bhāgavata,[330] Śaṅkara Miśra in his Upaskāra on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 4.25, Guṇaratna in the Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti[331] and Cakrapāṇi Datta in Bhānumati.[332] Mādhavācārya in the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha[333] says that the trees though devoid of sense *golakas*, have sensations (*viṣayopalambha*) and are not insentient and that, therefore, to cut them is looked upon as injury (*himsā*) in the Veda, thereby implying that they are living beings (*prāṇī*). That plants have life and consciousness and that as bodies they exhibit signs of growth, sensitiveness to stimulii, decay, disease and death and have respiration

sleep and waking, was recognised in India from the earliest times.[334]

It is, therefore, curious to note that Praśastapāda[335] does not recognise the body of plants. He divides earthly objects (*viṣayāḥ*) as threefold, viz., (i) earth proper (*mṛt*), (ii) stone (*pāṣāṇa*) and (iii) immoveables, i.e., plants (*sthāvara*). Under the last are included grasses (*tṛṇa*, e.g., *ulapa* etc.), herbs (*auṣadhi*, e. g., *godhūma*), trees (*vṛkṣa* or those which bear flowers and fruits, e. g., *kovidāra*), creepers, shrubs (*gulmas*), *vanaspatis* (e. g., *audumbara*), *avatānas* (or *viṭapas*, e. g., *ketakī*, *bījapura*, etc.), etc.

The Jain views on this question approximates more to the orthodox position than to the personal opinion of Praśastapāda[336], for they consider the *sthāvaras* as possessing bodies. In the Jain literature five kinds of *sthāvara* bodies are described. These embrace the four elemental bodies corresponding to the four primary elements (earth, etc.) and the vegetable body. These bodies have only the sense of touch. There is a sixth kind of body also, known as *trasa*, which has from two to five senses developed.

The next grade of evolution in *Yonis* is represented by the *Svedajas*, a class of insects produced from sweat or moisture. The Vahnipurāṇa[337] observes that there are different species of these creatures, e. g., some (viz., mosquitoes, etc.) produced from sweat (*sveda*) and impurities (*mala*) of men, some (viz., ants, etc.) growing in soil drenched by the fresh waters of the rainy season (*nava-megha-prasiktāyām*). *Ghuṇas* produced from the wood and *puttikās* from seminal *vikāras* are other instances of

this class of animal life.[338] The Prapañcasāra[339] defines *Svedaja* thus :

"स्वेदजः स्विद्यमानाभ्यो भूरग्न्यद्भ्यः प्रजायते ।"

The commentator to the Abhidharma-kośa[340] refers to human beings who were of this category, e. g., Māndhātā, Caru, Kapolamālinī, Āmrapālī, etc.

The third grand division includes those creatures which are born of eggs, viz., birds, reptiles, etc. The commentator to the Abhidharma-kośa[341] notes that in exceptional cases men too are egg-born. He cites the cases of the *theras* Śaila and Upaśaila, who are reported to have been born from the eggs of *krauñca* birds. Such was also the case of the 32 sons of Viśākhā, the mother of Mṛgāra and of the 500 sons of the king of Pañcāla.

The highest class is that of *Jarāyuja* species, including lower animals and men. The Śiva-gītā says[342] that *Jarāyu* is the name of uterus (*sūkṣmā strī-carmāvṛtiḥ*) and that as the union of *śukra* and *śoṇita* takes place within this the *garbha* is called *Jarāyuja*.

The physical body, in its usual form, is generated by the process of sexual reproduction. But there are bodies equally physical which are known to be a-sexual. The Sāṅkhya Sūtra—मातापित्रजं स्थूलं प्रायश इतरन्न तथा[343]—shows that a *sthūla* body is usually sexual, but may be a-sexual also. These a-sexually generated bodies may be super-human, human and sub-human. As to the process of sexual genesis we shall speak later. Among the a-sexual beings of the first class may be mentioned the gods, the *Ṛṣis* and the hell-beings. These bodies are produced directly from the atoms combined under

the influence of *dharma* and *adharma*.[344] These bodies may have a particular element pre-dominant in them, so that some of them are earthly, some are watery, some fiery and some aerial. The earthly forms exist on planes where earthly matter prevails, whereas the other forms belong to the planes of watery, fiery and airy matter. But it should be remembered, says the Vaiśeṣika, that each of the non-earthly types has an admixture (*upāṣṭambhaka*) of earth element also, without which it would not be capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. [345] The hell-beings too belong to this class and their bodies persist till the end of the *Kalpa*. The intermediary transmigratory bodies (*antarābhavadeha*) of beings after death and before re-birth are also a-sexual. The *pretas* may be sexually born of *Jarāyu* and may also be non-sexual.[346] Men are usually sexually generated and *Jarāyuja*. But there are human bodies which are a-sexual. In the beginning of the Cosmic Cycle the human body is believed to have been of this class. The commentator to the Abhidharma-kośa refers plainly to this fact. [347] Udayana in his Nyāya-kusumāñjali[348] also alludes to this in the following words:

"यथा हि वृश्चिकपूर्वकत्वेऽपि वृश्चिकस्य गोमयादाद्यः, तण्डुलीयकपूर्वकत्वेऽपि तण्डुलीयकस्य तण्डुलकणादाद्यः, वह्निपूर्वकत्वेऽपि वह्नेररणेराद्यः; एवं क्षीरदधिघृततैलकदलीकाण्डादयः। तथा मानुषगोब्राह्मणपूर्वकत्वेऽपि तेषां प्राथमिकास्तत्तत्कर्मोपनिबद्ध भूतभेदहेतुका एव"।

The mentally born physical bodies, human or otherwise, which are described in the Purāṇas, were all a-sexual.[349] The bodies of Droṇa, Dhṛṣṭadyumna, Sītā, Draupadī, etc., were also a-sexual. Śaṅkarācārya refers to them as instances of *Ayonija* bodies in his commentary on Vedānta Sūtra 3.1.19, noting that Droṇa's body was

unisexual and that Dhṛṣṭadyumna's body was not even such. There is another kind of human body which has to be classed under a-sexual. It is the *Nirmāṇa kāya* of the *Yogin* or of God. It may be regarded as both physical and super-physical. It is the body assumed by the Lord or by an Adept of an exalted order to teach wisdom to mankind[350]. This body or mind is free from the impurities incidental to an ordinary body or mind, however miraculously produced. Without such a body no *Dharmopadeśa* is possible.

The bodies produced from parents through sexual action are as a rule naturally defiled. Such bodies are usually dominated by *Kāma*, though we should remember that there may be exceptions when *Kāma* is held in check and being firmly controlled may be regulated by higher considerations. The culture of *Brahmacarya* is intended to purify *Kāma* and bring it under sway. If its expression is deemed necessary it may by an act of will be called into existence and made to function. Thus, we conclude that there are two possible types of physical body born of parental union : (i) Pure and undefiled body, where the parents are free from erotic influences and (ii) impure body as is usually known. Regarding the former type Udayana hints in the following line :

"पूर्वं हि मानस्यः प्रजाः समभवन्, ततोऽपत्यैकप्रयोजनमैथुनसम्भवाः, ततः कामावर्जनीयसन्निधिजन्मानः, इदानीं देशकालाद्यव्यवस्थया पशुधर्मादेव भूयिष्ठाः" |[351]

The *garbhādhāna* and other purificatory rites recommended in Dharma-śāstras, etc., are meant to help in the production of an uncontaminated physical body.

The usual sexual act, being prompted by passion, etc., cannot but generate unclean bodies. This being

assumed as the norm of the present age the doctrine of original sin in its physical sense becomes intelligible. Such defiled bodies, unless thoroughly purified, are believed to be unable to serve as vehicles of an illuminated *citta*. In other words, so long as a person identifies himself with such a body he cannot obtain knowledge (*jñāna*). For the *citta* must be freed from the body so that both may be rendered pure, whereupon illumination follows. Śrīdhara in the Nyāyakandalī observes[352] that a person with a defiled body such as is described above is unable to recollect his experiences in the past lives owing to the abolition, or suppression, of *saṁskāras* in consequence of great pain due to *garbhavāsa*, etc. But those whose birth is non-sexual, e.g., the Prajāpati, Ṛṣis, Manus and the mind-born ones, remember everything experienced in prior *Kalpas*[353] :

"योनिजशरीरो हि महता गर्भवासादिदुःखप्रबन्धेन विलुप्तसंस्कारो जन्मान्तरानुभूतस्य सर्वस्य न स्मरति। ऋषयः प्रजापतयो मनवस्तु मानसा अयोनिजशरीरविशिष्टादृष्टसम्बन्धिनो दृष्टसंस्काराः कल्पान्तरानुभूतं सर्वमेव शब्दार्थव्यवहारं सुप्तप्रतिबुद्धवत् प्रतिसन्दधते, प्रतिसन्दधानाश्च परस्परं बहवो व्यवहरन्ति। तेषां व्यवहारात् तत्कालवर्तिनां प्राणिनां व्युत्पत्तिः तद्व्यवहाराच्चान्योन्यमित्युपपद्यते व्यवहारपरम्परया शब्दार्थव्युत्पत्तिः"।

Udayana also draws a distinction between the bodies of gods[354] who are with three states, living through several *manvantaras*, with unwinking eyes, moving through space, going about at will (*kāmagāḥ*) and having three eyes, four arms etc., and those of men who have ten states, live a hundred years, are with rolling eyes (*paribhramaścakṣuṣaḥ*), move on earth, have their movements obstructed and are with two eyes and two arms.[355] It is for this reason that

higher beings, when they choose to come down for teaching wisdom to mankind, generally prefer bodies which are not sexually generated[356]. The immaculate conception of Virgin Mary may be cited as an illustration. The Bodhisattvas are not born and do not grow in the womb like an ordinary mortal nor are they defiled by the impurities of the womb.[357]

Besides, ordinarily it is difficult to retain consciousness when entering the womb, when staying there and when coming out of it. Some people retain consciousness when entering the womb, but lose it afterwards when they stay there or come out of it. Others retain consciousness when entering and when staying, but, lose it when they come out. The more fortunate people, however, retain consciousness always.[358]

Among the sub-human species which are non-sexual in birth we might mention the infusoria (*kṣudra-jantavaḥ*), e. g., gnats, mosquitoes, etc. (*daṁśa, maśaka*).[359] These are known as bodies of pain (*yātanā-śarīra*).[360] The commentator to the Abhidharma-kośa speaks of *śalabha*, etc., produced in the beginning of the rainy season as instances of this type of creatures. According to Cakradatta[361] *Svedajas*, (e. g., mosquitoes), *Udbhijjas* (plants) and *bhekas* (frogs) are born without a mother. Does it mean that the sperm-cells of these classes can develop into new organism without fusion or fertilisation ? Vācaspati Miśra in the Bhāmatī[362] refers to *Svedaja* and *Udbhijja* creatures as a-sexually generated.

The sexual origin of physical body is of course well-known. These bodies may be of men or of sub-human creatures. All sub-human forms, however, are not sex-born, but only the *Jarāyuja* and *Aṇḍaja* ones according

to Cakradatta,[363] though some of the *Aṇḍajas* too do not need a father : "**अण्डजास्तु मत्स्यादयः पितरं विनापि ऋतुविशेष-प्राप्त्यैव भवन्ति**".[364] That is, in the case of the latter the type of reproduction is what would be called parthenogenesis, wherein the eggs develop without any fertilisation.[365]

Śaṅkarācārya speaks of *valākās* as such : "**वलाकापि अन्तरेणैव रेतःसेकं गर्भं धत्त इति लोकरूढिः**"[366]. It is said that the females of these birds drink the tears of males and conceive. [367]

XIX. THE MĪMĀṂSĀ MANUSCRIPTS IN THE GOVERNMENT SANSKRIT LIBRARY

(PENARES)

[INFORMATIVE OF IMPORTANT AUTHORS AND THEIR WORKS]

The Mīmāṁsā Collection of manuscripts in the Library of the Government Sanskrit College, Benares, as represented in the Catalogue, recently published, comprises 572 manuscripts. This includes all the works on the subject which were acquired annually and from time to time and which hitherto formed part of different sections of the Library. Considering that a complete and exhaustive Catalogue of the Library in each of its classes should bring together all the works belonging to the class concerned an endeavour has been made to amalgamate all the sections so far as manuscripts of the particular class are concerned.

A mere glance at the contents of the Catalogue will suffice to convince one that the Mīmāṁsā Collection is as rich as it is valuable. There are 64 dated manuscripts in this Collection, of which 1 belongs to the 15th century, 8 to the 16th, 16 to the 17th, 6 to the 18th, 28th to the 19th and 5 to the 20th century.

IMPORTANT AUTHORS AND THEIR WORKS

Jaimini, the author of the Sūtras—We must start with the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras of Jaimini. This work represents a

body of aphorisms, as such works invariably are, and is divided, so far as the current portion goes, into 12 chapters, for which reason it is known as *Dvādaśa-lakṣaṇī*. Each of these chapters is sub-divided into *pādas* which vary. Of this work there are 13 manuscripts in the present Collection (Nos. 1 to 13).

Śabara Muni's Bhāṣya—The earliest and most authoritative commentary extant on the above is the Bhāṣya attributed to Śabara Muni, of which there are 57 manuscripts in the present Collection (Nos. 14 to 70). The date of the author is not definitely known, nor anything about his nationality.

Other commentaries on the Sūtras—Besides Śabara's work which is indeed the standard commentary on the Sūtras there are numerous glosses on these Sūtras, of which we have no less than 22, viz., those by Pārthasārathi, Mādhavācārya, Bhavanātha, Dinakara, Nīlakaṇṭha, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa II, Ananta Bhaṭṭa, Khaṇḍadeva (two works), Bhāskara Rāya, Rāghavānanda, Viśvakarmā, Brahmānanda, Vaidyanātha Tatsat, Vāsudeva Dīkṣita, Divākara Dīkṣita, Rāmeśvara Kavi and 4 glosses the authorship of which is not known.

Differences of interpretation : Prabhākara, Kumārila, and Murāri—There are two, or probably three, distinct lines of interpretation in the Mīmāṁsā school, represented by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, Prabhākara and Murāri Miśra. Murāri's school, except for some doubtful books associated with this name, is practically defunct. All that we know of him and his views is from references and quotations in later literature. [368]

Prabhākara and his school—Prabhākara's school too is practically non-existent, except for its surviving literature. Kumārila alone rules the field. But Prabhākara's influence was once enormous. And in the history of Indian philosophy his place is unique. He is generally known as *"Guru"* and is probably to be associated with Kashmir or its neighbourhood.[369]

Śālikanātha—His school is represented in the present Collection by manuscript No. 493, a copy of Prakaraṇapañcikā, written by Śālikanātha. Śālika's age and nationality have to be determined. The earliest reference to Śālika is probably to be found in Udayanācārya's Nyāya-kusumāñjali (*Stavaka* III). As I have already pointed out in my Introduction [370] to Varadarāja's Kusumāñjali-bodhinī, [371] the nature of the reference seems to indicate not only that Śālika was Udayana's contemporary or at best an immediate predecessor, but also that he was a native of Bengal. Udayana lived about the end of the 10th century, his Lakṣaṇāvalī being dated in Śaka 906 (*Tarkāmbarāṅka*) or 984 A. D. It is, therefore, probable that Śālika belonged to the middle of the 10th century. Besides the Pañcikā referred to above, Śālika was the author of a commentary on each of the two *ṭīkās* (Bṛhatī and Laghvī) of Prabhākara. These commentaries are known as Ṛjuvimalā and Dīpaśikhā respectively.[372]

Bhavanātha Miśra : Nayaviveka—Subsequent to Śālikanātha, Bhavanātha was a great advocate of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā. His Mīmāṁsā-naya-viveka of which we have 3 manuscripts (Nos. 189–191), is a commentary on the Sūtras. He is called a *Mahāmahopādhyāya* or simply *Mahopādhyāya*. In the colophons of the manuscripts he is sometimes named

Bhavadeva Upādhyāya.[373] But there appears to be no doubt that both Bhavanātha and Bhavadeva were variants of the same name. It may be pointed out in this connection that Varadarāja, who was the author of a commentary on Bhavanātha's work, speaks of Bhavadeva and Bhavanātha as identical. Thus *nātham bhavaṁ* occurs in verse 5 of his benediction and *Bhavadeva* in verse 10.

Some scholars are inclined to take this author to be the same as the father of Śaṅkara Miśra, the famous author of Upaskāra, Ātmatattvaviveka-kalpalatā, etc. But beyond a similarity of name there appears to be no plausible ground on which this identity may be established. Pratyaksvarūpācārya refers to Bhavanātha and to the Nayaviveka in his commentary, called Nayanaprasādinī, on Citsukha's Tattvapradīpikā. Pratyaksvarūpa's date being the 14th century, the date of Bhavanātha must be about 1200 A.D. or the beginning of 1400 A.D. In that case he cannot have been the father of Śaṅkara Miśra who lived about the middle of the 15th century.

Commentaries on Nayaviveka--(a) by Varadarāja– The present Collection contains 4 commentaries on the Nayaviveka. Of these the one, called Dīpikā, is by Varadarāja, son of Raṅganātha, son of Devanātha, son of Praṇatārtihara of Kiḍamli[374] family on the bank of the river Śukā. He was a follower of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism, and his *Guru* was one Sudarśana of Atrikula.[375] Varadarāja claims that his interpretation is supported by tradition and is *Sāmpradāyika*[375a]. He refers to Candra and other writers of Nibandhas. His commentary extends to the *Tripādī* section only, which is the most difficult portion of Bhavadeva's work.

(b) *By Śaṅkara*—There is another commentary on the Nayaviveka called Śaṅkādīpikā (Nos. 411 and 412). Nothing is known about this author except that he was a pupil of one Rāmārya and Govindopādhyāya[377].

(c) *By Dāmodara* -The third commentary is by Dāmodara Sūri, son of Mādhava Yogin, and is called Alaṅkāra (Nos. 413 and 414). The author is probably identical with the writer of a commentary on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras (Dharma-mīmāṁsā-vṛtti), called Subodhikā.[378]

(d) *By an unknown author* -The authorship of the fourth commentary is not known (Nos. 415 and 416).

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, his Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika, Ṭupṭīkā and Laghuvārttika—The greatest name, however, in the history of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā is undoubtedly that of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, called Kumāra Svāmī by Pārthasārathi in his Nyāya-ratna-mālā. He was the author of a series of expositions on the Bhāṣya, known as Vārttika. His Ślokavārttika on chapter I, *pāda* 1, is in verse. This is the best philosophical presentation of the Bhāṭṭa system on which all subsequent treatises are based. There are 4 manuscripts of this work in the present Collection (Nos. 278-281). Ślokavārttika stops at the end of *pāda* 1. With *pāda* 2, begins Tantravārttika, the *magnum opus* of Kumārila, a work which has proved to be a veritable mine of information to all Mīmāṁsā authors of later ages. It extends to chapter III. The remaining portion of Jaimini's work is discussed in his Ṭupṭīkā. There are 48 manuscripts of Tantravārttika (Nos. 282-329) and 5 of Ṭupṭīkā (Nos. 330-334). There is also a Laghu-vārttika attributed to Kumāra Svāmī.[379]

Kumārila is usually supposed to be a contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. Tradition says that he was defeated in a controversy with Śaṅkara and that he burned himself on a pyre before the latter's eyes. Śaṅkara's date is still an open question. Assuming that Śaṅkara lived towards the end of the 8th and beginning of the 9th century, it would follow that Kumārila belonged to the middle of the 8th century.[380]

The line so laboriously inaugurated by Kumārila seems to have practically died with him. His true aim of life, as that of every sincere advocate of Mīmāṁsā, was to revive in his own way the Vedic religion in its ritualistic and sacrificial aspects – aspects which suffered a deadly set-back owing to the rise and development of Buddhism and Jainism. In Kumārila's time Buddhist philosophy was flourishing especially at centres like Nālandā, and we find in the Ślokavārttika clearest indications of Kumārila's very close acquaintance with it. How far Kumārila or Śaṅkara really succeeded in demolishing the structures of Buddhist religious thought the future historian of Indian culture will be able to say.

Dark Age; Mādhavācārya and his Nyāyamālā-vistara– In any case it is strange that the Mīmāṁsā school does not seem to have thrived well immediately after Kumārila's age. So far as the literary history of the system is concerned the period from Kumārila to Mādhavācārya is, save for a few illustrious names, practically a total blank. The next author, therefore, which calls for our attention after Kumārila is probably Mādhavācārya of whose Jaiminīya-nyāya-mālā there are 37 manuscripts (Nos. 152-188) in the Library. In mediaeval Sanskrit

literature, more particularly in the Vedic and Vedāntic literature, Mādhava occupies a unique position. His contribution to the revival of Vedic culture in the country can be truly appreciated if only we remember that, as we have just pointed out, inspite of Kumārila's best efforts to introduce Vedic studies, there was a long and dark period immediately after Kumārila's death. It may be freely admitted that between the 8th century, when Kumārila lived and worked and the 14th, the age of Mādhavācārya, i.e., for a period extending over 500 or 55o years, Vedic religion had again gone to sleep. That Bengal under Buddhist and Tāntric influences, lost its Vedic culture, is probably certain. But it is of interest to note that even from Southern India Vedic traditions disappeared. The rise of Pāñcarātra Āgama, including as an offshoot the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava system, and of the Vīraśaiva cult, and the spread of Jainism, had much to do with the decline of Vedism in the south. The families of Mādhava and of his patron Bukka Rāya of Vijayanagara are associated with this revivalistic movement. The preparation of cyclopaedic commentaries on the Vedic Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas is only a step in the direction of this renaissance. The study of Mīmāṁsā Sūtras having ceased with the cessation of interest in the ceremonies the meaning of the Sūtras became obscure in course of time. Mādhava's chief object in composition of the Nyāya-ratna-mālā was to supply the *adhikaraṇas* in succession so as to render intelligible the context of the Sūtras.

Pārthasārathi – Pārthasārathi Miśra was a famous writer of Mīmāṁsā in mediaeval India. In the present Collection we have 81 manuscripts of his Śāstradīpikā, (Nos.71-151), 12 of his Tantraratna (Nos. 336-347) and 4

of his Nyāya-(or Naya) ratna-mālā (Nos. 486-489). The Śāstradīpikā is one of the best glosses on the Sūtras explained from the view-point of Kumārila. The Tantraratna is a commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya, or rather on the Ṭupṭīkā, and the Nyāya-ratna-mālā is an independent treatise dealing with the main topics of Mīmāṁsā.

Very little historical information is available regarding Pārthasārathi. He calls himself the son and pupil of Yajñātman and was probably a native of Mithilā. A manuscript of his Tantraratna existing in the Library of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, bears Saṁvat 1651 or 1594 A. D.[381] The India Office manuscript of Nyāya-ratna-mālā is dated Saṁvat 1591 or 1534 A. D. Mādhavācārya (1500 A. D.) refers to him in the Nyāyamālā; so does Pratyaksvarūpa (1400 A. D.) in the Nayana-prasādinī. Pārthasārathi may be assigned, therefore, to the 13th century at the latest.

Commentaries on his (i) Śāstradīpikā and (ii) Tantraraṭna—On his Śāstradīpikā we have commentaries by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Śaṁkara Bhaṭṭa, Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Campakanātha, Vidyānātha Tatsat and Somanātha.

The commentaries on the Tantraratna are by—

Someśvara alias Rāṇaka—The name of Pārthasārathi suggests that of Bhaṭṭa Someśvara, son of Mādhava Bhaṭṭa,[382] who is held as his rival in the field of Mīmāṁsā by subsequent authors. His Nyāyasudhā,[383] of which we have 33 manuscripts (Nos.437-469), is a commentary on the Tantravārttika. He is referred to very disparagingly, viz., as a plagiarist (*Rāṇaka-caurya*) by Kamalākara (1612 A. D.) in his Āloka on the Śāstra-

dīpikā and also by Anantadeva II in his Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra, by Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on the Śāstradīpikā, and by Pratyaksvarūpa (1400 A.D.) in the Nayana-prasādinī.

Someśvara, thus, appears to belong to the age in which Pārthasārathi lived.

Sucarita Miśra and his Kāśikā—To the same age may be assigned the name of Upādhyāya Sucarita Miśra of whose commentary, called Kāśikā, on Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, we have 3 manuscripts (Nos.432-434). Of these manuscripts No. 443 is dated Saṁvat 1507[384] or 1450 A. D. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, author of a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā, and Pratyaksvarūpa (1400 A. D.) refer to Sucarita and his work.

Rāmānuja, the author of Nāyakaratna—Nos. 536-539 are manuscripts of Nāyakaratna, attributed to one Rāmānuja Ācārya. It is a commentary on Pārthasārathi's Nyāya-ratna-mālā. The author says that though he is a follower of the Prābhākara school he undertakes this composition out of defence for Pārthasārathi.[385] Nothing very particular is known about the author, except that he was also the author of an independent work on the Prābhākara system of Mīmāṁsā, called Tantra-rahasya[386], in which he calls himself an inhabitant of Dharmāpurī on the bank of the Godāvarī and a worshipper of Nṛsiṁha.

Indrapati—No. 533 is a copy of Mīmāṁsā-rasa-palvala, attributed to Mahāmahopādhyāya Indrapati Ṭhakkura, son of Rucipati and Rukmiṇī. His *Guru* in Mīmāṁsā was one Gopāla Bhaṭṭa who is to be differentiated from his later name-sake, also a Mīmāṁsaka, the

author of Mīmāṁsā-vidhibhūṣaṇa. The date of Indrapati may be determined on the basis of the following data :-

(a) Rucipati was a protege of Rājā Bhairava Siṁha Deva of Mithilā (time about 1437 A. D. ?).

(b) Indrapati's son was Premanidhi, whose Dharmādharma-prabodhinī[387] was completed in Saṁvat 1410. In this place the word *Saṁvat* evidently means *Śakābda*, so that the year corresponds to 1488 A. D.

(c) Indrapati's pupil was Lakṣmīpati Upādhyāya, the author of Śrāddharatna in which it is said that the author's family once lived at Māhiṣmatī in Nizam Shahi's dominions. Lakṣmīpati was living in La Saṁ. 339 or 1458 A. D., when a manuscript of Udayana's Tātparya-pariśuddhi was transcribed for him. From this it appears that Indrapati lived in the middle of the 15th century.

Devanātha Ṭhakkura—No. 494 is a copy of Adhikaraṇa-kaumudī by Devanātha Ṭhakkura, a Maithila Brāhmaṇa. He was also the author of a Supplement (*Pariśiṣṭa*) to Pakṣadhara Miśra's Āloka on Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi. MM. H.P. Śāstrī noticed[388] a copy of this manuscript transcribed by order of the author himself.[389] It is dated La Saṁ. 443 or 1662 A.D. Hence Devanātha must be assigned to the middle of the 16th century. Devanātha followed Soma Bhaṭṭa and quoted Ratnākara, Kalpataru, Śrīdatta, Harināṭha and Vācaspati.

Rāmkṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa--Siddhānta-candrikā or Yukti-sneha-prapūraṇī is the name of a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā by one Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Mādhava, of the Parāśara Gotra. His genealogy is thus shown in the introductory verse of his commentary :—

Śivadāsa
|
Janārdana–m. Gaṅgā Devī
|
Bhairava[390]–m. Puna or Puta Devī
|
Nārāyaṇa–m. Ramā Devī
|
Mādhava–m. Prabhāvatī
|
Rāmakṛṣṇa

Rāmakṛṣṇa's father was a great Vedāntic scholar and a votary of Rāmacandra. Having renounced all worldly desires, he became an ascetic, and leaving Mālvā, his native land, came over to Benares—where he ultimately settled–with his wife for purposes of study. At Benares a son was born to him. This was Rāmakṛṣṇa, the present author. Rāmakṛṣṇa was devoted to his father, under whom he studied and was well-read in all the *Śāstras* and far-famed as a writer. He obtained the title of 'Bhaṭṭa' in the learned community of the Nāgaras from a Brāhmaṇa named Gopīnātha Rājarāja; and also the title 'Paṇḍita-śiromaṇi' from Balabhadra, the Court Pandit of the Gajapati King of his time, on account of his composition of Pratāpa-mārtaṇḍa. This Gajapati King was evidently Pratāparudra of Orissa, of whom we hear so much in connection with the Vaiṣṇavist propa-

ganda of Caitanya Deva of Bengal. The commentary on the Śāstradīpikā was composed at Benares in 1543A.D.

Raghunātha Vidyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya–Raghunātha was the writer of a work, called Mīmāṁsāratna (No. 525), which consists of two parts, viz., *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya*, or rather of three, viz., *Pramāṇa*, *Prameya* and *Vidhi*. Raghunātha refers to Pārthasārathi, Sucarita Miśra, etc. His time is not known. But as the India Office manuscript of his Mīmāṁsā-prameya-ratna belonged to the collection of Sarvavidyānidhāna Kavīndrācārya Sarasvatī, a contemporary of Shah Jehan, he may be assigned to a much earlier date. He may be tentatively placed in the 16th century.

Annam Bhaṭṭa—The name of Annam Bhaṭṭa is well-known in the bibliography of Indian philosophy. The present Collection contains one manuscript of his Subodhinī, which is a commentary on the Tantravārttika (No.470), and a manuscript of his commentary on the Nyāyasudhā, called Rāṇaka-phakkikā-vyākhyā (No.484). He is reputed to have been the author of several other works, viz., Mitākṣarā, a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, Uddyotana, a commentary on Kaiyyaṭa's Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa, etc. The author of Tarkasaṅgraha is also perhaps to be identified with him. He lived at Parikapadu, in the Kistna district. His father was Tirumala Bhaṭṭa, *alias* Sarvatomukha Yāji, son of Mallu Bhaṭṭa *alias* Agnihotra Sūri, son of Lokanātha *alias* Dvādaśāhajya. Agnihotra wrote commentaries on Cintāmaṇyāloka in Nyāya and Tattvaviveka in Vedānta. Annam Bhaṭṭa may with some probability be assigned to the 16th century A. D.

Appaya Dīkṣita—The name of Appaya Dīkṣita, whom Madhusūdana Sarasvatī describes as *Sarvatantra-*

svatantra, is a familiar name in the history of Sanskrit literature. He was one of the most brilliant and versatile scholars of India. In the present Collection there are 4 manuscripts of his Vidhirasāyana[391] (Nos. 518-521) and one manuscript of Upakrama-parākrama (No.517).

Appaya was the son of Raṅgarāja Adhvarin, author of Advaita-vidyā-mukura and Vivaraṇa-darpaṇa and grandson of Ācārya Dīkṣita *alias* Vakṣasthahācārya, a contemporary of Kṛṣṇarāja, King of Vijayanagara. He was of Bhāradvāja Gotra. He was born in 1587 A.D. and died in 1658 A.D. He came to Benares, where he stayed for some time and became acquainted with the veteran Mīmāṁsā scholar Khaṇḍadeva to whom he presented a copy of his Vidhirasāyana. Khaṇḍadeva entertained a very high opinion of Appaya's scholarship. It was here probably that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita read with him Brahma Sūtras and Śāṅkara-bhāṣya and also Appaya's own anti-Mādhava tracts.

The opposition of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha to Appaya and Bhaṭṭoji has become historical. It seems that the main cause of his irritation lay in Bhaṭṭoji's refutation of Prakriyā-prakāśa (commentary on Prakriyā-kaumudī), the work of Śeśakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita, the father of Jagannātha's own teacher Śeṣavīreśvara.

Appaya was a voluminous writer, having written no less than 104 works, on almost every important subject in Sanskrit literature. Some of his works are named below :—

A. In Advaita Vedānta

(a) Nyāya-rakṣā-maṇi, a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras (chap. 1).

(b) Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha.

(c) Vedānta-kalpataru-parimal, a commentary on Amalānanda's Kalpataru.

(d) Nayamañjarī.

B. In Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta-(Vaiṣṇava)

(a) Naya-mayūkha-mālikā.

C. In Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta-(Śaiva)

(a) Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā, a commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya.

(b) } Ratnatraya-prīkṣā and its commentary.
(c) }

(d) Maṇimālikā.

D. In Dvaita Vedānta—(Mādhva)

(a) Nyāya-muktāvalī, a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.

(b) Commentary on the Nyāya-muktāvalī.

E. In Alaṅkāra

(a) Citramīmāṁsā.

(b) Vṛtti-vārttika.

(c) Kuvalayānanda, a commentary on Jayadeva's Candrāloka.

F. In Mīmāṁsā

(a) Vidhirasāyana.

(b) Commentary on the above called Sukhopayojanī.

(c) Upakrama-parākrama.

(d) Vādanakṣatrāvalī.

(e) Citrakūṭa.

G. In Vyākaraṇa

(a) Vādanakṣatrāvalī.

H. In Epic Literature

(a) Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya.

(b) Rāmāyaṇa-tātparya-nirṇaya.

I. In Prākṛta Vyākaraṇa

(a) Prākṛta-candrikā and its commentary.
(b)

J. In General Philosophy

(a) Mata-sārārtha-saṅgraha. This is a synopsis of the views of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Madhva.

K. In Polemics

(a) Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana.

L. In Stotra and allied Literature

(a) In praise of Viṣṇu–

(i) Varadarāja-stava.

(ii) Śrīkṛṣṇa-dhyāna-paddhati.

(b) In praise of Śiva–

(i) Śivānanda-laharī.

(ii) Śikhariṇī-mālā.

(iii) Śiva-tattva-viveka, a commentary on Śikhariṇī-mālā.

(c) In praise of Śakti—

(i) Durgā-candrakalā-stuti.

(d) In praise of Sūrya—

(i) Āditya-stotra-ratna.

Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya—Rāmakṛṣṇa was the author of Adhikaraṇa-kaumudī, of which there is one manuscript in the present Collection (No. 493).

Veṅkaṭeśvara Dīkṣita—Veṅkaṭeśvara Dīkṣita, the writer of Mīmāṁsā-vārttika-ābharaṇa, of which there are 7 manuscripts in this Collection (Nos.477-483), was a famous Mīmāṁsā scholar. The present work was a commentary on Kumārila's Ṭupṭīkā. The author was the son of Govinda Dīkṣita and younger brother and pupil of Yajñanārayaṇa Dīkṣita.[392] Veṅkaṭeśvara was probably the *Guru* of Rāja Cūdāmaṇi Dīkṣita.

Campakanātha—Caṃpakanātha was the author of a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā, named Prakāśa (Nos. 372-380). He says that he explains the text according to the traditional line of interprtation. It seems from what he says that people in those days were not generally inclined to consult ancient commentaries.

The date of Campakanātha is not known.

Somanātha–Somanātha, son of Mahāmahopādhyāya Sura Bhaṭṭa of Nitila[393] family, was the writer of a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā, called Mayūkhamālikā (Nos.388-403). He states that he studied the various *Kalās* under the guidance of his elder brother Veṅkaṭādri Yajvan.

Āpadeva--Āpadeva, the author of Mīmāṁsā-nyāyaprakāśa (Nos.495-506), a popular Mīmāṁsā tract, was the son of Anantadeva I, son of Āpadeva I, son of Ekanātha. He wrote a commentary, called Dīpikā, on Vedāntasāra. The author's family lived at Benares. Āpadeva taught many pupils and was specially interested in Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta and Dharmaśāstra.

Anantadeva II--Āpadeva's son was Anantadeva, who wrote a commentary on his father's Nyāya-prakāśa, called Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra (Nos.540-545) and also a tract named Phala-sāṅkarya-khaṇḍana (No.566). He wrote numerous other tracts in Mīmāṁsā. But the work for which he became famous to posterity was his Smṛtikaustubha, a treatise on Dharmaśāstra. Anantadeva II is referred to by Khaṇḍadeva who died about 1666 A. D. Probably he was an earlier contemporary of Khaṇḍadeva and a later one of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa. In the Smṛtikaustubha Anantadeva II observes that he wrote it at the instance of Prince Bāza Bahādura Candra, son of Nīla Candra, son of Trimalla Candra, son of Lakṣmaṇa Candra, son of Rudra Candra, son of Kalyāṇa Candra, son of Māna Candra of the Lunar family. Trimalla was friendly to the Pandits of Benares. Lakṣmaṇa defeated chiefs of the Himālaya and possessed their states.[394]

Jīvadeva—Jīvadeva, the author of Bhāṭṭa-bhāskara (Nos.504–506) was Anantadeva's younger brother and pupil. Jīvadeva refers to his brother's Kaustubha, which shows that Kaustubha had been completed before his own works He also quotes Kamalākara's Nirṇaya-sindhu, thus showing that he lived after the second decade of the 17th century.

Koṇḍadeva—Anantadeva II's pupil was Koṇḍadeva, who calls himself the master of both the Mīmāṁsā systems. He wrote Bhāṭṭa-mata-pradīpikā, of which we have a manuscript (No. 529).

Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara Bindu—The time of Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara Bindu, of whose Cintya-saṅgraha-vāda we have a manuscript (No. 558), is not known. But Hall speaks of a manuscript of this work, dated Saṁvat 1729, so that the author must have lived at least before 1672 A. D.

Gopāla Bhaṭṭa—Mīmāṁsā-vidhi-bhūṣaṇa, of which there are 2 manuscripts in the present Collection (Nos. 522-523) is the work of Gopāla Bhaṭṭa, son of Maṅganātha Bhaṭṭa and grandson of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, described here as *Padavākya-pramāṇajña*. The author says that he wrote this work in reply to the unfair criticisms of Appaya Dīkṣita in his Vidhi-rasāyana on Kumārila's Vārttika, so that it is really a defence of Kumārila against the attacks of Appaya. He adds that as *Rasāyana* without *Bhāvanā* is injurious and produces derangement (*Vikāra*, e. g. *Śvetimā*) in the body, so does Appaya's work, viz., Vidhi-rasāyana, unless it is supplemented by *Bhāvanā* as furnished in the present work. The author was a votary of Nṛsiṁha.

Khaṇḍadeva alias Śrīdharendra--Khaṇḍadeva, son of Rudradeva[325], was another illustrious author of Mīmāṁsā works. His Mīmāṁsā-kaustubha (Nos.220-223), Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā (Nos.232-248) and Bhāṭṭa-rahasya (Nos. 5 .6-528) are standard treatises in Mīmāṁsā literature. Khaṇḍadeva lived at Benares. His time may be ascertained as below :-

(a) He refers to Āpadeva's Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-prakāśa and Anantadeva's Bhāṭṭālaṁkāra. Both Āpadeva and Anantadeva lived in the first half of the 17th century.

(b) His pupil Śambhu Bhaṭṭa wrote his Commentary Prabhāvalī on the Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā in 1707 A.D. Śambhu says that Khaṇḍadeva died at Benares in Saṁvat 1722 or 1665 A.D.

(c) We further have it from Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha's own admission that he read Mīmāṁsā with Deva at Benares. Nāgeśa in his Commentary Guru-marma-prakāśa says plainly that the word Deva is meant here for Khaṇḍadeva. Jagannātha, as is well-known, was a protege of Dara Shikoh and his father Shah Jehan, Khaṇḍadeva thus lived in the middle of the 17th century. We have a Ms. of his Bhāṭṭa-rahasya dated Saṁvat 1732, i.e., 1675 A.D. and copied at Benares.

Śambhu Bhaṭṭa—Khaṇḍadeva's pupil, as already noted, was Śambhu Bhaṭṭa, surnamed Kavimaṇḍana, who devoted his best energies to the interpretation of his master's Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā. His commentary is known as Prabhāvalī, of which we have 10 Mss. (Nos. 417-426).

The work was composed at Benares in Saṁvat 1764 or 1707 A.D. He was also the author of a commentary, called Sārasaṅgraha, on Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa's[396] Kāla-tattva-vivecana (composed in Saṁvat 1677 or 1620 A. D.), in which work his father's name appears as Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa. This Śambhu Bhaṭṭa is apparently identical with Śaṅkarānanda Nātha, disciple of Paramahaṁsa Parivrājaka Rāmānanda Sarasvatī. Śaṅkarānanda was the author of the famous Tāntrika work Sundarīmahodaya[397].

Bhāskara Rāya alias Bhāsurānanda Dīkṣita –From Śambhu Bhaṭṭa we pass on to the great Bhāskara Rāya who commented on the Jaimini Sūtras, Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa, chapters 13-16. Bhāskara intends his work, which he names Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā, to be a continuation of, or rather a supplement to Khaṇḍadeva's work of the same name which extends, as all Mīmāṁsā commentaries do, till the 12th chapter. No commentator, not even Śabara himself, is known to have commented on the body of Sūtras arranged in four chapters (13th to 16th). Of Bhāskara's commentary we have 2 Mss. (Nos. 249-250). In the Catalogus Catalogorum[398] Aufrecht describes Bhāskara's work, apparently on the basis of data available to him at the time, as a commentary on Khaṇḍadeva's Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā, but this is erroneous. He makes the necessary corrections in Vol. III, p. 142. The work is printed in the Pandit.[399]

Bhāskara says that till his time the Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā was without beginning and end (*ādyanta-vihīnā*).[400] The name Dīpikā was, therefore, quite appropriate. He states further that by adding four chapters to it (13-16) he converts it into the 'Candrikā.' The 16 chapters are

as it were the 16 *kalās* of the full work. The Dharma-mīmāṁsā was originally *ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇī*, i.e., in 16 chapters, divided into 4 sections, of which the first three were hitherto known and the fourth disappeared with time. It was like the *Tripadā Gāyatrī*. Bhāskara adds the fourth part and supplements it.

Bhāskara Rāya was the second son of Gambhīra Rāya Bhāratī Dīkṣita and Koṇāmbikā Devī. He was born at Thanuja[401] in the district of Vaijya in the Mahārāṣṭra country. Gambhīra Rāya was himself a person of great erudition and of devotional habits. Bhāskara often describes him as **पदवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारपारीण-धुरीणनिखिल तन्त्रस्वतन्त्र** which, unless it is an exaggeration, is a high distinction. Bhāskara received his secular education at Benares under Nṛsiṁha Yajvan. That he attained high proficiency in all branches of learning and won laurels of renown from all quarters is apparent from a close survey of his varied works and from the history of the contemporary and subsequent literature of the country. He was one of the greatest votaries of the *Śrī Vidyā*, into which he had been initiated by Śivadatta Śukla at Surat, and he wrote several works in connection with this worship and culture. His works as mentioned by his pupil may be enumerated :—

(A) In Mīmāṁsā

(a) Vāda-kutūhala.

(b) Bhāṭṭa-candrodaya.

(B) In Dharma-śāstra

(a) Smṛtitattva.

(b) Paradoṣa-bhāskara.

(c) Tṛcabhāskara.

(d) Ekādaśī-vinirṇaya.

(e) Commentary on Baudhāyana-vidhi.

(f) Kuṇḍa-bhāskara.

(C) In Tantra

(a) Varivasyārahasya.

(b) Ratnāloka—a commentary on Paraśurāma-kalpasūtra.

(c) Setubandha—a commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśi-kārṇava, composed at Saptakoṭīśvara Kṣetra in Goa in Saṁvat 1719 or 1662 A.D.

(d) Saubhāgya-bhāskara—a commentary on the Lalitā-sahasra-nāma, composed at Benares in Saṁvat 17 5 or 1728 A.D.

(e) Nātha-navaratna-mālā-manjūṣā.

(f) Commentary on the Bhāvanopaniṣat.

(g) Commentary on Kaula Upaniṣat.

(h) Commentary on the Tripurā Upaniṣat.

(i) Guptavatī—a commentary on the Durgā-saptaśatī.

(j) Śataślokī.

(k) Mālāmantroddhāra.

(l) Varivasyāprakāśa.

(D) In Metre

(a) Vṛtta-candrodaya.

(b) Chandaḥ-kaustubha.

(E) In Nyāya

(a) Nyāyamaṇḍana.

(F) In Vyākaraṇa

(a) Rasikarāñjinī—a commentary on the Madhya-kaumudī.

(G) In Miscellaneous Literature

(a) Khadyota—a commentary on the Gaṇeśa-sahasra-nāma.

(b) Commentary on Śiva's Aṣṭottara-śata-nāma.

Bhāskara lived in the first quarter of the 18th century.

It is said that once a controvery took place at the Court of King Mallikārjunapati or Mallarāja between Svāmī Śāstrī and Bhāskara Rāya as to the existence of *lakṣaṇā* in *matvartha* in the words *paśu*, *soma* etc., in the *Viśiṣṭavidhi*, viz. **पशुना यजेत, सोमेन यजेत**, etc. The Śāstrī admitted *lakṣaṇā* in such cases, whereas Bhāskara denied it. This controversy is recorded in a work called Vāda-kutūhala. It appears that this Śāstrī was the son of Nṛsiṁha, *Guru* of Bhāskara. Bhāskara had come there after a long time to see his *Guru*, when the Rājā, a patron of letters, out of curiosity set them wrangling.

Rudra Bhaṭṭācārya—No. 535 is a fragmentary Ms. of Adhikaraṇa-candrikā. On comparison with Hall p.184, it appears to be by Rudra Bhaṭṭācārya, son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya.

Vaidyanātha Tatsat--Vaidyanātha, son of Rāma Bhaṭṭa (called also Rāmacandra Sūri), of the Tatsat family, was the author of Prabhā, a commentary on Śāstradīpikā, of which there are 17 Mss. (Nos. 371-387) in this Collection. He describes his father as *Vidvanmānya* and as versed in *Pada*, *Vākya* and *Pramāṇa*, i.e., in Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya.[102] He was a votary of Mahāgaṇapati and was a poet. He also wrote a commentary on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras, called Nyāya-bindu, of which there are 4 Mss. (Nos. 260-263).

The Prabhā is said to have been completed in Saṁvat 1767 (मुनिरसमुनिचन्द्रमितेऽब्दे) or 1710 A.D., so that Vaidyanātha may be assigned to the first quarter of the 18th century.

Vāsudeva Dīkṣita-Vāsudeva, the author of Adhvara-mīmāṁsā-kutūhala-vṛtti, of which we hava 6 Mss. (Nos. 264-269) in the Library, was the son of Mahādeva Vājapeyī and Annapūrṇā, and a pupil of Viśveśvara. He was a retainer in the services of Ānanda Rāya, minister of the Rājās, Sarabhoji and Tokoji Bhonsle and of the Prince of Cola.

He lived after Bhaṭṭoji on whose Siddhānta-kaumudī he commented. His date may be placed about the middle of the 18th century.

Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa--The Bhaṭṭa family of Benares of Viśvāmitra line (hence called Gādhivaṁśa) produced a number of scholars versed in Mīmāṁsā and Dharma-śāstra. The famous Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was one of the most celebrated names of this family. He was the author of a large number of works, mostly in Dharma-śāstra, viz., Prayogaratna, Tristhalīsetu, etc.

In Mīmāṁsā we have a Ms. of his commentary on the Śāstradīpikā (No. 348). This Ms. represents the 8th chapter only of the book; and there is reason to believe that he commented on this chapter alone [403], and this he did at the request of his son Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I, who had been engaged in writing a commentary on this work. It seems that Śaṅkara omitted the 8th chapter altogether, apparently for the reason that it had been done by his father. In the beginning of Śaṅkara's commentary on the 9th chapter it is plainly stated that his interpretation is based on that of his father. Nārāyaṇa is described as **पदवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारधुरीण** and **मीमांसाद्वैतसाम्राज्यधुरन्धर** in Śaṅkara's Mīmāṁsā-bāla-prakāśa and as *Jagadguru* by his grandson Kamalākara. Nārāyaṇa was the son of Rāmeśvara, son of Govinda, son of Ciṅgadeva[404], son of Nāganātha[405]. His birth date being 1513 A. D. (Saṁvat 1570), his literary activities may be assigned to the second and third quarters of the 16th century. Nārāyaṇa's commentary on the Vṛtta-ratnākara is dated 1546 A. D. (Saṁvat 1602). It may be of interest to note that it was this Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa who was responsible for the rebuilding of the temple of Viśveśvara at Benares after it had been demolished by the Mahomaden vandalists.

Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I—Nārāyaṇa, second son of Śaṅkara I, has already been referred to as the writer of a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā, called Dīpa-prakāśa, of which we have 3 Mss. (Nos. 349-351). The present Collection contains two more works from his pen, viz., Mīmāṁsā-sāra-saṅgraha (No. 524) and Mīmāṁsā-bāla-prakāśa (Nos. 490-492).

He was the author of several other works. His Dvaita-nirṇaya, wherein he expounded the views of

southern writers on disputed points on *Dharma*, is well-known. He is said to have written a criticism on the Vidhi-rasāyana of Appaya Dīkṣita, of whom he was a contemporary. His Gādhivaṁśānucarita contains a historical account of the authors of his own family.

Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa lived about the end of the 16th century or beginning of the 17th. Manuscript No. 349, a copy of his Śāstradīpikā-prakāśa, bears marks of correction said to have been done in Saṁvat 1690, i.e., 1633 A. D. This manuscript must have belonged to his pupil, as there is a statement, viz., **श्रीशङ्करभट्टगुरुचरणसरोरुहाभ्यां नमः** on the last leaf.

Dinakara Bhaṭṭa—Dinakara Bhaṭṭa was the nephew of Śaṅkara, being the son of his elder brother Rāmakṛṣṇa. There are 17 Mss. of his commentary on Śāstradīpikā called haṭṭa Dinakarī, in this Collection (Nos. 192-208). He was the author of a series of treatises in Hindu Law, e.g., Ācāra-dinakara, etc. He undertook, at the request of Śivaji, the Chatrapati Rājā of Satara (1627-1680 A. D.), to write a comprehensive work on Law. This was named after his patron Śivadyumaṇi-dīpikā and after the author Dinakaroddyota. This he could not complete till his death. He lived in the 17th century.

Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa alias Dādu Bhaṭṭa—Dinakara's younger brother was Kamalākara, the famous author of Nirṇaya-sindhu, comopsed in 1612 A. D. In Mīmāṁsā we have got here his (a) commentary called Śāstramālā on the Sūtras, (b) commentary on Tantravārttika (No. 471), [his special object here was to criticise Rāṇaka, described as a pedant, plagiarist, verbose,

impostor of simple men and destroyer of Siddhānta], and (c) commentary called Āloka, on the Śāstradīpika (Nos. 352-355).

Ananta Bhaṭṭa calls himself the son of Dādu Bhaṭṭa, from which it appears that Kamalākara was also known by that name. It was this Ananta for whom Kamalākara composed his commentary on the Kāvya-prakāśa. Kamalākara was the author of a large number of works named in his Vivāda-tāṇḍava[406]. He belongs to the first half of the 17th century.

Gāgā alias Viśveśvara Bhaṭṭa—Gāgā, the son of Dinakara, was the author of Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi (Tarka-pāda) (No. 212). Gāgā was a pet name given to him by his father, but his real name was Viśveśvara. He completed his father's incomplete Dinakaroddyota or Śivadyumaṇidīpikā of which Ācāra and Śūdra form parts. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa wrote also Śivārkodaya which is a continuation in verse of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. This book was written at the request of the Maratha chief Śivaji (called Chatrādhīśa Bhosla house) son of Sahu (1627-1680 A. D.), at whose coronation he had officiated, and by whose order he allowed his ascetic life to be interrupted; thus :

यत्तर्कपादं (भट्टपादै) र्बहुनाग्रहेण श्लोकैः कृतं वार्त्तिकमार्य्यवर्य्यैः ।
गागाभिधेनायमपूरि शेषः तस्याज्ञया छत्रपतेः शिवस्य ॥
तस्यानुरोधादिह वादिवर्णाधिक्ये चतुर्थाश्रमभङ्गदोषः । etc.etc.[407]

He was also the author of a work named Kāyastha-dharma-dīpa where he refers to Aurangzeb. This work was undertaken at the bidding of Śivaji's minister, Bālāji Kāyastha.

Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa—Nīlakaṇṭha, famous for his twelve Mayūkhas, was a great Mīmāṁsaka. He won for himself great reputation in Mīmāṁsā, Dharma-śāstra and Vedānta. He was the author of Bhāṭṭārka, a commentary on the Sūtras (Nos. 209-211). Nīlakaṇṭha[T08] was the son of Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I, son of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. The manuscript No. 211 belonged to his son Śaṅkara II, who is called here Jagadguru Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara. It is called Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-saṅgraha, where on the margin of every leaf it is called Bhāṭṭārka. On a leaf there is the entry श्रीरवौ रक्षत्वहर्निशम्. Nīlakaṇṭha patron was Bhagavanta Deva King of Bhareha, of the Śṛṅgavara family, after whose name his twelve Prakāśas are collectively called Bhagavanta-bhāskara.

Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa II–Śaṅkara II was Nīlakaṇṭha's son. He wrote a commentary on the Sūtras, named Bhāṭṭa-bhāskara (and in Dharma-śāstra, Vratārka). Of the former we have 3 manuscripts (Nos. 213-215), of which No 214 belonged to his own private Collection. He salutes the Sun and Rāma in his manuscript.

Ananta Bhaṭṭa–Ananta was the son of Kamalākara and wrote a commentary on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras, called Nyāya-rahasya (Nos. 216-219), and a Vṛtti on the Śāstramālā of Kamalākara (Nos. 427-431). In Dharma-śāstra he was the author of Rāma-kalpadruma dealing with Ācāra, Śrāddha, Prāyaścitta etc.

Kṛṣṇa Yajvan--Like the Arthasaṅgraha and Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-saṅgraha, Mīmāṁsā-pribhāṣā was another popular Mīmāṁsā tract (Nos. 514-515). Its authorship is assigned to Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, about whose date nothing is definitely known.

Laugākṣi Bhāskara– Bhāskara, of the Laugākṣi family, was the author of Arthasaṅgraha (Nos.507-513), an elementary tract for the study of Mīmāṁsā.

Among the *Sannyāsins* we find the names of five authors treating of Mīmāṁsā, viz.: (1) Uttama-śloka Tīrtha, 2) Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, (3) Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, (4) Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī and (5) Govindāmṛta Muni.

Uttama-śloka –Uttama-śloka was the author of Laghu-nyāya-sudhā (Nos. 474-476).

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha –Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, called Paramahaṁsa Parivrājakācārya, was a versatile scholar and wrote works on various subjects.[409] The present Collection contains his Bhāṭṭa-bhāṣā-prakāśikā (No.530), which is an exposition of the *Śāstra* from Kumārila's point of view. He was the pupil of Śivarāma Tīrtha.[410] Elsewhere he refers to his *Gurus* as Vāsudeva Tīrtha and Rāmagovinda Tīrtha.

Nārāyaṇa lived after the middle of the 17th century, the date of Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, on whose Bhāṣā-paricchedа he commented. In the Sanskrit College Library, Benares, there is a manuscript of Muktāvalī-prakāśa by Dinakara, dated Saṁvat 1758 or 1701 A.D. This manuscript is said to have belonged originally to the Private Library of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha himself. Hence Nārāyaṇa must be assigned to the closing years of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th.

Rāghavānanda—Rāghavānanda, also known as Rāghavendra Sarasvatī, was another *Sannyāsin* author

whose works on Mīmāṁsā exist in this Collection. We have here 7 manuscripts of his commentary on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras, called Dīdhiti (Nos. 251-257) and one manuscript of Mīmāṁsā-stavaka. The first is sometimes called Nyāyāvali-dīdhiti[4 11].

Rāghavānanda wrote several other commentaries, viz., (1) Tattvārṇava, on the Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī, (2) on the Manu-saṁhitā, (3) on Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka (called Vidyāmṛta-varṣiṇī) and (4) Pātañjala-rahasya on the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali.

His date is not known. In the Mīmāṁsā-stavaka (fol.66) he refers to one Harināṭha and in the Manuṭīkā to Kullūka Bhaṭṭa. This Harināṭha may be the great Harināṭha Upādhyāya, the author of Smṛtisāra, to whom Śūlapāṇi Vardhamāna, Vācaspati, Rudradhara, Devanāṭha Ṭhakkura, Raghunandana and others refer. Harināṭha's date is about 1350 A. D. Kullūka belongs to to the 15th century. Rāghavānanda may, therefore, be placed in the 16th century.

Brahmānanda—Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, the famous author of a commentary on Madhusūdana's Advaita-siddhi, called Advaita-candrikā and more popularly known as Gauḍa Brahmānandī, was a pupil of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and of Paramānanda Sarasvatī. There are two versions of the Candrikā, which on account of their volume are known as Guru-candrikā and Laghu-candrikā.. He was also the author of Advaita-siddhānta-vidyotana, Vedānta-sūtra-muktāvalī, Siddhānta-bindu-ṭīkā, etc. In the present Collection we have his Mīmāṁsā-candrikā (No. 259), which is a gloss on the Sūtras of Jaimini.

Brahmānanda, like the great Madhusūdana, was probably a native of Bengal and lived at Benares. As a pupil of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha he may be placed in the beginning of the 18th century.

Govindāmṛta Muni—Govindāmṛta *alias* Devendra Sarasvatī wrote a commentary on Śābara-bhāṣya, called Vivaraṇa (No.385). He followed here the interpretation of Kumārila. The name of his *Guru* appears as Nārāyaṇāmṛta Muni.

Vaidyanātha alias Balam Bhaṭṭa Pāyaguṇḍa—Vaidyanātha, popularly known as Bālam Bhaṭṭa Pāyaguṇḍa, was the son of Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and Veṇī. He was the pupil of the famous grammarian Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa of Benares and had for his patroness Śrīmatī Lakṣmī Devī, qeeen of Rājā Candra Simha of Mithilā. His commentary on the Mitākṣarā was named after this queen. The present Collection represents him in two pamphlets only, viz., Pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍana (No. 553) and Piṣṭa-paśu-nirṇaya (No. 550). But he won a high renown among the then Pandits of Benares for his learned commentaries on Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's Śabdakaustubha (Prabhā) and Śabdaratna (Bhāva-prakāśikā) and on Nāgeśa's Paribhāṣenduśekhara (Gadā), Śabdendu-śekhara (Cidasthimālā), Mahābhāṣya-pradīpoddyota (Chāyā), and Laghumañjūṣā (Kalā).

He may be placed in the second quarter of the 18th century.

Rāmeśvara Kavi—He was the author of a gloss on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra (No.271). His parents were Subrahmaṇya and Guru Vāmā. The Vṛtti was composed at Benares (*Avimukta*) in the Śaka Era 1763, क्षमत्वंद्रिक्षमामिते

(=1841 A. D.). He was the pupil (in Mīmāṁsā) of his own father and was the votary of Lalitā. He was a spiritual descendant of the great Bhāskara Rāya, whom he calls his *Parameṣṭhi-guru* in his commentary on Paraśurāma-kalpa-sūtra.

XX. SOME VARIANTS IN THE READINGS OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA SŪTRAS

It is well-known that the text of the philosophical *sūtras*, as we find it to-day, is not generally free from doubtful readings. As regards the Nyāya-sūtras in particular, this was noticed in very early times, and in the age of Vācaspati Miśra I (900 A. D.) they were already in such a state of confusion that he was compelled to revise them personally and give publicity to the result of his revision in the form of a manual, called 'Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha'. There is another work of a similar nature dealing with these *sūtras*, named 'Nyāya-sūtroddhāra,' attributed to Vācaspati Miśra II (1600 A. D.). If all the commentaries and glosses on these *sūtras*, many of which are yet unpublished are carefully studied a good deal of fresh light will fall upon many of the obscure questions involved and will eventually lead to a more correct determination of the *sūtras*.

The *sūtras* of the other systems of course do not seem to have been so much muddled, but, even then it is doubtless that none of them represent, so far as the textual genuineness is concerned, absolute purity of the original form. The study of these *sūtras* is likely to yield interesting results.

Some years ago I came in possession, for a few days only, of an apparently very old manuscript (undated) of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. The manuscript wa

obtained by a friend of mine from a certain Private Collection at Benares.[1 2] On a careful reading of these Sūtras I noticed several differences from the current text : (i) firstly, the readings were in several places different; (ii) secondly, some of the *sūtras* in the current editions were absent; (iii) thirdly, some *sūtras* not found in the current text were found there; and (iv) fourthly, in one case, what appears as a single *sūtra* in the current edition was read there as two different *sūtras*.

With these few preliminary remarks I proceed to note the differences, taking the Gujarati Edition (published in 1913) of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras as standard for purposes of reference :

CHAPTER I

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 16—द्रव्याश्रयो गुणवान् संयोगविभागयोर्न कारणमनपेक्ष इति गुणलक्षणम् ।

,, 17— + + संयोगविभागेषु कारणमनपेक्षमिति ।

,, 19—यथा गुणः ।

,, 20—संयोगविभागवेगानां कर्म ।

,, 21—न द्रव्याणाम् ।

,, 24—गुणवैधर्म्यान्न कर्मणाम् ।

,, 25—(a) द्वित्रप्रभृतयः संख्या ।

,, —(b) पृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागाश्च ।

This *sūtra* (no. 25) is counted in the Ms. as two separate *sūtras*, viz., (a) and (b), as shown above.

Sūtra 30—संयोगविभागवेगाश्च कर्मणाम् ।

The *sūtra*, no. 25, being split up as two *sūtras*, the total number of the *sūtras* in this section comes up to 32, rather than 31, as in the printed text.

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 1 – कारणाभावाच्च, etc.

,, 5– + + + कर्मत्वं च सामान्यं च विशेषश्च ।

,, 9– 'च' is omitted.

After the last *sūtra* in the printed text, i. e., after the 17th *sūtra*, there appears a unique *sūtra* in the Ms., viz., न तु कार्याभावाद् गुणः.

CHAPTER II

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 1– रूपरसगन्धवती पृथिवी ।

,, 6– + + द्रवता + + ।

,, 7–द्रवता ।

,, 9–स्पर्शश्च ।

,, 10–इत्यदृष्टस्पर्शलिङ्गो + + ।

,, 14 -वायोराद्यमूर्छनं नानात्वे लिङ्गम् ।

,, 15–वायुसन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षाभावात् ।
दृष्टं लिङ्गं न विद्यते ।

,, 20–Absent from the manuscript.

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 1 – पुष्पवस्त्रयोः सति सन्निकर्षे गन्धाप्रादुर्भावो वस्त्रे गन्धाभावलिङ्गम् ।

,, 19– + अयथारूपत्वाच्च ।

CHAPTER III

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 7 —अन्य एव + + ।

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 3 + + एकं मनः ।

„ 10—यद् दृष्टं प्रत्यक्षमहं देवदत्तः + + ।

„ 17—'न तु' is omitted from the Ms.

„ 21—शास्त्रसामान्याच्च ।

CHAPTER IV

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 11— + + चाक्षुषाणि प्रत्यक्षाणि ।

„ 13 - + + सर्वेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं + + ।

Before the 7th *sūtra* of this section as arranged in the printed edition, there appears to have been another *sūtra* which has now disappeared. It is quoted by Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārttika[4|1|3] as—"अद्रव्यद्रव्यत्वात् परमाणावनुपलब्धिः." This *sūtra* is quoted by Puṇyarāja in his commentary on the Vākyapadīya,[4|4] along with, and in succession of, what now appears as the 6th *sūtra* of the current text. His reading, however, is—"द्रव्यत्वात् परमाणावनुपलब्धिः".

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 1—तत् + + त्रिविधम् ।

शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञम् ।

„ 4—अणुसंयोगस्त्वप्रतिषिद्धो मिथः पञ्चानाम् ।

पार्थिवं तद्विशेषगुणोपलब्धेः ।

The reading मिथः पञ्चानां is known to Śaṅkara Miśra, but it is absent from the current text. Perhaps the *sūtra* पार्थिवं etc. actually existed in the earlier *Sūtrapāṭha*, for it is referred to in the Upaskāra and appears in this Ms. It seems to have been removed by the editors, as it is found to be identical with the Nyāyā-sūtra 2.1.28.

CHAPTER V

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 9—यत्नविशेषात् + + ।

„ 10— + + पतनविशेषः ।

„ 11— + + बाहुकर्म (?) व्याख्यातम् ।

„ 13--प्रयत्नाभावे + + ।

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 16--तदना + + + मनसि ।

शरीरस्य सुखदुःखाभावः संयोगः ।

कार्यकारणात्मकर्म व्याख्यातम् (?) ।

The last one is an additional *sūtra*, altogether new, but the reading is evidently corrupt

Sūtra 25--गुणेन + + + ।

CHAPTER VI

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 1--+ + वेदः ।

„ 5— + + आत्मान्तरेष्वकारणात् ।

„ 12 – एतेन समविशिष्ट + + + ।

„ 14--This does not appear in the Ms.

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 8 – अयतस्य + + + विद्यते ।

नियमाभावाच्च ।
विद्यते वाऽर्थान्तिरत्वमस्य ।

CHAPTER VII

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 2 – + + + अनित्याः ।
,, 15 – + + गुणैगुँणाः + + ।
, 17 – – + ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वे + +
,, 21 – - च' does not occur.

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 12 – – This *sūtra* is absent from the Ms.
,, 21 – – एकदिक्कालाभ्यां + + ।
,, 22 – कार्यापरत्वात् कारणापरत्वाच्च परत्वापरत्वे ।
,, 23 – परत्वापरत्वाभावः etc. (The first phrase परत्वापरत्वयोः is lacking in the Ms.).
Sūtra 24–25 – – The *sūtras* do not appear in the Ms.

CHAPTER VIII

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 9 – – समवायिनः श्वैत्यात् ।
श्वैत्यबुद्धेश्च श्वेते बुद्धिः ते एते कार्यकारणभूते ।

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 2 – – दृष्टे + + ।
,, 5 – भूयस्त्वात् + + च ।
पृथिवी + + + प्रकृतिः ।

CHAPTER IX

Āhnika (i)

Sūtra 7 – + + **त्वात्** ।

,, 12—The word '**प्रत्यक्षं**' is omitted.

Āhnika (ii)

Sūtra 4—'**करणं**' is omitted.

,, 10—**संस्कारदोषात्**' is omitted.

CHAPTER X

Āhnika (ii)

After the 8th and the 9th *sūtras* occurs : "**अस्मद् बुद्धिभ्यो लिङ्गमृषेः**". This *sūtra* is also quoted by Śrīdhara in the Nyāya-kandalī.[1 1 6]

XXI. A SHORT NOTE ON TATTVASAMĀSA

There appears to be some difference of opinion regarding the total number of *sūtras* comprised in Tattvasamāsa, a Sāṅkhya work attributed to Pañcaśikha. No ancient commentary on the work being available it is not possible to ascertain the extent of the work in the earliest times. In recent years, however, some commentaries were written. But there is no doubt that the work represents a very old text although scholars have not hesitated to throw doubts on this. Mr. T. R. Chintamani, in an interesting note in the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras[416] has drawn attrention to the antiquity of the work by showing that extracts from this work exist in Bhagavadajjukam attributed to one Bodhāyana Kavi belonging to a period earlier than 700 A. D., the age of the Pallava King of Kāñcī, named, Mahendra Vikrama Varmā in whose Mamandur Inscription the work is mentioned. In this work eight *sūtras* of Tattvasamāsa are quoted and placed in the mouth of Śāṇdilya.[417]

In the Adyar Library there is a manuscript of Tattvasamāsa which reads 22 *sūtras* in all. In the Library of the Government Sanskrit College, Benares, there are five manuscripts of this work, to be referred to in this paper as A (fols. 1–21), B (fols 1–11), C (fols.1–4), D (fols. 1–4) and E (fols 1–8). Of these manuscripts A is in Bengali script and the rest are in Nāgarī. In manuscript D, the number of *sūtras* is given as 25.

There are two printed editions of the work published form Calcutta (Sam. 1929) and Benares.[418]

A list of the *sūtras*,[419] prepared from a comparison of the various recensions, is shown below :–

1. अष्टौ प्रकृतयः	A–E (1); Ad (1); BE (2) CE (2)[420].
2. षोडश विकाराः	A–E (2); Ad (2); षोडशकस्तु विकारः CE, (3); BE (3 .
3. आत्मा	A, C-E (पुरुषः) (3); B पुरुषश्च (3); Ad पुरुषः (3); पुरुषः (BE, CE, 3).
4. त्रैगुण्यम	A-E (4); Ad (4); BE, CE (5).
5. संचरः	AD (5); D-E, (5)[421].
6. प्रतिसंचारः	D&E (6) read प्रतिसंचरः[421] .
7. अध्यात्मम्	Ad. (6).[422]
8. अधिभूतम्	Ad (7).[422]
9. अधिदैवम्	Ad. (8).[422]
10. पञ्चाभिबुद्धयः	A, B&C (7); D,E. (8); CE (8); Ad. (9) reads पञ्च वह्नयः .
11. पञ्चकर्मयोनयः	A, B, C (8); D, E (9); CE (9); Ad. (10).
12. पञ्च वायवः	A-C (9); D, E (10); BE (10); CE (10); Ad. (11).
13. पञ्च कर्मात्मानः	A-C (10); D, E (11); CE (11); Ad. (12).
14. पञ्च पर्वाऽविद्या	A-C (11); D E (12); CE (12); Ad. (13).

15 अष्टाविंशतिधाऽशक्तिः CE (13); B, C (12); D (13); A (12) & E (13) read °विंशतिरशक्तिः; Ad (14) reads अष्टचत्वारिंशधा शक्तिः.

16. नवधा तुष्टिः A,B,C,E (13); CE (14); Ad. 15); D (14) reads °तुष्टः.

17. अष्टधा शक्तिः Ad. (16); E (15 ; °सिद्धिः A B,C (14); D,E (15).

18. दश मूलिकार्थाः Ad. (17); CE (16); A (15 ; E (16 ; B (15) reads दश मूलिका अर्थाः; C (15) दश फलिकार्थाः; E (16).

19. अनुग्रहः सर्गः CE (17); C (16); D E (17); A (16); B (16) and Ad. (18) read अनुग्रहसर्गः .

20. चतुर्दशविधो भूतसर्गः Ad. (19); A,B,C(17); CE (18); E (18); D (18); reads °विधाभूत°.

21. त्रिविधो धातुसर्गः B (18).

22. त्रिविधो बन्धः Ad. (20); CE (19); A,C (18 ; B (19); D,E (19).

23. त्रिविधो मोक्षः Ad. (21); CE (20); A,C (19); B (20); D,E (20).

24. त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् Ad. (22); CE (21); A,C (20); B (21); D, E (21).

25. त्रिविधं दुःखम् A,C (21); B (22); D,E (22).

The above is followed by the statement = एतत् परं याथातथ्यं, एतत् सम्यक् ज्ञात्वा कृतकृत्यः स्यात् न पुनस्त्रिविधेन दुःखेनाभिभूयते (A and B). C reads °यातातथ्यादेतत्°. D and E read एतत्परं यातातथ्यं as one *sūtra* (No. 23) and एतत् सर्वं ज्ञात्वा कृतकृत्यः स्यात् as another (No. 24). C E read the whole as one *sūtra* (No. 22), thus : एतत् सम्यग् ज्ञात्वा कृतकृत्यः स्यात् न पुनः त्रिविधेन दुःखेनानुभूयते ।

XXII DESCRIPTIVE NOTES ON SANSKRIT MANUSCRIPTS

The history of Indian Literature and Culture does not seem to have yet been taken up for study in the manner which the nature of the subject demands. The efforts of Max Müller, Weber, Macdonell Keith, Winternitz and others have done much indeed to systematise the researches into the history of the Sanskrit Literature, especially in regard to chronology and bibliography as a whole; and a host of writers have done, and been still doing, a good deal of valuable spade-work in various fields connected with Sanskrit Studies. Descriptive Catalogues of Manuscripts hitherto published, are of great use, not only for bibliogrophical studies, but also for literary chronology, which is often a vexed subject. But with all these data—and they are by no means insignificant—it is not possible to attempt to build up the cultural history of the country, unless and until they are reinforced by the data available on a close and systemative study of the contents of the important unpublished manuscripts, lying in deposit in the various libraries of India and outside. It is indeed true that even all the published Sanskrit works have not yet been ransacked and subjected to a thoroughly critical examination, so far as their contents are concerned. But such a work may be left to scholars, who will be able to accomplish it, each in his own sphere of study, sooner are later. As for the Mss, however, the need of such an examination is imminent and even imperative, for the following reasons :

(a) Mss. deposited in libraries are not within easy reach of all scholars interested in the subjects concerned.

(b) Some of them being fragmentary and unique may never be published at all.

(c) Even those which are complete are not likely to be published in entirety and at an early date.

(d) Single leaves are sometimes found to contain valuable information which, unless it is noted, is never likely to be available for study.

(e) Mss., old and decaying, are in fear of being soon destroyed. It is desirable to have a record of the contents, specially on the important points dealt with, of intersting Mss. which for some reason or other have a value of their own. A critical and comparative study of these notes can easily be attempted subsequently, when a large amount of such matter will have been collected.

I think a work of this nature has long been a desideratum, and I believe that every library of Sanskrit manuscripts ought to come forward, ready for co-operation in this cyclopaedic work, and try to contribute its own quota to the end. This must be done, if a systematic study of Sanskrit literature and the culture reflected therein has ever to be undertaken.

Under the name of "Descriptive Notes" I propose to bring out the results of my studies of manuscripts, with special reference to their contents. These notes keep in view the requirements of cultural and historical study. The names of the Mss. from which notes have been taken have not been arranged in any order—such arrangement is evidently impossible at the beginning.

But it is proposed to append at the end of notes on a certain number of Mss. a classified list of the works noticed. The Mss. belong mostly to the Government Sanskrit Library, but there are some of private owners also. In every case this has been clearly indicated.

No. 1.

ŚRĪ-KṚṢṆA-YĀMALA-MAHĀTANTRA

Fols. 3-13. *Script –Devanāgarī.*

Interlocution between Brāhmaṇa and Brāhmaṇī. A fragment only. Ms. old, the script rather peculiar. (Plate)

The Codex begins with an interesting tale of the various *Avatāras* : viz., (a) Pṛśnigarbha, (b) Ṛṣabha, (c) Pṛthu, (d) Nara-Nārāyaṇa, (e) Dhanvantari, (f) Hayagrīva, (g) Datta, son of Atri and Anasūyā, (h) Kapil, (i) Paraśurāma, son of Reṇukā, (j) Rāma and his brothers, (k) Vyāsa and (l) Kṛṣṇa who descends in every *Manvantara* in 22nd Dvāpara Yuga, with His own Śaktis, and Gopas etc., who are the products of His own Body.

Vṛndāvana is said to be of two kinds – (i) earthly (*bhauma*) and (ii) transcendent (*divya*) ; of which the former again is two-fold one in Mathurā and the other in Puruṣottama (Puri).


यत्र वै भगवान् कृष्णस्तत्र वृन्दावनं वनम् ।
तत्रैव राधिका नित्या भद्रा देवी च तत्र वै ।
तत्र वै बलरामस्तु गोपा गोप्यो गवां गणः ॥

Names of Viṣṇu's *Avatāras* and their various functions for redemption of the world are then stated.

It is here added in passing that the Way of Knowledge was for the first time preached by the four Sanas[1,2,3] and the Way of Devotion by Nārada.

The Divya Vṛndāvana is above *Liṅga* and *Yoni*—*Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*; it is here that the Supreme Being abides in the undiminished splendours of His Existence, Self-awareness and Delight. He is transcendent and formless (*nirākāra*), while at the same time invested with infinity of forms (*sākāra*)—the Quintessence of Joy, the Lord of the Universe. His Śakti is Rādhikā the Soul of Delight (*Paramānanda-rūpiṇi*). From Her come forth and in Her continue the Universe and the innumerable Souls (*Koṭināryaḥ*)[1,2,4] inhabiting it. With them Śrīkṛṣṇa is reported to be playing always and in myriads of ways. He is the limitless Ocean of joy (*Rasāmbudhi*) and His plays with His Śaktis, also limitless, give rise in phenomena to the varieties of what we have come to term Aesthetic Joy (*Rasa*).

The position of Nitya Vṛndāvana, according to this school, may be understood from a glance at the following rough sketch :



It is related that once Brahmā, with a host of other gods, conceived the idea of making a pilgrimage to this Vṛndāvana. They took for their guide a Person, named Mahāhari,, an emanation from the mouth of Mahāviṣṇu and started on their journey. This Person is represented as blue, eight-armed, yellow-robed, lotus-eyed and wearing a garland of wild flowers. They went first to the Plane of Durgā or Tripurā Sundarī, whose Form is described as that of a bright and youthful goddess, with there eyes and four arms bearing the fivefold arrow, a bow, a noose and a hook and decked with red ornaments. She appears here as the Type of Supreme Beauty. She blessed them all.

Thereupon the gods proceeded up to the Plane of Śiva where they beheld a Luminous *Liṅga* in touch with the *Mahāyoni* or *Yogapīṭha*. It pervaded the Universe and yet transcended its utmost bournes. It was Sadāśiva. The gods recognised Him and sang hymns in His praise, on which God issued forth from the *Liṅga* in form half-male and half-female, called Ardhanārīśvara. He described Himself to be the *Liṅga* or *Tejas* of Śrī-Kṛṣṇa and Durgā as Rādhikā Herself. It was through the effect of Māyā alone that she was of the form of *Yoni*.[425] This Plane is the utmost limit of the *guṇas*. Beyond is the Ineffable, Unsullied, the Immutable, the Silent. Here Time and Space, as *limiting conditions*[426], are annihilated, and do not find any place :

नात्र दिक्कालनियमौ न चैवास्ति गमागमः ।

Śiva blessed them all. But the gods were disheartened and were about to retire, in view of the immensity, unmeasureability and inaccessibility of the Light Beyond.

Śiva took pity on the depressed gods, and at that time from His five mouths issued forth the great *Mantra*, called the *Pañcapadīvidā*, viz., क्लीं कृष्णाय गोविन्दाय गोपीजन-वल्लभाय स्वाहा, which the gods received and the Initiation took place.

The next step was the river Virajā. It is described as luminous (*Jyotirmayī*), shoreless and endowed with innumerable qualities. While on its bank they heard coming from Beyond a sweet strain, as of flutes (*veṇu*), lutes (*vīṇā*) and *mṛdaṅgas* and the sounds of Kṛṣṇa, names (Govinda, etc.) chanted. The gods were over-joyed and began to meditate fervently (*Japa*) on the great *Mantra* which they had received. Opening their eyes they beheld lying before them a vast City of Light, bright but mellow, and brilliantly decked. In the river they saw, around them, the reflection of a forest of *Kadambas*. In this was a *Kalpa* Tree, with branches of ewels, leaves of emerald, trunk of gold, fruits of rubies, roots studded with gems, and shadowy. Under this tree they beheld to their infinite delight and amazement, sitting, a Beautiful Boy, with the crown of peacock's tail on His head, wild garlands round His neck wearing robes like lightning-flashes and various ornaments and shining with the bluish tint of a newly risen cloud on the horizon. He was playing on the flute and was of a Form whose beauty surpassed in an infinite degree the love-liness and charm of the God of Love. On his lap was a Girl, lightning-like and adorned.

The *devas* were so much taken with this glorious vision of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa that they at once set themselves to swim across, when Mahāhari stopped them, saying :—

"अवगाहनाद् भवेदस्याः पुमान् स्त्री महिला पुमान् ।
ऊर्द्ध्वं गच्छन्ति ये चास्याः ते वै ज्योतिर्मयाः परे ॥
निरञ्जने निराधारे निर्मले चापुनर्भवाः ।
शुद्धे सूक्ष्मे निमज्जन्ति कृष्णे ज्योतिर्मयेऽजरे ॥"

The river was embanked. The city was decorated all round with jewelled-staffs (*Ratna-dhvaja*) and flags. The gods moved on towards it, when lo !

आत्मानमेकमभितो नानाकारमितस्ततः ।
पश्यन्ति परमाश्चर्यं ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः ॥

The rare and marvellous vision of One Self playing in myriads of forms was vouchsafed to them.

A picturesque description of this Realm is then given. It is narrated that gods, before actually entering into the precincts of this city, were asked by the gate-keeper, who was himself in every respect of the same form as Kṛṣṇa, to state from which *Brahmāṇḍa* they came and for what purpose and also to establish the identity of each.[‡27]

No. 2

VIPRĀNANDA-TARAṄGIṆI

by

KĀŚĪNĀTHA

Fols. 1—3. Script—Nāgarī.

The work begins—

या विद्येत्यभिधीयते श्रुतिपथे शक्तिः सदाद्या परा
सर्वज्ञा भवबन्धभित्तिनिपुणा सर्वाशये संस्थिता ।
दुर्ज्ञेया सुदुरात्मभिश्च मुनिभिर्ध्यानास्पदं प्रापिता
प्रत्यक्षा भवतोह सा भगवती बुद्धिप्रदा मेऽस्तु वै ॥ १ ॥

नत्वा श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तिचरणाम्भोरुहद्वयम् ।
काशीनाथः प्रतनुते विप्रानन्दतरङ्गिणीम् ॥ २ ॥

The author says that is declared in the Kalpa-sūtras, attributed to Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa, that the *upāsanā* of Gāyatrī alone is sufficient for the Brāhmaṇas to secure *Mokṣa*—**परब्रह्मपरमकारुणिकेन भगवता नारायणेन कल्पसूत्रे विप्राणां गायत्र्युपासनामात्रेणैव मुक्तिरिति प्रतिपादितम्.**[428] In support of this several quotations are given, some without reference to to the source and some from the Āditya-purāṇa, Viṣṇu-yāmala, Atharva-veda, Devyātharva Śiras, Gāyatrī-hṛdaya, Gāyatrī-stava-rāja. Gāyatrī-rahasya and Vāsiṣṭha.

The Gayātrī-hṛdaya presents this scheme of Emanation : *Praṇava* (the mystic syllable 'Om')—Vyāhṛti—Gāyatrī—Sāvitrī—Sarasvatī—Vedas—Brahmā—the Lokas. It is stated that all the Vedas with their *aṅgas*, all the Upaniṣads, all the *Itihāsas* have emanated from the Gāyatrī. In the Gāyatrī-rahsya prominence is given to Śakti, as usually in the Tāntrika works, and the Śakti is described as two-fold, viz., *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa*, the former worshipped by men of the world (*Rāgiṇaḥ*) and the latter by the recluse (*Virāgiṇaḥ*).

The quotations from the "Atharva-veda" (?) consist of Anuṣṭup verses, Paurāṇic or Tāntrika in character, in which the order of Emanation is given as below :

Citśakti—Prakṛti (=the Reflectcd Image of *Citśakti*, (*Pratibimba-svarūpiṇī*)—*Mahat—Ahaṅkāra—Ākāśa—Vāyu—Agni—Jala — Prithvī—Oṣadhi — Anna—Retas*. In this way the entire universe is ultimately traced to *Śakti-bimba* or Nature.

No. 3

VĀMĀCĀRA-MATA-KHAṆḌANAM

by

KĀŚĪNĀTHA

Fols. 1—10. Script—Nāgarī.

The author calls himself Kāśīnātha Bhaṭṭa Bhaḍa, son of Śiva Bhaṭṭa *alias* Jayarāma Bhaṭṭa, son of Śivarāma Bhaṭṭa. His mother's name appers as Vārāṇasī in the colophons of his works—(a) Gāyatrī-puraścaraṇa-candrikā and (b) Caṇḍikārcana-dīpikā, of which extracts are given in Peterson's Ulwar Catalogue.[429] In the Introductory verse (No.1) of (a) his teacher is named Ananta. His other known works are—

(c) Yantra-candrikā[430].

(d) Śiva-pūjā-taraṅgiṇī[431].

(e) Viprānanda-taraṅgiṇī, described in No. 3, *passim*, is probably his work. In (c) the author is described as *Dakṣiṇācāra-mata-pravartaka*.

The author is very anxious to prove that the views of the *Vāmācārins* are unfounded. It is said that in the 64 Tantras and 8 Yāmalas the teacher Dakṣiṇāmūrti precribed all rites for the first three castes according to *Dakṣiṇa-mārga* and for the Śūdras according to *Vāma-mārga*. The Merutantra says plainly that *Vāmācāra* is not intended for the three higher castes and again that of the three kinds of *Upāsanā*, mental *Pūjā* and *Japa* are *sāttvika*, *Dakṣiṇa* and Image worship are *rājasika* and offerings to '*Bhagā*' etc., are *tāmasika*. The Samayācāra Tantra divides *Ācāra* into two classes and explains *Vāmācāra* as connected with the five *mudrās*, etc., and *Dakṣiṇā-*

cāra as devoid of the same. In the Uttara-kaulārṇava there is a description of *Vāmācāra*, saying that in this form wine, meat and similar other things are its accessories and that *really* obscene acts have to be indulged in (*Pratyakṣa-yonyāṃ*). The triangle (*Trikoṇa*) is a symbol of the female organ. The Digambaras, Kṣapaṇakas, etc., are votaries of this form of worship, which is declared to be non-Vedic. There are certain minor differences, however between the methods of worship of the Kaulas and those of the Digambaras[432].

XXIII. NOTES AND QUERIES

[1] VIRGIN WORSHIP

The Mahākāla-saṁhitā says that the best way of propitiating Śiva is to worship a virgin (*Kumārī*) and to feed her. The Kaulas are to worship her in the night and the Smārtas in afternoon. The virgin should be well-bathed, well-draped in a piece of multi-coloured cloth and well-decorated. She must be one whose heart has not yet been even touched with passion and who has not fallen into love. She must be of 7, 8 or 9 years of age, of fair complexion, of noble birth, and with her parents living. She must not be deformed in body, long-haired, with protruding teeth, or betrothed to anybody (*vāgadattā*).

In the Yāmala a virgin is said to be of 3 kinds, viz., *parā*, *aparā* and *parāparā*. The Virgin was the Sole Existence before the Creation of the Universe and is, therefore, known by the name of *Ādyā-śakti* or Primal Energy (*Ādyā*).

Names of the virgin from the 1st to the 16th year are as given below--Sandhyā, Sarasvatī, Tridhāmūrti, Kālikā, Subhagā, Umā, Mālinī, Kubjikā, Kāla-saṁgharṣā, Aparājitā, Rudrāṇī, Bhairavī, Mahālakṣmī, Kulanāyikā, Kṣetrajñā and Caṇḍikā.

As for the mode of her worship the Mahākāla-saṁhitā says that the virgin is to be conducted respectfully with music and entertainments to the door of the

hall of worship. The number of virgins to be worshipped must be an odd number, either 5 or 7 or 9 or even 11. Of these the fairest one is to be considered as the Primary (*Mukhyā*) One, but if many maidens are not available one will do. In Kāmya and Naimittika *pūjās* only one is needed, while in the autumnal worship a large number is a necessity. They are to be kept standing in a row, with their eyes cast down. The worshipper is to regard the *Mukhyā* as identical with the Goddess herself, take up a cup of wine, and go through the process of *prāṇāyāma*, *bhūtāpasāraṇa* (expulsion of evil spirits), obeisance to *Guru* and Gaṇeśa, and *Dig-bandhana*. He is then to wash her feet, place the water on his head and rub her feet with the corner of his own wearing garment. With unbroken rice (*akṣata*) he should then perform the ceremony for removing the obstacles (*vighnotsāraṇa*). The ceremonies for expelling the evil influences (*bhūtāpasāraṇa* and *vighnotsāraṇa*) have to be performed once again, the reason being that many minor gods and goddesses enter the hall of worship together with the Virgin Goddess to see her; and very often they create disturbances. The worshipper has to take with his left hand the right hand of the maiden, step forth with his right foot planted first on the ground and lead the line of the maidens on into the hall, uttering 5 verses in her praise : **त्वमम्ब जगतामाद्ये जगदाधार-रूपिणि** etc.

The worship of the *Mukhyā* is enough to please the rest. This is followed by an act of offering to the minor gods. Then follows *Kumārī-nyāsa*. The names of the 18 maidens and their respective seats in the body : Mahā-candra Yogeśvarī, Siddhikarālī, Siddhivikarālī, Mahāntā-mārī (??), Vajrakapālinī, Muṇḍamālinī, Aṭṭahāsinī,

Caṇḍakapālinī, Kāla-cakreśvarī, Guhykālī, Kātyāyanī, Kāmākhyā, Cāmuṇḍā, Siddhilakṣmī, Kubjikā, Mātaṅgī, Caṇḍeśvarī and Kaumārī. Their respective seats : head (*śiraḥ*), face (*mukha*) eyes, ears, nostrils, cheeks, lines of teeth, shoulders, heart, arms, belly (*jaṭhara*) back, thighs, knees, hips (*jaṅghā*), legs and the entire frame.

The worship of 9 goddesses—viz., Śuddhā, Kālikā, Lalitā, Mālinī, Vasundharā, Sarasvatī, Ramā, Gaurī and Durgā—and of two gods—viz., Baṭuka, a boy of 5 years, and Gaṇeśa, of 9 years—is enjoined. So also of 8 Bhairavas—viz., Asitāṅga Bhairava, Ruru°, Caṇḍa°, Krodha°, Unmatta°, Kapāli°, Bhīṣaṇa° and Saṁhāra° and of 8 Devīs – viz., Mahāmāyā, Kālarātrī, Sarvamaṅgalā, Damarukā, Rājarājeśvarī, Sampatpradā, Bhagavatī and Kumārī. The 6 Śaktis, attendant on the Devīs, are named : °Anaṅga-kusumā, °Manmathā, °Madanā, °Kusumāturā, °Madanāturā and °Śiśirā.

The worship of the *Mukhyā* being over, the remaining maidens should next be attended to. They should be allowed to eat of the food offered up to them in silence. No sound of any instrument should be made to disturb them at their meals. The worshipper with folded hands should sing in their praise a hymn called Kumārī-stotra (16 verses in *anuṣṭup* metre, from the Mahākāla-saṁhitā). After they have taken their food they should be served with betels in due form. This is followed by the offering of *dakṣiṇā*, and finally the ceremony of *Visarjana*.

The leavings of their dishes should be given to jackals or buried in the earth.

The worship of the Virgin is recommended during the *Navarātra* festival for 9 days in succession. The names of 9 Durgās to be worshipped on the 9 days are :

Hṛllekhā, Gaganā, Raktā, Mahocchuṣmā, Karālikā, Icchā, Jñānā, Kriyā and Durgā. Last of all we find the following remarkable expression :—

"यदि सा क्षोभमायाति स्वयमेव विलासिनी ।
तया सह नयेद् रात्रिं वासरं वा निशीतधीः ॥
कुमारिं न स्पृशेदेव भावयुक्तेन चेतसा ।
अन्यथा मृत्युमायाति नो चेद् देवी पराङ्मुखी" ॥

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[2] THE AUTHOR OF PRAPAÑCASĀRA : A QUERY

'Prapañcasāra' is the name of a Tāntrika work attributed to Śaṅkarācārya. But there appears to be a good deal of difference of opinion as to the identity of its author.

Mr. Jahnavicharan Bhaumik in his recently published work on the "History of Sanskrit Literature" (in Bengali),[488] makes Govinda *alias* Śaṅkara Svāmī, the grandson of Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana, the author of this Tantra. This is evidently impossible, for Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana belonged to the latter part of the 18th century and his grandson might be assigned to the beginning of the 19th. It is simply needless to adduce any evidence in support af the priority of the Prapañcasāra to this period. The work is also associated by some with the name of Śaṅkara of Kāmarūpa. This too is far from plausible, in view of the fact that the Assamese reformer is not known to have any connection with the Śākta cult which the work represented and that

it is already referred to as an authoritative work as early as the 14th century, viz., in the Parāśara-Mādhava of Mādhavācārya.

This leaves no doubt that the work was older than the 14th century, and that even in that early age it was considered as of great authority. Mādhavācārya ascribes the book to *Ācāryāḥ*, by which term he means of course the great Śaṅkarācārya.

Now the question is – can Śaṅkara the great be supposed to have been the author of this Tāntrika work? Tradition credits Śaṅkara and his *Paramaguru* Gauḍapāda with the authorship of several Tāntrika works of the Tripurā sect, and many of Śaṅkara's successors in the line are similarly credited. The story of Śaṅkara, as given in the Śrīvidyārṇava and in the Sammohana Tantra, would seem to lend support to the view that Śaṅkara, the great Vedāntic scholar, was also a Tāntrika writer.

But even then the question remains – can Śaṅkara be supposed to have been the author of this Tāntrika work? Can the linguistic evidence on the peculiarity of style of the Prapañcasāra be considered as favourable to the view which attributes the work to his pen?

XXIV. NYĀYA-KUSUMĀÑJALI

(English Trasnlation)

Perfatory Note

The following pages embody an English translation, to be continued and published serially, of Udayana Ācārya's famous theistic treatise, viz., Nyāya-kusumāñjali. The work consits of a certain number of memorial verses distributed in five chapters, and of a prose commentary on the same by the author himself. The metrical portion of the work has been enjoying immense popularity for the last three or four hundred years and in the community of teachers and pupils the name Kusumāñjali is generally understood as standing for this portion alone. With a few exceptions all the commentaries available deal exclusively with the verses and leave the prose portion wholly untouched. The whole book, however, including Udayana's original commentary in prose is known by the name of Kusumāñjali Prakaraṇa, and has been commented upon by Varadarāja, Vardhamāna and Guṇānanda and partly by Śaṅkara Miśra.

It is a strange fact that while so many philosophical works in Sanskrit have been traslated into English, not a single work by Udayana has yet been taken in hand. And yet Udayana, according to the unanimous verdict of all ancient and modern scholars, was one of the deepest, most learned, abstruse and authoritative of Indian Philosophers. His position in the history of Indian Philosophy is as a specialist (in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika)

certainly higher than that of Vācaspati Miśra. His Ātmatattvaviveka, Nyāya-kusumāñjali, Kiraṇāvalī and to some extent his Nyayā-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi bear upon them the stamp of his bright genius and deserve to be more widely known than they have hitherto been done. Long ago, as far back as in 1854, Cowell published an English translation of the Kusumāñjali, but it was only of the metrical portion of the work accompanied by Haridāsa's popular gloss on it. The translation herewith offered for the first time, is however of the entire work, including Udayana's own scholium.

Besides translating the text, we have deemed it proper to add an elaborate annotation (with foot-notes) of the nature of a historical, and critical exegesis, intended to clear up obscurities in the text and generally to throw such light upon it as to make it easily intelligible to a modern mind. The technicalities of scholastic philosophy, together with the stiffness and concentrated charater of Udayana's style, render an interpretative annotation absolutely necessary. Without such annotation the translation is likely to leave the original text obscure and vague; and it is inevitable, because the complex associations and the delicate shades of meaning, which every technical Sanskrit word, especially of philosophy, has come to assume in the course of centuries, can hardly find an appropriate expression in a merely literal rendering into a foreign language

Among the commentaries on the text used in preparing the translation, annotation and notes may be mentioned the names of those of Varadarāja, Vardhamāna, Śaṅkara Miśra, Guṇānanda, Haridāsa, Rāmabhadra, Jayarāma, Raghudeva, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and

Trilocana. The sub-commentaries of Rucidatta and Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura have also been occassionally utilised.

We propose to deal at great length, in the Introduction which will follow the completion of the translation, with the contents of the work in comparison with the Theistic Problem discussed in the different systems of Indian Philosophy and with the history of Udayana Ācārya and his successors in the field. An exhaustive bibliography of Indian Theism will also appear as an appendix to the translation.[434]

G. N. Kavirāj

NYĀYA-KUSUMĀÑJALI

FIRST CLUSTER

I. May this handful of flowers of Nyāya, free from any fault, laid at the feet of God, delight my mind bee-like roving about them—this handful of flowers having the petals blooming under favourable conditions, and affording delight by its fragrance to those whose olfactory organ is not affected by phlegm, etc.—one which is not disfigured even when rubbed with the hand ; and which is the source of honey as sweet as nectar.[1]

II. He whose worship the sages *(manīṣiṇaḥ)* **declare to be the means of Heaven and Liberation—that Supreme Self** *(Paramātmā)* **is here ascertained.**

Annotation

It has been declared, though in a implied manner, in the benedictory verse that Nyāya (lit. reasoning), i. e., worship of God, leads to *mokṣa*. To this it may be objected :

(i) So long as the Karmans remain there is no escape from re-birth : thus the Karmans, unless experienced, cannot be exhausted, but, experience of them would produce fresh Karmans, so that there is no possibility of *mokṣa* or destruction of all the *guṇas* of the self. (ii) And, there is no evidence to show that the study (*vyutpādana*) of the theistic proofs is a means to *mokṣa*. Such a study, therefore, which the author proposes to undertake, is absolutely fruitless. (iii) If, however, it could be shown that the

contemplation of God (*Īśvaramanana*) is the cause of *mokṣa* the study of the theistic proofs might find some justification. But there is really no evidence in favour of such causality. The Śruti "आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः", etc., means by the term *Ātmā* the individual self, and not God, because the context would not allow it. In the context we have "आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति", etc., which cannot be twisted to yield the sense of God, since *priyatva*, etc., cannot be ascribed to Him. Again, the root of this worldly life of bondage (*saṁsāra*) is the ignorance of one's own self (*svātmagocaraṁ mithyājñānaṁ*) rather than that of *Jīvātmā* as such (*Jīvātma-mātra*) or of *Īśvara*.

To the above it may be replied that the infinity of Karmans need not be an obstacle in the way of realisation of *mokṣa*. It is the inherent potency of Truth that error, however long standing, vanishes before its light, even as the darkness of centuries melts away in a moment in the presence of Light. And on the dawn of this Light of Knowledge the possibility of fresh Karmans is gone, and there remains nothing to obscure the purity of this Light. The sacred scriptures too are positive in asserting this fact. The second and third objections have been answered by Udayana in the present couplet. He states in plain terms that both heaven and liberation[436] result from the worship of God (*upāsanā*), which consists in His contemplation (*manana*). The discussion (*vyutpādana*) of proofs in support of His existence being a part (*aṅga*) of such contemplation is useful. And the contemplation of God, as the cause of *mokṣa*, is verily enjoined in the Śruti, viz., "तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति", etc., according to which the knowledge of God is the cause of *mokṣa*, just like the knowledge of one's own self. What the Vedic text "द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये" really insists upon is Knowledge only. The contribution of the contemplation of God to *mokṣa* is not through eradication of Nescience, but indirectly as leading to the attainment of the self-realisation of the individual Self. It is said : "स हि तत्त्वतो ज्ञातः स्वात्मसाक्षात्कारस्योपकरोति". The causal relation between such contemplation and *mokṣa* may be explained differently also. The declaration of the Śruti establishes the causal relation between contemplation and *mokṣa*, but, in order to make this possible it is necessary to assume *adṛṣṭa*

as the modus operandi. In other words, the contemplation of God generates an *adṛṣṭa* which conduces to *mokṣa*.

Varadarāja holds that the knowledge of the individual Self as such (*Jīvātmā*) is unable to produce *mokṣa*. The Supreme Self or God must be realised, and the Grace of God thus realised acts as an auxiliary to the knowledge of the individual Self. The Grace thus working, the knowledge of the individul Self is competent to give rise to *apavarga* : "साक्षात्कृतपरमेश्वरप्रसादसहकृतमेव हि जीवात्मज्ञानमपवर्गमातनोति". The Śrutis "द्वेब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये", "द्वा सुपर्णा", etc., are explained having this sense.

The question how a single *upāsanā* produces two different results is easily answered. Varadarāja says that difference in effect is due to difference in causal assemblage, which in the present case is occasioned by the auxiliary, viz., the desire of the worshipper.

Although with regard to that Being whom all men worship, whichever of the (four) Aims of Man they may strive after, viz., the Being whom the followers of the Upaniṣads worship as One by nature pure and enlightened, the followers of Kapila as the perfected First-Knower, the followers of Patañjali as the Being who is untouched by afflictions (*Kleśas*), actions, fruits and deserts, and who by assuming a 'phantasmal body' revealed the Veda and imparts (Saving) Grace, the followers of Mahāpaśupati as the absolutely Independent One, who is undefiled by actions opposed to those enjoined in the Vedas and sanctioned by popular usage, the Śaivas as Śiva, the Vaiṣṇavas as Puruṣottama, the Paurāṇikas as the Supreme Father (lit. the Father of father), the Sacrificialists as Soul of the sacrifice, the Saugatas (i. e., the Bauddhas) as the Omniscient, the Digambaras as the Uncovered, the Mīmāṁasakas as That


which is enjoined (by the Vedas) as the object of worship, the Naiyāyikas as the Being who is endowed with all the attributes (among those mentioned above) which befit Him, the Cārvākas as One whose authority is established by the convention of the world, what more—whom even the artisans worship as Viśvakarman, the Great Architect—now, although with regard to such a Being, the Lord Śiva, whose power is universally recognised, like caste, family (*gotra*)[437], *pravara*[438], school (of Veda), family-duties, etc., there can hardly be any ground for doubt and consequently any need for investigation, still,

III. This logical dissertation of God, which may be called His contemplation, constitutes verily His worship, in as much as it follows the hearing of the Śruti.

The Lord has indeed been heard of frequently in the Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa and Purāṇa, and requires to be contemplated now ; for the Śruti declares : "He is to be heard, He is (then) to be contemplated", and the Smṛti has : "One attains to the highest Yoga by invoking Knowledge in a threefold manner, viz., through the revealed scriptures, through inference (based upon them) and through the joy of continued meditation".

Annotation

The *Puruṣārthas*, the 'Ends of man', are usually counted as four in number, called by the collective name of *Caturvarga*—the fourfold group. These are (*1*) *Dharma*, (*2*) *Artha*, (*3*) *Kāma* and (*4*) *Mokṣa*. On analysis of human aspirations it would appear that what men really strive after is nothing but Pleasure (or absence of Pain). It may be thus classified :—



This, however, is the usual conception. But the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhya-yogins do not consider pleasure as the highest end of man. Pleasure as an inferior end is not denied, so that in regard to *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma* there does not exist any difference of opinion.

Now this leaves aside the view of the Bhāgavatas who consider Divine Love as the Highest *Puruṣārtha* and call it the fifth End of Man. This Divine Love, much like *Brahmānanda*, which is revealed in *mokṣa*, is positive in character; but, it is supposed to differ from the latter in the sense that it is the culmination of *Bhakti*, while the latter is that of Knowledge.

In other words, *Bhakti*, according to the thinkers of this school, is a deeper Joy because it rests on the eternal *Aiśvarya* and *Mādhurya* of the Supreme Self, which may or may not be looked at from the monistic view-point; but, *Brahmānanda*, though the highest from the world's point of view in so far as it is eternal, pure, steady and free from the action of the *guṇas* of Nature, pales into insignificance before the transcendent raptures of Love Divine.

Udayana, however, does not name the *Puruṣārthas* and speak of any of them specifically. We need not, therefore, enter into a detailed review of the field in this connection. What he means to say is that whatever fruit a man may desire comes really from God, so that in whatever form he may worship, the giver of his fruit is verily God Himself. It is immaterial whether the worshipper consciously resorts to Him or is even theoretically opposed to His existence, but, the fact is that it is God, and God alone, so Udayana thinks, who responds to the prayer. The conception one may have of the Divinity, in case one is inclined to believe in It, has nothing to do with the special attitude of the worshipper. This view of Udayana, which of course is shared by Nyāya[439] and Vaiśeṣika in general, is also to be found in Vedānta. The Brahmasūtra "फलमत उपपत्तेः"[440], which is a refutation of the Mīmāṁsā view expressly declares that the fruit of an action comes from God and not from the *Karma* itself as Mīmāṁsā holds. Udayana's position is really based upon the statement in the Gītā —

"मम वर्त्मानुवर्त्तन्ते मनुष्या पार्थ सर्वशः"[441],

and more particulary on the text :

"येऽप्यन्यदेवताभक्ता यजन्ते श्रद्धयान्विताः।
तेऽपि मामेव कौन्तेय यजन्त्यविधिपूर्वकम्"[442] ॥

implying that God is the only object of worship. The Upaniṣad declares that whatever a man may love, be it wealth or fame or relation or anything else, it is because of the Self that he loves it :

"न वाऽरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति."

The Self is the only object of Love; in every act of love it is the Self that is loved in reality, though the lover may not be aware of the fact. In a similar strain Udayana observes that there can be no denial of God from the practical standpoint, so long as a man has any want and resorts to a means for its fulfilment, for the simple reason that the fulfilment is due to a Will other than his own—a Will more potent indeed but determined by the nature of the action performed by and the desire existing in the man himself. It is in this sense that the rest of the views concerning the means which leads to the realisation of the fruit becomes intelligible, for otherwise the names of Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṁsaka, Cārvāka, Bauddha, Jaina, etc., which are avowedly non-theistic, cannot be justified.

Another point deserves to be noted. In *Kāriṭkā* II it has been stated that the worship of God is a means to Heaven and Liberation, i.e., two of the four well-known ends of man, but no mention was made of the remaining two *Puruṣārthas*, but here the author adds—"यं कमपि पुरुषार्थं प्रार्थयमानाः.....उपासते", meaning that every desire of man, worldly or transcendent, finds its satisfaction from the Supreme Self. As to whether such a desire is proper or not is of course a different question.

It is clear that all people, seeking for Enjoyment or for Emancipation, worship God, though unknowingly in some cases. Udayana now takes a brief survey of the various conceptions which different sects have formed of this Supreme Object which they worhsip for the fulfilment of their desires.

(1) In the very beginning the views of the Upaniṣad school, the Vedāntists, are stated.

(2) The Sāṅkhya conception of *Īśvara* requires to be analysed. Udayana describes Him as *Ādividvān* and *Siddha*, and says nothing more. It is well-known that Sāṅkhya repudiates the idea of *Īśvara*, but this must be understood in the sense that there is no room in Sāṅkhya for an eternal *Īśvara* posited for explaining the origin, maintenance and destruction of phenomena, or even for the imparting of actions or of saving knowledge. To understand their position we must consider the arguments at some length.

(*i*) *Īśvara conceived as the Creator, etc., of Universe*

This is repugnant to Sāṅkhya which believes in the doctrine of *Satkārya*, holding that every effect pre-exists in its material cause as a *Śakti* and that the causal operation simply helps to bring out or evolve what was always involved. *Prakṛti* is the fundamental stuff of the world and is by nature liable to modification. The state of relative equilibrium in which it rests in Dissolution is disturbed after the period of suspense is over and the *guṇas* begin to form more and more differentiated wholes. This arrest of repose in Nature is due to the contiguity of *Puruṣa*—by which term is to be understood here not the pure Self, alienated from *Prakṛti*, but the bound Self sullied by the coating of *Prakṛti*. In Dissolution this coating, which is a thin luminous film, viz., *buddhi*, returns to its source where it remains immersed until it rises up again from the abyss at the end of the Cycle of Rest. As to why it rises again, i.e., why Nature is disturbed in its equilibrium the answer which Sāṅkhya has to offer is that it is due to the influence of actions, i.e., germinal *saṁskāras* awaiting fruition[443]. Of course the operation is natural[444] and not intelligent, Nature being insentient. The superintendence of an eternal and intelligent Being capable of observing the *dharmas* and *adharmas* in their latent condition and of bringing forth the requisite products so as to facilitate the fruition of those *dharmas*, etc., is a gratuitous assumption. The laws of Nature, i.e., the laws of cause and effect are inexorable, and such is the nature of things that they manifest themselves automatically. As in creation, so in preservation and destruction. There is no justification for assuming an Eternal *Puruṣa* in order to explain the creative and other allied phenomena.

(*ii*) *Īśvara conceived as the giver of fruits*

This is denied by Sāṅkhya[445] which expressly delcares—"नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलसम्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः"[446]. It is held that the *Karman* brings about its own fruition. The superintendence of *Īśvara*, if assumed, would lead to fatal difficulties, e. g., selfishness or worldliness, possession of desire or absence of eternal freedom, attachment, and so forth.

(iii) Īśvara conceived as the giver of Saving Knowledge

According to Sāṅkhya Saving Knowledge comes only from the *Jīvanmukta*, for it cannot come from one whose detachment is very keen (*Tīvra-viveka*) and who being unaware of anything external is unable to serve as a spiritual guide (*upadeṣṭā*), nor can it come from one whose detachment is very weak (*manda-viveka*) and who being ignorant is himself an object of such guidance. The real instructor is one whose detachment is neither very keen nor very weak (*madhya-viveka*), who is free from passions, merits and demerits,[447] is no longer subject to pleasure and pain and retains only a trace of *saṁskāras* enabling him to continue in life. Such a person is known as *Jīvanmukta*.

Thus, in this scheme of spiritual illumination there is no place for *Īśvara*.

From the above it is clear that an eternal and universal *Īśvara* is unknown to Sāṅkhya. The Divinity, with which Sāṅkhya is familiar, is that of lordship over a particular cosmic system or *Brahmāṇḍa*. The lord of a *Brahmāṇḍa* is called Hiraṇyagarbha. He is no more than a *Puruṣa* who by virtue of his spiritual culture has attained to perfection in the highest or the *Sāsmita Samādhi*—a *Samādhi* which is just a step below *Kaivalya* and in which the *Mahattattva* is realised. When the *citta* of such a *Puruṣa* is in a state of suspense he is called *Prakṛtilīna*, because it is then dissolved and rendered unmanifest in Nature. But unlike the *Kevalin* his *citta* is liable to periodic upheaval—return to surface[448] ("न कारणलयात् कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात्")[449] and to continuance, until of course he obtains discrimination (*vivekaja-jñāna*) from the *buddhi*. *Buddhi* being the first evolute from Nature such a *citta*, when it has returned from *nirodha*, is naturally endowed with omniscience and omnipresence, and consequent control over the *Brahmāṇḍa*. He remains manifest in the Highest *Loka* of the *Brahmāṇḍa*, viz., Satya or Brahmaloka. Any *Puruṣa* who attains to similar perfection realises similar status. Each of these *Puruṣas* is known as *Janya* or *Kārya Īśvara*, because *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā-śakti* of His Lordship is not eternal, but obtained or developed through culture, and confined to a single *Brah-*

māṇḍa and continues till Discrimination or *Kaivalya* ensues. The phrase "*upāsāsiddha*"[450] is used to mean such a person. The Sāṅkhya Sūtra III. 56, describing *Puruṣa* as omniscient (*Sarvavit*) and omnipotent (*Sarvakarttā*), refers to the above *Janya Īśvara;* and the next Sūtra ("ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा"[451]) emphasises that such a conception of Lordship is consistent with Sāṅkhya.

The phrases *Ādividvān* and *Siddha* mean, according to Sāṅkhya, *Īśvara* as described above. Their significance comes out when we remember that He receives discriminating knowledge before all others at the beginning of the cycle and his *Siddhi*, though realy the outcome of his culture in the previous cycle, appears as inborn in his present life. Kapila and others were *Siddhas* of this kind. The Sāṅkhya view is thus expressed by Udayana himself, in a different context, in the second luster : "सन्तु कपिलादय एव साक्षात्कृतधर्माणः कर्मयोगसिद्धास्त एव संसाराङ्गारेषु पच्यमानान् प्राणिनः पश्यन्तः परमकारुणिकाः प्रियहितोपदेशेनानुग्रहीष्यन्ति, कृतं परमेश्वरेणानपेक्षितकीटादिसंख्यापरिज्ञानवता".[452]

And Pañcaśikha indeed speaks of Kapila, though not by name, as the First Enlightened One (*Ādividvān*), the Great *Ṛṣi* (*Paramarṣi*), who out of compassion assumed a *nirmāṇacitta*[453] and taught the *Tantra*, i.e., the Sāṅkhya Śāstra to enquirying Āsuri :

"आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच"[454] .

(3) The Yoga[454] conception of God requires to be considered next. According to the *yogins* the current Sāṅkhya notion is inadequate to explain facts and scriptures. They say that contingent lordship, such as that produced through self-culture, points to the existence of unconditioned and natural lordship. To the Sāṅkhya, Saving Knowledge comes from the *Jīvanmukta*, but the question arises—wherefrom did the *Jīvanmukta* himself receive it ? The answer would however be—from another *Jīvanmukta*, and the latter from still another, and so forth. In this way there would be a continued series of illuminated teachers, known technically as *Guru-paramparā* or *Sampradāya*, until we

reach back to the period of the beginning of this cycle. How could the First Enlightened One (*Ādividvān*), call him Kapila or by any other name, receive his Light ? That he had not obtained it at the time of his absorption in Primordial Nature (*Prakṛti-laya*) at the end of the last cycle is undoubted, for in that case he would not have been *Prakṛti-līna* at all, but become a *Kevalin*. It is well-known that *Prakṛtilaya* follows from *Vairāgya*, and not from Discrimination : "वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः". Hence when the *Prakṛtilīna* returns to life at the beginning of the cycle he resumes naturally his old position. His lordship is intelligible. But whence does he get his Light ? Of course the Sāṅkhya has its own solution to the problem, viz., that the Saving Knowledge had already been received during the last *Kalpa* and that in the beginning of the present *Kalpa* it only matures and asserts itself. But the *yogin* is not satisfied with this halfway solution. The Yoga Sūtra declares that the First Teacher, the teacher of even the First Enlightened One, is the Supreme Lord Himself: "स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात्".[455] He is the Supreme Teacher and the Initial Point of all lines of teachers. His name *Sampradāya-pradyotaka* is thus apt and significant. It is believed that every *Śāstra* has been revealed originally by God whose omniscience is realy unlimited (*niratiśaya*). The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says: "ऋषिं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्त्ति". This means that the Teacher of Kapila is God Himself.

(4) The theistic conception of the Mahāpāśupatas is next described. They hold that God is free from stain (*nirlepa*), and is the Supreme Agent (*Svatantra-Karttā*).[456] No action, though opposed to the moral standard of the world or of the Veda, really clings to Him. It is known in Indian Mythology that Paśupati holds about His person serpents and fire : this is opposed to the custom of the world. And the besmearing of His body with the ashes of burnt-up corpses, together with similar other actions described in the holy books of the Pāśupatas, is certainly against the Vedic sanction. But in spite of this defiance of Veda, He is free from the specific quality, viz., demerit (*adharma*) which such defiance is sure to produce in the case of ordinary persons; and freedom from demerit implies freedom from suffering. He is

thus shown to be above pleasures and pain (*bhoga*) as well as merit and demerit (*dharmādharma*). What the Pāśupatas mean to say is that the seed of *Karma* sprouts forth as merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*) only when the mental soil is already drenched with the waters of Nescience, and not when it is rendered barren with its moisture sucked up by the heat of Right Knowledge: "मिथ्याज्ञानसलिलावसिक्तायामात्मभूमौ कर्मबीजं धर्माधर्माङ्कुरमारभते, न तु तत्त्वज्ञाननिदाघनिपीतसलिलतयोषरायाम्"[457]. This shows that there being no Ignorance in God (owing to His Omniscience), merit and demerit have no significance for Him.

Who were these Mahāpāśupatas? Varadarāja and Śaṅkara Miśra say that they were those Pāśupatas who practised *Mahāvrata* (called *Ugravrata* in Ch. XIII. 24 of the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā).[458] These may be identified with some probability with the sect whose tenets are embodied in the Atharva-śiras Upaniṣad. It is believed that Śiva as Ahirbudhnya fashioned Pāśupata System[459]. This system had eight *kāṇḍas*, viz., Pati, Paśu, Pāśa (of 5 kinds), Śuddha-caryā, Miśra-caryā, Deva, Dīkṣā and Sāyujya. Its philosophical exposition is to be found in the Pañcārtha Darśana (in five chapters, called *Pañcādhyāyī*) attributed to Śiva and commented on by Rāśikara.

(5) The Śaivas are apparently different from the preceding sect. They name their object of worship Śiva which means 'one who is above the three *guṇa*s and essentially benevolent'. In the Padma Tantra[460] Śiva is said to have been the author of Kāpāla Śuddha Śaiva and Pāśupata systems[461]. The Śaivas are apparently those mentioned under *Siddhāntamārga* in the Śiva-purāṇa, Vāyavīya Saṁhitā[462]. One of the most important points on which they differ from the Pāśupatas is the emphasis they lay upon *adṛṣṭa* in the determination of the Divine Will. They hold that the Divine Body is absolutely pure, being free from *mala* and *karma*, and is made up of five *mantras* forming his five parts and five powers.[463]

(6) The Vaiṣṇavas are probably Pāñcarātras, Bhāgavatas and Tridaṇḍins. The word *Puruṣottama* is evidently reminiscent of the Gītā,[464] where we find an account of three *Puruṣas*, viz,

Kṣara Puruṣa, i.e., '*Prakṛti*', '*Akṣara Puruṣa*, i.e., '*Puruṣa*', and the third the Supreme *Puruṣa*, i.e., *Puruṣottama*, otherwise called *Paramātmā* or the Supreme Self.

(7-8) The views of the Paurāṇikas call for no comment. But, it is difficult to say what the term Yājñikas really means. That they were distinct from the Mīmāṁsakas is, of course, clear from the latter, being mentioned separately in the same context.

(9) The term *Kṣaṇika Sarvajña* as used by Udayana is really God conceived as such. It is well-known that *Sarvajña* is one of the names of the Buddha. The word *Kṣaṇika* implies that the doctrine was of those schools of Buddhism which upheld the theory of Universal Flux. The Nihilists are, of course, excluded.

In Mahāyānism the nearest equivalent to the Deity is, as is well-known, the Dharmakāya Buddha. The words *Amitābha* and *Vairocana* are generally used by the followers of the Sukhāvatī Sect. Other names too are sometimes to be found. The *Dharmakāya* is conceived as a Being, a Spirit, with Will and Intelligence, and thus distinct from Suchness (*Bhūta-tathatā Nirguṇa-Brahma*). It is free from *vāsanā* and *mala*, and manifests itself in the world, responsive to the call of *Karma*. The Buddhist philosophers describe it as pure, universal, serene and eternal, as a homogeneous unity, unlimited and yet embodied in all bodily forms. It is said to have unrestricted freedom and infinite power of creation. Under the exigencies of *Karma* it assumes a material body and illuminates all. It is above all contradictions and is possessed of an inherent tendency to lead the entire creation to *Nirvāṇa*.

(10) There is no room for a Supreme God in the Jain religious philosophy.

The Digambaras believe that every soul passes through fourteen stages (*guṇasthānas*) on its way to final deliverance. The last two are known as *Sayogikevalī Guṇasthānaka* and *Ayogikevalī Guṇasthānaka* and correspond to *Jīvanmukti* and *Videhamukti* respectively. The former represents the stage in which the soul gains eternal wisdom, unlimited insight, everlasting happiness and unbounded power, and becomes, as a matter

of course, the *Guru* of the entire Universe, including the *devas*. The third part of *Śukla-dhyāna* is developed in this stage, the first two having been already perfected in the preceding stage. Though the soul still resides in the body it reaches every part of the Universe. On this level of spiritual culture the *Jīva* is able to found sects (*Tīrthas*) and thereby become a Tīrthaṅkara[465] if only he is inclined towards it and preach the truths revealed to him. Such a *Jīva*, viz., a Tīrthaṅkara, is the object of human worship. The fourteenth stage, called by the name of *Ayogikevalī*, is the last in the series, and as soon as this is reached the soul realises *Nirvaṇa* and becomes a *Siddha*. The *Siddha* and freed soul, together with infinite others of a similar order, dwell for ever, above the Siddha-śilā, descending no more on the lower planes and taking no longer any interest in the affairs of the world. He has a formless existence, and a body which is neither light nor heavy.

The term *Nirāvaraṇa* ('Uncovered') as used in the text stands for the last two *Guṇasthānas*, specially the fourteenth. All the *ghātikarmans*, viz., those which obscure the *Jñāna* and *Darśana* (*Jñānāvaraṇīya* and *Darśanāvaraṇīya*) of the soul and those which infatuate it (*Mohanīya* and *Antarāya*) disappear in the twelfth stage, so that what are generally known as *aghātikarmans* (viz., *Vedanīya*, *Āyuḥ*, *Nāma* and *Gotra*)[466] only remain in the thirteenth. These do not obscure the omniscience of the soul, but help to keep up the body, and as soon as these are exhausted the body falls off. The two kinds of *mokṣa* (*Sadeha* and *Videha*) are known as *Bhāvamokṣa* and *Dravyamokṣa* respectively.

The above is a brief resume of the philosophical notions of the different sects mentioned by Udayana on the object of their worship, which in fact is identical with God.

Udayana says that there is no question as to *Jāti*, *Gotra*, *Pravara* and *Caraṇa*-these are so universal; similarly, he adds, there is no doubt on God either, whose extraordinary powers are practically recognised by every sect, even by those who profess to ignore His existence. *Jāti* is caste, such as *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣattriya*, etc.; *Gotra* is the progenitor of a line such as *Kāśyapa*, etc.; *Pravara* is the *Ṛṣi*,

who is elected in a sacrifice. *Caraṇa* is a Vedic recension (*Śākhā*).[३७७] The question thus arises—what is then the necessity of setting forth the *Nyāya* in support of His existence, the rule being "सन्दिग्धे न्यायः प्रवर्त्तते न निश्चिते नाप्रसिद्धे". The reply is that this *Nyāya-carccā* is of the nature of *manana* and comes logically after *śravaṇa*. It is, therefore, essentially *upāsanā* or worship. The scriptures are full of descriptions of *Īśvara* and of His Powers and Functions. All these have been heard by us from them. But this much is not adequate. These must be ratified by reason. The intellect or the rational faculty must be convinced by demonstration of the logical grounds in favour of those stated in the holy books. Every philosophical work is, from the orthodox Indian point of view, an attempt at rational justification of the truths embodied in the scriptures.[३७८] Philosophy, in the true sense of the term, has no right to speculate independently, for mere speculation is incapable of leading to the truth. It must be faithful to the dictates of the higher authorities. Its only function consists in providing proofs for the truths which are already revealed in the Śruti, etc., and thus showing that they are not inconsistent with reason. It is, therefore, worship.

There is in brief a five-fold objection to this (*atra*), based on the following grounds: (1) absence of a supersensuous ground for the existence of life after death; (2) the possibility of otherwise (i.e., without admitting God) carrying out the means to another world (viz., sacrifice); (3) the existence of proofs demonstrating His non-existence; (4) His unreliable character as a proof or a source of right knowledge (*apramāṇatva*) even on the assumption of His existence; (5) absence of proofs demonstrating His existence.

Of these the first alternative is untenable, since—

IV. The supersensuous ground exists by reason of dependence, beginninglessness, variety, universal belief, and the restriction of joy and sorrow to each individual.

Thus this world, full of miseries of various kinds, cannot be described as independent. In that case it would either be only existent or only non-existent, but would not have an occasional existence.

Annotation

It is desirable to say a few words about the five-fold theoretical objection to the existence of God. These five objections are supposed to come from five distinct sources which are identified by some with certain well-known systems. But this identification does not seem to be quite reasonable.[169] It is better to hold that the author has classified all possible anti-theistic arguments under five general heads. These anti-theistic arguments presuppose a corresponding number of theistic proofs current in the schools (Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika). The first objection with which we are just now concerned is evidently from the materialists or Cārvākas who deny the existence of *adṛṣṭa*, i.e., *dharma* and *adharma*. The theistic pnilosophers who believe in *adṛṣṭa*, which is a special quality of the self, find themselves compelled under logical stress to postulate the existence of a Supreme Self, all-knowing and all-powerful, to account for the working or fructification of *adṛṣṭa*, which cannot work by itself. The *adṛṣṭa* being denied, the existence of God as the supervisor of *adṛṣṭa*, at once falls to the ground.

The Cārvāka means to say that the whole argument in favour of *adṛṣṭa* centres round the assumption of the causal relation. But, adds he, it is a mere assumption having no foundation in fact. Causality cannot be known through perception, for even when the *dharmin* as such is perceived doubt may persist as to its causal character. It is sometimes held that the causal relation is ascertained by "अन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानज्ञानसहकारिविरह".[170] But this much is in common with the *vyabhicārī*. The elements of invariable character and relevancy (अनन्यथासिद्धिशून्यस्य नियतपूर्ववर्त्तित्वं) cannot be assured, being points of dispute. It will thus

be clear that perception cannot vouch for causality. As for inference the Cārvāka has no faith in its validity as a proof. The Cārvāka adds :

"तत्साधने क्वचिदसिद्धौ अन्वयिनोऽसम्भवात्तदप्रसिद्धौ व्यतिरेकज्ञानात् केवलव्यतिरेक्यनवतारात्".

To the Cārvāka, who assumes *asat-khyāti* for an object not rightly cognised, there is no difficulty on the ground that the object of denial is unknown.

The Naiyāyika would retort, saying that the alternative of the Cārvāka is not strong, because its object is imaginary (*kalpanā* or *asat-khyāti*). If the Cārvāka does not really believe in causality how is it that he uses words which are meant to result in the genesis of conviction in others *para-pratipatti-phalaka-vacana*) ? He is bound to land himself in contradictions (*vyāghāta*), for the more he attempts to demolish causality the more is he entangled in its meshes—the more strongly it asserts itself.

Having said so much the Naiyāyika proceeds to sum up the arguments in support of *adṛṣṭa*.

It cannot be urged that the world--the effect--proceeds from no cause (*akasmāt*).

V. This (statement, viz., the effect takes place without a cause) cannot mean denial of cause (*hetu*) **nor of production** (*bhūti*); **it cannot mean affirmation of production (of the effect) from itself** (*sva*) **or from something unreal** (*anupākhya*). **It does not mean spontaneous origination either** (*svabhāva-varṇanā*)**--the reason being that the effect is definitely limited.**

If the cause were denied it would involve that the production is independent (*nirapekṣa*) and consequently perpetual, because (there being no cause on which the origin of the effect is to depend) the effect may equally appear at all times. If production were denied it would

amount to non-production after origin as well as before it, for there is no difference between the two states. The alternative "from itself" is untenable, because the effect before its origin is itself non-existent and hence unable (*aprabhu*) to beget itself. The relation of cause and effect is one of invariableness (*niyama*) in priority and sequence. One thing cannot be both antecedent and consequent. Sequence is possible only where there is difference. If the unreal (Void) were declared a cause (of production), it would involve the existence of the effect before (its production) and consequently the same perpetual being (*sadātanatva*) again.

It may, however, be urged: "By the expression '*akasmāt*' it is not meant merely to deny the cause of production, nor does it mean the affirmation of the effect being its own cause or being caused by the unreal—but, we hold that the product is by nature associated with a fixed time, just as it is naturally associated with a fixed point of space." The Naiyāyika replies: "We say 'No', because the denial of limit (in time) or of fixedness of limit (in time) would be subversive of occasionalness (*kādācitkatva*). For occasionalness does not consist merely in the existence at a succeeding moment, but such existence together with prior non-existence. In case the limit (in time) is admitted, this upper or prior limit is known as 'cause' (*hetu*).

"Well", (says the Cārvāka), "let prior non-existence itself be the limit sought." To this it is replied (by the Naiyāyika), "No. Because others also (other positive things also) exist at the same time (with prior non-existence). If they did not exist it would not be possible to know the non-existence itself. Hence the effect has

not that alone (prior non-existence alone) as its limit (because the positive entities also will be limits in an equal sense), there being no difference (between the two cases).

If prior non-existence, independent (*nirapekṣa*) of anything else, is declared a limit, in that case it would imply the existence of the effect as being due to that limit even before. If it is held by the Cārvāka "let there be any number of limits, but they are not required or resorted to (*apekṣitāḥ*), and this is the meaning of the term *svabhāva*, the reply by the Naiyāyika is as follows— "What is meant by saying 'they are not required'? Is it meant (i) that they are not invariable (*niyata*), or (ii) that though they are invariable they are not active (*upakāraka*)? In the first case, there being no determinant, smoke could have donkey also as its limit, just as it has fire as its limit. In the second case, what is the use of another action, for the meaning of dependence is nothing but invariable character, and this again is of the nature of cause; and such a doctrine of *Svabhāva* is favoured (by us)."

The Cārvāka says: "The *Svabhāvavāda* which we hold has its analogy in the restriction (*niyama*) of the *Svabhāva* or nature of eternal things. It is not proper to say 'why should not the nature *(tattva)* of everything be accidental *(ākasmika)*, just as the nature of *ākāśa* (viz., *ākāśatva*) is accidental?" Naiyāyika replies, "No. The word 'nature' *(Svabhāva)* would lose its peculiar sense if it were common to all. One thing cannot be of multiple nature, for this would involve contradiction". The Cārvāka—"Well, in the same manner in the present case also there would be contradiction by admitting

occasionalness (*kādācitkatva*) as the nature (*Svabhāva*) of a thing which is eternal (*sarvadā bhavataḥ*): thus the solution is identical." The Naiyāyika replies: "Not identical. Because there would be self-contradiction if the effect were assumed to be without any limit or without a fixed limit. The assumption of a fixed limit, however, is to fall back upon the theory of causality."

Annotation

The 4th *Kārikā* enumerates five reasons in favour of the existence of *adṛṣṭa*. The subsequent *kārikās* take up each of them in turn and expand the ideas.

The first reason stated is *sāpekṣatva*. It is said that the world which comes into existence occasionally cannot but have an extrinsic ground for its occasional character. Had it been self-dependent, so far as its existence is concerned, that is, if it had no relation with anything other than itself, it would either have an eternal existence or an eternal non-existence. But as a matter of observed fact we cannot say, in an absolute sense, that the world is or that it is not. Being or non-being is relative in it. In other words, the world, having no existence at first, springs into existence later, and returns to non-existence subsequently. Thus we can neither affirm that it always exists (for in the past and in the future it does not exist), nor that it never exists (for in the present it does exist). Hence we say that it sometimes exists, meaning that sometimes it does not exist. This is the meaning of occasionalness or contingency of phenomena.

Now this contingency is a fact of observation and admitted by all. This proves that the world, every effect, depends upon something else for its existence. Then again it should be remembered that it has varieties of painful (*anekavidha duḥkhamaya*)[471] experience involved. These varieties as well as the contingency are positive evidences to show that the world, i.e., the effect, is not *nirapekṣa* or independent: that on which it has to depend is its cause.

We have noted before that the Cārvāka does not believe in causality. The Naiyāyika, therefore, sets himself at the very outset to the task of establishing the causal relation. This he does by a process of inference based upon the observation of change. Udayana's argument in this connection, especially his language, is reminiscent of Dharmakīrti. Udayana says :

"तदा (i.e., संसारस्य निरपेक्षत्वे) स्यादेव न स्यादेव वा न तु कदाचित् स्यात्".

Dharmakīrti says :

"नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा हेतोरन्यानपेक्षणात् ।
अपेक्षातो हि भावानां कादाचित्कत्वसम्भवः ॥"

The opponent puts forward a different explanation of the fact of contingency (*kādācitkatva*), so that the reasoning of the Naiyāyika is vitiated. Thus, it is urged that the effect comes into existence (*bhavati*) from no thing (*akasmāt*).

Now the statement '*akasmāt bhavati*' which the opponent makes, has to be analysed. The particle '*a*' may have a negative sense (*pratiṣedhārtha*) or a positive sense (*paryudāsārtha*). In either case it may be syntactically related to *kasmāt* or to *bhavati*. Thus, (i) taking *kasmāt* in the sense of a cause and '*a*' as a negative particle related to it, we have the meaning 'originating (*bhavana*) without a cause'. (ii) Again, if we take '*a*' as before and connect it with the verb *bhavati*, we have the meaning 'not originating at all'. (iii-iv) If the negative particle is taken in the sense of *paryudāsa*, which implies the affirmation of something other than what is actually denied, and if it is related to *kasmāt*, we have the meaning 'originating from what is different from what is other than itself (i. e., the effect)', i.e., originating from what is identical with itself or from the Unreal. Now all these four meanings are etymologically possible—they may be derived in the usual manner. (v) But the word '*akasmāt*' may also be supposed to be an underived (*avyutpanna*) word, like *Aśvakarṇa*, conveying the sense 'by nature', so that it would be vain to hunt for an etymology.

These five interpretations of the word '*akasmāt*' represent indeed five distinct metaphysical positions in opposition to the

causal theory. It should be remembered that there is no question as to the contingency of phenomena, but only to the way in which the fact is to be accounted for. The causalists set forth the principle of causality as the only adequate explanation of the dependence (*sāpekṣatva*) involved in the contingency, while the anti-causalists come forward with their own views on the question.

(i) At the very outset we are confronted with the school which holds that phenomena have no cause. These are the *Ahetuvādins*. Probably the doctrine discussed in the Nyāya Sūtras IV. 1. 22-24 is an aspect of this wider view.[472]

(ii) The second school denies production altogether. It is difficult to supply the historical setting of this view, but we may probably trace it to a form of *Śāśvatavāda* or to the *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṅkhya.

(iii) The third alternative represents the view that there is no difference between the cause and the effect. Every effect is in fact its own cause.

(iv The fourth view is that of the school which holds the *asat* to be the cause. The text has *anupākhya* which is supposed to mean 'unreal' (*nirdharmaka, alīka*), 'non-existent'. This doctrine is probably the same as the one discussed in Nyāya Sūtras IV. '. 14-18.[473]

Regarding the first view nothing requires to be said at present. So with the second. The third view is rejected on the ground that since an effect cannot have existed before its origin, it cannot possibly be maintained as the cause of itself. The identity of cause and effect is an absurdity. And to admit causality of a non-existent thing is to admit the existence of the effect before its origin and after its destruction : and this would be inconsistent with the non-perception of the effect before and after. This identity would lead to a further contradiction in that it would be opposed to the testimony of causality as established by experience, viz., that those who are in need of an effect, e.g., a cloth, are found to take up, not the effect itself which does not

yet exist, but the materials, e.g., the threads, etc., which are temporally antecedent to it. Whatever view one may hold of the causal notion it is beyond question that there must be some sort of time-sequence between the cause and the effect, and this sequence is absent in the unity of cause and effect.

(iv) The objections to the fourth view are: (a) that the unreal (*anupākhya*) can have no pragmatic efficiency (*arthakriyā-janakatva*) and (b) that it leads to the absurdity of perpetual existence of the product. Vardhamāna says :

"एतत्पटानुत्पत्तिक्षणः यद्येतत्पटोत्पादकानुपाख्योत्तरक्षणः स्याद् एतत्पटाधिकरणं स्यात्".

This means that if the moment prior to the origin of the product were identical with the moment subsequent to the unreal (*anupākhya*), which is maintained as the cause of this product, it would be the substr ate of this product—which is a contradiction in terms. Mo reover, extending this analogy we shall find that the product wa s always in existence in the past.

(v) The most interesting doctrine, however, is the view of the *Svabhāvavādins*. Udayana gives a brief account of these philosophers' doctrines, though only to refute them. *Svabhāvavāda* in a certain sense has to be admitted by all thinkers in the last resort. It is well-known that a product, e.g., jar, inheres in its material cause, e.g., *kapāla*, according to Naiyāyika. But, it may be asked : Why does not the jar, for instance, inhere in the threads ? In plain language, why is the effect produced from one kind of cause rather than from another ? What is the inner meaning of *upādāna-niyama*, which is a fact of general experience ? The Naiyāyika's analysis, acute as it is, fails to provide the right solution to this question. Another example may be taken by way of illustration. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Universals (*Sāmānya*) are declared to be eternal and omnipresent. But how is it that they are not manifested always and everywhere ? Of course, there are certain conditions which determine and limit their manifestation. A universal, for example, in so far as it inheres in a whole (*avayavī*) is revealed by the peculiar collocation of the parts (*avayava-saṁsthānaviśeṣa, ākṛti*)

constituting that whole (*avayavi*). In other words, as Nyāya Sūtra expressly states, the relation between a particular universal (*Sāmānya, Jāti*) and a particular collocation (*ākṛti*) is one of *vyaṅgya vyañjaka-bhāva*. Now the question arises – what determines this *vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāva* ? To be plain, how is one *jāti* manifested through one *ākṛti* and not through another ? Why does not *kambu-grīvādi-mattva* reveal *gotva* instead of *ghaṭatva* ? What is the root of the correspondence between a *jāti* and an *ākṛti* ? The Naiyāyika cannot furnish an adequate rational answer to this question. Similarly on every problem and in every system the last solution is never to be found. Analysis, however searching, may go deeper and deeper, but it is hopelessly impotent in the face of the ultimate problems. The only answer, if answer it could be called, is to fall back upon the nature of the thing (*vastu-svabhāva*) about which no further question is permissible—*vastu-śakteraparyanuyojyatvāt*. Thus, says the Kandalī.[474] :

"एष हि तन्त्वादीनां कारणानां स्वभावो यदेतैरुत्पाद्यमाने द्रव्ये पटत्वमेव समवैति, नान्यत्; एष हि मृत्पिण्डादीनां महिमा यत् तैः क्रियमाणे द्रव्ये घटत्वमेव समवैति, नान्यत्".

Call it *Svabhāva* or *Mahimā* or *Śakti* or by any other name, it is the last irreducible surd in all causal analysis, philosophical or scientific. Elsewhere too Śrīdhara observes :

"अथोच्यते विषयेन्द्रियजन्यविज्ञानं कथमात्मन्येव समवैति यद्यात्मा सहजज्ञानमयो न स्यात्, तस्याचेतनत्वे हि कारणत्वविशेषादिन्द्रियादिष्वपि ज्ञानसमवायो भवेदिति । तन्न । स्वभावनियमादेव नियमोपपत्तेः । यथा तन्तूनामपटत्वेऽपि तन्तुत्वजातिनियमात् तेषु पटसमवायो न तुर्यादिषु, तद्वदचिदात्मकेऽप्यात्मनि आत्मत्वजातिनियमाद् ज्ञानसमवायस्य नियमो भविष्यति".[475]

NOTES

1. Cf. Suali, p. 129; Liṅgapurāṇa, Chap. 24, Rājaśekhara, Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya (Vaiśeṣika Darśana, 30), p. 12; Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, p. 329.

2. अक्षपादमते शिवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिवः etc. (Bib. Ind. Ed., p. 51, Naiyāyikamataṁ 13); cf. Guṇaratna, p. 51.

3 See, Guṇaratna, p. 51. These Pāśupatas are called *Jaṭādhārī*, Śaivas or *Māheśvaras* in Ratnaprabhā and Ānandagiri (under Vedānta Sūtra 2. 2. 37-41;) cf. Guṇaratna, pp. 49-50.

4. A detailed exposition and examination of the doctrines of this Philosophy, together with a discussion as to the place of this system in the History of Indian Thought in gereral, will appear in my forthcoming Monograph on Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy (Part II).

5. Non quaero intellegere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.

6. The word for philosophy in India variously appears as *Nyāya*, *Ānvikṣiki*, etc. cf. Nyāya-vārttika, p. 13. The statement on p. 12, viz,. "संशयादिभेदानुविधायिनी आन्वीक्षिकी" implies that philosophy is meant for dispelling doubts on the principle that 'नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीते न्यायः प्रवर्त्तते'. A categorical enunciation of the truths is not its province—it deals with reasons of things.

7. Cf. Madhusūdana: "शब्दात् प्रथमतोऽपरोक्षज्ञानं जायते विचारप्रयोजकम्। तदनन्तरमसम्भावनोदये सति विचारशास्त्रं प्रवर्त्तते। तच्च वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मण्यद्वितीये समन्वयप्रतिपादनद्वारा परपक्षखण्डनद्वारा चोपयुज्यते। प्रमाणगताऽसम्भावना श्रवणनिवर्त्त्या, प्रमेयगताऽसम्भावना तु मननिवर्त्त्येत्यन्यत्र विस्तरः। तदनन्तरमपि विपरीतभावना तिष्ठत्येव, सा निदिध्यासनेन निराक्रियते। तदनन्तरं पुनरपि महावाक्यमनुसन्धीयमानमविद्योन्मूलनसमर्थमन्तःकरणवृत्तिभेदरूपं मुक्तिफलकं साक्षात्कारमुत्पादयति"—Advaitaratna-rakṣā (Nirnaya Sagar Ed.), p. 44-45.

8. Quoted from his Prasthāna-bheda, a fragment which forms a part of his commentary on the Mahimnaḥstotra. See, Nir. Sag. Ed. of the Stotra, p. 22 (no. 7).

9. II. 60-64.

10. Jayanārāyaṇa Ed., pp. 96-97.

11. Mahimnaḥstotra, pp. 11-23 (Nir. Sag. Ed.).

12. p. 16, *sūtra* 8.

13. Cf. "संविदेव हि भगवती वस्तूपगमे नः शरणम्", as quoted in Upaskāra, under Vedānta Sūtra 7. 2. 26.

14. The principle of causality is a self-evident principle. Denial of this would lead to the absurdities of what in technical language would be called *Svobhāva-vāda* and *Yadṛcchā-vāda*.

15. Nyāya-bhāṣya 4. 1. 29.

16. The etymological structure of the word *vyakti* (manifestation) shows that the individual is conceived as a *manifestation* only, implying that the Universal (*Jāti*) as such is unmanifested.

17. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga is an advocate of *Satkāryavāda* and denies the necessity of assuming a real independent Universal. The individual is considered to consist of a two-fold aspect (cf. the view of the Indifferentists, e.g., Adelard of Bath), viz., the generic and the specific (*sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka*) and has an eternal existence per se. What is popularly called production is only manifestation (*āvirbhāva*), i. e., descent as it were from the Eternal Plane into the realm of Time. And as all manifestation is relative, it means that in an absolute sense, i.e., from the standpoint of God or *Yuktayogi*, there is nothing like production or creation. In Eternity on the Divine Plane—there can be no 'motion' and consequently no flux. Causality, implying succession, is a category in Time. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, being a representative of *Asatkārya-vāda* is constrained to admit the non-existence of the individual before its production and after its destruction. But along with this he is bound to ascribe eternal existence to the Universal.

Otherwise his position would be like that of the Buddhist Realist who rejects the reality of both the Concrete Individual (cf. *Saṁghāta-vāda*) as well as of the Abstract Universal (cf. *Apoha-vāda*).

18. This shows that there is no form in matter during the period of dissolution. In the Sāṅkhya also Matter is described in its primary state as undifferentiated and formless (*avyākṛtā Prakṛtiḥ*). According to both it is indeterminate and super-sensuous (*atīndriya*).

19. Cf. Dr. Seal's "The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus".

20. There is no room for Chance (*Ākasmikatva-vāda*) in philosophy. The different doctrines of Chance, viz., *Niyati-vāda*, *Kāla-vāda*, *Yadṛcchā-vāda* and *Svabhāva-vāda* have been rejected.

21. This excludes the case of the *Yogins* who are able to experience the pleasure and pain of any body whatsoever as if they were their own. But then this experience would not be called *bhoga* at all and is not the result of his prior *Karma*. Hence *bhoga = svasukha-duḥkha-sākṣātkāraḥ*. Cf. Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā, p. 357 : "अस्ति हि परकीयसुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारो योगिनाम्, न हि चैते भोगिनः".

22. Cf. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 511 : "दुःखसंस्पर्शे शाश्वतिकसुखसम्भोगसम्भवाद् दुःखस्य चावश्यहातव्यत्वाद् विषमधुनो इहैकत्र पात्रपतिते उभ अपि सुखदुःखे त्यज्येतामिति".

23. Udayana approaches the problem from a slighty different point of view : "न चाकुर्वतः कुलालादेः कायसंक्षोभादिसाध्यो भोगः सिध्येदिति तदर्थमस्य कर्तृत्वमीश्वरोऽनुमन्यते, तदर्थमात्रत्वादैश्वर्य्यस्येति"—Nyāya-kusumāñjali (Ben. Ed.), Ch. V, p. 47.

24. Cf. Nyāya-kandalī, p. 281 : "यः कर्ता भोक्ताऽस्तीत्यात्मानमभिमन्यते परमार्थतो दुःखसाधनं च बाह्याध्यात्मिकविषयः सुखसाधनमित्यभिमन्यते सोऽविद्वान्".

25. p. 3 (Ben. Ed.).

26. (a) "जगन्निर्माणाय स्वेच्छामात्रनिर्मितानि संसारचेतनवर्गनिर्मितानि वा शरीराणि" —Varadaraja.

(b) "निर्माणकायं वेदाभिव्यञ्जनघटादिकरणशिक्षार्थं च कायव्यूहम्"—Guṇānanda.

27. The aphorism appears as a quotation in Vyāsa's commentary on Yoga-Sūtras, thus: "आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद् भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच". Both Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu attribute it to Pañca'ikha.

28. Verse 63.

29. "समयोऽप्येकेनैव मायाविनेव व्युत्पाद्यव्युत्पादकभावावस्थितनानाकार्याधिष्ठानाद् व्यवहारतः सुकर एव"—Kusumāñjali, (Ben. Ed.), Chap. II, p. 53. Here the bodies of the Teacher and the Pupil are both Divine, being created for purposes of guidance of humanity.

30. Cf. Gaṅgeśa's Īśvarānumāna, pp. 84-85 (Bib. Ed.).

31. Sometimes an objection is raised: The *Jiva*, in so for as he is a *Jiva*, albeit endowed with Yogic powers, is spatially limited (*prādeśika*) and incapable of simultaneously entering into and presiding over the natural (*svabhāva-nirmitāni*) bodies which occupy different positions in space—Bhāmatī under Sūtra 4. 4. 15.

32. Under Sūtra 1. 1. 20.

33. This is the Vetulyaka theory. Cf. Kathāvatthu, XVIII. 1. 2.

34. Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 33.

35. Commentary on Nyāya Sūtra 3. 2. 20, p. 115 (Jīvānanda Ed.).

36. "तथाप्यागमप्रामाण्यात् काययौगपद्यस्यापि प्रसंख्यानफलतया सिद्धत्वादनन्तानामनियतविपाकसमयतां चाभ्युपगम्यैव परिहृतम्। विभूतिमतोऽनेककालोपभोग्यमप्येकदा भुज्यत इत्यत्र समुद्रपानमुदाहरणम्। योगर्द्धिप्रभावसम्पन्नो विविधफलभागिनो विचित्रस्वभावान् एकदैव बहून् कायान् इच्छामात्रेणैव निर्मिमीत इत्यत्र दण्डकारण्यसृष्टिरुदाहरणमिति"—p. 83 (Bib. Ed.).

37. Cf. Bhāmatī under Vedānta Sūtra 4. 4. 11; Gauḍa-Brahmānandī, pp. 569-570.

38. 10. 33. 20.

39. Cf. Bhāgavata, 10. 69. 2.

40. See. Laghu-Bhāgavatāmṛta, 1. 21.

41. Bhāmatī, p. 249 (Nirnaya Sagar Ed.).

42. In elucidation of this point I extract the following from the excellent commentary on the Pañcaśikha Sūtras by Svāmī Hariharānanda Āraṇya of Kapilāśrama: "When a great Yogī, by subduing all passions and attachments and being perfectly disillusioned, destroys all *Saṁskāras* or mental accretions (the dureê of Bergson), then by a conscious effort of the will he can stop all psychosis, nay obliterate the empiric ego or phenomenal existence, for all times to come, if he desires it. This state is *Kaivalya Nirvāṇa.* After realising *Nirvāṇa*, but before having gone permanently to that state, if there be any reason (the only reason in this case is his desire to do good to others) for continuing phenomenal existence, then the *Yogī* may do so by relaxing *Nirodha Samādhi* or the mentation stopping effort, and creating anew the necessary faculties of thinking. The potential energy of the mind having been dissipated or the dureê destroyed, these faculties (*Nirmāṇa-cittaṁ*) are to be considered as new formations. The term *Nirmāṇa-cittaṁ* or Created Mind is a well-known Yogic term. This term is also found in the Pali Scriptures, and the Buddhists also explain in this way the continued post-nirvāṇic activities of the Buddha or *Arhat* after he has attained *Nirvāṇa*", pp. 6-7.

Cf. also his notes on the Yoga-bhāṣya under Sūtras 4. 4-5, p. 233.

43. Yoga Sūtra IV.

44. Cf. also Śaṅkarācārya: "एकमनोऽनुवर्त्तीनि समनस्कान्येवापराणि शरीराणि सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वात् स्रक्ष्यति। सृष्टेषु च तेषूपाधिभेदादात्मनोऽपि भेदेनाधिष्ठातृत्वं योक्ष्यते। एषैव च योगशास्त्रेषु योगिनामनेकशरीरयोगप्रक्रिया"—Bhāṣya under Vedānta Sūtra 4. 4. 15.

45. For some interesting notes on this subject, see, Vijñāna-bhikṣu, Yoga-vārttika, pp. 262-263 (Ben. Ed.).

46. "योगिसंविद एव सा तादृशी शक्तिः यदाभासवैचित्र्यरूपमर्थजातं प्रकाशयतीति तदस्ति संभवः यत् संविदेव अभ्युपगतस्वातन्त्र्या अप्रतिघातलक्षणादिच्छाविशेष-

वशात् संविदोऽनधिकात्मतया अनपायादन्तःस्थितमेव सद् भावजातमिदमित्येवं प्राणबुद्धिदेहादेः वितीर्णाकयन्मात्रसंविद्रूपाद् बाह्यत्वेनाभासयतीति''–Abhinavagupta's Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī, 1. 5. 8, pp. 184-185.

This is a general statement of all creation proceeding from the Free Will of the Enlightened One and is applicable to *Nirmāṇakāya* as well.

47. Cf. Bodhisattvabhūmi, I.V—"निर्वस्तुकं निर्माणं निर्माणचित्तेन यथाकाममभिसंस्कृतम्''.

48. See, Laghu-Bhāgavatāmṛta; Jiva Gosvāmī, Ṣaṭsandarbha; Caitanya-caritāmṛta; B. N. Seal, 'Vaishnavism and Christianity', pp. 64-66.

49. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha in his Bhakti-candrikā takes it to be a case of *Avatāra* rather than *Vyūha*.

50. Rg. V. S., VI. 47. 18.

51. XII. 67.

52. Cf. also Hariharānanda's 'Introduction to Pañcaśikha', pp. 2-4. The only argument which Dr. Garbe (Sāṅkhya und Yoga, p. 3) advances against the high antiquity of Pañcaśikha is what he considers to be the linguistic testimony of his fragments. But this is a highly questionable testimony on which diversities of opinion are possible. But even if this be conceded there can be no denying the fact that Pañcaśikha was pre-Christian, at least prior to Aśvaghoṣa, in age (Cf. Dr. Belvalkar's Paper on the Māṭhara-vṛtti in Bhandarkar Memorial Volume, p. 180. fn. 2, where he seems inclined to claim for Pañcaśikha a period before 200 B.C.). In support of the great antiquity of this Ācārya it may be pointed out that one of the works of Pañcaśikha, viz., Ṣaṣṭitantra (Vācaspati's ascription of it to Vārṣagaṇya in Bhāmatī on 2. 1. 3. may be an oversight) was known to early Jain literature, e. g., Bhagavatī-sūtra (see, Weber, Bhagavatī II, pp. 246-248). Dr. Keith also in his recent work on 'The Sāṅkhya System' seems to make Pañcaśikha a comparatively late author, placing him with Dr. Garbe (Sāṅkhya Philosophie, p. 34) in the first

century A.D. or even a century later (p. 43). We propose to deal with the arguments of Keith at length in a separate paper.

53. Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana-parva, XVIII. 75.

54. Baṅgāvāsī Ed., p. 1883.

55. Cowell & Neil's Ed., pp. 162 & 166.

56. 9. 63.

57. Cf. Also Poussin, 'The Three Bodies of a Buddha', in J. R. A. S.; 1906, p. 968. For some interesting notes on *Nirmāṇa-kāya*, see also D.T. Suzuki, 'Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism', pp. 73, 257, 268; W. M. Mc. Govern, 'An Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism', pp. 75-98.

58. A Catalogue of this collection originally in possession of the late Mm. Pandit Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin, Assistant Librarian, Government Sanskrit Library, Benares, has now been printed and published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series.

59. See, Peterson's Catalogue, p. 44, No. 1067 and pp. 78-80, extract No. 225.

60. Because the author himself understands *Āśā* as representing light elsewhere. Cf. "अष्टाशाकरिकर्णतालजमरून्मूर्च्छत्प्रतापानलः" (verse 5 of benediction).

61. Pāṇini in his Sūtra IV. 3·110, refers to one Pārāśarya as the author of a Bhikṣu-sūtra—a word which denotes Vedānta or Brahma-sūtra.

62. Cf. foot-notes to the text following.

63. The Sūtras 1.1.4 and 2.1.1 read together imply that the word *utpatti* is to be understood as 'manifestation', and not 'production'.

64. 1. 4. 134-137.

65. XII. 13-14.

66. Cf. "कृत्वा हरिं प्रेमभाजं प्रियवर्गसमन्वितम् ।
भक्तिर्वशीकरोतीति श्रीकृष्णाकर्षिणी मता" ॥
—Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu, 1. 1. 28.

67. This would remind one of the following *śloka* in the Bhāgavata :

"सालोक्यसार्ष्टिसामीप्यसारूप्यैक त्वमप्युत ।
दीयमानं न गृह्णन्ति विना मत्सेवनं जनाः ॥"

68. The word *brāhma* as referring to happiness in this context must be understood in the sense of *Para-brahmānanda* and not *Pārameṣṭhyānanda*. Cf. Jīva Gosvāmī : "ब्राह्माणीत्यत्र पारमेष्ठ्यानीति तु न व्याख्येयम्, परब्रह्मानन्देनैव तस्य तारतम्यं श्रीभागवतादिषु प्रसिद्धम्."

Cf. also Svāyambhuvāgama :

"ब्रह्मानन्दरसादनन्तगुणितो रम्यो रसो वैष्णवः
तस्मात् कोटिगुणोज्ज्वलश्च मधुरः श्रीगोकुलेन्दो रसः ।"

—Quoted in Rīdhī-tattva-sudhā-nidhi, Ms. in possession of the writer, fol. 10 a.

69. "हरिभक्तिमहादेव्याः सर्वा मुक्त्यादिसिद्धयः ।
भुक्तयश्चाद्भुतास्तस्याश्चेटिकावदनुव्रताः ॥"

70. The reason why Bopadeva mentions *kāma* and other forbidden *vṛttis* of the mind as possible means to *Bhakti* is thus given :

"कामाद् द्वेषाद् भयात् स्नेहाद् यथा भक्त्येश्वरे मनः ।
आवेश्य तदघं हित्वा बहवस्तद्गतिं गताः" ॥

Hemādri points out that these *vṛttis* being natural (स्वभावसिद्ध) there is no possibility of injunction. Injunction (*vidhi*) is operative only where the object is not natural. Hemādri observes that even though *kāma*, etc., are forbidden such is the natural potency of the Supreme Lord that if they are directed towards Him they will enable the soul to shake off its burden of sin and secure union with Him. Loving mercy and Lordship constitute the nature of God, so that the *bhaktas* receive their desired fruits from Him by the mere fact of having their thoughts fixed upon Him and not by resorting to any particular means : "ईश्वरो हि कृपाशालित्वात् प्रभुत्वाच्च कथमपि स्वनिविष्टमन्तःकरणमपेक्ष्य भक्तानां फलं प्रसूते, न तूपायविशेषेणैवेति". It is immaterial whether the means adopted are enjoined in the *Śāstras* or forbidden. The one thing needful is the concentra-

tion of one's thoughts on Him. And this alone forms the essence of *bhakti*. Cf. "येन केनाप्युपायेन मनः कृष्णे निवेशयेत्".

71. This refers to the view of a school of *Alaṅkāra*. Cf. Kāvyaprakāśa, IV, Kārikā 48.

72. Cf. "परत्रानासङ्गं जनयति रतिर्या नियमतः
परस्मिन्नेवास्मिन् समरसतया पश्यत इमम्।
परप्रेमाख्येयं भवति परमानन्दमधुरा
परा भक्तिः प्रोक्ता रस इति रसास्वादनचणैः॥—

Quoted in commentary on Sāhityasāra, p. 130 (Nirnaya Sagar Ed.)

73-74. Cf Muktāphala, Chap. XI : "स नवधा भक्तः, नवविधत्वे हेतुमाह—भक्तीति। भक्तिर्विहिताविहिता च। भक्तिरसस्यैव हास्यशृङ्गारकरुणरौद्रभयानकबीभत्सशान्ताद्भुतवीररूपेणानुभवात्".

75. Cf. Muktāphala, Chap. V : "कर्ममिश्रा त्रेधा".

76. Cf. Ibid, loc. cit. : "सात्त्विकी त्रेधा—कर्मक्षयार्था विष्णुप्रीत्यर्था विधिसिद्ध्यर्था च". This is based on Bhāgavata 3. 29. 10.

77. Cf. Ibid, loc. cit. : "राजसी त्रेधा—विषयार्था यशोऽर्था ऐश्वर्यार्था च". Cf. Bhāgavata 3. 29. 8.

78. Cf. Ibid, loc. cit. : "तामसी त्रेधा—हिंसार्था दम्भार्था मात्सर्यार्था च". Cf. Bhāgavata 3. 29. 8.

79. In the Muktāphala this has been called *Nirguṇā Bhakti*. Its scriptural basis is Bhāgavata 3. 29. 11 : "मद्गुणश्रुतिमात्रेण", etc.

80. Cf. Muktāphala, loc. cit. : "कर्मज्ञानमिश्रा त्रेधा—उत्तमा मध्यमा अधमा च, सत्त्वतारतम्यात्". Cf. Bhāgavata 11. 2. 45-47.

81-82. These two Sūtras sum up the author's views on the four kinds of the so-called 'forbidden *bhakti*' as mentioned in the Muktāphala, Chap. V. They are named : (1) *Kāmajā*, (2) *Dveṣajā*, (3) *Bhayajā* and (4) *Snehajā*. Hemādri explains *Kāma* as "परपरिगृहीताया अनूढाया वा स्त्रियाः परपुरुषे दुरभिसन्धिः". *Dveṣa* and *bhaya* mean, of course, malice (*apriti*) and fear (*trāsa*). *Sneha* is distinguished from *kāma* and interpreted as "सन्निकर्षजः परस्परमकृत्रिमः चित्तबन्धः". As examples of the types of 'forbidden *bhakti*' may be mentioned respectively the names of (1) Gopīs,

(2) Śiśupāla, (3) Kaṁsa and (4) Yudhiṣṭhira, etc., and the Vṛṣṇis.

83. Cf. Bhāgavata IX :

"अहं भक्तपराधीनो ह्यस्वतन्त्र इव द्विज।
साधुभिर्ग्रस्तहृदयो भक्तैर्भक्तजनप्रियः॥

मयि निर्बद्धहृदयाः साधवः समदर्शिनः।
वशे कुर्वन्ति मां भक्त्या सत्स्त्रियः सत्पतिं यथा" ॥

84. This is apparently the so-called Kaṇṭha-kūpa mentioned in the Yoga-sūtra 3. 30.

85. Could this term mean *Pūrṇāhantā* or *Parāhantā* of the Trika and Tripurā systems of philosophy ?

86. Sixteen lobes, according to 'The Serpent Power', p. 146.

87. White only, according to the Ms.

88. Amdā Śakti, according to the Ms.

89. According to the Ms. the *Brahma-cakra* is really within the *Bhramara-guhā* and consists of 108 lobes in which the great Maunins are incessantly occupied with the repetitions of *Ajapā*.

90. The Ms. calls the *Devatā Acintyantāha* and the Śakti *Avyakta*.

91. Dr. B. N. Seal, 'The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus', p. 221; Avalon, 'The Serpent Power', p. 146.

92. "द्वादशान्तं ललाटोर्द्ध्वं कपालोर्द्ध्वावसानकम्।
द्वयङ्गुलोर्द्ध्वं शिरोदेशं परं व्योम प्रकीर्तितम्"—

Quoted by Bhāskara in his Varivasyā-rahasya (commentary on verse 51), p. 94 (Calcutta Ed.).

93. Cf. "नवद्वारे पुरे देही", etc.—Gītā.

94. See, 'Introduction to the Praṇava-gītā'. In 'The Serpent Power', p. 130, the *Suṣumṇā* is said to terminate at the twelve-petalled lotus in the pericarp of the *Sahasrāra*. The Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇopaniṣad and its Rāja-Yoga Bhāṣya refer to the *Suṣumṇā* ending in the *Brahma-randhra* (Mysore Ed., p. 9).

95. "तस्मिन् रन्ध्रे विसर्गं च नित्यानन्दं निरञ्जनम् ।
तदूर्द्ध्वे शङ्खिनी देवी सृष्टिस्थित्यन्तकारिणी ॥
ब्रह्मरन्ध्रं ततः स्मृतम्" ।

96. The date of Brahmānanda is not known. But as he refers to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha in his commentary on the Haṭha-yoga-pradīpikā (1. 4), he must have lived in the beginning of the 18th century or even later.

97. Ibid.

98. On Haṭha-yoga-pradīpikā 1. 5-9.

99. Cf. 'Jalandhara-stotra' attributed to Śabala.

100. In the 'Ananta-vākya' attributed to Carpaṭa, he is called a *Rājā* ('सत्य सत्यं वदति चर्पटो राजेति'), that is, a prince of royal heritage. In the 'Mahā-santa-vākya' Mayanāmatī calls him her brother.

101. About Gogā several traditions are in existence, viz. : (1) He was the son of a Chauhan King of Bagar in Rajputana—born by the grace of Gorakṣanātha; (2) he lived about 1150 A. D.; (3) he was a contemporary of Pṛthvī Rāja Chauhan; (4) he was a great warrior and was killed with his son in a battle with Mahmud of Ghazni in 1024 A. D.

102. Rāma Siṁha was of 'Gauḍa-jāti' ! Jalandhara showed him Grace on the bank of the river 'Kāliya'.

103. It is said that Jalandhara showed special favour to Bhīma and transmitted to him all the Yogic Powers (*Ṛddhayaḥ*) at once. The name of one Bhīma occurs on the list of Siddhas furnished in the Varṇa-ratnākara.

104. The name appears in the 'Mahā-santa-vākya' as well as in Marathi traditions. In the Hindi version of the story Triloka-candra has been corrupted into Tilaka Canda. In some early Bengali works the name occurs as Trailokya-candra.

105. Ādinātha : "योगमार्गात् परो मार्गो नास्ति नास्ति श्रुतौ स्मृतौ"; Viveka-mārtaṇḍa : "योगशास्त्रं पठेन्नित्यं किमन्यैः शास्त्रविस्तरैः", etc.

106. 1. 4.

107. It may be remembered in this connection that some of the Haṭha practices are associated with the names of certain historical persons of this school, e.g., *Matsyendrāsana, Padmāsana* (approved, according to Brahmānanda, by Matsyendra, etc.) with Matsyendra; the *Jālandhara-bandha* with Jālandhara-nātha, and so forth.

108. Haṭha-yoga-pradīpikā 1. 1; Ādinātha taught this *Vidyā* to Pārvatī, as described in the Mahākāla-yoga-śāstra and other works : "गिरिजायै आदिनाथकृतो हठविद्योपदेशो महाकालयोगशास्त्रादौ प्रसिद्ध : "—Jyotsnā.

109. Cf. Yogī Yājñavalkya : "हिरण्यगर्भो योगस्य वक्ता नान्यः पुरातनः," where Rāja-yoga is attributed to Hiraṇyagarbha.

110. The School of Mārkaṇḍeya recognised eight *aṅgas* of Yoga, but the latter School eliminated *yama* and *niyama* from *Yogāṅga* proper and reduced the number to six.

111. The four aspects of Haṭha-yoga are : (a) *Āsana*, (b) *Kumbhaka* or *Prāṇāyāma*, (c) *Mudrā* and (d) *Nādānusandhāna* : "आसनं कुम्भकं चित्रं मुद्राख्यं करणं तथा। अथ नादानुसन्धानम्". *Pratyāhāra, Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna* and *Samādhi*, as enunciated in Yoga treatises, would come under the fourth head.

112. Read in this connection the Paper on "The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy" by the present writer in the 'Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute', Poona.

113. Siddha-siddhānta-saṅgraha, IV. 37.

114. Amaraugha-śāsana attributed to Gorakṣanātha : "यत्र च मूलभगमण्डलान्ते कुण्डलिनीशक्तिर्विनिर्गता तत्र वामभागोद्भवसोमनाडिका दक्षिणभागोद्भवसूर्यनाडिका, चन्द्रो वामाङ्गव्यापकः सूर्यो दक्षिणाङ्गव्यापकः, चन्द्रो वामाङ्गे वामनासापुटं सूर्यो दक्षिणाङ्गे दक्षिणनासापुटम्—इत्येवं सूर्यचन्द्रौ व्यवस्थितौ".

115. Verse 64.

116. Yogabīja, p. 159-160.

117. Cf. Yogabīja, verse 31 :

"ज्ञाननिष्ठो विरक्तो वा धर्मज्ञो विजितेन्द्रियः।
विना योगेन देवोऽपि न मोक्षं लभते प्रिये॥"

The Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, declares the Yoga view thus : "ज्ञानमात्रेण मुक्तिः स्यादित्यालस्यस्य लक्षणम्" etc., Patañjali-pakṣa, verses 4 et seq.

118. The Rasa-hṛdaya says :

"ये चात्यक्तशरीरा हरगौरीसृष्टिजां तनुं प्राप्ताः ।
मुक्तास्ते रससिद्धा मन्त्रगणः किङ्करो येषाम्" ॥

The body referred to here is the immortal (*nitya*), divine body (*divya-tanu*), produced from *Rasa* (mercury and *Abhraka* (mica). The 18 varieties of *Rasakarma*, known as 18 *Saṁskāras*, have to be gone through before the desired perfection in the mercury can be obtained.

119. Cf. 'तस्मात् दिव्यं देहं सम्प्राप्य योगाभ्यासवशात् परतत्त्वे दृष्टे पुरुषार्थप्राप्तिर्भवति"—Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, Raseśvara Section. Here the practice of Yoga is evidently in the sense of Rāja-yoga.

120. Cf. Rasa-hṛdaya :

"गलितानल्पविकल्पः सर्वाध्वविवक्षितश्चिदानन्दः ।
स्फुरितोऽप्यस्फुरिततनोः करोति किं जन्तुवर्गस्य" ॥

In the 'Gopīcandrera Sanyāsa' by Sukur Muhammad we read :

(1) "गुरु भजिले वाछा अमर हय कन्ध" (कन्ध=स्कन्ध=body).
(2) "भजिले गुरुर चरण अमर हय काय".
(3) 'भजन साध नाम जप हइबे अमर".

All these passages tend to show that the principal instruction given to the disciple in the school of the Nāthas is to make the body immortal. In the 'Gorakṣavijaya' of Shaikh Faizulla, there are similar statements, some of which are quoted at random :

(1) "आप गुरु उलटिया योग धर काया तोमार स्थिर करह स्मरण", p. 115.
(2) 'काया साध आमि पुत्र बलि", p. 130.
(3) 'काया साधे मीननाथ वसिया आसने", p. 198.
(4) "योग साधे मीननाथे स्थिर कैल काया", Ibid.

121. In the article we get the expression 'to be continued', at the end, but it was not continued in the further volumes of the Series.

122. Cf. The well-known verse 'आत्मा जन्तुरनीशोऽयं', etc., forms the nucleus, as it were, of the whole subsequent literature on *Īśvara vāda*. The *locus classicus* of this *śloka* is Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, 30, 28. For further details see our note on *Īśvara-vāda* (passim).

123. 1. 7.

124. 1. 28.

125. 1. 528.

126. pp. 10-19.

127. pp. 75-76 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Ed.).

128. pp. 37-38 (Benares Sanskrit Series Ed.).

129. No. 61.

130. 1. 7.

131. Verses 877-883.

132. IV. 1. 14-43.

133. Cf. Śiva-purāṇa, Vāyavīya Saṁhitā, Uttarabhāga, VIII. 14.

134. Dr. Schrader, in his excellent tract "Uber den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Ziet Mahāvīras und Buddhas" (Strassburg, 1902), has attempted to sum up the views of some of these theories.

135. I say almost, as some of the other *Vādas* also (e. g., *yādṛcchā*, etc.) reject the principle of causality altogether.

136. Cf. Bhaṭṭa Utpala (on Bṛhat-saṁhitā 1. 7) "अपरे अन्ये लोकायतिकाः स्वभावं जगतः कारणमाहुः। स्वभावादेव जगद् विचित्रमुत्पद्यते स्वभावतो विलयं याति". See also Schrader, pp. 30-32; Kern, 'Manual of Buddhism', p. 134.

137 As to the reason why and the circumstances under which the name *lokāyata* went out of popular use and was superseded by the term *Cārvāka* nothing is definitely known. But it is

interesting to note that the meaning of the two terms is virtually the same. Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary on Mahābhārata, 1. 91. 48 (Kumbh. Kon. Ed.), p. 164 ; Mādhava's Sarva darśana-saṅgrha (Poona Ed.), p. 1.

138. The word *lokāyata* is explained as Casuistry (*Vitaṇḍāvāda-sattha*, *Vitaṇḍasattha*) by Buddhaghoṣa, and in the Abhidhānappadīpikā. Cf. Nyāya-mañjarī (Vizianagram Ed.), p. 270 :

"न हि लोकायते किञ्चित् कर्त्तव्यमुपदिश्यते ।
वैतण्डिककथैवासौ न पुनः कश्चिदागमः" ॥

In the Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka (Fausboll, 'The Jātaka, VI, p. 286) Vidhura declaims against it ('न सेवे लोकायतिक'), where the commentator expounds the word as "वितण्डसल्लापं लोकायतिकवादं"

But, cf. Aṅguttara-nikāya, III. 58. 1, III. 59. 1 ; Kūṭadanta-sutta 14 ; Assalāyana-sutta (beginning); Milinda-pañha (Trenckner's Ed.), p. 10 ; where the word *lokāyata* stands for a branch of learning distinctive of well-educated Brahmins. It is clear, therefore, from a glance at the testimonies of these literary usages that the word meant originally *Vitaṇḍā* or Casuistry and nothing else, and that its adherents brooked no authority other than their own. That *Vitaṇḍā* too has a recognised place in a well-organised System of Debate seems evident from Nyāya Sūtra 4. 2. 50. What makes it repugnant to the orthodox community, therefore, is impatience of all authority. In Nyāya the function of *Vitaṇḍā* is destructive, negative (*para-pakṣa-pratiṣedha*) and is necessarily subordinate, whereas in *Lokāyata* it is essential; and we know that without a constructive element, without a positive theory to propound (*sva-pakṣa-sthāpanā*), a *Śāstra* ceases to have any great interest and even value. It is this negative element in general characteristic of the Lokāyata school which has earned for it the opprobrius nickname of *Nāstika*.

For some interesting notes regarding this sect as bearing on the Mahābhārata, see Hopkins, 'The Great Epic', p. 86-90.

139. II. 100. 38-39.

140. II. 11.

141. Vinaya Piṭaka, Cullavagga, V. 33. 2.

142. Saddharma Puṇḍarīka, Chap. XIII.

143. Weber, Bhagavat, II. 248.

144. In the commentary on Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka (1. 528), where the *Svabhāva-vāda* is alluded to, Rāmatīrtha attributes the view to the *Nāstikas* and Madhusūdana explains it, saying that it consists in holding that the product comes into existence without any cause: "कारणविनैव कार्यं भवतीति स्वभाव-वादिनः". Agnicit Puruṣottama adds: "स्वभाव एव हेतुरिति चार्वाकाः",

145. See, Nyāya-kusumāñjali, 1. 5. Guṇaratna in the Introduction to his commentary on the 'Saḍdarśana-samuccaya', p. 13, gives also a report on the views of these *Svabhāvavādins* on causation.

146. Commentary on Gīta, 16. 8. (Nirnaya Sagar Ed., p. 641).

147. (a) While denying the effectuating power of a *Nimitta-kāraṇa*, and conceiving matter as moved into action of its own nature *Pariṇāma-svabkāva* the Sāṁkhya too approaches the position of a *Svabhāvavādin*. [Cf. the identification proposed by Nīlakaṇṭha in his commentary on Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 231. 53, p. 1635. But this is historically untenable]. But it has this difference from the above that the necessity of a *nimitta* is not here entirely dispensed with :

(1) The *Puruṣa*, though exercising no volition, is still a *nimitta* by virtue of Its Presence merely. This Presence is indispensable to set into motion all varieties of existence which lie eternally embosomed in the Premordial Unmanifest Matter.

(2) And the efficiency of *adṛṣṭa* is also accepted, in so far as it determines the precise nature of the product, by removing the obstructions which stand between the cause and its manifestation as (i. e., transformation into) the product.

(3) In addition to this, the efficiency of *Puruṣārtha*, viz., *Bhoga* and *Apavarga*, is admitted though as a Final Cause--*uddeśyatvena*. The aim and purpose of all natural evolution is either one or the other, according as the Self is on the path of Enjoyment or of Renunciation. All movement is governed by purpose.

(b) Of the 4 Buddhist systems in Nepal, of which Hodgson gave a brief sketch in his famous essay on the subject (Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVI, pp. 435-440), I feel disposed to identify the *Svābhāvikas*, the *Yātnikas* and the *Kārmikas* with sects which held *svabhāva*, *prayatna* (will) and *karma* (*adṛṣṭa*) respectively as the sole principle of efficiency. The *Aiśvaryikas*, of course, are the well-known *Īśvaravādins*.

148. under 1. 7.

149. p. 13.

150. Śārīra°, Chap. I.

151. IX. 47-52. Cf. Gommaṭasāra, verse 883, where the reading is :

"को करइ कंटयाणं तिक्खत्तं मिगविहंगमादीणं।
विविहत्तं तु सहाओ सव्वं पि य सहाओत्ति" ॥

The verse—

"अग्निरुष्णो जलं शीतं समस्पर्शस्तथानिलः।
केनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात् स्वभावात्तद्व्यवस्थितिः" ॥

—quoted in Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (Poona Ed., p. 4) and in Varadarāja and Vardhamāna on Kusumāñjali—may also be compared.

152. 1. 5

153. Cf. Brahmajāla-sutta, 1. 30-34, Dīgha-nikāya, Vol. I, pp. 28-30; Milinda-pañha, 1. 443.

154. Milinda-pañha, 1. 442.

155. Cf. Udāna, VI. 5.

156. Sumaṅgala-vilāsini, 1. 118.

157. Fausboll, 'The Jātaka', VI, pp. 228, 237.

158. Quoted in Nyāya-kośa, 2nd Ed., p. 971.

159. 1. 7.

160. On Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Chap. 231.53 (Beng. Ed., p. 1635). Cf. Bhaṭṭa Utpala : "परे अन्ये मीमांसका जगतः कर्म कारणं जगुरुक्तवन्तः". The following verse is quoted :

"पूर्वजन्मार्जितं यच्च कर्म पुंसां शुभाशुभम् ।
तदेव सर्वजन्तूनां सृष्टिसंहारकारणम् ॥"

—Commentary on Bṛhat-saṁhitā, 1. 7.

161. It seems to be against these *Niyativādins* or necessitarians that the tirades of the Yogavāśiṣṭha were directed.

162. Fausboll, 'The Jātaka', Vol. V, pp. 228, 238-239.

163. Verse 882.

164. Vairāgya section, Chap. 26.

165 Verse 6 (Nirnaya Sagar Ed., Vol. I, p. 5).

166. This seems to be a counterpart of the remarkable conception which ascribes all rhythm in the universe—nay, all vibrations in it—to the dancing sports of Hara and Pārvatī.

167. In the Paurāṇic view *Kāla* and *Niyati* are but forms of the Divine Energy, or more properly of the Divine Will, so called when this latter is concerned with the creation, maintenance and disruption of universe. It is rather a loose employment of the term, characteristic of the popular literature of the Purāṇas, and may be taken for what it may be worth.
Cf. :

"महामायेत्यविद्येति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च ।
प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येव तवेच्छानन्त चोच्यते ॥"

—Quoted in Vācaspatya, p. 4076.

168. Kālidāsa, in Raghuvaṁśa, VIII. 46, says that nectar and poison may be converted into each other under God's Will : "विषमप्यमृतं क्वचिद् भवेदमृतं वा विषमीश्वरेच्छया". This shows that the

properties of physical objects were believed to be the immediate result of God's Will.

169. Yogavāśiṣṭha, Utpatti section, 54. 22 (Nirnaya Sagar Ed., Vol. I, p. 260).

170. See, Schrader's Introduction, loc. cit, pp. 62-66.

171. Sāṅkhya Sūtra, II. 12.

172. See, Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya, Sūtra 9, p. 22-23 (Srinagar Ed.).

173. Cf. J. C. Chatterjea's excellent summary of the Śaiva doctrines in the 'Kashmir Śaivism', pp. 51, 75–83; Avalon, 'Studies in Mantra-śāstra', part I.

174. For a very able and comprehensive survey of the materials bearing on this theory, see, Schrader, pp. 17-30.

175. Benares Ed., p. 459. Cf. Hopkins, 'The Great Epic'.

176. Commentary on Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka, I. 528.

177. Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha on Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 231. 53. But Jayanta in the Nyāya-mañjarī (p. 138, 9-17) gives a different report of the astronomical conception of Time. In this view, it is urged, time is taken to be a series of movements of the stars and planets on which our notions of succession and simultaneity depend.

I do not see how to reconcile the two accounts except by supposing that they represent two different epochs in the history of astronomical notions.

178. Cf. Guṇaratna, p. 15.

179. Ibid.

180. Nīlakaṇṭha attributes, evidently, this chance-theory to the Ārhatas : "यदृच्छेत्यनियमवादिनामार्हतानाम्" (On Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 231.53).

181. Vizianagram Ed., p. 246.

182. It is hard to say anything conclusively in regard to the identity of this Bṛhaspati with the scholar of the same name who is associated with the foundation of a school of politics.

Bhāsa in the Pratimā (5th Act) and Kauṭilya in his Arthaśāstra refer, the latter very frequently, to Bṛhaspati as the author of an Arthaśāstra; and it is interesting to observe that in the *Vidyā-samuddeśa* section of Kauṭilya's work (Mysore Ed., p. 6), where the views of different *Ācāryas* are cited as to the number and names of sciences fit for study, Bṛhaspati is quoted as holding that *Vārttā* and *Daṇḍanīti* are the only branches of knowledge which deserve to be specially cultivated : *Ānvīkṣikī* and *Trayī*—the sciences dealing with the super-sensuous—are ignored as of subsidiary importance. May not this be a fact of some historical significance ?

183. Cf. Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, p. 210-218; Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (Poona Ed.), p. 4.

184. Noted in the Bhāmatī (Nirnaya Sagar Ed.), p. 767.

185. These 3 Sūtras occur elsewhere also; Varadarāja in his Kusumāñjali-bodhanī quotes the Sūtra marked (b) in the same form; the Sūtra defining the Self appears also in the same form in the Gītā Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara (18.5) and Śiva-sūtra and with slight verbal alterations in the Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya (under Sūtra 8th), thus : "चैतन्यविशिष्टं शरीरमात्मा".

186. It appears that some of the older materialists did actually attribute consciousness to each of the atoms. But the view does not seem to have obtained currency.

187. As to how this peculiar collocation or organisation results it is answered that the union of parents is the immediate cause, and as a period of Universal Dissolution is not admitted the difficulty about the first origin of Life and Consciousness does not arise—Brahmānanda's commentary on Siddhānta-bindu, p. 62.

188. See Nyāya-mañjarī, pp. 439-440.

189. This frame of mind will make intelligible the principles of conduct involved in teachings like 'ऋणं कृत्वा घृतं पिबेत्', etc.

190. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 437.

191. 3. 1. 2; Cf. also Vedānta-sāra (Jīvānanda Ed., 1915), pp. 95-96; Siddhānta bindu with Ratnāvalī (Advaita Mañjarī Ed.), pp. 56-57, 63-64; and more particularly Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, p. 181.

192. Vidvan-mano-rañjinī (Jīvānanda Ed., 1915), pp. 96-97; Cf. Brahmānanda's commentary on Siddhānta-bindu, p. 57.

193. See Vedānta-sāra, p. 97; Nyāya Sūtra 3. 1 16; Nyāya-kandalī, p. 72; Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 441; Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, pp. 181-182. This old materialistic doctrine of *Manaścaitanya* was recently revived with fresh vigour by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Rākhāla Dāsa Nyāyaratna; see his Tattvasāra with his own commentary as well as its refutation by Pandit Hari Dāsa Śāstrī, M. A.

194. Advaita Mañjarī Ed., p. 57.

195. So far this view is exactly what Arcesilaus is said to have asserted in reply to the Stoic's objection that scepticism makes life impossible, viz., "Probabilty is the only rule of practical life". This is the doctrine of Probabilism. The difference, however, lies in this that while Arcesilaus doubts all knowledge, including even sense-perception, the Cārvāka leaves margin for it.

196. The position of the *Lokāyatikas* is thus summarised in the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, p. 211 : "भूतचतुष्टयमेव तत्त्वम्, प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणम्, स्वभाववाद एव पारमार्थिकः".

In the original article we get the mention of 'to be contined' in the end. But we do not get any further continuation of the article in the further volumes of 'The Saravat Bhavana Studies'.

197. Section I, Chap. 28, verses 15-16.

198. "सर्वेषां स्थानभूतत्वाल्लयभूतत्वतस्तथा।
तत्त्वानां महदादीनां स्थलमित्यभिधीयते॥
अधिष्ठानसमस्तस्य स्थावरस्य चरस्य च।
जगतो यद् भवेत् तत्त्वं तद्धि वै स्थलमुच्यते॥

आधारः सर्वशक्तीनां ज्योतिषामखिलात्मनाम् ।
यत् तत्त्वं भवति प्राज्ञैः स्थलं तत् परिगीयते ॥
आलयः सर्वभूतानां लोकानां लोकसम्पदाम् ।
यद् भवेत् परमं ब्रह्म स्थलं तत् प्राहुरक्षरम्" ॥

199. The Śruti also declares that the *Parā Śakti* of the Lord is natural and that it is manifold in character ; Cf. "**परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च**". Śivāditya observes :

"धर्मरूपा परा शक्तिर्धर्मिरूपः परः शिवः ।
तस्यानावृतरूपत्वात् परा शक्तिः परात्मनः ॥
सदा तत्स्वरूपेण भाति भानोरिव प्रभा ।
तादात्म्यमनयोर्नित्य धर्मधर्मिस्वभावतः" ॥

200. Cf. Śivānubhava Śivayogīndra ('Śivādvaita-darpaṇa', Chap. I): "**अस्मन्मते ब्रह्मधर्मरूपाया शक्तेश्चिच्छक्तिरूपत्वं तत्प्रतिबिम्बरूपाया अचिच्छक्तिरूपत्वमित्यङ्गीकारेण चिच्छक्तितत्प्रतिबिम्बाचिच्छक्तयोर्ब्रह्मधर्मविरोधाभावेन शक्तिद्वयं समुच्चित्यैकस्यैव सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्रूपशक्तिविशिष्टत्वस्य लक्षणीकरणे तात्पर्यात्**".

201. 'सन् हृदयप्रकाशो भवनस्य क्रियाया भवति कर्त्ता ।
सैव क्रिया विमर्शः स्वस्था क्षुभिता च विश्वविस्तारा" ॥

202. So in Vaiṣṇavism, more particularly in the Gauḍiya and Vallabhīya schools, He is declared to be comprising within Himself the Lover and the Beloved both (cf. Rādhikopaniṣad). The Advaita Śaiva and Advaita Vaiṣṇava are really on a par in their outlook on the Supreme Being, except for the attitude with which each approaches Him in relationship. The true Śaiva is a devotee and a worshipper, but a Vaiṣṇava is nothing if not a lover. *Aiśvarya* or the sense of Divine Majesty prevails in the former, *Mādhurya* or Divine Fellowship in the latter. To the Śaiva *Sadhakā* God reveals Himself as the Father, the Lord and the Teacher ; to the Vaiṣṇava He is the Friend and Beloved, and sometimes also the Child.

203. "लीयते गम्यते यत्र येन सर्वं चराचरम् ।
तदेव लिङ्गमित्युक्तं लिङ्गतत्त्वपरायणैः" ॥

204. "अनाद्यन्तमजं लिङ्गं तत्पदं परमं प्रति ।
यद् गच्छति महाभक्त्या तदङ्गमिति निश्चितम् ॥

सम्भवेत् परमं तत्त्वं तद्गततत्परायणः।
अङ्गस्थलमिति प्राहुरङ्गतत्त्वविशारदाः॥
अमिति ब्रह्मचिन्मात्रं गच्छतीति गमुच्यते।
रूथ्यतेऽङ्गमिति प्राज्ञैरङ्गतत्त्वविचिन्तकैः" ॥

205. "सर्वज्ञत्वं च तृप्तत्वं तथानादिप्रबोधिता॥
स्वतन्त्रताऽपि चालुप्तशक्तिताऽनन्तशक्तिता॥
इत्येतैर्लक्षणैः षड्भिः शिवाङ्गमिति लक्ष्यते।
तस्मादङ्गस्थलं साक्षादात्मैवायं न संशयः"—Anubhava-sūtra.

These terms are explained in Śrīkaṇṭha Śivācārya's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra 1. 1. 2 (Mysore Ed., pp. 10-12). See also Appya Dīkṣita's Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā on the above (Kumbhakonam Ed., pp. 121-125).

206. "यद् यद्रूपमुपास्यात्र [=पास्यत्वात्] शिवो व्रजति शक्तिमान्।
उपासकत्वतश्चात्मा तत्तदाप्नोति भक्तिमान्॥
यथा स्वरूपमादत्ते पूज्यत्वेन महेश्वरः।
पूजकत्वेन चात्मायमेतद्रूपमनुव्रजेत्॥
यथा स्वरूपमादत्ते साध्यत्वात् परमेश्वरः।
साध्यकत्वादसावात्मा तत्तदास्थाय तिष्ठति॥
यद्यत्स्वरूपमादत्ते गुरुत्वेनाम्बिकापतिः।
शिष्यत्वेनायमात्मा च तत्तद्रूपमुपासते" ॥

Cf. the first verse of Utpala's 13th Stotra :

"संग्रहेण सुखदुःखलक्षणं मां प्रति स्थितमिदं शृणु प्रभो।
सौख्यमेव भवतां समागमः स्वामिना विरह एव दुःखिता" ॥

Kṣemarāja in his commentary explains the term *samāgama* as *samāveśyaikadhvaṁ* and *viraha* as *svarūpāpratyabhijñānaṁ*.

207. In the Śiva-purāṇa (Vāya. Saṁ., Pt. 2, Chap. 13) the verse appears in the following slightly altered form :

"दीयते येन विज्ञानं क्षीयते पाशबन्धनम्।
तस्मात् संस्कार एवायं दीक्षेत्यपि च कथ्यते" ॥

The Rudrayāmala and Merutantra also contain the same definition of *Dīkṣā* (see Purāścaryārṇava, Benares Ed., p. 40); so the Devī-bhāgavata XII 7. 5. Cf. also Śiva Sūtra III. 28, with Kṣemarāja's Vimarśiṇī (pp. 114-115) and Bhāskara's Vārttika (pp. 69-70); Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi, Chap. VI. 11-12, (p. 85).

208. Cf. Anubhava-sūtra, V. 40. 57. Also Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi, VI. 13-14.

"गुरोरालोकमात्रेण हस्तमस्तकयोगतः।
यः शिवत्वसमावेशो वेधादीक्षेति सा मता।

Śrīkaṇṭhadārya adds: "गुरोदृष्टिर्गर्भे स्थित्वः करकमले समुत्पन्नस्यात्मनः चिन्मयस्वरूपोपदेशो वेधादीक्षा"।

209. Chap. III

210. Cf. Anubhava-sūtra, V. 41, 58; Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi, VI. 14; Śivādvaita-darpaṇa, Chap. III.

211. *Kriyā* refers to what is offered by the *Guru* to the disciple in his hand, i. e, the *Śivaliṅga*. The rule is that an auspicious *liṅga* (one made of crystal, moon or sun stones, or one prepared from the rock of Śrīśaila or obtained from the bed of the Narmadā river) has to be secured, sanctified and worshipped, and thereupon the teacher has to draw forth by means of the so-called *Aṅkuśa-mudrā* from the head (i. e. *Sahasrāra*) of the disciple the *Śaivīkalā* and infuse it into the *liṅga*. This process resembles that of lighting one fire from another already burning (प्रदीपाद् दीपान्तरमिव). He has then to draw out in a similar manner the *Jīvakalā* or Vital Power (*Prāṇa*) of the disciple and settle it on the *liṅga*. The two *kalās* are thus balanced with each other, and the *liṅga* is then placed in the hand of the disciple with instruction to hold it on his body.

212. This is practically an explication of the central teaching of the Iṣopaniṣad Cf. the idea involved in its first couplet 'त्यक्तेन तेन भुञ्जीथाः' etc. It is compromise in spirit between the absolute rejection (*saṁnyāsa*) of Vedānta and the utter self-indulgence of the sensual life. (For a masterly analysis of this Upaniṣad and its exposition *vide* A. Ghose's papers in "Ārya", Vol. I). Cf. Gītā, III. 12.

213. From this it is apparent that the two acts—or rather the two attitudes—are not so much as two distinct attitudes as two phases of the same indescribable reality, so that what is *Bhakti* (Faith) on the part of *Jīva* is really the

other side of what is *Prasāda* (Grace) from the view-point of Īśvara. There is no causal relation between the two. This will remind one of the famous statement in the Bhāgavata wherein it is said that whatever is offered to the Lord comes back reflected to the soul and that the best way of securing a thing is to sacrifice it unto the Lord :

"नैवात्मनः प्रभुरयं निजलाभपूर्णो मानं जनादविदुषः करुणो वृणाते ।
यद्यज्जनो भगवते विदधीत मानं तच्चात्मने प्रतिमुख्य यथा मुखश्री": ॥

The two acts are really simultaneous. See, Madhusūdana Sarasvati's discussion on this point in his commentary on the Gītā, VII. 14 (Nirnaya Sagar Ed , p. 360) Cf. Miestar Eckhart :

"Thy opening and His entering are but one moment (Underhill, Mysticism, p. 159).

214. "आप्तकामस्य सुखिनः कामाचारबहिर्मुखाः ।
प्रवृत्ता लौकिकाः सर्वे प्रययुर्नाशमात्मनि ॥
प्रणष्टेष्वेषु सर्वेषु स्वेच्छाचारेण यत्कृतम् ।
तच्छिवार्चनमेव स्याद् यद्भुक्तं तच्छिवार्चितम् ॥
शिवरूपतया भाति यस्य सर्वं स्वभावतः ।
स्वेच्छाचारसमाचारः तस्य चार्चा हि शूलिनः" ॥

215. "बन्धमुक्त्योरभावे हि भक्तिरुक्ता निरर्गला ।
न बन्धे मोचने चापि लीनयोश्च समुच्चये ।
न योगो न तपोऽन्यच्च क्रमः कोऽपि न विद्यते ।
अमाये शिवमार्गेऽस्मिन् भक्तिरेका प्रशस्यते" ॥ —Anubhava-sūtra.

The latter verse occurs with some variation in Utpala's Śiva-stotrāvali, *stora* no. 1 (Verse 18).

216. "अद्वैतभक्तियुक्तस्य योगिनः सकला क्रिया ।
अस्ति दग्धपटन्यायात् क्रियामात्रा न हि क्रिया ॥
यथा नानाविधा नद्यो नानाविधजला अपि ।
स्यन्दमाना इमाः सर्वाः पारावारं समाश्रिताः ॥
तदरूपैणैव दृश्यन्ते नामरूपे विहाय च ।
तथाद्वैतं समाश्रित्य क्रिया नानाविधा अपि ॥

अद्वैततत्त्वरूपेण दृश्यन्ते भक्तियोगतः।
क्रियाकारस्वरूपेण प्रतीता अपि सर्वदा।
न केवल क्रिया ह्यस्य लीलामात्राः स्वभावतः" ॥

217. Cf. "धर्मादिपुरुषार्थानां चतुर्णां परतः परा।
पञ्चमः पुरुषार्थो हि भक्तिः शैवी सनातनी" ॥ —Anubhava-sūtra, VIII. 78.

218. "स्वच्छन्दाचारवृत्तिन्या भक्त्या यत् कृतमर्चनम्।
यद्भुक्तमर्पितं लिङ्गे सत्यमेव मयोदितम् ॥
गन्धपुष्पादिगन्धस्य ग्रहणं तस्य पूजनम्।
षड्रसास्वादनं तस्य नैवेद्याय प्रकल्पितम् ॥
इन्द्रियाकारभासा सा विषयाकारभासनम्।
क्रीडया देवता भुङ्क्ते स्वत इत्यर्चनं कृतम् ॥
लिङ्गदेही शिवात्मायं लिङ्गाचारो न लौकिकः।
सर्वं लिङ्गमयं रूपं लिङ्गेन सममश्नुते ॥
सर्वाङ्गं लिङ्गमेव स्यादन्नपानं यदर्पितम्।
प्रसादः तृप्तिरेव स्यात् सर्वं लिङ्गमयं भवेत् ॥
एवमद्वैतभक्त्यैव प्रसादः सर्वतोमुखः।
प्रसिध्यति ततः सर्वमात्मरूपेण दृश्यते" ॥

219. "कर्त्ता कारयिता चैव करणं कार्यमेव च।
सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
भोक्ता भोजयिता भोग्यं भोगोपकरणान्यपि।
सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
ग्राहकश्च तथा ग्राह्य ग्रहणं सर्वतोमुखम्।
सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
शरीरमिन्द्रियं प्राणा मनोबुद्धिरहंकृतिः।
सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
विधयश्च निषेधाश्च निषिद्धकरणान्यपि।
सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात्" ॥

220. The name is variously spelt as Sondala, Saundala, Sondaḍa and Saundaḍa.

221. Benares Sanskrit Library's Ms., fol. 38, lines 5-6.

222. Fol 10a, lines 5-6.

223. It had been a famous and familiar maxim even in the past. The wording of the verse bears such a close resemblance to the style of Vākyapadīya that even without any verification one would feel inclined to set it down to the authorship of Bhartṛhari. But really confirmatory evidence is not altogether wanting. Thus, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his Laghu-mañjūṣā (Chowkhamba Ed , p 377) as well as in his Parama-laghu-mañjūṣā (Benares Ed. of 1913, p. 29) ascribes it in the plainest terms to Bhartṛhari. And it seems to be possible, on the consideration of the logical context, that it occurred somewhere in the second *Kāṇḍa*, where many *ślokas* are missing in the printed text of Gaṅgādhara's edition (Benares Sanskrit Series).

Bālambhaṭṭa in his commentary, called Kalā, on the Mañjūṣā, quotes the whole verse as in the Nyāya-kaustubha and assigns it to *Khaṇḍana-kāra* (Chowkhamba Ed.,p.380). But in the Chowkhamba edition of the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya (p. 168), though the reading of the first line is the same, the second line reads differently, thus : 'अबाधात्तु प्रमामत्र स्वतः-प्रामाण्यनिश्चलाम्'. And in the Medical Hall Press edition of this work (p. 104) the first line too has a different reading, the same as in Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's commentary. It may be further pointed out that this *śloka* is also found in Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika with the following reading of the second line (the first line being identical with that in Nyāya-sāra-vicāra) : 'तेनोत्सर्गैः स्थिते तस्य दोषाभावात् प्रमाणता' (Verse 6 under Codīna-sūtra, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 46). The above will serve to reveal the state of confusion existing in the minds of the older writers as to the the original source of this oft-quoted couplet. And I believe this was due to the fact that Vākyapad ya had even then gone out of general use.

224. See, Tattvacintāmaṇi, *Śabda-khaṇḍa*, Bib. Ind. Ed., p., 276, line 1 and Mathurānātha's note upon it, p. 276, line 12.

225. "धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रो हि धर्मः धर्मिविक्रियैवैषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्च्येत इति। तत्र धर्मस्य धर्मिणि वर्त्तमानस्यैव अध्वसु अतीतानागतवर्त्तमानेषु भावान्यथात्वं भवति न द्रव्यान्यथात्वम्"—Yoga-bhāṣya, III. 13.

226. In popular parlance, however, one *dharma* may be described as the *dharma* of another.

227. The arguments in Sāṁkhya-kārikā, viz., 'उपादाननियमात्', etc., are in consonance with our ordinary experience which justifies this restriction. An effect, to be brought forth, requires an appropriate material (and appropriate subsidiary causes). This is so, because we are dealing with limited *Prakṛti* and with limited human resources. But to the *Yogin*, to whom the entire *Prakṛti* is open, it is easy to evolve any thing from any thing.

228. Yoga-vārttika, pp. 260-261.

229. Cf. Yoga-bhāṣya : "गुणस्वाभाव्यं तु प्रकृतिकारणमुक्तं गुणानाम्", under Sūtra, III. 13.

230. The atoms remain the same, but their qualities change.

231. अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणामः"—Yoga-bhāṣya, III. 13.

232. "उपजनापायशाली धर्म एव च विकार इत्युच्यते"—Brahma-vidy -bharaṇa, p 146 (Adv. Mañj. Ed.).

233. III. 13.

234. "धर्मिणोऽपि धर्मान्तरमवस्था, धर्मस्यापि लक्षणान्तरमवस्था इत्येक एव द्रव्यपरिमाणो भेदेनोपदर्शित इति". Again : "परमार्थस्तु एक एव परिणामः". Bālarāma points out (p. 210, foot-note 3) that the three *pariṇāmas* are really cases of *avasthā-pariṇāma* or they are all to be labelled as *dharma-pariṇāma*, since all the mutations are in the *dharmī* as their permanent abode.

235 "धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामैः शून्यं न क्षणमपि गुणवृत्तमवतिष्ठते, चलं च गुणवृत्तम्"—Yoga-bhāṣya, III. 13.

236. P. Brahmānanda Bhāratī, in his Sarala-sāṁkhya, p. 17, seems to deny that in the state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) there could be *pariṇāma*. He says that the admission of *pariṇāma*, even if *sadṛśa*, would militate against the theory of Equilibrium of *Guṇas* in *Pralaya*, for *pariṇāma* (*vaiṣamya*) and *sāmya* are contradictory. Bhāratī's objection seems to me unfounded. It rests on a misunderstanding of the meaning of *pariṇāma*.

237. Cf. Conservation of energy.

238. Yoga-bhāṣya, III. 14.

The question is : How, then, can the *Yogin* call back the past, though he does not usually call back, but revokes only a phantom, an exact duplicate, of the past.

239. Cf. the original meaning of the term conception.

240. Cf Yoga-sūtra, IV. 32.

241. Yoga-sūtra, II. 22.

242. This is the doctrine of *Anādi-saṁyoga* : "अनादिसंयोगः द्रग्दर्शन-शक्त्योर्नित्यत्वादनादिः संयोगो व्याख्यातः"—Yoga-bhāṣya, II. 22. The Naiyāyikas, as a rule, reject the possibility of contact being without a beginning. According to them *Saṁyoga*, which is अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः, must be due to motion, either of one or of both. But *Ajasaṁyoga* also is sometimes admitted. Cf. Nyāya-vārttika, p. 466. For eternity of *Saṁsāra*, see Nyāya-bhāṣya, 3. 1. 27; 4. 1. 2; Nyāya-vārttika, 1. 1. 2; 1. 1. 19; Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 499. The relation which is expressed in Yoga as a contact between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (or rather *Sattva*, i.e., *Citta*) appears in Nyāya as the contact of the Self with the *Manas* (Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 499) or with the body (Nyāya-bhāṣya, 3. 1. 27).

243. Pañcaśikha in Yoga-bhāṣya, II. 22.

244. Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, II. 1. 36.

245. Cf. also Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, 1. 3. 30.

246. By Y. Mahalinga Sastri, B. A., B. L., Mylapore.

247. Vol. II, Pts. 3-4, pp. 226-237.

248. The present writer pointed out long ago : "Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, in his Preface to the Vādivinoda, pp. 1-2, places Śaṅkara about Saṁvat 1585. But in view of the positive evidence adduced above it is no longer possible to hold this date as true"—The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. III, p. 151 (Reprint Series No. 2, p 59, fn. 230).

249. In my paper on "Mīmāṁsī Manuscripts in the Government Sanskrit Library (Benares)" I assumed (vide p. 178 of The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. VI; Reprint Series No. 3, p. 236) 1587–1658 A.D. as the probable date of Appaya Dīkṣita. But this may now be rejected in favour of the date proposed by Mr. Y. Mahalinga Sastri. Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I, the second son of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, was the author of a criticism on Appaya's Vidhi-rasāyana. Śaṅkara's time is about the end of the 16th century, his father's commentary on the Vṛtta-ratnākara having been composed in 1545 A. D. This too shows that Appaya lived in the 16th century and not later. This Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa was one of the *Gurus* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (Indian Antiquary, 1912, p. 11). Cf. also Bhaṭṭa Vaṁśa Kāvya, Kānta Bhaṭṭa. Kamalākara, Śaṅkara's by-nephew is also quoted by Appaya Dīkṣita (S. K. De's Sanskrit Poetics, Vol I, p. 266). It may be pointed out in this connection that Dr. Keith too accepts the 16th century as the probable age of Appaya Dīksita (See, 'A History of Sanskrit Literature', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928, pp. 396 & 481).

250. See, 'History of Vedanta Philosophy', by Swami Prajnananda, Vol. III, pp. 730, 750.

Rāma Tīrtha was also the author of a commentary on Śaṅkara's Upadeśasāhasrī.

The *Guru* of Rāma Tīrtha was one Kṛṣṇa Tīrtha, as mentioned in Rāma's commentaries on the Upadeśasāhasrī and Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka, There is a manuscript of Tattva-candrikā, a commentary on Ānandagiri's Vivaraṇa on Śaṅkarācārya's Pañcīkaraṇa, by an unnamed author, who describes himself as the pupil of Kṛṣṇa Tīrtha and Jagannāthāśrama (India Office Catalogue, p. 733). If this Kṛṣṇa Tīrtha is the same as the *Guru* of Rāma Tīrtha, Rāma Tīrtha would be a contemporary of Nṛsiṁhāśrama, the pupil of Jagannāthāśrama. Nṛsiṁha was living in 1546 A. D. Hence the year 1550 A D. assigned to Rāma Tīrtha is quite plausible.

251. Khaṇḍa Deva refuted the views of Āpa Deva II and of Ananta Deva II in his Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā and Mīmāṁsā-kaustubha. Śambhu Bhaṭṭa, Khaṇḍa Deva's pupil, says plainly in his Prabhāval , a commentary on the Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā : "यत्तु न्यायप्रकाशे सप्तमीबहुव्रीहिराश्रितः तस्य दूषणं कौस्तुभे द्रष्टव्यम्," and "यत्तु भाट्टालङ्कारकृता+ + +तदुपेक्षितं पूज्यपादैः" Khaṇḍa Deva must have been a very old man when he died, for he was the *Guru* of Peru Bhaṭṭa, the father of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, who belongs to the middle of the century.

252. At the end of the article we get the mention 'to be continued,' but it did not continue further in the Series.

253. The list of the Muṇḍamālā Tantra being taken as standard, the three and six additional names which occur in Sammohana Tantra are : (i) Caṇḍeśvarī, Laghu Śyāmā and Tripuṭā, and (ii) Vanadurgā, Śūlinī, Aśvārūḍhā, Trailokyavijayā, Vārāhī and Annapūrṇā.

254. *Paṭala* 1.

255. This is according to Toḍala Tantra, but the Śakti-saṅgama names the Bhairava as Kāla.

256. Cf. Puraścaryārṇava.

257. The story runs that Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others being unable to confer Brāhmaṇahood on Viśvāmitra, Nārada advised the latter to invoke Mahādeva. Viśvāmitra acted accordingly and received the one-syllabled *mantra* of Kālī from Śiva, but for all his hard penances he could not propitiate the Goddess. Viśvāmitra felt disconcerted and cursed the Goddess to be deprived of all worship. Śiva explained to the saint that his mode of worship was improper and that he should correct it in the way he suggested. This being done, the Goddess was pleased and appeared in company of Śiva to Viśvāmitra who asked for the boon, viz., attainment of the glory of a Brāhmaṇa. Kālī looked at Śiva, who embraced the saint and conferred on him what he was so long striving for.

258. p. 724.

259. This is the *Sakala* form of the Goddess, which has three distinct aspects, viz., gentle (*saumyā*), rough (*ugrā*) and extermely fierce (*mahākrūrā*). The *Niṣkala* form is unique.

260-261. Tārā, with the initial and final syllables removed is Nīla-sarasvat. (Mantra-mahodadhi, fol. 28). Ekajaṭā also is little different from Tārā so far as the *Mantra* is concerned. Its *Mantra* is either 5-syllabled (e. g., in the case of Nārāyaṇa's *Mantra*) or 22-syllabled, in which case the *Ṛṣi* is Patañjali. The expulsion of Divodāsa from Benares is said to have been effected by the power of Tārā *Mantra*.

262. The *Mantra* is 32-syllabled (Mantra-mahodadhi, fol. 39). This is generally known as Māhāvidyā.

263. The *Mantra* is 2-syllabled. The Goddess is described as white-complexioned and ten armed—Mantra-mahodadhi, fol. 527.

264. Sarasvatī is not exactly identical with Vāgīśvarī in form or *Mantra*. There are several *Mantras* of Sarasvatī—viz., (i) 10-syllabled, of which the *Ṛṣi*, *Chandas* and *Devatā* are Kaṇva, Virāṭ and Vāgīśvarī; (ii) 11-syllabled; (iii) 38-syllabled (worshipped by the Jains);(iv) 1-syllabled (Mantra-mahodadhi, fol. 531). The form of the Goddess corresponding to the *Mantra* (i) is white-complexioned, standing on a white lotus (Mantra-mahodadhi, fol. 529); the Goddess of (ii) is described as white-complexioned and either riding on a swan or holding a *Japamālā* and a pair of lotuses in hands (Mantra-mahodadhi, fols. 530–531).

265. 11th *taraṅga*.

266. *Paṭala* XVIII.

267. *Paṭalas* I & II.

268. i. e , in Kāmākhyā (in Assam).

269. Or to the Kāmākhyā hills in Assam, according to Brahmayāmala.

270. The Brahma-yāmla described the *Cīnācāra* in the following terms :

"स्नानादिर्मानसः शौचो मानसः प्रवरो जपः।
पूजनं मानसं दिव्यं मानसं तर्पणादिकम्॥
सर्व एव शुभः कालो नाशुभो विद्यते क्वचित्।
न विशेषो दिवारात्रौ न सन्ध्यायां महानिशि॥
वस्त्रासनस्थानगेहदेहस्पर्शादिवारिणः।
शुद्धिं न चाचरेत् तत्र निर्विकल्प मनश्चरेत्॥
नात्र शुद्ध्याद्यपेक्षास्ति न चामेध्यादिदूषणम्।
सर्वदा पूजयेद् देवीमस्नातः कृतभोजनः॥
महानिश्यशुचौ देशे बलिं मन्त्रेण दापयेत्।
स्त्रीद्वेषो नैव कर्त्तव्यो विशेषात् पूजनं स्त्रियाः॥"

271. Cf. Puraścaryārṇava, p. 782.

272. Cf. Prāṇa-toṣiṇī, pp. 720-722.

273 Cf. Ibid, p. 719.

At the end of the article in the old Series we get the mention 'to be continued', but it was not further continued in the Series.

274. This section was originally published in open leaves. But the edition became scarce and the growing interest in Indian philosophical thought rendered a republication of the text necessary.

275. Preface to the edition of the Kalpasūtras of Paraśurāma as published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXII, in 1923.

276. Preface to Paraśurāma's Kalpasūtras, p. x.

277. P. Lakṣamaṇa was well aware of the weakness of his arguments, for he admits that the Kalpasūtras are not in a dialogue form He adds, however, that the concluding passage of the work shows that it is a dialogue between the Master and his pupil (Ibid, p. X). But it must be pointed out that there appears to be nothing in the text of the Sūtras to warrant this inference.

278. "इह खलु सकलागमाचार्यचक्रवर्ती साक्षात् शिव एव अनुरूपागर्भसम्भूतः क्रोधभट्टारकाख्यदुर्वासा महामुनिः" etc.

279. See, Purascaryārṇava, Sundari-stava, p. 20 : "कदाचिदाद्या ललिता पुंरूपा कृष्णविग्रहा", etc.

280. This is the view of Śakti-saṅgama Tantra. But in the Vaiṣṇavism associated with the name of Śrī Caitanya, Lalitā is represented, not as identical with Kṛṣṇa—which position is reserved for Rādhā—but as a *Śakti* whose function is to preside over *Nikuñja*, where the eternal sport of the Divine Couple takes place and from where all are shut out. Cf. Rādhā-tattva-sudhā-nidhi for further particulars.

281. Muṇḍamālā Tantra, *Paṭala* 1.

282. Ibid.

283. *Paṭala* 1.

284. Puraścaryārṇava, pp. 13-14.

285. It should always be borne in mind that the Absolute suffers no change, not even when through its power it assumes limitation. It remains always pure and undivided, although to those whose vision is dimmed it appears as multiple.

286. The work has been published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, No. XV, 1920.

287. Cf. Ath. Saṁ. 11. 2. 28; Vāja. Saṁ. 16. 28; Pāraskara-gṛhya-sūtra, 3. 8; Āsvalāyana-gṛhya-sūtra, 4. 8.

288. VI. 86-91.

289. The Śaiva sect was led by Śakti, son of Vasiṣṭha and *Guru* of Gopāyana. The Kāladamana sect was represented by Āpastamba, the *Guru* of Kṛtheśvara. Dhanada (=Kuvera) headed the Kāpālika sect and had a disciple, named Arṇodara, who was a Śūdra by caste. Dhanada is described as a *Mahāvratin*.

290. Vāyavīya-saṁhitā, 2nd Chap.

291. Śiva-purāṇa, V (a) 28. 15-16.

292. p. 10.

293. The editor in the foot-note (p. 100) adds that it is a Yoga work of the *Hādi* class belonging to Śaiva school.

294. The Sanskrit name of this place was Kāyāvarohaṇa, literary the place where the body (of Śiva) descended. It refers to the story that Śiva incarnated himself in this place in the form of a human figure holding a club in hand. A temple of Lakulīśa is still to be seen here. An inscription is found in the neighbourhood of the temple of Ekaliṅgajī, at a distance of 14 miles from Udaipur. The Śiva-purāṇa (Santkumāra Saṁhitā, 31. .2) refers to Lakuli of Kayāvarohaṇa as one of the 68 forms of Śiva.

295. The story is given in the usual form of a prediction.

In this Inscription, however, the name of the third disciple, as given above, appears as Maitreya.

296. Farquhar believes that Lakulīśa was a historical person and lived between the ages of the Mahābhārata and Vāyu-purāṇa (Rel. Literature, p. 147). The age of this Purāṇa is taken to be 300-400 A.D. Hence Lakulīśa is placed at an earlier date. Fleet says (J. R. A. S , 1907, p. 419) that the figure of Śiva with club found on the coins of Kushan King Huvishka represents Lakulīśa.

297. Ratnaṭīkā observes that its character as a *guṇa* is from the standpoint of Pāśupata System, but according to Vaiśeṣika it would be *dravya*.

298. *Hasita* is *aṭṭahāsa*—side splitting laughter, with lips etc., gaping wide.

299. *Gīta* refers to singing of songs in praise of Śiva and in accordance with the canon of the Science of Music.

300 Dancing must be according to the dictates of Nāṭya-śāstra.

301. *Huḍukkāra* is the utterance of the sound '*Huḍuka*' in the manner of an Ox-bellowing. This is a sanctifying sound produced from the contact of tongue with palate.

302. Ratnaṭīkā, p. 10.

303. This anteriority of the Reality in its essence to the creative process is to be regarded more as a logical than as a temporal antecedence For creation, being in sense an eternal process, is co-existent with the Absolute and marks a moment in its being. The temporary process involved in creation is really a consequence brought on by the action of Time on the eternal *Kalās* thrown into its vortex under a transcendent influence.

304. The Śakti-sūtra ascribed to Agastya says: "चिद्वह्निः अवरोहपदे छन्नोऽपि चिन्मात्रया मेयेन्धनं प्रुष्यति" The commentator observes here in regard to the significance of the word *mātrā*—"कवलयन्नपि न सार्वात्म्येन ग्रसते, अपि त्वंशेन संस्कारात्मना तत् स्थापयति'. From this it is evident that even in the state of *Pralaya* or Periodic Repose t e Universe does not disappear altogether, but exists in a subtle condition, only to re-emerge in a concrete form when the subsequent creative stage sets in. In this state the souls which are not yet favoured with saving knowledge and are invested with *adṛṣṭa* continue in the *caitanya*, together with the grosser and subtler elementary matters: "सुषुप्तिकाले जीवस्येव पूर्वसृष्टिदशायां ये तावज्ज्ञानानुदयात्र मुक्तिसम्पन्ना जीवराशयः ते तददृष्टानि पञ्चभूतानि स्थूलसूक्ष्माणि च कार्पासबीजे पटा इव सूक्ष्मरूपेण प्रलयकालीनब्रह्मणि तिष्ठन्ति"—Bhāskara Rāya, Setubandha.

305. Bhartṛhari, in his Vākyapadīya speaks of a supreme state as an unrevealed background of the triple manifestation of the world and of what reveals it: "त्रय्या वाचः परं पदम्". He refers evidently to the *Parā Vāk* or *Śabda Brahma* which eternally reveals the Transcendent or *Para Brahma*. It should be noted that this revelation does not divest the Absolute of Its transcendent character, it is never caught in time or in a psychic process.

306. Cf. the Śruti: "नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यः", etc.

307. The expression 'in a sense' is meant to bar out the perpetual activity of the *Śakti* which is co-extensive with and equivalent to Eternal Rest.

308. Cf. Ājñāvatāra: "स्वेच्छयैव जगत् सर्वं निगिरत्युद्गिरत्यपि".

309. This corresponds partially to the *Para Brahma* of Vedānta with the difference that it has *svātantrya*, whereas the latter is neutral.

310. The appearance of *Liṅga* out of the *Aliṅga* is everywhere a similar process. The Sāṁkhya system conceives the *Prakṛti* as *Aliṅga* (unmanifest) and the *Mahat*, the 'first begotten' one, as the *Linga*, which emanates from *Prakrti* out of its union with *Puruṣa* The origin of *Liṅga* body out of the Causal-body is also similar.

311. The three sides of this triangle stand for three kinds of *Vāk* (viz., *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*), three cosmic functions (viz., Creation, Maintenance and Destruction), three aspects of *Śiva* (viz., *Vāmā*, *Jyeṣṭhā* and *Raudrī* or Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra) and three aspects of *Śakti* (viz., *Icchā*, *Jñāna* and *Kriyā*).

312. "शिवशक्तिरिति ह्येकं तत्त्वमाहुर्मनीषिणः".

313. At the end of the article we get mention of 'to be continued'; but it did not further continue in the Series.

314. That the cessation of the modalities of the Mind is in itself no criterion of Wisdom is recognised by all the *Śāstras* and by the people who have some experience of the path. The system propounded by Patañjali makes a clear-cut distinction between the cessation due to physiological or even psychological causes (भवप्रत्यय असम्प्रज्ञात समाधि) and that which follows as a matter of course from the rise of Intution or *Prajñā* (उपायप्रत्यय असम्प्रज्ञात समाधि). Intution is the legitimate offspring of the *Samprajñāta Samādhi* which developes itself steadily and through continued practice from proper *Sādhanas* (*upāya*), viz., *Śraddhā*, *Vīrya* and *Smṛti*. The ascending courses of this *Samādhi* serve to clarify the Intution and liberate it from the discursive elements of the lower nature The purity of Intution implies an effacement of all the *Saṁskāras* and inhibition of all the *Vṛttis* and its own disappearance in the end. This is Yoga proper, from the standpoint of Patañjali, in which the individual spirit,

standing on itself, becomes the witness of the Nature, in itself and in its becoming (though the process of becoming for the observing subject has stopped). The Buddhists also were aware of this distinction in *Nirodha* The difference between the *Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* and *Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* which has been described with such details in general treatises of some of the Buddhist sects is in reality this very difference in another shape. One is reminded in this connection of the interesting story of the Buddhist scholar Kamalaśila, the disciple of Śāntarakṣita, who was invited from Magadha to Tibet by its King Thi Shron Den tsan and had a learned controversy on this very question with the Great Chinese Monk Mahāyāna Hoshang (900 A. D.). Hoshang maintained that if the mind was kept absolutely free from *vikalpanā* emancipation from worldly existence (*bhava*) was possible. This freedom from thought or *vikalpanā* corresponded in his opinion to the state of *nirālamba* which was the ideal to be aimed at. But the position of Kamalaśīla was that the absolute negation of mental activity implied an absence of *Pratyavekṣaṇa Prajñā* (critical knowledge) without which perfect knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*), which was transcendent (*loka-vigata*), could not arise. The inactivity of the mind or its unconscious state could not ensure eternal freedom from *vikalpas* for which the rise of transcendent wisdom through *Pratyavekṣaṇa Prajñā* was indispensable.

315. At the end of the article we find the mention 'to be continued', but it did not continue further in the Series.

316. There are different ways of computing the number of births in each of the main divisions of life. The Garuḍa-purāṇa (Chap. II) speaks of the four *Yonis*, each of which comprises two million and ten thousand sub-species.

317. Quoted in Bengali Viśva-kośa, Vol. XVI, p. 89.

318. 1. 56. (in the section on Aitareya Upaniṣad).

319. Śārīrasthāna, III. 23.

320. In Prapañcasāra I.

321. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI. 3. 1) says : "तेषां खल्वेषां भूतानां त्रीण्येव बीजानि भवन्ति –अण्डज जीवजमुद्भिज्जमिति". This employs the term *bija* instead of *Yoni* as the source of animal variation, and this is held to be threefold. But Bādarāyaṇa (Vedānta Sūtra, 3. 1. 21) observes that the third type, viz., *Udbhijja* includes *saṁśokaja* (*saṁśoka = sveda*, Ratnaprabhā) type (*tṛtiya-śabdāvarodha*). Śaṅkarācārya points out here that *Udbhijja* is of two kinds—viz, *sthāvara* and *jaṅgama*—the former meaning plants and the latter *svedajas*. The word *Udbhijja*, according to him, means *bhūmyudakodbheda*, which is common to both kinds, though the two kinds are mutually distinct. Hence the four kinds mentioned in Aitareyaka are also correct. The Ratnaprabhā points out that plants issue forth from earth, whereas the *Svedajas* (*yūkādi*) from water : "भूमिमुद्भिद्य जायते वृक्षादिकम्, उदकमुद्भिद्य यूकादि जङ्गममिति भेदः". Sureśvarācārya in his Vārttika on Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra speaks of four kinds of *Jivas* in this order, viz., *Udbhid*, *Svedaja*, *Aṇḍaja* and *Jarāyuja*. This is in order of ज्ञानादिवृत्तितारतम्य. The Śiva-gitā (8. 2) also refers to this fourfold class of *Yoni*. The Sāṅkhya Sūtra (5. 111) recognises the four *Yonis* and notes that the origin of bodies may be different also. Among the different kinds of bodies he mentions *Saṁkalpaja*, e. g , the bodies of Manu, etc. and *Sāṁsiddhika*, e.g., those produced through *Mantra*, *Auṣadha*, etc.

322. Caraka, Śārīrasthāna, III. 23

323. Cf. Ibid, III. 24.

324. Ibid.

325. Cakradatta, III. 25.

326. Prapañcasāra, 1. 64.

327. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, III. 9; Śaṅkara Miśra on Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 4. 25.

328. p. 57.

329. 1. 49.

330. 3. 10. 19-20. The Bhāgavata speaks of six species of plants, viz., (i) *vanaspoti*, which bears fruits without flowers, (ii) *oṣadhi*, which dies as soon as the fruit is ripe, (iii) *latā* or creepers (iv) *tvaksāra*, e. g., bamboos, (v) *virudha* or hard creepers and (vi) *druma*, which fructifies after flowering. The explanation here adopted of the name is according to Śr dharāc rya. All these are described as 'उत्स्रोतसः तमःप्राया अन्तःस्पर्शा विशेषिणः', which implies that plants take nutrition in the lower part which courses upwards, have a stupefied consciousness and possess an organic and unmanifested tactile sense. Mr. G. P. Majumdar's rendering of *antahsparśā* as 'possessing sensation of touch' (Vanaspati, p. 58) leaves unconsidered the specific significance of the term *antah-sparśā*.

331. "अतः पुरुषशरीरतुल्यत्वात् सचेतनो वनस्पतिः".

332. "वृक्षास्तु चेतनावन्तोऽपि तमआच्छन्नज्ञानतया शास्त्रोपदेशविषया एव".

333. p. 185.

334. For a detailed treatment, see, G. P. Majumdar, Vanaspati, pp 27-65.

335. p. 28.

336. It appears to be Pra´astapāda's personal opinion, for even Udayana, who commented on him was not able to reconcile himself to this viewpoint. Udayana plainly says (Kiraṇāval , pp. 57, 58) that plants have bodies. Śrīdhara (p. 35) defines *Sthāvara* as implying absence of voluntary movement (स्वेच्छाधीनचेष्टा), which exists in all the earthly objects in common and differentiates *Sthāvaras* from the other two *viṣayas*, thus : "तयो रूपान्तरस्यापि सम्भवादनेन रूपेणाभिधानं न कृतम्". Vācaspati Mi´ra, in the Ny ya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā, p. 148, also shows Pra´astapāda's view that plants are not *Śārīras*.

337. Chap. on Kaśyap ya Vaṁśa.

338 vide Śabda-kalpadruma, s. v., *Svedaja*.

339. I. 66.

340. III. 8-9.

341. Ibid.

342. Chap. VIII. 5-6.

343. 3. 7.

344. Pra'astapāda, pp. 28-29; see also Bhāmatī under Brahma Sūtra 1. 3. 27.

345. Cf. Kiraṇāvalī, p 71.

346. In the Peta vatthu (1. 6) there is a discourse in which a female *preta* is said to have told Maudgalyāyana that she produced 5 sons a day and ate them up and yet she has no satisfaction. This shows that *pretas* which are *Jarāyuja* also exist. According to some *Nijjhāma-taṇhika-pretas* are exclusively a-sexual.

347. Cf. the Abhidharma-kośa Kārikā III. 96—"प्रागासन् रूपिवत् सत्त्वाः"

348. Under II. 2.

349. Cf. Udayana—"पूर्वं मानस्यैव प्रजाः समभवन्", Nyāya-kusumāñjali II, under verse 3.

350. Cf Nyāya-kusumāñjali, I : 'क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टो निर्माणकाय-मधिष्ठाय सम्प्रदायप्रद्योतकोऽनुग्राहकश्च". It is also called *Nirmāṇa-citta* in view of the fact that this *Kāya* and *Citta* are mutually convertible. It is said that the great *Ṛṣi* Kapila appeared before his disciple Āsuri in this body and explained to him the mysteries of the Ṣaṣṭitantra. Cf. : "आदिविद्वान्निर्माणचित्त-मधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद् भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच"—Yoga-bhāṣya under Sūtra 1. 25.

351 Nyāya-kusumāñjali, II. 3. The Yoga school recognises several other means (besides *Yoga* or *Samādhi*) by which such a body or *citta* may be assumed, e. g., birth in a peculiar species (*janma*), potency of herbs (*oṣadhi*), penances (*tapaḥ*), *mantra*, etc. But none of these bodies is free from *Karmāśaya*. And there can be no teaching of divine wisdom through a body which is essentially impure. The will-born

(*saṁkalpaja*, e. g , Manu) and natural (*sāṁsiddhika*, produced through *mantra*, *auṣadha*, etc.), bodies mentioned in Sāṅkhya Sūtra 5. 11, come under the category of *Nirmāṇa-kāya* mentioned in Yoga Sutra 4. 1. But the question is : Does the will-born (*saṁkalpaja*) class coincide with the meditation-born (*dhyānaja*) type of Patañjali ? The latter class has *asmitā* for its basis. The Buddhists also have their theory of *Nirmāṇa-kāya*. The Mahāsaṅghikas and the Vetulyakas hold that the so-called historical Buddha or Śākyamuni was only a phantom (*Nirmāṇa-kāya*) of the transcendental Buddha (*Lokottara*) and was an *Upapāduka* or a-sexually born. They say that the *Rūpa-kāya* of the transcendental Buddha is eternal, unlimited and pure (*anāsrava*), always in *Samādhi*, never sleeping or dreaming, all-knowing and always enlightening sentient beings. The historical Buddha is only an appearance of Him at will. The *Nirmāṇa-kāya* is assumed for rendering service to worldly beings. The Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra, the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, the Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā, the Laṅkāvatāra, etc., all affirm this great truth. But it is believed that the *Nirmāṇa-kaya* is not meant for beings of all grades. The Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi says that it appears for *Śrāvakas*, *Pṛthagjanas*, *Pratyekabuddhas* and those *Bodhisattvas* who are not in one of the 10 *bhūmis* both in pure and impure lands. The Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā also holds that the *Nirmāṇa-kāya* appears for *Śrāvakas* and *Bodhisattvas* not in *bhūmis* and that the actions of *Nirmāṇa-kāya* are transcendental (*asaṁsāra*), because they are associated with a body which is related to the Real *Kāya* or *Svabhāva-kāya*. It describes the 37 purificatory actions, i. e., the 37 steps through which the *Nirmāṇa-kāya* passes (N. Datta, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 116). The Laṅkāvatāra regards the *Nirmāṇa-kāya* as free from *kriyā* and *saṁskāra* and endowed with *bala*, *abhijñā* and *vaśitā*.

352. p. 54.

353. Suśruta (Śārīrasthāna, II. 57) notes that even ordinary men may recollect past lives. But this is consequent on self-purification :

"भाविताः पूर्वदेहेषु सततं शास्त्रबुद्धयः।
भवन्ति सत्त्वभूयिष्ठाः पूर्वजातिस्मरा नराः" ॥

Here the word *Pūrva-deha* means bodies which have passed away. *Bhāvitāḥ* means those whose minds are purified (*bhāvita*) by *Śāstra-bhāvanā*. Cakradatta also observes : "योनियन्त्रपीडायामपि हि उद्भूतेन तमसा विलुप्तं मनो नातिक्रान्तजन्मगतं स्मरति यस्तु उद्भूतसत्त्वः तमसा नाभिभूयते स स्मरत्येवातिक्रान्तजन्मानुभूतम्" (Caraka, Śārīrasthāna, III. 19). The Garbha Upaniṣad (Sec. 5) observes that the foetus in the 9th month recollects its previous birth and realises good and evil actions : "(नवमे मासि) पूर्वं जातिं स्मरति, शुभाशुभं च कर्म विन्दति". But when it comes out of the womb it feels extreme pain and under the touch of *Vaiṣṇava Vāyu* forgets its past memory and the past actions : "अथ योनिद्वारं सम्प्राप्तो यन्त्रेणापीड्यमानो महता दुःखेन जातमात्रस्तु वैष्णवेन वायुना संस्पृष्टस्तदा न स्मरति जन्ममरणानि, न च कर्म शुभाशुभं विन्दति" (Sec. 7).

354. The Śiva-gītā (8. 12) says that the bodies of gods and *ṛṣis* are mental (*mānasa*), springing as the commentary notes, from the mind (*manaḥ*) by virtue of Yogic power.

355. Kiraṇāvalī, p. 55.

356. Cf. Gītā (4. 9) : "जन्म कर्म च मे दिव्यम्".

357. Mahāvastu I, p. 143; II, pp. 14-15, 16, 20. The Lalita-vistara refers to a *Ratnavyūha* in which the *Bodhisattva* lives in the mother's womb. The Abhidharma-koṣa (3. 9) speaks of *upapatti-vaśitva* of *Bodhisattvas*, i.e., power of choosing the manner of their birth.

358. Sampasādan ya Suttanta, Dialogues of the Buddha, III, pp. 98-99.

359. Modern Science regards as a-sexual reproduction the division of simple organism (e g , Amoeba) into two or more parts. The purely vegetative reproduction of plants (bulbs, cuttings, etc.) are also a-sexual.

360. Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, pp. 28-29.

361. Caraka, Śārīrasthāna, III. 12.

362. 1. 3. 27.

363. Caraka, Śārīrasthāna, III. 12.

364. What really happens is that fish do not copulate, but their zoo-sperms on being ejected swim about for a long time in the water until they come in contact with the eggs spawned by the female. This intermingling gives rise to fecundation and impregnation (Esoteric Anthropology by J. L. Nichols, M. D., p. 106).

365. It is well-known that the fertilised eggs of the queen bee develop into females but non-fertilised eggs become males.

366. Under Vedānta Sūtra 3. 1. 19.

367. See, Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, translated into Hindi, Jaipur, p. 130.

At the end of the article we get the mention 'to be continued', but it was not further continued in the Series.

368. "मुरारेस्तृतीयः पन्थाः" has almost become a proverb in Sanskrit. That Murāri was a great author, and not merely a dialectician, may be presumed (Cf. Catalogue of the Deccan College Library).

369. As to the relative priority of Kumārila and Prabhākara there are wide differences of opinion The reader is referred for a discussion of this point to the following : Gaṅgānātha Jhā, 'The Prābhākara School of Mīmāṁsā; A. B. Keith, 'The Karma Mīmāṁsā; Kuppuswami Śāstrī in the 'Proceedings of the Oriental Conference, Vol. II; Gopinath Kaviraja, 'Introduction to the English Translation of Tantravārttika (Bibliotheca Indica), pp. xiv-xvi. According to Mādhava's Sarvadarśana-kaumudī Prabhākara was the author of two commentaries on Śabara Bhāṣya—viz., (i) Vivaraṇa, in 6,000 *ślokas*, and (ii) Nibandhana, in 12,000 *ślokas*. Bṛhatī is another name of this Vivaraṇa (Cf. 'Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, pp. 477-478). But it seems probable that Nibandhana was from another pen. Vācaspati in the Nyāya-kaṇikā and Pārthasārathi in the Nyāya-ratna-

mālī refers to the two authors as distinct. But Rāmānuja also in the Tantra-rahasya attributes to Prabhākara two commentaries on the Bhāṣya, a bigger one called Bṛhatī and a smaller one called Laghvī. There is apparently no difficulty about the identity of the Vivaraṇa and Bṛhatī. But if the Nibandhana is really proved to be from a different pen, the second and smaller commentary, to which both Mādhava and Rāmānuja refer, remains still to be determined.

370. pp. vii-ix.

371. The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, No. 4.

372. Cf. Mādhava's Sarvadarśana-kaumudī and Rāmānuja's Tantra-rahasya.

373. Cf. Colophons at the end of V. 1-4, VI. 1 and 2.

374. Dr. Hultzsch's manuscript (Report, No. 11, p. 137) reads it as Tigambi family and the name of the river appears there as Śakā. The Colophon of the Manuscript noticed by Dr. Hultzsch reads 'इत्याकोयस्य सुदर्श', from which it would seem that Varadarāja was of Atri family.

375. This Varada is to be distinguished from the famous Varadācārya of Vatsya family who was the author of 'Tattvanirṇaya' and was the nephew and pupil of the great Rāmānuja Sudarśana, the writer of Śruta-prakāśikā, a commentary on the Śrībhāṣya, was pupil of Varada.

376. He says plainly that though he is able to write an independent treatise on the subject (*Vidhāntaraṁ*), he is satisfied with writing a commentary only, simply to give out the traditional view which is not generally known (सम्प्रदायोऽत्र दुर्लभः संप्रकाश्यते).

377. Cf. Hall, p. 180.

378. Peterson, Ulwar Catalogue, p. 14.

379. The Śloka-vārttika is otherwise known as Kārikā and the Tantravārttika as Tantra-ṭīkā. Kumārila was perhaps also the author of two works—one, the Bṛhaṭṭīkā and the other,

the Madhyama-ṭikā. These are now lost and were attributed to him by Kṛṣṇa Deva in the Tantra-cūḍāmaṇi and by Mādhava Bhāratī in the Sarvadarśana-kaumudī (see, Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, pp. 475,529).

380. For a detailed study of the date of Kumārila and of certain episodes in the story of his life, see my 'Introduction to the English Translation of Tantra-vārttika', published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

381. Catalogue of Calcutta Sanskrit College, Indian Philosophy, No. 184, p. 117.

382. Called by Someśvara himself 'त्रिकाण्डमीमांसामण्डनप्रतिवसन्त-सोमयाजी'.

383. Also called Sarvopakāriṇī or Sarvānavadyakāriṇī.

384. See, fol. 876.

385. "गुरुतन्त्रनियन्त्रितोऽप्यहं बहुमानादिह पार्थसारथेः।
विवृणोमि मतीतराश्रितां स्थिरभावां नयरत्नमालिकाम्" ॥

386. Published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series (No. XXIV) in 1923.

387. Mitra, No. 1999.

388. Notices, Vol. III, No. 116, pp. 74-75.

389. "ल सं ४४३ चैत वदि एकादश्यां चन्द्रे महामहाठक्कुर श्रीदेवनाथमहाशयानुशासनात् राघवेन लिखितं".

390. Bhairava was a famous Vedāntist and patronised by the Rājās of Śeṣa family.

391. Appaya's own commentary on this work bears the name Sukhopayojanī.

392. The author describes himself as 'साग्निचित्यवाप्तवाजपेययाजी', his father as 'अद्वैतविद्याचार्यसाग्निचित्-सर्वतोमुखातिरात्रसाग्निचित्य-वाप्तवाजपेययाजी' and his elder brother as 'साग्निचित्यसर्वपृष्ठाप्तोर्याम-याजी'. In the Colophon of Rāja Cūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita noticed by Hultzsch (II, p. 139) Veṅkaṭeśvara is also called 'अद्वैतविद्याचार्य-सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र-साग्निचित्यवाप्तवाजपेययाजी'.

393. Written sometimes as Nithila or Nillala.

394. See, Hall, p. 185.

395. Described by his son as well-versed in both the schools of Mīmāṁsā.

396. Raghunātha belonged to the Bhāradvāja family and was the son of Mādhava and grandson of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Bhāradvāja. His elder brother, Nārāyaṇa, was the father of Mahādeva, father of Bālakṛṣṇa, father of Mahādeva, the famous author of Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī.

397. India Office Catalogue, p. 900.

398. Vol. I, p. 404 b.

399. New Series, Vols. XIV—XV.

400. Why does Bhāskara call the available portion of the Sūtras as *ādyanta-vihīna* ? That the concluding portion was lacking is, of course, clear. But not so the initial part.

The reason of the nomenclature is furnished by P. Rāma Miśra Śāstrī in his edition of the work. It is not known when the last section became obsolete. But Rāmānuja probably knew of it; cf. his Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtra, III, *Pradānādhikāra*.

401. Bhāskara's pupil Jagannātha in his Bhāskara-vilāsa says that Bhāskara was born at Bhaga and brought over to Benares by his father. Umānanda, Bhāskara's pupil, says in Nityotsava-nibandha (1745 A.D.) that Bhāskara came originally from Rāṣṭi and settled on the bank of the river Kāverī in Cola country.

402. Sometimes his father is described as 'तत्सत्कुलजलधिचन्द्रधर्म-शास्त्रपारावारीण'.

403. But see, 'Introduction to Vyavahāra-mayūkha' by P.V. Kane (p. IX, fn. 1), where it is pointed out that Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa commented on the first *pāda* of the first chapter and the first two *pādas* of the sixth chapter of the Śāstra-dīpikā.

404. or Gaṅgadeva.

405. or Nāgapāśa.

406. India Office Catalogue, p. 455.

407. Peterson, Ulwar Catalogue, extract 117.

408. Nīlakaṇṭha's daughter was married to Mahīdeva II Bhāradvāja, son of Bālakṛṣṇa, son of Mahādeva I, son of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Mīdhava, son of Rāmakṛṣṇa. Mahīdeva II's son was Divākara, the author of Dharma-śāstra-sudhā-nidhi, composed in Saṁvat 1740 or 1683 A. D. *Tithyarka*, *Ācārārka*, etc., are the parts of this cyclopaedic work. Divākara's son Vaidyanātha wrote an Index or Anukramaṇikā to this work in Saṁvat 1750 or 1693 A. D.

409. In Nyāya he commented on Udayana's Kusumāñjali *Kārikās*, Raghunātha's Cintāmaṇi-didhiti and Viśvanātha's Bhāṣā-pariccheda; in Sāṅkhya on the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa; in Yoga on the Sūtras of Patañjali; in Vedānta on Madhu-sūdana's Siddhānta-bindu; and in Bhakti-śāstra on the Śāṇḍilya Sūtras. His Vedānta-vibhāvana in Vedānta and Bhāṭṭa-bhāṣā-prakāśikā in Mīmāṁsā are also well-known.

410. Jammu Catalogue, p. 111.

411. Cf. Garbe, Catalogue of the University Library of Tübingen, Oriental Section, p 34; and India Office Catalogue, p. 703.

412. The owner of collection being unwilling to have his name disclosed, no attempt was made by me to find it out.

413. Benares Edition, p. 231.

414. Vol. II, p. 180.

415. p. 216.

416. Vol. II, p. 145-147.

417. These Sūtras are: "अष्टौ प्रकृतयः ; षोडश विकाराः ; आत्मा ; पञ्चावयवाः ; त्रैगुण्यम् ; मनः, संचारः and प्रतिसंचारः".

418. There are two printed editions :

Calcutta Edition = CE (कापिलसूत्रम्) pp. 165 with Bhāṣya by Narendra Nātha of Brahmani Kunda, Purana Prakasa Press, Maniktolla Street, Calcutta, 1929.

Benares Edition = BE

419. The recensions are :

Five Mss, of the Government Sanskrit Library Benares, marked A, B, C, D and E.

A = fols. 1-21 (with Kramadīpikā) ; Script—Bengali ; Complete

B = fols. 1-11 ; Script—Nāgarī ; Complete.

C = fols. 1-4 ; Script—Nāgarī ; Incomplete.

D = fols 1-4 ; Script—Nāgarī ; Incomplete.

E = fols 1-8 ; Script—Nāgarī ; Incomplete.

Ad = The Ms. at Adyar Library.

420. CE reads the first Sūtra as 'अथातः तत्त्वसमासः'.

421. A, B and C (5) read the two Sūtras as 'संचरः प्रतिसंचरः''. So does the Calcutta Edition (6). The Benares Edition too (6) reads them together, but the reading 'संचरः' is replaced here with 'संचारः'.

422. A, B and C (6) and the Calcutta Edition (7) read the three Sūtras together with the addition of particle 'च' at the end. D and E also do the same, the serial number of the Sūtra being 7.

423. Viz., Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana and Sanatkumāra.

424. Mentioned here as *nārīs*, female ones. It may be of interest to note that in Vaiṣṇava cult, of which Rādhikopaniṣad represents an aspect, the souls are conceived as faminine. Śrī kṛṣṇa Himself, the Supreme Self is the only *Puruṣa* in this view and the rest are His *Prakṛtis* or *Śaktis*. Even in the Gītā (VII. 4-5) the *Jīva* is described as the *Prakṛti* of *Īśvara*, along with Nature (the *Avyakta* of Sāṅkhya), with this distinction, however, that it is higher (*Parā*) and that the latter is lower (*Aparā*).

The passage in the Rādhikopaniṣad, which refers to Rādhikā (= आनन्द or ह्लादिनीशक्ति of the Deity) as the

Immaculate source of Universal manifestation, finds its closest parallel in the saying of the Upaniṣad, "आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते', etc. And it also implies that from the Fulness of Divine Joy (*Ānanda*), by an apparent split within Itself, by a process of negation or contradiction, *Cit* (corresponding to *Saṁvit-śakti*) and *Sat* (corresponding to *Sandhinī-śakti*), the so-called *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, have finally evolved (much in the fashion indicated in Sūfi philosophy).

425. *Liṅg* and *Yoni* are two pro-creative symbols and stand for the Divine Father and Mother. They stand at the apex of creative flux, and above them both (also permeating and upholding them) is the Eternity.

426. This is important, for as *Līlā-parikara* they have their use even in the Eternal Realms (*Nitya Dhāma*).

427. For the worlds being infinite, the Brahmās, Viṣṇus, etc., who are only the functionaries concerned with government of the Universe under the direction of the Supreme, must also be consistently held to be countless. It is immaterial in this context whether we are to conceive the gods as *Jīvas* with extended power and wisdom or as *Īśvara*, with His infinite power and wisdom curtailed for division into multiple centres of activity. In both hypotheses the worlds and gods would be innumerable. The Primum Materia being given as infinite, the worlds following from it must be supposed to be without an end. The plurality of worlds is a rational and legitimate hypothesis and is accepted as a matter of course in every system of Indian Thought. Cf. Kusumāñjali (II *Stavaka*), Śiva-purāṇa; Schrader, 'Introduction to the Pāñcarātra', p. 29. See also Caitanya-caritāmṛta, Sarkar's English Translation of the above, pp. 273-275; Tattva-traya (Benares Ed.), p. 66.

428. fol. 1b.

429. pp. 238, 239.

430. Peterson, Ulwar Catalogue, p. 252.

431. Ibid.

432. "अत्र नाम महापूजायां सुरामांसमधुमद्यादिद्रव्यैः समर्चनं वामाचारप्रवृत्त्या; प्रत्यक्षत्रिकोणस्थान मन्मथछत्रं कृत्वा", etc.

433. p. 256.

434. But in the meantime the reader may be referred, for some interesting notes, to our 'Introduction to the Kusumāñjali-bodhanī of Varadarāja', pp. i-x (The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, No. 4, - Government Sanskrit Library, Benares).

435. The verse has a double meaning, applicable both to the work in hand as well as to a handful of flowers to which it is likened.

436. It is better to take the words *Svarga* and *Apavarga* in their usual sense than to interpret with Vardhamāna *Svarga* as 'intensely desired' (*utkaṭa-rāga-gocara*) and *Apavarga* as the two forms of *Mukti*, viz., lower (*aparā*) and higher (*parā*) or *Jīvanmukti* and *Videhamukti*. Vardhamāna observes that both the kinds of *mukti* being attainable by the same means what the author really aims at is the *Parā-mukti*, together with *Jīvanmukti*. To us, however, the interpretation of the word *Svarga* as 'intensely desired' seems to be far-fetched and strained. When the usual and primary sense of the word is quite consistent with the context there is no justification for running of the track in search of a secondary meaning. Varadarāja too is evidently of this view, but he notes that there was no need for bringing in the question of *Svarga*. He justifies it, however, on the ground that as people whose minds are full of worldly desires cannot be drawn up to the contemplation of God except by an appeal to the sensuous element in their nature, i.e., by placing before them some alluring prospect (e. g., heaven), it has been purposely introduced by what is called the गुडजिह्विकान्याय :— 'गुडजिह्विकया रागिजनमावर्ज्जयितुमत्र स्वर्गोपादानम्". The motive is that even such men will be disgusted with the sparks of evanascent pleasure shining glow-worm-like in the midst of thick darkness of Pain and will desire to get Release from it.

437-438. The word *gotra* means 'the name of the *Ṛṣi* in whose line one is born, the ancestor being a son or descendant of

one of the seven great *Ṛṣis* and the eighth Agastya' : "सप्तानां सप्तर्षीणामगस्त्याष्टमानां यदपत्यं तद् गोत्रमित्याचक्षते". The word *pravara* means, 'the *Ṛṣi* chosen by the *Yajamāna* in a sacrifice'. Vardhamāna says : "ऋषयः एव यज्ञे वियमाणाः प्रवराः". For some interesting historical notes on these words, see, C. V. Vaidya's paper 'Gotra and Pravara', in the 'Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference', Poona, Vol. II, pp. 34-45.

439. Cf. Nyāya-sūtra, IV. 1. 19-21.

440. Vedānta-sūtra, III. 2. 38.

441. IV. 11.

442. IX. 23.

443. Sāṅkhya-sūtra, III. 51, 62.

444. Ibid, III. 61.

445. Ibid, II. 9.

446. Ibid, V. 2.

447. Ibid, III. 78-83.

448. Ibid, III. 54.

449. Vijñāna Bhikṣu says : "यथा जले मग्नः पुनरुत्तिष्ठति एवमेव प्रकृतिलीनाः पुरुषाः ईश्वरभावेन पुनराविर्भवन्ति"—Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya on III. 54.

450. Sāṅkhya-sūtra, I. 95.

451. Ibid, III. 57.

452. Nyāya-kusumāñjali (Benares Ed.), p. 68.

453. For the meaning of this term, see, Yoga-sūtra, IV. 4-6, and our paper on 'Nirmāṇakāya' in 'The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies', Vol I, pp. 47-60 (Reprint Series No. 3, p. 19-28).

454. Quoted in Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga-sūtra I. 25.

That this refers to Kapila is beyond doubt. He is usually described as *Paramarṣi* and the teacher of Āsuri

(Cf. Sāṅkhya-kārikā, No. 70). But it seems to me open to suspicion whether Vyāsa, who quotes Pañcaśikha, meant to support the current Sāṅkhya notion on the question. Whatever Pañcaśikha may have meant himself, Vyāsa certainly understood by the epithets *Ādividvān* and *Paramarṣi* the Supreme Lord (*Parameśvara*), and not any *Janya Īśvara* merely. For the context speaks of eternal *Īśvara*, whose Lordship and Omniscience are unlimited and who is the Teacher of all teachers. The Gītā actually speaks of Kapila as the special manifestation of Divinity among the *siddhas* : "सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः" (Gītā, X. 26)

By 'Yoga' is to be understood the system of Patañjali, as Udayana clearly states.

455. I. 26.

456. The word *svātantrya*, as used by Udayana in reference to God, has a peculiar sense in Pāśupata literature. From the Ratnaṭīkā on Bhā-sarvajña's Gaṇakārikā (pp. 9-10) it seems to stand for the Lordship (*Aiśvarya*) of Maheśvara, consisting of *Jñāna-śakti* and *Kriyā-śākti*. The former (*Jñāna = Śakti*), though one, is five-fold according to the difference of the objects, taken severally and collectively. It is natural and unlike the secondary omniscience (उपचरितसर्वज्ञत्व) of Brahmā, etc. The latter (क्रियाहेतुः शक्तिः) is of three kinds, viz., *Manojavitva*, i.e., the power of doing a thing extremely quickly, *Kāma-rūpitva*, i.e , the power of assuming and using infinite forms by mere Will, independently of *Karma* and *Vikaraṇa-dharmitva*, i.e., association with unsurpassed Power (*Aiśvarya*) even though He is without body and senses. (Cf. also the section on Pāśupata Darśana in Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha).

457. Vardhamāna, Prakāśa.

458. In the Vāyavīya Saṁhitā of Śiva-purāṇa (II. 24. 177) the Mahāvratadharas are the Kālāmukhas. *Mahāvrata* means eating food placed in a human skull, besmearing the body with the ashes of human carcasses, etc. (See Rāmānuja on

Brahma Sūtra, Pāśupata *Adhikaraṇa*). In the commentary on Mālatīmādhava Jagaddhara calls it the *Kāpālika-vrata,* and Dr. Bhandarkar confirms it saying that the ascetics in the Kapāleśvara Temple (District Nasik), who were evidently Kāpālikas, are described in the grant as *Mahāvratins.*

In the Vedic, Jain and Yoga literatures, however, the word *Mahāvrata* conveys a different sense.

459. Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā, Chap. XI et seq.

460. I. 1. 50.

461. Schrader, 'Introduction to the Pāñcarātra', p. 112.

462. II. 24. 177.

463. Mādhavācārya, Śarva-darśana-saṅgraha, Śaiva Darśana; Bhandarkar, 'Vaishnavism, Śaivism, etc.', pp. 124-127.

It is strange that of all the Śaiva systems Udayana speaks only of the Pāśupatas and the Śaivas. The Vīraśaivas as a distinct sect had not probably been in existence at that time. But why does he not mention the name of the so-called Pratyabhijñā system or the *Trikādvaitavāda* of Kashmir ?

464. XV. 16-18.

465. The word *Tīrtha* means *Sampradāya,* 'line of spiritual succession', and one who initiates such a line is aptly described as *Tīrthaṅkara.*

466. These *aghātikarmans* correspond to a certain extent to the so-called *prārabdha karmans* which result in *Jāti* (=*Nāma* and *Gotra* as named here), *Āyuḥ* and *Bhoga* (=*Vedanīya*).

467. This is how Vardhamāna explains the terms.

468. For details see our paper on "The View-point of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy", in the first Volume of the Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, pp. 29-34. (Reprint Series, No. 3, pp. 1-18).

469. For this see Introduction.

470. Vardhamāna, p. 12.

471. Vardhamāna observes that the use of this qualifying phrase is intended to create a sense of disgust (with the world) in the minds of those who are out for release (मुमुक्षुवैराग्यार्थं) or to emphasise the fact of varieties in product (कार्यवैचित्र्य-द्योतनार्थं). These varieties are meant to point to variety in *adṛṣṭa*. Varadarāja notes that reading is *naikavidha* and *duḥkhamaya*. *Naikavidha* means 'everchanging', i. e., contingent, *Kādācitka*; *duḥkhamaya* is meant to suggest that everything should be considered as miserable (दुःखमयत्वभावना); it is not used as a logical ground (*sādhana*). Or it is intended to show that even the opponent must resort to causality (*hetumattva*) so as to shun misery which is *heya*. The reading *anekavidha* also is known to him and he takes it separately from *duḥkhamayatva* and understands its significance as 'variety of products'.

472. The denial of *hetu* and *pratyaya* is attributed to Gosāla and to Pūraṇa Kassapa in the Pali canonical literature. It will be of interest to note that *hetu-niṣedha* and *svabhāva-varṇanā* (I & V) are both connected with Gosāla's *Pariṇāma-vāda* which ought to explain the variety in the world by (a) *Niyati*, (b) *Saṅgati* (= *Paryāya*) and (c) *Bhāva* (= *Svabhāva*).

473. Udayana's sense of the word *Anupākhya* is pretty certain. But originally, the word might have had, like the term '*Śūnya*', a slight different sense. The meaning of *Śūnya* is 'free from the four possible modes of predication, viz., affirmation of being and non-being, simultaneous affirmation of being and non-being and simultaneous negation of being and non-being (चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्त)', and if the sense of the word *Anupākhya* was similar it was the doctrine, prior to the rise of Mahāyānic Buddhism, of Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta who denied the possibility of all these modes of expression.

474. p. 317.

475. At the end of the article we get the mention of 'to be continued', but it was not continued in the further volumes of 'The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies.


सम्पूर्णानन्द-संस्कृत-विश्वविद्यालयः
श्रुतम् मे गोपाय